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EDITOR’S NOTE
Every year, the ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
publishes three Issues. The Journal strives to publish on relevant topics in
international law which are of great global importance. Volume 24 Issue 1
focuses on human rights in the areas of marriage, judicial corruption, selfdetermination, juveniles, and access to healthcare.
This Issue begins with Professor Hijratullah Ekhtyar’s article, “Public
Trials and Trial Broadcasting as Combating Tools for Judicial Corruption in
Afghanistan.” Professor Ekhtyar discusses the vast amount of bribery and
corruption occurring within Afghanistan’s judiciary and the ability to
prevent or minimize it by having open trials both to the public and the
media. While such laws exist, Professor Ekhtyar proposes that the remedy
to fight the judicial corruption is to further strengthen these laws regulating
open trials.
The second piece is authored by a fellow student, Nicholas Meyer. Meyer’s
note—“A Comparative Analysis of the Juvenile Death Penalty in the
United States, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and China: Will It Be Abolished?”—
discusses the continuous human right violations on juveniles. Despite
international laws, which outright bans the sentencing of death to juvenile
offenders, Meyer’s note reveals that death sentences for juveniles are still
occurring in some areas of the world. The note further analyzes the law and
the ongoing battle to completely eradicate juvenile death sentences.
The next piece is an article authored by Rez Gardi, “From Suppression to
Secession: Kurds, Human Rights and the Right to Self-Determination in
Turkey.” In this piece, Ms. Gardi provides the history of the Kurds and
highlights Turkey’s disregard and mistreatment of the Kurds. While
international law provides the right to self-determination, Turkey has
consistently violated this right of the Kurds. Ms. Gardi analyzes the
applicable tests to determine if a group is entitled to self-determination and
offers insight on what the Kurds should do to obtain their right to selfdetermination.
War and terror continue to strike our world today leaving many refugees
seeking a new home. Student, Paula Castañeda Restrepo authored a
comparative note entitled, “A Comparative Study of Migrants’ Access to
Healthcare: Similarities and Differences Between England, Germany, Italy,
Spain, Canada, and the United States.” In this note, Ms. Castañeda
Restrepo compares the access to healthcare for migrants in Europe and
North America and social challenges that arise which can aid or inhibit
migrants’ access to healthcare.

vii

Professor Yuichiro Tsuji delivers a powerful piece—“Decisions That
Declared Laws Unconstitutional and Their Impact on Japanese Families”—
which shows the history and progression of marriage laws in Japan and the
impact the constitutional amendments have had. In this piece, Professor
Tsuji analyzes multiple cases of human right violations, the
constitutionality of same-sex marriage, and the constitutionality of laws
which discriminate against women, all of which have had major impacts on
Japan’s family law system.
Finally, this Issue concludes with the winning memorial briefs from the
2017 Philip C. Jessup International Moot Court Competition. Each year,
thousands of law students from around the world participate in regional
qualifying competitions to potentially earn a spot in the International
Rounds, held annually in Washington, D.C.
As a proud Editor, I would like to announce on behalf of the Journal that
the ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law hosted its Inaugural
Conference, “ILSA Journal Conference: Current Issues in Immigration
Policy.” The Journal hosted the Conference on immigration policy because
of the effects it has globally, as well as the impact it has locally on our very
own diverse community here in South Florida.
The Conference had an excellent turnout, consisting of both students and
local attorneys in the community. The topics covered an array of areas such
as Temporary Protected Status (TPS), Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA), Prosecutorial Discretion, Non-Physical Abuse Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA), and Asylum. I want to thank Arianna
Zabala, Vanessa Terrades, and Stephanie Viel for all their work planning
the Conference, Dean Jon Garon for his continuous support of ILSA
Journal, Dean Shahabudeen Khan for helping us plan and moderating the
Conference, and Ms. Kathy Perez for her assistance in making this possible.
On behalf of the Journal, I want to thank the authors for working with us
and for providing us with great publishable work on current topics, the
Junior and Senior Staff members for their hard work, the Editorial Board
for being meticulous and hardworking, and Professor Donoho, our faculty
advisor, for his continuous support and guidance.
Last, I want to thank the 2017–2018 Executive Board for all of their hard
work and commitment to the ILSA Journal. I am honored to work with a
group of gifted women who support me the way you all do. To my
husband, Jack Esau, thank you for supporting me in everything I do and for
always believing in me. To my family and friends, thank you for your
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continuous support and for always being understanding. I am so grateful to
have you all as my amazing support system and I love you all very much.
Lora Esau
Editor-in-Chief, 2017–2018
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Abstract
Although Afghanistan has a very effective judicial system in theory, in
practice, a lack of accountability, oversight, and public involvement have
enabled judicial corruption to continue. The Constitution of Afghanistan
has a provision providing for public trials, but it does not have any
provision clarifying that the broadcasting of court hearings is permitted.
Moreover, the Penal Code of Afghanistan has expressly prohibited the
broadcasting of court hearings without the permission of the court. The
resulting lack of oversight and public awareness about trials has enabled
and perpetuated corrupt practices like bribery, nepotism, misinterpretation
of the law, and consequently, weakness of the rule of law. This paper
suggests that by reinforcing and strengthening the law to force courts to
conduct trials publicly (unless otherwise prohibited for the protection of the
litigants), and to broadcast them in the media, Afghanistan could encourage
judges not only to closely follow the law, but also to curb the culture of
taking bribes and engaging in other corrupt practices that may otherwise go
unnoticed.
“If you can buy a judge, you do not need to hire a lawyer”1
–Kenyan proverb.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Despite various law reforms and efforts to promote good governance
over the past decade, Afghanistan remains one of the most corrupt countries

1.
I heard this proverb from one of my classmates, Francis who is from Kenya and has
experiences of working with Transparency International of Kenya. Francis is graduating this year from
Sustainable International Development Program of Law School, University of Washington.
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in the world.2 With this tragic story of corruption, one cannot point blame
at any one institutiuon; it is widespread and deeply rooted in the political,
military, judicial, and bureaucratic systems of the country. Although
Afghanistan has a very effective judicial system in theory, in practice, a
lack of accountability, oversight, and public involvement have enabled
corruption to flourish in the Judiciary; and with the wide acceptance of
corrupt practices like bribery, corrupt officials enjoy cultural impunity as
well. In this article, the term “judicial corruption” means “behaviors
conduct[ed] by judges who try to influence adjudgement with their official
authorities so as to obtain some personal interests.”3
Studies show that judges, prosecutors, and police are the most corrupt
government officials in Afghanistan.4 About 55% of people, who dealt
with courts in 2016, were asked for bribes.5 The general reasons for bribing
Afghan officials are “no other way to obtain a service,” “to speed up the
process,” or “to be sure [they] get what [they] need.”6 Judges and judicial
officials are not exceptions in the case of bribing. In addition, nepotism,
and influences of high-ranking officials and politicians are also ever present
in the every-day conduct of the Judiciary.
This article posits that public trials and trial broadcasting offer two
effective ways to increase transparency and reduce corrupt practices in the
Judiciary, and Afghanistan would be well served by promoting and
facilitating both. To this end, the first part of this article describes the state
of judicial corruption in Afghanistan, discussing the results of surveys and
studies by national and international institutions about judicial corruption
there. Next, the article argues that open court proceedings, including
promotion and facilitation of public trials and trial broadcasting, could help

2.
In 2016, Afghanistan ranks 169th among 176 countries in Transparency International’s
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).
See Corruption Perception Index 2016: Afghanistan,
TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perce
ptions_index_2016. In the World Justice Project (WJP)’s Rule of Law Index, Afghanistan ranks 111th
among 113 countries. See WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT RULE OF LAW INDEX
2016: AFGHANISTAN 47 (2016), https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/RoLI_Final
-Digital_0.pdf [hereinafter WJP RULE OF LAW INDEX 2016]. The Integrity Watch of Afghanistan’s 2016
survey report reveals that Afghans give $3 billion dollars in bribes annually. See Afghans Pay Close to
$3B in Bribe Annually, INTEGRITY WATCH AFG. (Dec. 26, 2016), https://iwaweb.org/integrity-watchafghans-pay-close-to-3b-in-bribes-annually-4/.
3.
Yaxin Wang, “Judicial Corruption” Understanding - Several Theoretic Reflections Based
on Empirical Investigations, 2 CIV. PROC. REV. 74, 76 (2011).
4.
INTEGRITY WATCH AFG., NATIONAL CORRUPTION SURVEY 2016: AFGHAN PERCEPTIONS
EXPERIENCES OF CORRUPTION x (2016), https://iwaweb.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/12/
Executive-NCS2016.pdf [hereinafter IWA 2016 SURVEY].
AND

5.

Id. at 33.

6.

Id. at 36.
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Afghanistan fight judicial corruption and improve the justice system. Then,
the paper examines and presents the judicial practices in the United States
(U.S.) and Kenya, particularly with respect to the way they facilitate open
courts. From there, the article discusses current international law and
policy that supports and recommends open trials, describing and identifying
international norms for facilitating open court proceedings. The article
concludes with practical recommendations for reforms related to promoting
and facilitating open trials in the Afghan judiciary.
II.
A.

JUDICIAL CORRUPTION IS WEAKENING THE RULE OF LAW IN
AFGHANISTAN

Everyday Corruption

Afghanistan, with an illiteracy rate of over 60%,7 has been plagued by
instability, war, poverty, backwardness, and corruption.8 Since 2007, it has
consistently remained among the five most corrupt countries in the world
(with the exception of 2016, when it was ranked 169 among 176
countries).9 The World Justice Project (WJP),10 Rule of Law Index, ranked
Afghanistan at 111th amongst 113 countries in 2016; and about the corrupt
status, Afghanistan falls at the bottom of the list: 113 out of 113.11
Corruption in Afghanistan is an increasing problem in people’s lives.
In a survey conducted by Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA), 55% of the
7.
The World Factbook: Literacy, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov
/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2103.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2017).
8.
Larry Sage, Rule of Law Development in Afghanistan: A Brief Report, NEV. LAW., June
2010 at 6, 10.
9.
See Corruptions Perception Index, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, https://www.transparency.org/
research/cpi (last visited Dec. 13, 2017) (analyzing the reports from 2007–2016).
10.
Measuring the Rule of Law, WORLD JUST. PROJECT, worldjusticeproject.org (last visited
Oct. 15, 2017). The WJP is an independent, multidisciplinary organization working to advance the rule
of law around the world. “It is the foundation for communities of peace, opportunity, and equity—
underpinning development, accountable government, and respect for fundamental rights.” WJP RULE
OF LAW INDEX 2016, supra note 2, at 4. The WJP measurements rule of law across the countries. Its
Rule of Law Index (RoLI) contains factors such as:
1) constraints on government powers;
2) absence of corruption;
3) open government;
4) fundamental rights;
5) order and security;
6) regulatory enforcement;
7) civil justice; and
8) criminal justice. Id.
11.
WJP RULE OF LAW INDEX 2016, supra note 2, at 3.
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respondents were asked for bribes.12 In this survey, the overwhelming
majority, approximately 80% of respondents considered corruption as a
serious problem in their lives.13 Similarly, in a survey by the Asia
Foundation in 2014, 62.4% of respondents considered corruption to be a
major problem.14 Further, in a 2010 survey by United Nations Office of
Drugs and Crimes (UNODC), a Survey of the Victims of the Corruption,
identified the Judiciary as the most corrupt and bribe-demanding agency in
Afghanistan.15 In fact, corruption in the justice sector (the police, the
prosecution offices and the courts) accounted for 43% of corruption in
Afghanistan, almost half of the total corruption in the country.16
B.

Judicial Corruption

1.

Definition of Judicial Corruption

In his influential book, “Corruption and Political Development, A Cost
Benefit Analysis,” Joseph S. Nye, defines corrpution as an “abuse of office
by a public official for personal gains,” and he explains that it includes any
behavior that deviates from the normal duties of a public officer.17 These
deviations may also be tied to family or close private cliques, and they may
result in pecuniary or status gains, or they may violate rules as well.18 The
judiciary, as a public office, is not immune to corruption of this kind.
Amélie Arvidsson and Emelie Folkesson define judicial corruption as
conduct that results in some kind of advantage for judges, judicial officials,
or others involved in the judiciary.19 This behavior typically leads to

12.

IWA 2016 SURVEY, supra note 4, at 33.

13.

Id. at 25.

14.
ZACH WARREN, ASIA FOUND., AFGHANISTAN IN 2014: A SURVEY OF THE AFGHAN
PEOPLE 91 (Nancy Hopkins ed., 2014), https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/Afghanistan2014
final.pdf.
15.
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, CORRUPTION IN AFGHANISTAN: BRIBERY
REPORTED BY THE VICTIMS 25 (Ragnhild Johansen & Suzanne Kunnen, eds., 2010),
https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Afghanistan/Afghanistan-corruption-survey2010Eng.pdf.
AS

16.

Id.

17.
POLITICAL CORRUPTION: CONCEPT & CONTEXTS 26 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer & Michael
Johnson eds., 3d ed. 2002).
18.

Id.

19.
Amélie Arvidsson & Emelie Folkesson, Corruption in the Judiciary: Balancing
Accountability and Judicial Independence, ÖREBRO UNIV. DEP’T OF LAW, PSYCHOL. & SOC. WORK 1, 5
(2010), https://www.academia.edu/5046438/Corruption_in_the_Judiciary_Balancing_Accountability_an
dJudicial Independence.
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extralegal or unfair court decisions.20 Arvidsson and Folkesson explain that
judicial corruption may include “payment or acceptance of bribes,
extortion, embezzlement, threats, abuse of the procedural rules, or other
improper pressures that can affect the independence and impartiality of the
judicial outcome . . . .”21
Similarly, Yaxin Wang22 explains that judicial corruption involves
bribes, intercessions of family, friends, or colleagues, and interventions
from internal or external leaders, when affecting the judicial decisions in
such manner as “swearing black is white” or more abusively, preventing the
implementation of the law.23 Wang, focuses on the misinterpretation, or
misapplying the law, under the influences of externalities.24 Transparency
International,25 the United Nations (U.N.) Convention Against Corruption
of 2003,26 and the WJP,27 independently enumerates what judicial
corruption consists of.

2.

Status of Judicial Corruption in Afghanistan

Judicial corruption prevents a government from establishing a firm
rule of law,28 and in this way, it is at the heart of many of Afghanistan’s
struggles with and attitudes about the rule of law. Many Afghans are
skeptical about the level of corruption they see in the Judiciary—viewing

20.

Id.

21.

Id.

22.
Wang, supra note 3, at 74. Mr. Wang is a Professor of the School of Law at the Tsinghua
University, Beijing, China. Id.
23.

Id. at 77.

24.

Id.

25.
Judiciary: Problem, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/topic/detail/
judiciary (last visited Oct. 15, 2017). Transparency International (TI) asserts that “judicial corruption”
consists of, (i) bribes to fast-track backlog cases; (ii) payment to court personnel “to slow down or speed
up a trial, or dismiss a complaint”; and (iii) involving judges in: bribing, suffering pressure from above,
and influencing by the politicians in decisions which can distort the appointment process. Id.
26.
G.A. Res. 58/4, at arts. 15–20 (Oct. 31, 2003). The United Nations Convention Against
Corruption of 2003 lists certain types of corruption such as bribery, embezzlement, trading in influence,
abuse of functions, and illicit enrichment. See id.
27.
Absence of Corruption (Factor 2), WORLD JUST. PROJECT, http://worldjusticeproject.org/
factors/absence-of-corruption (last visited Oct. 15, 2017). In the WJP’s Rule of Law Index, judicial
corruption includes: “bribery, improper influence by public or private interests, and misappropriation of
public funds or other resources [in the judicial system].” Id. These forms of corruption could also be in
executive, police, and military, or legislative branches of a state. Id.
28.
BEN WHEATLAND, U4 ANTI-CORRUPTION RES. CTR., AFGHANISTAN: CORRUPTION AS A
DRIVER OF CONFLICT 6 (2015).
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Afghanistan’s courts as one of the country’s most corrupt institutions.29 In
a 2016 survey by the WJP, only 7% of respondents maintained that there is
“[n]o corruption in the Judiciary”; the remaining 93% answered that there is
corruption in the Judiciary.30 In the survey of Criminal and Civil Justices of
Judiciary: 23% of the respondents said that there is no corruption in the
criminal justice system, while the remaining 77% affirmed that there is.31
Only 6% of the respondents said that there is “no corruption” in the civil
justice system, while the remaining 94% of them said that there is
corruption in civil justice.32
In Afghanistan, judicial corruption affects justice in a variety of ways,
especially when it comes to political influence by high-ranking bureaucrats
or high-ranking judicial officials over judicial appointments and subsequent
influence over judicial decision-making, undermining the independence of
the judges.33 For example, in 2007, the record of the Supreme Court
showed that among the 1415 judges in the Afghan judiciary, only 44% of
them were graduates from the faculty of Sharia, and 11.6% of them were
graduates of law schools; notably, more than one-third (36.6%) of them did
not have a university degree, and 7.7% of them graduated from other

29.
In 2006, 74% of the respondents to the IWA’s survey, “Afghan Perception of Corruption”
perceived that corruption had increased in the last five years. See Yama Torabi & Lorenzo Delesgues,
Afghan Perceptions of Corruption: A Survey Across Thirteen Provinces, INTEGRITY WATCH AFG. 2, 63
(2007), https://iwaweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/04-afghan_perception_of_corruption_2006.pdf.
In 2010, the graph of this perception reduced, and about 50% of the respondents to the IWA’s national
survey, “Afghan Perceptions and Experiences of Corruption,” labeled the judiciary and ministry of
justice as the most corrupt institutions. See INTEGRITY WATCH AFG., NATIONAL CORRUPTION SURVEY
2010: AFGHAN PERCEPTIONS AND EXPERIENCES OF CORRUPTION 74 (2010), https://iwaweb.org/wp
content/uploads/2016/12/Executive-NCS2016.pdf [hereinafter IWA 2010 SURVEY]. In 2013, the
corruption perception graph increased and 60% of Afghans—perhaps those who attended in the
survey—viewed the judiciary as a corrupt institution and 65% admitted to paying bribes to judges. See
Report Shows Judiciary is Most Corrupt Institution in Afghanistan, TOLO NEWS (July 11, 2013), http://
www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/report-shows-judiciary-most-corrupt-institution-afghanistan.
Interestingly, in 2016, once again the level of perception came down and around 55% of the people who
dealt with the courts were asked for bribes. IWA 2016 SURVEY, supra note 4, at 33.
30.

WJP RULE OF LAW INDEX 2016, supra note 2, at 47.

31.
Compare with id. (finding responses of “[n]o corruption” receiving only 7%, while 93% of
respondents believed that corruption exist in the branch).
32.

Id.

33.
Marie Chêne, U4: Expert Answer: Tackling Judicial Corruption in Afghanistan, U4
ANTI-CORRUPTION RES. CTR. 1, 2, http://www.u4.no/publications/tackling-judicial-corruption-inafghanistan/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2017).
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faculties than Law and Sharia.34 In another finding of September 2007,
about 80% of Afghan judges were found unqualified.35
In response to this finding, the Afghanistan Independent Human
Rights Commission (AIHRC), began a project in 2011, to further examine
the qualifications of judges and court staff in its observational report of the
courts and judicial system—after a comprehensive assessment, the AIHRC
recommended further professional training for court staff, especially for
judges.36 With continued concerns about judicial qualifications, in 2016 the
government launched a Justice Sector Reform Plan in which new
qualification requirements were set forth for prosecutors and judges,
including refresher exams.37
In addition, the historically acceptable practices of bribe and nepotism
continue in Afghanistan.38 These forms of judicial corruption also affect
court proceedings, from requiring bribery fees to award “judicial access”
and to speed up the process; judges and judicial officials are also extracting
money from defendants for satisfactory decisions.39 Corrupt practices in
the Judiciary also perpetuate the strength of the parallel, an informal
Judiciary ran by the Taliban.40 People who do not trust the formal Judiciary
or who cannot afford bribes have been known to go to the Taliban’s
informal court “to resolve their legal cases swiftly and with a lack of red
tape.”41
Public attitudes about judicial corruption are reinforced by personal
experience in the courts. In interviews with Afghan litigants in 2013,
Antonio De Lauri42 found that many in Kabul had lost their cases because
34.
Levingston Armytage, Justice in Afghanistan: Rebuilding Judicial Competence After the
Generation of War, 67 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 185, 190 (2007).
35.

Chêne, supra note 33, at 3.

36.
Judiciary: An Overview to the Report of Overseeing the Status and Functioning of Courts
and Judicial System in Afghanistan, AFG. INDEP. HUM. RIGHTS COMM’N (Sept. 14, 2011),
http://www.aihrc.org.af/home/article/939.
37.
TRANSPARENCY INT’L, FROM PROMISES TO ACTION: NAVIGATING AFGHANISTAN’S
ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMITMENTS 3, 8 (Sept. 2016), https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/
publication/from_promises_to_action_navigating_afghanistans_anti_corruption_commitments.
38.

IWA 2016 SURVEY, supra note 4, at 33, 38.

39.
Parag R. Dharmavarapu, Corruption and Graft in Post-Conflict Afghanistan, 7 INQUIRIES
J. 1, 3 (2015), http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1057/corruption-and-graft-in-post-conflictafghanistan.
40.
Hasib Danish Alikozai, Corruption Encourages Parallel Judiciary in Afghanistan:
Asia, VOA (Jan. 12, 2016, 6:39 PM), http://www.voanews.com/a/corruption-encourages-paralleljudiciary-afghanistan/3142316.html.
41.

Id.

42.
Antonio DeLauri, ACADEMIA.EDU, http://cmi-norway.academia.edu/AntonioDeLauri (last
visited Oct. 15, 2017). “Antonio De Lauri (PhD) is Senior Researcher at the Chr. Michelsen Institute . .
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the opposing party had bribed the judge.43 IWA conducted a survey in
2016 in which 55% of respondents stated that the court had asked them for
bribes.44
In this same survey, Afghans reportedly gave around
AFN2,323,608 ($37,210) in bribes to courts, and AFN1,818,000 ($30,300)
in bribes to prosecutors.45 In fact, 58% of Afghans believed in 2016 that
“there [was] no other way” to receive judicial services than to bribe court
officials.46
Ironically, despite their perpetuations of corrupt practices, courts are
charged with overseeing corruption cases for other agencies of government.
In this way, they are directly responsible for ensuring that corruption is
addressed through the courts. They set the tone for whether and how
Afghanistan can heal the wounds of corruption—deciding what is corrupt
and not corrupt.47
III.

PUBLIC TRIALS AND TRIAL BROADCASTING AS A WAY TO FIGHT
CORRUPTION IN THE JUDICIARY

One of the main arguments that this paper makes is that the promotion
and support of public trials and trial broadcasting could help curb and
prevent corruption in the Judiciary in Afghanistan. This section provides
some background on what these mechanisms are and the rationales for
them.
A.

Meanings and Purposes

When this paper refers to a “public trial” it means “an open court
where people can witness . . . proceedings as long as they show reasonable
behaviour.”48 Openness of the justice is a common law policy that
“proceedings ought to be open to the public, including the contents of court
files and public viewing of trials.”49 The Lord Chief Justice of England and

. . Since 2005 he has been carrying out fieldwork in Afghanistan and lately in Pakistan, with a focus on
legal reconstruction, judicial practice, human rights, war, humanitarian interventionism, forms of
dependence and freedom.” Id.
43.

Dharmavarapu, supra note 39.

44.

IWA 2016 SURVEY, supra note 4, at 33.

45.

Id. at 35.

46.

Id. at 36.

47.

See generally Dharmavarapu, supra note 39.

48.
What is PUBLIC TRIAL?, L. DICTIONARY (2d ed.), http://thelawdictionary.org/publictrial/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2017).
49.
Open Justice Definition, DUHAIME’S L. DICTIONARY, http://www.duhaime.org/Legal
Dictionary/O/OpenJustice.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2017).
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Wales, Harry Kenneth Woolf, explained that trial should be private only if
it is necessary for the protection of:
1) national security;
2) confidentiality of information of the parties (including
information about personal financial matters);
3) interests of children or any protected party; or
4) interests of judiciary.50

The purpose of public trials is “the protection of innocence and the
pursuit of truth.”51 It not only keeps the judges and lawyers honest and
competent, but it also assures that society can rely on decent operations of
the judiciary.52 A public trial is critically important for monitoring the
legitimacy of convictions and public trials promote other checks on the
judiciary, such as observance of procedural rules in the courts of appeal.53
By enabling citizen oversight, public trials discourage the misinterpretation
of the laws against defendants and reduce the likeliness of corruption in the
judicial system.
The openness of justice also involves the reporting or broadcasting of
court proceedings, because the media operates as a representative for the
public to ensure that trials in the courts are in fact open and accessible by
the people.54 The term “trial broadcasting,” as used in this paper, refers to
television and photographic coverage of the courtroom proceeding,55 as
well as other forms of media such as radio, newspaper, magazines, and
even online media such as Twitter.56 Trial broadcasting increases the
possibility that people can access public trials, even when they cannot be
physically present in the courts. By allowing media cameras and media
representatives into the courtroom to record and/or broadcast trials and

50.

Id.

51.

Kristin Saetveit, Close Calls: Defining Courtroom Closures Under the Sixth Amendment,

68 STANFORD L. REV. 897, 899 (2016).
52.

Id. at 902.

53.

Zach Cronen, Criminal Law: Behind Closed Doors: Expanding the Triviality Doctrine to

International Closures—State v. Brown, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 252, 254 (2013).
54.
Cristina Carmody Tilley, I Am A Camera: Scrutinizing the Assumption That Cameras in
the Courtroom Furnish Public Value by Operating as A Proxy for the Public, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
697, 697 (2014).
55.
Adriana C. Cervantes, Will Twitter Be Following You in the Courtroom?: Why Reporters
Should be Allowed to Broadcast During Courtroom Proceedings, 33 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 133,
137 (2010).
56.

Id. at 135, 137.
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make those proceedings available to the public, “the achievement of the aim
of . . . a fair trial” is guaranteed in any democratic society.57
Notably, for trial broadcasting like this to happen, the Judiciary must
also trust the way the media reacts to and reports on crimes and other
problems that exist in society.58 This article will address the issue of public
trust more fully in later sections.
B. Rationale for Public Trials and Trial Broadcasting as Tools to
Combat Corruption in Afghanistan
Greater transparency enhances public trust in the courts.59 This
influence undermines the independence of the judiciary60 in interpretation
and application of the laws. If the courts conduct proceedings openly, the
chance for influence from the politicians and high-ranking judicial officials
would undoubtedly be reduced.
Proponents of trial broadcasting point to various important benefits to
society:
1) assuring the public’s right to know and access to information;
2) increasing public confidence in the fairness of the Judiciary;
3) observing and checking on any unfairness in the Judiciary;
4) discouraging false testimony;
5) encouraging attorneys and judges to be well-prepared for
trial;61 and
6) having trial records for the future, records that can be used on
appeal or by future litigants, if needed.

Televising trials has other benefits too: namely, educating the public
with information about court procedures and the legal system, in general.
Enabling people to see how the courts decide cases and apply the law to

57.
Joshua D. Rosenzweig, Public Access and the Right to a Fair Trial in China, DUI HUA
FOUND., http://duihua.org/wp/?page_id=2542#3fn (last visited Oct. 15, 2017) (internal citations
omitted).
58.
Wendy Pogorzelski & Thomas W. Brewer, Cameras in Court: How Television News
Media Use Courtroom Footage, 91 JUDICATURE 124, 125 (2007).
59.

Cervantes, supra note 55.

60.
See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, COMBATING CORRUPTION IN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS: ADVOCACY
TOOLKIT 3, 33–34 (2007), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/Judiciary
_Advocacy_ToolKit.pdf [hereinafter TI Advocacy Toolkit].
61.
See Roger K. Warren, Public Trust and Procedural Justice, CT. REV. 12, 12 (2000),
http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/courtrv/cr37/cr37-3/CR37-3Warren.pdf.
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resolve disputes and hold criminals accountable has the potential to
improve public perception of courts and the government.62
Many international and domestic laws support policies of public trial
and trial broadcasting for similar reasons. For example, Transparency
International (TI) posits arguments in favor of these mechanisms stating
that they:
1) enhance judicial transparency;
2) promote fairness in judicial appointments;
3) promote decent judicial terms and conditions; and
4) increase judicial accountability and discipline.63

In fact, enhancing judicial transparency is one of TI’s most important
missions.64
This transparency includes access to information and
transparency practices related to the internal operations and administrative
aspects of the judiciary, including jurisdictional functions of the judiciary.65
While these could have impact on the appointment of judges and judicial
officials, public trials and trial broadcastings are much more influential on
access to information and transparency practices related to the jurisdictional
functions of the judiciary.
To curb the roots of irregularities in the court proceedings, enhancing
the public trial and trial broadcasting (access to information) are among the
recommended reforms by various institutions and researchers.66 Because in
public trial when the media is also present, the judges are more likely to
carefully follow the rules protecting due process and describe reasons for
their decisions, decreasing the likelihood that judges would be susceptible
to taking bribes.
The public’s right to “access to information” not only includes
coverage of proceedings by the media, but it also includes: access to the
laws, procedural regulations, code of conducts, ethics inside the courtroom
or during proceedings, information about judge appointment criteria,
judicial decisions and holdings, and reasons for those decisions and

62.
Angelique M. Paul, Turning the Camera on Court TV: Does Televising Trials Teach Us
Anything About the Real Law?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 655, 655 (1997).
63.

TI Advocacy Toolkit, supra note 60, at 37–43.

64.
Mission, Vision and Values, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, https://www.transparency.org/
whoweare/organisation/mission_vision_and_values/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2017).
65.
See Álvaro Herrero & Gaspar López, Access to Information and Transparency in the
Judiciary: A Guide to Good Practices from Latin America 13 (World Bank Inst.: Governance Working
Paper Series, Paper No. 80757, 2010), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/2137981259011531325/6598384-1268250334206/Transparency_Judiciary.pdf.
66.

Id. at 35.
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holdings.67 In a democratic country, the judicial officials cannot be sided
from the political and social contexts of the country. The judicial officials
should effectively arrange for the public to have access to information
related to their administrative operations and its jurisdictional work “under
the right to freely access to public information.”68
Despite all of these benefits, and while Afghanistan has open trials in
theory, most of the trials in most of the courts are held out of the public
eye.69 Antonio De Lauri, explains that in the Afghan legal system today,
“[a] corrupt official accepts money not to do his job or to do it wrongly, a
good official accepts money to do what he is supposed to do anyway, but to
do it for you and do it now.”70 Furthermore, it is more common in
Afghanistan that court proceedings “prevent the media and civil society
from monitoring court activity and exposing judicial corruption.”71 Trial
broadcasting is practically non-existent in all courts and provinces.72
IV.

INCREASING ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE JUDICIARY: LEARNING FROM
THE EXPERIENCES OF OTHER NATIONS

A. Accountability in the United States Courts, Public Trials and Trial
Broadcasting
As a leader among established democratic nations, the United States
can provide a strong example to Afghanistan for how to develop a strategy
for designing policies and procedures that would both encourage and
facilitate public trial and trial broadcasting. The United States is also a
logical place to start because of the relationship Afghanistan has with
67.

Id. at 7, 19, 40.

68.

Id.

69.
In an informal inquiry, conducted by the members of civil society organizations in
Nangarhar and Kandahar provinces, the respondent, defense lawyers revealed that because of various
reasons, such is insecurity, lack of public interest, and imposing of restrictions over judges from the
Supreme Court, most of the trials in those provinces hold with attending of only the litigants, and few
clerks of the court. Some respondents even said that some judges invite the defense attorneys and
prosecutors with litigants to decide in their offices. More and specific description about this will come
later.
70.
Antonio De Lauri, Corruption, Legal Modernisation and Judicial Practice in Afghanistan,
37 ASIAN STUD. REV. 527, 530 (2013).
71.
See Judicial Corruption Fuels Impunity, Corrodes Rule of Law, Says New Transparency
International Report, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (May 23, 2007), https://www.transparency.org/news/press
release/20070523_judicial_corruption_fuels_impunity_corrodes_rule_of_law_says_repor.
72.
In Nangarhar and Kandahar provinces, the judges and defense attorneys said in an
informal inquiry that the court allows media in some serious cases but this is very rare, with each court
deciding five to seven cases in a week. More description will come later.
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United States advisors and funding agencies, persons and entities that have
formed strong relationships with members of the judicial system over the
past sixteen years, and a strong role in supporting anti-corruption efforts in
Afghanistan—especially through programs like the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID).

1.

Doctrinal Foundations for Public Trials and Trial Broadcasting
in the United States

In the United States, the right to a public trial and trial broadcasting
stem from the constitutional guarantees afforded by the First and Sixth
Amendments: the First Amendment protects the right of freedom of
speech,73 and the Sixth Amendment protects the right of fair and public
trial74 of individuals. The concepts of open or public trial and trial
broadcasting are closely related to these rights75 that they require balancing
of the two Amendments.
Trial broadcasting was first recognized as constitutional by the United
States Supreme Court in 1981 in Chandler v. Florida, in which the Court
held that “consistent with constitutional guarantees, a state could provide
for radio, television and still photographic coverage of a criminal trial for
public broadcast, notwithstanding the objection of the defendants.”76 With
Chandler, the Supreme Court reversed its previous decision in Estes v.
Texas, which had prohibited cameras from the court proceedings.77 Unlike

73.
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution reads,
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” Id.
74.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution reads,
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense. Id.

75.
Jeanine Blackett Lutzenhiser, An Open Courts Checklist: Clarifying Washington’s Public
Trial and Public Access Jurisprudence, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2012).
76.

Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981).

77.

Id. at 586 (J. Stewart, concurring).
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in Estes, in Chandler, no one had presented empirical data that the
broadcast of the court hearing had an adverse effect on the process.78
In Chandler, the Court reasoned that, “[a]n absolute constitutional ban
on broadcast coverage of trials cannot be justified . . . that, in some cases,
conduct of the broadcasting process . . . may impair the ability of jurors to
decide the issue of guilt or innocence uninfluenced by extraneous matter.”79
The Court further explained that “Estes . . . did not announce a
constitutional rule that all photographic [or broadcast coverage] of criminal
trials is inherently a denial of due process.”80 Ultimately in Chandler, the
Court held that the Constitution does not prohibit a state from broadcasting
trials, and that doing so does not inherently violate due process.81 As such,
trial broadcasting remains a viable avenue for expressing the right to a fair
and open trial.
Some do argue that trial broadcasting violates the Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process.82 Opponents of the trial broadcasting
point to the psychological impact of the camera in the courtroom—on
everyone from judges, lawyers, witnesses and juries.83 In Estes, Chief
Justice Warren wrote that, “the evil of televised trials . . . lies not in the
noise and appearance of the cameras, but in the trial participants’ awareness
that they are being televised. To the extent that television has such an
inevitable impact[,] it undercuts the reliability of the trial process.”84 At the
same time, it also could be said that the presence of cameras in the
courtrooms ensures the due process right because it encourages judges and
jurors to follow and interpret the law properly because their actions will be
scrutinized by the public. In this way, it increases the accountability and
transparency in the decision-making process, thereby protecting due
process.

2.

A History of Controversy in the United States

Historically, media coverage of criminal proceedings has been a hot
issue among lawyers and courts in the United States. In 1946, the media
coverage of the criminal proceedings in federal courts was prohibited under

78.

Id. at 561.

79.

Id.

80.

Id. at 560.

81.

Chandler, 449 U.S. at 583; Tilley, supra note 54, at 722–23.

82.
Ralph E. Roberts, Jr., An Empirical and Normative Analysis of the Impact of Televised
Courtroom Proceedings, 51 SMU L. REV. 621, 623 (1998).
83.

Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 599 (1965).

84.

Id. at 570.
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the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 53.85 This law explicitly stated
that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by a statute or these rules, the court
must not permit the taking of photographs in the courtroom during judicial
proceedings or the broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the
courtroom.”86
In 1972, in the Judicial Conference of the United States, the
prohibition of media coverage was once again adopted more explicitly, and
it expanded to the civil cases too.87 These prohibitions included
“broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking photographs in the courtroom
and areas immediately adjacent thereto.”88 These prohibitions also stated in
the Code of Conduct for the United States Judges.89 Following that, in
1988 the Supreme Court assigned an Ad Hoc Committee to observe the
need of Cameras in the Courtrooms, and in its September 1990 session, the
Conference adopted the Committee’s report which recommended a pilot
program allowing media coverage of civil proceedings.90
Following its 1994 refusal of the proposed amendment to the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 53: Courtroom Photographing and
Broadcasting Prohibited, about media coverage, the Conference, adopted
rules and guidelines for media coverage in all courts in 1996, and once
again in 2017.91 The current media coverage rule about court proceedings
allows a judge to authorize “broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking
photographs in the courtroom and in adjacent areas during investit[ure],
naturalization, or other ceremonial proceedings.”92 Moreover,

85.
History of Cameras in Courts, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federalcourts
/cameras-courts/history-cameras-courts (last visited Oct. 15, 2017).
86.

FED. R. CIV. P. 53.

87.

See generally History of Cameras in Courts, supra note 85.

88.

Id.

89.

Id.

90.

Id.

91.

Id.

92.

History of Cameras in Courts, supra note 85.
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[a] judge may authorize such activities . . . during other
proceedings, or recesses between such other proceedings, only:
1) for the presentation of evidence; 2) for the perpetuation of the
record of the proceedings; 3) for security purposes; 4) for other
purposes of judicial administration; 5) for the photographing,
recording, or broadcasting of appellate arguments; or 6) in
accordance with pilot programs approved by the Judicial
Conference.
When broadcasting, televising, recording, or
photographing in the courtroom or adjacent areas is permitted, a
judge should ensure that it is done in a manner that will: 1) be
consistent with the rights of the parties; 2) not unduly distract
participants in the proceeding; and 3) not otherwise interfere with
the administration of justice.93

Currently, it is permitted to televise courtrooms’ proceedings with the
authorization of judges at both the federal and state levels. Per the
Sunshine in the Courtroom Act of 2017, every presiding judge of appellate
or trial court of the United States has the discretion to “permit the
photographing, electronic recording, broadcasting, or televising to the
public of any court proceeding over which that judge presides.”94 The
presiding judges, or the panel of judges in both courts takes in to account
the due process rights of the parties while permitting media coverage of the
proceeding.95
Notably, at the trial court level, a witness can request to “disguise” or
“obscure” his or her voice and/or face; it is the obligation of the presiding
judge to inform the witness of this right.96 Furthermore, the presiding judge
also can obscure the face and voice of an individual, if there is good cause
that shows the media coverage threats:
1) the safety of the individual;
2) the security of the court;
3) the integrity of future or ongoing law enforcement operations;
or
4) the interest of justice97

93.

Id.

94.

Sunshine in Courtroom Act, S. 643, 115th Cong. § 2 (b)(1)(2) (2017).

95.

Id.

96.

Id.

97.

Id.
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Public Trials and Trial Broadcasting in Kenya

As a developing country that has had some success in implementing
laws that support public trials and trial broadcasting, Kenya provides a
useful example for Afghanistan to learn from and develop such
mechanisms. Like Afghanistan, Kenya also had a fundamental change to
government in 2002, when a new government came to power.98 Judicial
reform was one of the promises by the new government. After a deep
incisive investigation about the judiciary, among the key issues that needed
reform were the issues of 1) performance management; 2) corruption, ethics
and integrity; and 3) access to information and communication in the
judiciary.99 Reforms to the judiciary began in earnest after the new
government came to power in 2007.100
Furthermore, the new 2010 constitution created a new momentum for
judicial reforms. Among the main transformational reforms were:
a) transformation of the “[j]udiciary to be an independent but
complementary partner with the other branches of government
...;
b) [t]ransforming Court procedures, processes, organizational
culture, and management to re-orientate them towards a
culture of responsive, friendly, and effective service delivery .
. . ; [and]
c) [r]eordering the [j]udiciary’s [staff] and judicial [procedures]”
to improve delivery of services; “improv[ing] the speed of
justice; and improv[ing] access to justice . . . .”101

The wave of judicial reforms also led to a new eagerness for openness
and transparency among judicial officials. The Kenyan judiciary developed
a “case-tracking system that facilitated nationwide monitoring of delays and

98.
See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, KENYA’S UNFINISHED DEMOCRACY: A HUMAN
RIGHTS AGENDA FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT 10 (2002), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/kenya2/
kenya1202.pdf.
99.
REPUBLIC OF KENYA, FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL REFORMS 65, 73,
97 (2010), http://www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/Final%20Report%20of%20the%20Task%20Force%20
on%20Judicial%20Reforms.pdf.
100.

See id. at 4–5.

101. REPUBLIC OF KENYA: JUDICIARY, JUDICIARY TRANSFORMATION FRAMEWORK, 2012–
2016
11
(2012),
http://www.judiciary.go.ke/portal/assets/downloads/reports/Judiciary's%20
Tranformation%20Framework-fv.pdf.
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workloads . . . [and] opened lines of communication for citizens to register
complaints, suggest changes, and receive responses.”102

1.

Kenyan Law on Public Trials and Broadcasting of Courtroom
Proceedings

Chapter 4, Article 50 of the Kenya Constitution provides for the right
of a fair hearing.103 The law states that this right includes a right to be
heard by any court or tribunal and the hearing must be fair and public.104
This provision is dealing with fair prosecuting of an accused person that
contains creating such mechanisms to ensure that the proceeding of the
court is fair to all persons.105 Further the right to a fair trial is included as
among the inalienable rights under the Constitution, and constitutionally it
is among the fundamental rights that cannot be limited.106
In practice, all Kenyan courts are, therefore, open to the public and the
media; and this openness has led to greater levels of transparency in how
courts operate and how disputes are adjudicated.107 For recording the
proceeding and storing the cases, the courts are facilitated with digital
instruments to provide cases for the public “at a click of a button.”108 It has
also helped to restore and boost the confidence that ordinary members of
the public have in the Judiciary.109 The lack of confidence in the judiciary
was a major contributor to the violence that rocked the country in 2007 and
2008.110 The judiciary also organizes open days where judges and
magistrates get opportunities to interact with the public outside the confines

102. Transforming the Courts: Judicial Sector Reforms in Kenya, 2011-2015, INNOVATIONS
SUCCESSFUL SOCIETIES: PRINCETON UNIV., 1 (2015), https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/
sites/successfulsocieties/files/MG_OGP_Kenya.pdf [hereinafter Transforming the Courts].

FOR

103.

CONSTITUTION art. 50(1)–(2) (2010) (Kenya).

104.

Id.

105. Waikwa Wanyoike, Kenya: Access to Justice and the Constitution - Part 1, ALLAFRICA
(Mar. 14, 2015), http://allafrica.com/stories/201503150184.html.
106.

CONSTITUTION art. 25 (2010) (Kenya).

107. See Judiciary Scorecard, INSIDE JUDICIARY, Mar. 2014, at 1, http://www.judiciary.
go.ke/portal/assets/files/NEWSLETTERS/EMAG%20E04%20March%202014.pdf.
108.

Id. at 5.

109. See Jay Loschky, Less Than Half in Africa Confident in Their Judicial Systems, GALLUP
NEWS (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/174509/less-half-africa-confident-judicialsystems.
aspx.
110. See KENYA NAT’L COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF
INQUIRY INTO THE POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE (CIPEV) vii (2008), http://www.knchr.org/
Portals/0/Reports/Waki_Report.pdf.
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of a courtroom; This is meant to help demystify the institution and to give it
a human face.111
A Kenyan judicial officer can, however, exclude members of the
public and press in certain circumstances.112
This case-by-case
determination is made based on the peculiarity of a certain case or the
sensitivity of witnesses or evidence to be tabled.113 Among the main cases
that are often heard in-camera include cases involving sexual offences to
minors especially during the time that a minor is testifying.114
Media access to Kenyan courts is highly liberalized.115 The only
requirement is for the individual journalists to be duly accredited by their
employer.116 The administrative wing of courts also provides authorization
to the media representatives that are assigned to the different courts.117 This
allows them to bring in equipment, to sit in court and listen to proceedings
and to also relay the proceedings to their media stations uninhibited by any
restriction.118 Authorized media representatives are also allowed to take
photographs and record video and audio of the proceedings.119 In the recent
past, during the hearing of cases of national importance, the courts allowed
for proceedings to be relayed live to local television and radio stations.120
This has played a great role in demystifying the administration of justice in
the country.121

111. Open Day at Githongo Law Courts, JUDICIARY (Mar. 2, 2017), http://www.judiciary
.go.ke/portal/blog/post/open-day-at-githongo-law-courts.
112. See Children Act (2001) Cap. 6 § 76(5) (Kenya) (discussing publication prohibitions, with
regard to proceedings in Children’s Court, whether it be by publication, report, law report or otherwise).
113. Interview with Francis Kairu, Lawyer, in Seattle, Washington (June 2017) [hereinafter
Interview with Francis Kairu]. Francis has experience working with Transparency International of
Kenya; he graduated from Sustainable International Development Program of Law School, University
of Washington in June 2017. Id.
114.

Id.; see generally Children Act (2001) Cap. 6 (Kenya).

115.

Interview with Francis Kairu, supra note 113.

116.

Id.

117.

Id.

118.

Id.

119.

Id.

120. The Presidential Election Petition: The Mwananchi Friendly Version, KENYA L. (Apr.
25, 2013), http://kenyalaw.org/kenyalawblog/the-presidential-election-petition-the-mwananchi-friendlyversion-2/.
121.

Interview with Francis Kairu, supra note 113.
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Challenges and Successes

In 2011, Justice Willie Mutunga, was appointed as Chief Justice;
holding such position places the holder as the president of the Supreme
Court and the leader of the entire Judiciary, the third arm of government in
Kenya.122 He and his team initiated the Judiciary Transformation
Framework and the 2011 Judicial Service Act, through which he applied
critical reforms in the Judiciary.123 One of significant reforms of Justice
Mutunga was engaging civil society and the public in courts affairs.124 The
Judiciary has partnered with other stakeholders such as the civil society and
the bar association to form court users’ committees.125 The committees
bring together judicial staff and selected stakeholders to discuss ways of
improving the administration of justice, and in the meantime, the
committees are established for each county.126 Court users’ committees
have been crucial in establishing a culture of accountability and
transparency among judicial officers.127
Within the court users’
committees, any challenges with access to court, handling of cases,
management of court files and other administrative issues can be discussed
and solutions proposed in a constructive manner underpinned by a form of
peer review and feedback.128
Other reforms also included access to and expeditious delivery of
justice; people-centeredness and public engagement; and stakeholder
engagement in the Judiciary.129 The Judiciary has established an Office of
the Judicial Ombudsperson (Judiciary Ombudsperson).130 “The Judiciary
Ombudsperson is mandated to enforce administrative justice in the
Judiciary by addressing mal-administration through effective complaint

122.

CONSTITUTION art. 163(1)(a) (2010) (Kenya); Transforming the Courts, supra note 102.

123. THE JUDICIARY, STATE OF THE JUDICIARY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
ANNUAL REPORT, 2014–2015 3–4 (2014–2015) [hereinafter Annual Report].
124.

Id. at 19.

125. Interview with Francis Kairu, supra note 113; CJ Launches Milimani Criminal Division
Court Users Committee, JUDICIARY (Mar. 22, 2016), http://www.judiciary.go.ke/portal/blog/post/cjlaunches-milimani-criminal-division-court-users-committee [hereinafter CJ Launches].
126.

CJ Launches, supra note 125.

127. KNCHR,
HUMAN
RIGHTS
BASELINE
SURVEY
REPORT
53
(2016),
http://www.knchr.org/Portals/0/GeneralReports/KNCHR_Human-Rights-Baseline-Survey-Report_2016
_FX-Print.pdf?ver=2016-0823-121839-380.
128.

Interview with Francis Kairu, supra note 113.

129.

JUDICIARY TRANSFORMATION FRAMEWORK, 2012–2016, supra note 101, at 13–15.

130. Office of the Ombudsperson: About Us, JUDICIARY, http://www.judiciary.go.ke/portal/
page/office-of-the-ombudsperson (last visited Dec. 10, 2017).
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handling structures. The office investigates any allegations of misconduct
by judicial officers [or] staff.”131
Although levels of corruption within the Judiciary still have remained
high, open bribery and malfeasance among judicial officers and staff has
been eradicated almost completely.132 TI ranks the Judiciary third in
likelihood encountering of bribery as among the top ten most corrupt
sectors in the country.133 Anticorruption experts, however, have concluded
that in the sequencing of anticorruption reforms, curbing open blatant
bribery and malfeasance is the first step towards addressing corruption and
highlighting it as an evil deed.134
Indicator/Year
Average size
of bribe (Ksh)
Average size
of bribe (USD)

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

11,046

9230

5063

8390

7885

108

90

49

82

77

Figure 1: Average size of bribe—Kenya Judiciary 1 USD =
102.5 Ksh. Source: East African bribery index trends analysis.
Transparency International Kenya, www.tikenya.org.

C. Promoting and Facilitating Public Trials and Trial Broadcasting in
the Afghan Context

1.

Legal Grounds for Public Trial and Trial Broadcasting in
Afghanistan
a.

Afghanistan Constitution

The current 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan clearly states that trials
in Afghanistan’s court “shall be held openly,” and it is the constitutional
right of Afghan citizens to attend in the public trials. Article 128 of the
Constitution states the following:

131.

Id.

132.

See Annual Report, supra note 123, at 16–17.

133. TRANSPARENCY INT’L, THE EAST AFRICAN BRIBERY INDEX 2017 16 (2017), http://www.ti
kenya.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/East-African-Bribery-Index-EABI-2017-1-1.pdf.
134. See George R.G. Clarke, How Petty is Petty Corruption? Evidence from Firm Surveys in
Africa, (Munich Pers. RePEc Archive, Paper No. 15073, 2008), https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/15073/1/petty_corruption_Aug08_WPS.pdf.
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In the courts in Afghanistan, trials shall be held openly and every
individual shall have the right to attend in accordance with the
law. In situations clarified by law, the court shall hold secret
trials when it considers necessary, but pronouncement of its
decision shall be open in all cases.135

This provision of the Afghan Constitution is designed after the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and other international
principles and norms about the Justice and Rule of Law.
However, secret trials are not necessarily prohibited by the
Constitution. From the first clause of the Article 128, it seems that the
publicity of trials is the principle, and it is not only for the criminal cases,
but the terms (in the courts in Afghanistan) and (trials) mean that criminal,
civil, and commercial trials should be public. Moreover, the clause also
places the condition (in accordance with the law) that means attendees must
obey the rules, and code of conduct of the court and must not violate
them.136
The Afghan Constitution does not say anything about trial
broadcasting or recording the court proceeding. However, like the United
States, it has foundational provisions for “right of freedom of speech”137
and “right of access to information.”138 Based on Article 50, the right of
access to information is limited by the “violation of others’ rights,” and
“national security.”139 Some judges in Afghanistan’s courts justifies the
prevention of the trial broadcasting and recording of a court proceeding as a
violation of rights of the defendants,140 but this author has not seen any
interpretation of the provisions mentioned above for trial broadcasting.
b.

The Afghanistan Statutes

The New Criminal Procedure Code (NCPC) of Afghanistan was
adopted in 2014.141 NCPC comports with the Constitution regarding public
trials for criminal cases. For example, Article 213 of the NCPC guarantees
the right to public trials, in general, but it identifies exceptions for 1) moral

135.

CONSTITUTION OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN ch.7, art. 128.

136. CRIM. PROC. CODE, ch. 8, art. 225 (Jan. 26, 2014) (Afg.) (explaining that if someone
disturbs the courtroom’s order the judge can exclude him or her or impose a fine up to 5,000 AFN).
137.

CONST. AFG. ch. 2, art. 34.

138.

Id. art. 50.

139.

Id.

140. Anatullahullah Hafiz, Do Not Read Journalists!, ROHI.AF (May 25, 2013), http://rohi.af/
fullstory.php?id=26447.
141.

CRIM. PROC. CODE (Afg.).
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issues, 2) family issues, and 3) public security.142 Keeping in consideration
the courtroom’s space, the court can limit the number of attendees;
moreover, the law excludes the armed and those who do not hold perfect
legal competency from the courtroom attendance.143 Chapter 8 of the
NCPC is allocated to the regulations about the order of the courtroom144
that is vital for public trials.
As stated in the Constitution, the NCPC also insists on the public
announcement of court decisions under all circumstances.145 The recording,
photographing, and publishing of the courtrooms’ proceedings, however,
depends on the permission of the judges on the panel;146 otherwise,
broadcasting is prohibited. Moreover, the Penal Code also treats the
publication of court’s decision as a complimentary punishment.147 The
NCPC only allows the publication of decision, which concerns the
innocence of the accused.148
There is no specific procedure or pathway for the announcement of the
schedule of open trials or invitation of the public or media representatives
in the procedural laws, and as well as in the Regulation of Judicial Conduct
for the Judges of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The NCPC only has
provisions for inviting of family members of the person who is convicted of
the death penalty one day prior to the date of his or her execution.149

142. Id. art. 213. This article reads, “Trial is public, everyone can attend in it, unless the judge
declares part of the proceeding or at all to be closed, because of moral issues, family secrets, protection
of order or public peace.” Id.
143. Id. arts. 214–15. Article 214 reads, “The president of the bench can take in account the
space of the courtroom and limit the attendance in preceding, and distribute visitor cards to the
attendees.” Id. art. 214. Article 215 reads, “From the proceeding, the reports of radio, television, [and]
video recording and photographing; and its broadcasting are only permitted with the permission of judge
[president] of the court.” Id. art. 215.
144.

See generally id. arts. 223–25.

145.

Id. art. 234. Article 234 reads,

Although the case is investigated in a close proceeding, the announcement of the
is announced public at any situation. The court can take such measurements that
ensure the presence of the accused person during the announcement. In case of
acceptance of the decision by the accused person, the measurements include the
capturing and detaining of him. Id.
146.

CRIM. PROC. CODE at art. 215. (Afg.).

147.

PENAL CODE, ch. 3, art. 117 (Oct. 7, 1976) (Afg.).

148.

CRIM. PROC. CODE at art. 215. (Afg.).

149.

Id. art. 312.
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Notwithstanding, the Regulation of Judicial Conduct for the Judges150
of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan also prevents the publication of the
decision without the consent of the judges. However, in a comment, it
accepts that it would be a better way for catching public trusts and
educating public through the media.151 In addition, one could raise the
questions that what is the purpose of the announcement of the decision
publicly? What does the term (publicly) mean here? Does it really differ
from the broadcasting of a decision through the television, radio, or in a
newspaper?
c.

What Happens in the Afghan Courts?

Afghanistan has substantial legal grounds for public trial; however, it
does not have clear rules for recording and broadcasting court proceedings.
The Supreme Court of Afghanistan only publishes the list of weekly
decisions held in various provincial and district courts in its official journal,
the Mezan (pair of scales). In a recently published number, the Mezan
includes a list of seventy-five decisions of provincial appellate courts and of
city trial courts.152 The list includes the titles of the courts, type of
accusations, number of convictions, date of decisions, and type of
punishments.153 Interestingly, the number publishes a four-sentences report
of two decisions, held at public trials in the trial court of Jalalabad city,
Nangarhar province. The report does not include any picture from the
proceedings, nor the names of convictions. It only has the names and titles
of the judges who heard the cases. The report does not say anything about
the number of attendees in the proceeding.154
In an informal inquiry, attended twenty defense lawyers in Jalalabad
city of Nangarhar province, most of them (twelve) described their clients’
proceedings legally public but the majority of them (fifteen) illustrated that
they have not seen public people to attend in those proceedings.155 Those
150. REGULATION OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR THE JUDGES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF
AFGHANISTAN (June 19, 2007), http://www.deontologie-judiciaire.umontreal.ca/fr/magistrature/
documents/REGULATIONOFJUDICIALCONDUCTFORTHEJUDGESOFTHEISLAMICREPUBLIC
OFAFGHANISTAN.pdf.
151.

Id. art. 12 cmt.

152. JARIDA-AL-MEZAN, DA STARI MAHKAME KARE SARGANDOYA KHPARAWANA [THE MEZAN
JOURNAL, A PUBLICATION FOR SUPREME COURTS CONDUCTS], Serial No. 374, p.3 (May 10, 2017),
http://supremecourt.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents/%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%B2%D8%A7%DB%
8C%D9%86%DB%B3%DB%B7%DB%B4135201712757541553325325.pdf (Afg.).
153.

Id.

154.

Id. at 2.

155. Interview with Mohammad Ibrahim Afghan, Member, Civil Soc’y Org., in Jalalabad, Afg.
(Apr. 1, 2017).
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attorneys attend, approximately, more than five proceedings in a week, but
almost all of them revealed that they have not seen the media
representatives in the court proceedings more than once a month.156 The
defense attorney explained that because of security concerns, the court does
not allow the public to attend the proceedings. Three of them even said that
because no one comes to the proceedings, most judges simply decide cases
in their offices, not in the courtroom.157
The same questionnaire was also sent to the judges of the Jalalabad
city while majority of them refused to answer questions because (as they
said) the Supreme Court does not allow them to share information or
interview with the media or others.158 Only three judges answered the
questionnaire, and they requested anonymity. In their responses, they
claimed that their proceedings are public, but they tried to justify that they
cannot allow people to attend because of concerns about security.159 About
the media coverage, they accepted that at least once a month we allow the
media to cover the proceeding, especially in some serious or major cases.
The judges were also asked the meaning of Public Trial; they described that
those trials in which public, media, witness, and experts attend are public
trials.160
The same questionnaire was also sent to Kandahar,161 a southern
province of Afghanistan. A total of seventeen defense lawyers were asked
in that province about the status of public trials and attendance of public
and media in court hearings.162 About half of them (nine out of seventeen)
consider the court proceedings public, but almost all of them do not see
media to cover the court proceeding at least once a month.163 The majority
of the respondents (thirteen of them) said that they attend more than five
hearings a month, and ten of the respondents said that they attend more than
ten sessions in a month.164 Like the Jalalabad’s attorneys, the vast majority

156.

Id.

157.

Id.

158. Personally, I haven’t seen such a law, or regulation but majority of the judges refrain from
sharing information or interview with media and others with saying this.
159.

Interview with Mohammad Ibrahim Afghan, supra note 155.

160.

Id.

161.

Interview with Atiqullah Daqiq, Student, Prosecution Off., in Kandahar, Afg. (Apr. 1,

162.

Id.

163.

Id.

164.

Id.
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in Kandahar too, marked the security concerns as reason that courts could
not allow public to attend in hearings.165
Haroun Rahimi,166 an Afghan PhD researcher in the Law School of
University of Washington has also described to this author what he
observed while seeking information in Afghan courts for his research.
Rahimi went to four provincial-commercial courts of Afghanistan to gather
information through a survey, but the judges refused to share with him even
some general information such as “the usual length of proceedings, and the
number of cases [they receive] per year.”167 Rahimi says that in every
court, the judge referred to a letter from the Supreme Court that prohibits
the judicial officials from sharing information about court proceedings
without the formal approval from the Supreme Court. However, the
problem was solved when Rahimi used his “personal connections,” and
pulled “so many strings” to interview with judges, and obtain information
from them in three different provinces, without the formal approval from
the Supreme Court which is a long procedure and is time consuming.168
V.
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS THAT ENCOURAGE
PUBLIC TRIALS AND TRIAL BROADCASTING TO PROMOTE TRANSPARENCY
IN THE JUDICIARY
Many countries are committed to establishing foundations of freedom,
justice, and peace in their own territories, as well as in the world.169 This
commitment is reflected in their ratification of and membership in various
international conventions and instruments. The UDHR, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Bangalore
Principles of Judicial Conducts of the United Nations (BPJCUN) are the
foundations for justice and treatment with criminals. Justice does not need
to only be done, but it needs to be observed by the people that it is done.170
For this purpose, countries are committed to the public trials and trials
broadcasting.
The “Right to a Fair Trial” is declared by the international community
as a foundation for ensuring justice.171 The UDHRs regards it, for
165.

Id.

166.

Interview with Haroun Rahimi, Professor, Herat U., in Herat, Afg. (Apr. 1, 2017).

167.

Id.

168.

Id.

169. The Right to A Fair Trial, FAIR TRIALS, https://www.fairtrials.org/about-us/the-right-to-afair-trial/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2017).
170. Id. See also Open Justice, FAIR TRIALS, https://www.fairtrials.org/about-us/the-right-to-afair-trial/open-justice/.
171.

See generally The Right to A Fair Trial, supra note 169.
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everyone, as a principle of human rights to be tried in an open trial before
an independent and impartial court. It says, “[e]veryone is entitled in full
equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial
tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and any criminal
charge against him.”172 Countries are required to develop certain ways of
doing this, unrelatedly of which legal system is following by them.173
ICCPR, also supports public trial and trial broadcasting. ICCPR
recognizes the “fair and public hearing” as a fundamental right of all
persons.174 However, it announces that the press can be excluded from the
court for some exceptional reasons such as:
1) morals;
2) public order or national security;
3) when the interests of the private lives of the parties so
requires; or
4) to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in
special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the
interests of justice.175

If other than these reasons, it could be assumed from ICCPR’s “fair
and public hearing” that media can attend and broadcast the proceedings
because it reads that, “[a]ny judgement rendered in criminal case or in a suit
at law shall be made public . . . .”176 The exceptions in banning publicity of
the judgements that ICCPR sets are “interests of the juvenile persons,” and
“concern [of] matrimonial disputes.”177
The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (BPJC) adopted by the
Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity was supported by the
U.N. at the Hague on November 25–26, 2002.178 BPJC indirectly supports
public trials and trial broadcasting when it articulates the importance of
“fair trial,”179 “reinforc[ing] public confidence in the judiciary,”180

172.

G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 10 (Dec. 10, 1948).

173.

See generally id.

174. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14
(Dec. 16, 1966).
175.

Id.

176.

Id.

177.

Id.

178. The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2002) (adopted by the Judicial Group on
Strengthening Judicial Integrity, Nepal on Nov. 25–26, 2002).
179.

Id. at 3.

180.

Id.
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“maintain[ing] and enhanc[ing] the confidence of the public,”181 and
“reaffirm[ing] the people’s faith in the integrity of the Judiciary”182 as core
principles that should guide judicial conducts. These principles, as
constraints on judicial conducts, aim to assure the public that processes for
treatment with law-breakers are fair and certain and that governments
cannot abuse their powers.183
The right to a fair trial is not just to protect defendants, but its aim is to
make trust in justice and government among the public.184 Trial
broadcasting is not separable from the right to a public trial, and it serves to
deter criminal activity. Furthermore, trial broadcasting also plays a
significant role in informing people about the crimes and the symptoms of
criminals.185 That is why the abovementioned international instruments,
directly or indirectly, are in favor of fair and public trial to protect the rights
of defendants, and make trust in courts.
The “competency,”
“independency,” and “impartiality” that ICCPR sets as conditions for the
court, could be ensured when the proceeding of the court is fair and public,
and the public has an eye over the proceeding through the lens of media.
A.

International Norms of Fair Justice and Due Process

International law and policy is committed to promoting “fair trials”
and “due process” in the judiciaries of the world,186 commitments that, as
this article has explained, are furthered by mechanisms like public trials and
trial broadcasting. Moreover, these standards are indirectly supported by
the certain international institutions that are fighting to establish rule of law
and combating judicial corruption.
Fair trial refers to the trialing of a defendant by an authorized court,
while enjoying all its constitutional rights. A fair trial does not only
increase transparency in the judicial system, but it lacks errors in the
process that could be causing egregious harm to the defendant,187 most
often, when the innocent defendant is convicted in misinterpretation of the
laws. There is a common saying in the judicial profession that the escape
181.

Id.

182.

Id. at 4.

183.

See generally The Right to A Fair Trial, supra note 169.

184.

Id.

185. Arguments for and Against Allowing Television Cameras into the Courtroom, U. NEB.LINCOLN, https://www.unl.edu/eskridge/cj211cameras.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2017).
186. Scott C. Pugh, Checkbook Journalism, Free Speech and Fair Trials, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
1739, 1741–42, 1758 n.99 (1995).
187. 21 TEX. JUR. 3D CRIM. LAW: RTS. OF THE ACCUSED Courtroom Atmosphere § 28,
Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2017).
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of ten guilty persons is not worse than the punishing of one innocent
person.188 Therefore, it is not easy to see whether the court (or generally the
judicial system) provides a defendant with fair justice or not, but with
coverage of public trials, the media could assure the fairness of trials, and
prevent the misinterpretation of the laws.189
Due process refers to the operation of the judicial system within the
law (“legality”) and providing a fair procedure190 for the prosecution of an
accused person. It aims to interpret the laws properly for all litigants, and
not to prejudice them consciously. American Judge Henry Friendly lists the
points that remain highly influential on the legality procedure of a casehearing. He enumerates them as follow:
1) An unbiased tribunal.
2) Notice of the proposed action and the grounds asserted for it.
3) Opportunity to present reasons why the proposed action
should not be taken.
4) The right to present evidence, including the right to call
witnesses.
5) The right to know opposing evidence.
6) The right to cross-examine adverse witnesses.
7) A decision based exclusively on the evidence presented.
8) Opportunity to be represented by counsel.
9) Requirement that the tribunal prepares a record of the
evidence presented.
10) Requirement that the tribunal prepare[s] written findings of
fact and reasons for its decisions.191

The public trial and trial broadcasting assures the application of all
these procedural-points because these points could incentivize judges to
follow the due process strictly and not to prejudice the interests of the
litigants.
In addition, TI emphasizes the vital role of, “[c]ivil society, the private
sector, [and] the media.”192 It believes in peoples’ influences on
organizational behaviors with insisting that, “[w]e must expose judicial bias

188.

Danny J. Boggs, The Right to A Fair Trial, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 1, 5 (1998).

189. See Mark R. Stabile, Free Press-Fair Trial: Can They Be Reconciled in A Highly
Publicized Criminal Case?, 79 GEO. L.J. 337, 337–38 (1990).
190. See Due Process, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/due_process (last
visited Dec. 10, 2017).
191.

Id.

192. Judiciary: Solution, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/topic/detail/
judiciary (last visited Dec. 10, 2017).
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and drive reforms to increase courtroom honesty.”193 TI’s understanding of
the ways for illuminating the judicial corruption, and enhancing the
transparency and accountability in the judicial system are public trial and
trial broadcasting. TI explicitly supports these two instruments for
combating corruption.
Furthermore, the WJP defines the Rule of Law (RoL) in the context of:
1) accountability of the governmental officials;
2) publicity and clearness of the law;
3) fairness and efficient process of the enacting of the laws; and
4) the independence of the justice.194

Without public trials and trial broadcasting, these goals for RoL
projects cannot be easily achieved. When United States Supreme Court
Justice Louis Brandeis said, “[p]ublicity is justly commended as a remedy
for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”195 He meant that
the only way for the fairness, accountability, discovering the truth, and
preventing the prejudice to the public, is public trials and trial
broadcasting.196
Overall, many institutions that are involved in combating corruption,
directly and indirectly, are in favor of public trial and trials broadcasting for
increasing the accountability and preventing the misinterpretation of the
laws.
B.

International Codes About Free Media and Access to Information

“Freedom of expression,” “access to information,” and “respect for the
truth and for the right of public to the truth” are important human-rights and
professional-journalism principles that enshrined in the international
instruments about the human rights and in the codes of conducts of
journalists adopted by worldwide organization. The UDHR, the Universal
Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, and the ICCPR support the
mentioned principles about free media and access to information. The
international organizations for supporting professional journalism, and their

193.

Id.

194. What is the Rule of Law?, WORLD JUST. PROJECT, http://worldjusticeproject.org/whatrule-law (last visited Dec. 10, 2017).
195.

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976).

196. Sherilyn Streicker, Criminal Trial Publicity, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legalencyclopedia/criminal-trial-publicity.html# (last visited Oct. 15, 2017).
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code of conducts and ethics also provide support to the above-mentioned
principles.
The UDHR in description of “the right of freedom of opinion and
expression” reads that this right includes “to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”197
Interestingly, the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights not only
regards the “search after truth” as a right, but it burdens as a duty over
every Muslim.198 The Islamic Declaration further states, “there shall be no
bar on the dissemination of information” unless it “endanger[s] the security
of the society or the state and is confined within the limits imposed by the
[l]aw.”199 The ICCPR repeats the language of UDHR, but it more precisely
sets the limitation for enjoying this right as:
1)respect for the rights and reputation of others;
2)protection of national security and the public order; and
3)protection of public health and morals.200

The Society for Professional Journalism’s (SPJ)201 Code of Ethic
encourages journalists to seek and broadcast truthful information and
burdens journalists to “[r]ecognize a special obligation to serve as
watchdogs over public affairs and government.”202 Based on the SPJ’s
Code, the journalists should “[s]eek to ensure that the [public affairs are]
conducted in the open, and that public records are open to all.”203 The
Society offers a “comprehensive guide on accessing government records,”
including access to the courts’ records and attending in court
proceedings.204 “The campaign is called Open Doors and covers what
197.

G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 172, at art. 19.

198.

Islamic Council, Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, at art. XII (Sept. 19,

199.

Id.

200.

G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), supra note 174, at art. 19.

1981).

201. About SPJ, SOC’Y PROF. JOURNALISTS, http://www.spj.org/aboutspj.asp (last visited Dec.
10, 2017). The Society of Professional Journalists is a “broad-based journalism organization, dedicated
to encouraging the free practice of journalism and stimulating high standards of ethical behavior [in the
United States of America]. Founded in 1909 as Sigma Delta Chi, SPJ promotes the free flow of
information . . . .” Id.
202. SPJ Code of Ethics, SOC’Y PROF. JOURNALISTS (Sept. 6, 2014, 4:49 PM), https://www.
spj.org/pdf/spj-code-of-ethics.pdf.
203.

Id.

204. Recognize A Special Obligation to Serve as Watchdogs Over Public Affairs and
Government. Seek to Ensure that the Public’s Business if Conducted in the Open, and that Public
Records are Open to All., SPJ NETWORK: BLOG, https://blogs.spjnetwork.org/ethicscode/?p=148 (last
visited Dec. 13, 2017).
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people should know and do about accessing records that belong to the
public.”205 The Open Doors declares to the journalists that courts files are
open to the public and media and both media and public can attend in court
proceedings, unless they are not declared close by the judge who preside
the court.206
The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) also has a Declaration
of Principles on the Conducts of Journalists that encourages the journalists
to “respect for [the] truth and for the right of the public to the truth . . . .”207
The Declaration motivates the journalists to “defend the principles of
freedom in the honest collection and publication of news, and of the right of
fair comment and criticism.”208
The Swiss Press Council also declared a declaration of the Duties and
Rights of a Journalist in 2008.209 The duties part of the declaration sets
rules for the journalists that should be bounded to, among others; here are
two rules that directly support free media and access to information rights:
1) seeking the truth, “in the interests of the public’s right to know”; 2)
“defend[ing] freedom of information, freedom of commentary and criticism
. . . .”210 Furthermore, the declaration recognizes “[f]ree access to all
sources of information and the right to investigate without impediment
anything that is in the public interest” as a right of journalist; and in
exceptional circumstances, and with the clearly defined reasons, the public
or private confidentiality can be invoked against the journalist.211 The same
rights and duties were enshrined in the Declaration of Munich that was
“approved at a meeting of representatives of the Journalists’ Unions of the
six countries of the European Community in Munich, Germany, on
November 23–24, 1971.”212 Apart from these codes, there are many others
too that in different ways support the free media and access to information
right, especially when it is in the interest of public.213
205.

Id.

206. FOI and the Courts, SOC’Y PROF. JOURNALISTS, https://www.spj.org/opendoors2.asp (last
visited Dec. 13, 2017)
207. IFJ Declaration of Principles on the Conduct of Journalists, INT’L FED’N JOURNALISTS,
http://www.ifj.org/en/about-ifj/ifj-code-of-principles/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2017).
208.

Id.

209. The Declaration of the Duties and Rights of a Journalist, SWISS PRESS COUNCIL FOUND.
(2008), https://presserat.ch/en/journalistenkodex/erklaerungen/.
210.

Id.

211.

Id.

212. Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Journalists, ACCOUNTABLE JOURNALISM (Nov.
23–24, 1971), https://accountablejournalism.org/ethics-codes/International-Declaration.
213. See Code of Ethics: International, ACCOUNTABLE JOURNALISM, https://accountable
journalism.org/ethics-codes/international (last visited Dec. 11, 2017).
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PROPOSAL OF AMENDMENTS TO ENSURE PUBLIC TRIALS AND TRIAL
BROADCASTING IN AFGHANISTAN

This section recommends specific steps that the Afghan government
could take to combat judicial corruption through ensuring public access to
trials and establishing and supporting programs that enable and promote
trial broadcasting. As explained above, the Afghan Constitution guarantees
a right to public trials, with some standard limitations for family issues,
juvenile issues, or issues related to the national security; however, more
steps are needed to ensure access to and oversight of courts.
A.

Legislation to Clarify the Right to Public Trial

Like the United States’ Sunshine in Courtroom Act of 2017, and like
the Kenya’s Judiciary Transformation Framework and the Judicial Service
Act of 2011 in the time of Justice Willie Mutunga, Afghanistan Judiciary
also could develop such a draft of act for enhanced transparency and
accessibility to the courts. This act could be passed and ratified by the
legislature to be legalized its implementation. Under this new act, public
hearing should be mandatory in all cases, except in some special
circumstances. For closing trials, the courts must show reasonable causes
such as family issue, juvenile issue, or issue related to the national security
to the public through their websites or public media. The new act should
oblige on the courts to announce their schedules of public trials via local
media, courts’ websites, and official pages of social media. The courts
even can send their monthly or weekly trial schedules to the schools,
universities, mosques, and community leaders, and youths’ organizations in
their jurisdictional area.
The new legislation can also amend the provision of criminal code that
considers the publication of courts’ decisions as complimentary
punishment. The bill should also better define and enlighten the
international interpretation of “the right of public trial,” “trial
broadcasting,” “the right of access to information,” “due process,” “the
right of the protection of witness,” and “protection of interests of the courts,
and litigants.” The bill should clearly introduce the constitutional
discretions of the judges about conducting of the public trials, trial
broadcasting, banning and permitting the media from the courtrooms.
Under the “fair trial” standard, the bill should prevent the judges from
excluding media and members of the public from attending hearings, as this
is the practice of courts in Kenya.
Furthermore, the bill should require the courts to issue their written
decisions, illustrating their legal reasoning and justification, and file them in
their office. This obligation may require hiring new personals to courts, or
force the judges and judicial officials to work hard and more. As the judges
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receive the high amount of salary among the public officials, in some courts
where the workload is not that much, I am quite sure if both judges and
judicial official work from 8:00 AM through 4:00 PM in their offices, they
can easily handle this task. In the sites, where the workload is much more
on the courts, the new act should require the government for recruitment of
new lawyers who are well familiar with computer technology to work
towards computerizing the courts’ decisions and prepare it for online
availability. This is the courts practice in the United States.
When statutes are promulgated, their provisions are of two
characteristics: permissive and obligatory.214 The “right of public trial”
under Afghan laws is not permissive—it is obligatory; nonetheless, most of
the lawyers, especially judges, believe that it is just a permissive right. This
paper recommends that the right of public trial should be taught as an
obligatory provision, with the exceptions of certain cases where a public
trial would violate others’ privacy rights or the national interests. As public
trial is interpreted as core principle of fair trial, and a constitutional right of
citizens, Afghanistan also needs to interpret it as a core principle of its
adjudication, and pave the way for its ensuring, without keeping in mind the
conditions, and realities on the ground, as most judges and courts do this.
B.

Media Access to the Courtroom

As part of promoting media access, the government should develop a
manual to teach the media representatives the legal responsibilities of them
toward the courts and litigant parties. Because understanding court
proceeding requires some legal knowledge this paper also recommends that
the Ministry of Information and Cultural with consultation of Supreme
Court, Prosecution Office, the Afghanistan Independent Bar Association,
and the Afghanistan Journalists Independent Association should develop
such a manual to educate the Afghan journalists who report the courts’
proceedings. The manual should teach the journalist the legal language of
reporting, the legal terminology, and the proceeding procedure and the
ethics of attending in a proceeding. As part of this manual, there should be
instruction on how to take notes during proceedings, how to ask questions if
needed, how to write a report, and how to publish that report.
Media plays a proxy role for the public in the courtrooms of United
States and Kenya, except in some special cases; while in Afghan courts, the
media are invited in rare cases. In the United States and Kenya, access to
214. People v. Harner, 213 Cal. App. 3d 1400, 1405 (1989). Permissive provisions only allow
doing of an act, while obligatory provisions impose responsibility of doing of an act over the citizens.
Id. For example, in human rights principals, the “right to live” is not a permissive right, but it is an
obligatory right to every human being. The “right to travel,” in contrary, is a permissive provision, but
we are not obliged to travel. Id.
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the courtrooms, and their decisions, are interpreted under the people’s
access to information right, and freedom of expression. In Afghan courts,
while not only most of the trial proceedings are closed, but most of the
courts’ documents and decisions are considering the secret documents.
Even for educational, and academic purposes, the judges are not allowed to
disclose such information. To ensure compliance, the paper recommends to
the Supreme Court of Afghanistan to develop a comprehensive strategy for
ensuring access to information right and freedom of expression of the
public, enshrined in the constitution of Afghanistan.
C.

Promoting the Involvement of Law & Sharia Faculty and Students

In addition, this article recommends that Law and Sharia professors
and students should be formally encouraged to attend the courts’
proceedings and do their research in courts procedures and decisions. The
new bill should set foundation for the government to foster relationship
between courts and Sharia and Law Schools, and as well with the
Afghanistan Science Academy. The professors, and members of the
Academy could also be rewarded with increases in rank for serving time
observing courts—as a benefit of engaging and leading in this public
service. They will also enjoy the possibility of easy access to the courts’
decisions and documents for their research and writing. Similarly, students
of those faculties could receive credits for attending court proceedings and
recording and evaluating their observations. Furthermore, the students of
Law and Sharia schools could serve a short term of their externship in the
courts and help the judicial officials in writing their decisions.
This involvement would have the added benefit of bringing a more
practical aspect to legal education, teaching students about the practical
work that most currently do not learn until they leave law school. This
would undoubtedly improve the profession overall, as students would learn
how prosecutors develop lawsuits, how defense attorneys defend, and how
judges reason. As the Supreme Court of the United States provides a
number of internships for law school students to work in the Office of the
Counselor to the Chief Justice, Office of the Curator, Public Information
Office and Office of the Clerk, and as well as in the Appellate, and Trial
Courts of the United States, the Afghan government also can think about
such internship programs for their law and sharia schools’ students.
D.

Promoting Public Awareness About the Right to Public Trials

Civil society organizations (CSOs) can play a vital role in developing
public awareness of their rights to attend court proceedings, and seek and
support media coverage of those proceedings as an expression of their right
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to access to information. This paper recommends a broad-reaching
campaign to develop public awareness that attendance in court proceedings
is a citizen’s right. For this purpose, the government of Afghanistan can
use two practical ways: first, the government can ask the donor agencies to
initiate funds for civil society organizations to do a wide campaign about
the necessity of public trial and trial broadcasting. The members of the
civil society organization will work with local people to teach them about
their right to attend in the trials of the court. This practice will pave the
way for civil society engagement with courts, as it is in the Kenya. Second,
the government of Afghanistan can ask the professors of the universities,
the teachers of the schools, and the Mulas (religious scholars) of the
mosques to inform the people about the necessity of the public trial and trial
broadcasting. These influential figures can teach to people that how their
attendance in the court proceedings, and broadcasting of the court
proceedings can increase transparency and accountability in the courts; and
decrease the level of corruption in a significant level. The engagement of
the CSOs with courts is the most obvious cause of eradicating open
corruption in Kenya.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Over the past decade, Afghanistan has continued to be one of the most
corrupt countries in the world. Corruption is widespread in all branches of
the government, but judicial corruption has heavy impact on weakening the
rule of law in the country. To increase accountability, and transparency in
the Judiciary, public trial and trial broadcasting are the useful, and easy
ways for combating corruption in the Judiciary. Openness and access to the
courts’ decisions are the practices in many countries to grab the public trust
in Judiciary, and consequently in the government. Among others, the
United States (as a developed country, and the most fund provider to
Afghanistan) and Kenya (as a developing country) also follow the
Openness and Access to Courts’ Decision standards. These ways of
increasing accountability are also supported by the international legal
instruments. The Afghanistan Constitution also provides grounds for the
public trial and access to information rights; however, the criminal
procedure code and penal code of Afghanistan do not have clear provisions
to oblige judges for conducting trials openly. In practice, in most of the
proceedings, public do not attend and the courts also do not allow media to
cover their hearings for the public. This article recommends that
Afghanistan adopt legislation that clearly supports openness of proceedings
and access to courts and their decisions through the media.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Nations across the globe do not permit citizens to kill other citizens, so
the question remains why governments of certain countries permit the
lawful killing of its own citizens as a form of punishment. There remain
only fifty-seven countries in the world which retain the death penalty, in
that they permit the practice for ordinary crimes.1 Many of these countries
are located in Africa and the Middle East.2 Thirty other countries are
considered abolitionist in practice, meaning that they retain the death
penalty for ordinary crimes such as murder, but “have not executed anyone
during the past ten years and are believed to have a policy or established
practice of not carrying out executions.”3 Countries in this group have

*
Nicholas J. Meyer is a J.D. candidate for May 2019 at Nova Southeastern University,
Shepard Broad College of Law. Nicholas graduated in 2005 from Syracuse University, where he
received his Bachelor of Arts in Political Science.
1.
Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Dec. 31, 2016),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries?scid=30&amp;did=140.
2.

Id.

3.

Id.
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made an international commitment to not use the death penalty.4 Issuing
death sentences to juveniles is a relatively unaccepted practice in the
countries that still retain the death penalty; however, Iran is the only known
country to have executed or imposed death sentences for crimes committed
by offenders who were under the age of eighteen at the time the offense was
committed.5 Saudi Arabia and China have imposed the death penalty on
juveniles in recent years as undercover news agencies have been able to
document it covertly, despite that international law prohibits the use of the
death penalty for crimes committed by children.6 The international human
rights system is a “collection of international and regional treaties, nonbinding declarations, resolutions, rules and guidelines,” giving offenders
certain protections and giving them an opportunity to be heard all while
complying with the law of that particular country.7 The practice of
executing criminals who were under the age of eighteen at the time of their
crime is directly prohibited by the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child (UNCRC), and the American Convention on Human Rights.8
Article Six of the ICCPR ensures that the sentence of death be carried out in
accordance with the individual country’s laws and not contrary to the
provisions of the Covenant.9 Article Six states, in pertinent part,
1) Every human being has the inherent right to life. The right
shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
his life. 2) In countries which have not abolished the death
penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most
serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of
the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of
the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only
be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a
4.

Id.

5.
Michael Garcia Bochenek, Doing Away with the Death Penalty, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr.
11, 2017, 11:01 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/11/doing-away-death-penalty.
6.
Id.; Saudi Arabia: 3 Alleged Child Offenders Await Execution, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr.
17, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/17/saudi-arabia-3-alleged-child-offendersawait-execution [hereinafter Saudi Child Offenders].
7.
Iraj Lotfi, Criminal Responsibility of Children in International Documents and
Comparative Study with Iranian Law, J. POL. & L., June 1, 2017, at 98.
8.
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6(5)
(Dec. 16, 1966); G.A. Res. 44/25, International Covenant on the Rights of the Child, art. 37(a) (Nov. 20,
1989).
9.

G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), supra note 8, art. 6(2).
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competent court . . . . 5) Sentence of death shall not be imposed
for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age and
shall not be carried out on pregnant women. 10

Although there is almost a unanimous international agreement that the
juvenile death penalty violates international law, Amnesty International and
other human rights organizations have reported that a few rogue nations
continue to execute juveniles.11 A majority of these death sentences are in
Iran, where there are many children on death row.12 Some third world
countries do not have accurate record-keeping methods and are unable to
definitively determine the age of persons.13 They use their best efforts to
determine the age, but there is growing sentiment that persons ought not to
be sentenced until their age can be definitely determined.14
However, around the world, efforts are underway to abolish the death
penalty. The United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly voted on December
19, 2016, to adopt a resolution co-sponsored by eighty-nine
countries, urging a worldwide moratorium on the death penalty.15 This was
the world body’s sixth resolution on the subject, and 117 nations voted in
support of the proposal.16 The resolution also called upon all countries to
respect international standards, providing for procedural safeguards for
those facing the death penalty, to progressively restrict their use of capital
punishment, and to make available data on how and against whom they
apply the death penalty.17
This note will begin by giving a history of the juvenile death penalty in
the nations of the United States (U.S.), Saudi Arabia, China, and Iran. With
respect to each country, it will then explain in which instances the death
penalty is used on juveniles and the progress being made in the
international community to abolish it. A discussion will then follow with
10.

Id.

11.

Juvenile Offenders and the Death Penalty, CORNELL CTR. ON DEATH PENALTY
WORLDWIDE, http://www.deathpenaltyworldwide.org/juveniles.cfm (last updated Oct. 31, 2011)
[hereinafter Juvenile Offenders].
12.

Id.

13.

Id.

14.

Id.

15.
Elise Guillot et Aurélie Plaçais, The UN General Assembly Voted Overwhelmingly for A
6th Resolution Calling for A Universal Moratorium on Executions, WORLD COALITION AGAINST
DEATH PENALTY (Dec. 20, 2016), http://www.worldcoalition.org/The-UN-General-Assemblyvotedover
whelmingly-for-a-6th-resolution-calling-for-a-universal-moratorium-on-executions.html.
16.

Id.

17.

Id.
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alternatives to the death penalty and what can be done to lessen or end its
use. It will then discuss the reasoning behind why most of the countries in
the world have chosen to abolish the juvenile death penalty and why the
remaining countries should follow this same reasoning. This note will
conclude that the juvenile death penalty should be abolished worldwide
because of juveniles’ lack of maturity and the possibility that they may
contribute to society in a meaningful way at later points in their lives.
II.
A.

JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES

United States

Being a democratic republic, the United States has a President as its
chief of state.18 The legal system is a common-law system, further codified
by state and federal statutes, which is mostly based on English common law
at the federal level and common law on the state level.19 The chief of state
and head of the government is Donald J. Trump, who has been President
since January 20, 2017.20 The legislative branch is a bicameral Congress
consisting of the Senate, which has 100 members who are elected for sixyear terms and the House of Representatives, which has 435 members who
are elected for two-year terms.21
The United States is the only country in the G7 and the most
developed country to continue to execute criminals.22 The juvenile death
penalty was a feature of the criminal justice system in the United States for
some time.23 English and American common law permitted execution of
juvenile offenders.24
Children under the age of seven were conclusively presumed to
have no criminal capacity.
[But,] that presumption was
rebuttable for children aged seven to fourteen, and, if rebutted,
[they] could be convicted and subjected to adult punishment,

18.
The World Factbook: United States, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
19.

Id.

20.

Id.

21.

Id.

22.

See Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, supra note 1.

23.
Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty and International Law, 52 DUKE L.J. 485,
492–93 (2002).
24.

Id.
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including execution. Individuals over the age of fourteen were
treated as adults for purposes of criminal punishment. 25

In 1966, the United States signed and ratified the ICCPR, while also
reserving its right to disregard the ban on executing juveniles.26 “The
United States is the only country of the 144 signatories with such a
reservation.”27 The United States further reiterated its reservation in 1995
by “exempting itself from the adherence to the juvenile death penalty
ban.”28 Between 1994 and 2004, the United States “executed more juvenile
offenders than every other nation in the world combined.”29
The major turning point in relation to the death penalty being imposed
on juveniles came in 2005. In that year, the United States Supreme Court
decided that it was unconstitutional to impose a death sentence on
individuals who committed the underlying crime while under the age of
eighteen.30 This decision effectively overruled a prior decision which
upheld the death penalty for offenders above or at the age of sixteen.31 The
respondent in Roper v. Simmons relied on the Eighth Amendment’s32
protection against cruel and unusual punishment.33 For the Court to
determine if the juvenile death penalty was permissible, they referred to the
“evolving standards of decency that mark the process of a maturing
society” test in deciding if it was “so disproportionate as to be cruel and
unusual.”34
The Court in Roper noted that the death penalty should be used only
for the most heinous crimes and was reserved for the worst offenders, and
pointed to three main reasons why juvenile offenders cannot with reliability
be classified among the worst offenders.35 The first reason is that scientific
and sociological studies have shown that “[a] lack of maturity and an

25.

Id.

26.

G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), supra note 8; JOHN A. TUELL, CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM.,
JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND THE DEATH PENALTY: IS JUSTICE SERVED? 11 (2002).
27.

TUELL, supra note 26.

28.

Id. at 12.

29.
Juveniles and the Death Penalty, AM. C. L. UNION, https://www.aclu.org/other/juvenilesand-death-penalty (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
30.

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005).

31.

See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).

32.

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

33.

Roper, 543 U.S. at 560.

34.

Id. at 561 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (plurality opinion)).

35.

Id. at 569.
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underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than
in adults and are more understandable among the young.36 These qualities
often result in impetus and ill-considered actions and decisions.”37 The
Court referred to the limitations placed on those under eighteen with respect
to voting, serving on juries, and marrying without parental consent to show
the comparative immaturity and irresponsibility of juveniles.38 The second
notable difference is that “juveniles are more vulnerable . . . to negative
influence and outside pressures, including peer pressure.”39 The Court
stated that those under eighteen are most susceptible to influence and
psychological damage and have less control over their own environment.40
Further, the Court said that “the third broad difference is that the character
of a juvenile is not as well formed as an adult[, and] the personality traits of
juveniles are more transitory, [and] less fixed.”41 Noting these major
differences between adults and juveniles, the Court reasoned that it is hard
to “conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence
of [an] irretrievably depraved character.”42 The Court concluded that due to
a juvenile’s insufficient culpability, objective immaturity, vulnerability, and
lack of true depravity, inflicting the death penalty on a person under the age
of eighteen would be a cruel and unusual punishment.43
Litigants and scholars have been attempting to incorporate
international human rights laws into the legal system of the United States.
For example, in Roper, the Court noted the international community’s
almost universal opposition to the practice of the juvenile death penalty,
and even cited the UNCRC as reflective of the growing standards of
decency.44 The success of the elimination of the juvenile death penalty will
likely have a significant impact on other attempts to incorporate
international human rights law in the United States.

36.

Id.

37.

Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).

38.

Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.

39.

Id.

40.

Id.

41.

Id. at 570.

42.

Id.

43.

Roper, 543 U.S. at 572–73.

44.

Id. at 576.
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Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy.45 This means it is a “monarchy
that is not limited or restrained by laws or a constitution.”46 Saudi Arabia is
governed by Islamic or Shari’a law, which is a legal system that mirrors
Egyptian, French and customary law.47 The legislative branch features a
unicameral Consultative Council of 150 members, who are appointed by
the monarch to serve four-year terms.48 The executive branch has been led
by Salman bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud since January 23, 2015, who is both the
chief of state and head of government.49
Shari'a law is based on the teachings of the Prophet, with the Qur'an
and Sunnah being the main sources of Shari'a law.50 Morals, legal
relationships and economic activity in Saudi Arabia are governed and
regulated by judicial precedent and established practices of the kingdom.51
The penal law is not codified regarding criminal offenses and judges
are given wide latitude to apply Shari'a law as they see fit.52 “Information
about any prisoner or judicial proceeding in Saudi Arabia is hard to come
by—the justice system in notoriously arbitrary and secretive, and the media
often offers only sparse or fragmented details.”53

45.
The World Factbook: Saudi Arabia, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2017) [hereinafter Saudi
Arabia].
46.
Absolute Monarchy, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/absolutemon
archy?s=t (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
47.

Saudi Arabia, supra note 45.

48.

Id.

49.

Id.

50.
Marci Hoffman, Saudi Arabia-Introduction, BRILL ONLINE REFERENCE WORKS,
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/foreign-law-guide/saudi-arabia-introduction-COM_162300
# (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
51.

Id.

52.
Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sudan: End Juvenile Death Penalty, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 8,
2010, 11:59 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/10/08/iran-saudi-arabia-sudan-end-juvenile-deathpenalty.
53.
Miriam Wells & Namir Shabibi, These Are the Juvenile ‘Offenders’ Saudi Arabia
Executed in January, VICE NEWS (Apr. 26, 2016, 7:50 AM), https://news.vice.com/article/these-are-thejuvenile-offenders-saudi-arabia-executed-in-january.
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“Under Saudi law, [those under the age of eighteen should be tried in
juvenile court,] where the death penalty does not apply.”54 However, the
legal system does not operate or always run on established principles;
events, where juveniles are sentenced to death, are not publicized. “On
January 2, 2016, Saudi Arabia carried out a mass execution of forty-seven
men convicted on terrorism-related charges,” and there are reports that at
least one of the four Shia executed was under the age of eighteen at the time
of the offense.55 This shows that Saudi authorities will execute juveniles if
they think no one is watching.56
C.

China

The government of China is a communist state.57 The chief of state is
the President, Xi Jinping, since March 14, 2013.58 The legal system runs by
civil law influenced by Soviet and continental European law systems.59
The legislature is the unicameral National People’s Congress made up of
2987 members who are indirectly elected by municipal, regional, and
provincial people’s congress and serve five-year-terms.60
In 1983, there was a movement in the Chinese government called the
“severe blows against serious criminal activities,” which hoped to put an
end to the increasing crime trends.61 Throughout this time, many gang
leaders and major criminals were executed, but at the same time, many
minors were being executed along with those who were adults.62 Article
Forty-Four of the Chinese Criminal Law states that, “[t]he death penalty is
not to be applied to persons who have not reached the age of eighteen at the
time the crime is committed.”63 It went on to say that, “[p]ersons who have

54.
Richard Spencer, Minors Among 47 Executed by Saudi Arabia, Activists Say, TELEGRAPH
(Jan. 25, 2016, 3:02 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/saudiarabia/12120
230/Minors-among-47-executed-by-Saudi-Arabia-activists-say.html.
55.

Id.; Saudi Child Offenders, supra note 6.

56.

Spencer, supra note 54.

57.
The World Factbook: China, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
58.

Id.

59.

Id.

60.

Id.

61.

Børge Bakken, Crime, Juvenile Delinquency & Deterrence Policy in China, 30
AUSTRALIAN. J. CHINESE AFF. 29, 50 (July 1993).
62.

Id. at 52.

63.

Id.
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reached the age of sixteen, but not the age of eighteen may be sentenced to
death with a two-year suspension of execution if the crime is particularly
grave.”64 During this campaign, the death penalty was handed down to
those under the age of eighteen numerous times.65 In 1997, the criminal
law was revised in Article Forty-Nine and only stated that the death penalty
should not be imposed on “persons who have not reached the age of
eighteen at the time the crime is committed . . . .”66
It is likely that thousands of people have been executed in China, but
the numbers remain classified.67 The death penalty data is treated as a state
secret, so it is likely that the information released by the country is not the
most accurate.68 However, Amnesty International has recorded two specific
incidents where a juvenile was executed when they were under eighteen at
the time the crime was committed.69 “Zhao Lin was reportedly killed in
January of 2003 for committing murder when he was only sixteen years
old.70 In March 2004, Gao Pan was reportedly executed for murder during
an attempted robbery he committed before the age of eighteen.”71 China
signed on to the UNCRC in 1992, which prohibits the execution of
juveniles, so they are clearly violating international law when this occurs.72
D.

Iran

The legal system of the Islamic Republic of Iran is a “religious system
based on secular and Islamic law.”73 The chief of state is the Supreme
Leader Ali Hoseini-Khamenei, since June 4, 1989, and the head of the
government is President Hasan Fereidun Ruhani, who has been in power

64.

Id.

65.

Id.

66.

Bakken, supra note 61.

67.
penalty/.
68.

Death Penalty, AMNESTY INT’L (2016), https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/deathBochenek, supra note 5.

69.
China Death Penalty Database, CORNELL CTR. ON DEATH PENALTY WORLDWIDE,
https://www.deathpenaltyworldwide.org/country-search-post.cfm?country=China (last updated Apr. 10,
2014).
70.

Id.

71.

Id.

72.

Id.

73.
The World Factbook: Iran, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
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since August 3, 2013.74 The legislative branch is a unicameral consultative
assembly, which has 285 members that are elected in single and multi-seat
constituencies by a two-round vote.75
Iran continues to execute persons under the age eighteen when the
crime was committed, which is a violation of international law.76 From the
period of 2004–2007, Iran is known to have executed at least seventeen
individuals who were under eighteen at the time the crime was committed,
which is eight times more than any other country in the world.77 In
addition, many of the death sentences violate Iranian domestic law
requiring children under eighteen to be tried in special juvenile courts.78
The Islamic Penal Code came into effect in 2013, and has more
favorable conditions regarding juvenile justice, but has not fully ended
juvenile executions.79 The Islamic Penal Code allows the application of
capital punishment to juvenile offenders “unless the offender is found to
lack the mental capacity to understand the nature of the crime or its
consequences.”80 There have been reports that at least 160 juvenile
offenders are on death row as of 2014 in Iran.81 Moreover, at least eight
juveniles were executed in 2014 who were below the age of eighteen at the
time the offense was committed.82 The United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights (UNHCHR) has expressed its concern that this practice
was still occurring in Iran.83 They are in direct violation of the ICCPR and
the UNCRC.84 The High Commission has said that no matter the
circumstances of the crime, Iran was violating international human rights
74.

Id.

75.

Id.

76.
Death Sentences and Executions in 2015, AMNESTY INT’L, https://www.amnesty.org
/en/latest/research/2016/04/death-sentences-executions-2015/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
77.
Iran Leads the World in Executing Children: New Executions Highlight Arbitrary Nature
of Iranian Justice, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 19, 2007, 8:00 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2007
/06/19/iran-leads-world-executing-children.
78.

Id.

79.
U.N. Secretary-General, Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, ¶ 14,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/26 (Feb. 20, 2015) [hereinafter A/HRC/28/26].
80.
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/70 (May 28, 2015).
81.
U.N. Secretary-General, Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, ¶ 17,
U.N. Doc. A/69/306 (Aug. 12, 2014).
82.
U.N. Secretary-General, Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, ¶ 7,
U.N. Doc. A/69/356 (Aug. 27, 2014).
83.

A/HRC/28/26, supra note 79, ¶ 15.

84.

Id.

2017]

Meyer

49

laws when executing those who committed their crimes under eighteen.85
Iran has not denied that the practice was still occurring, but it has
maintained that Iran has shown a great deal of leniency and flexibility in
dealing with juvenile offenders, including encouraging victims’ families to
seek retribution, rather than execution.86 Further, Iran has responded that
although they do execute those under the age of eighteen, they will wait for
execution until the juvenile matures to eighteen.87 The U.N., however, has
said that this is still in violation of human rights laws, which bases
sentencing on the time when the offense is committed.88 Iran has accepted
a recommendation to halt juvenile executions, and the U.N. renewed its call
in this report for Iran to take action and commute all juvenile death
sentences.89
Amnesty International has faced considerable difficulty in obtaining
information regarding the juvenile death penalty and has not been able to
conduct human rights research in Iran for the last thirty years.90 Detailed
information on child offenders is not readily available in Iran, and cases,
where the death penalty is imposed on juveniles, is not regularly reported in
Iran or by the judiciary until the Supreme Court has confirmed the death
sentence or until after the execution has been carried out.91
Notwithstanding this, lawyers and families of those juveniles with death
sentences are hesitant to provide information or court documents, fearing
that this “could place them in jeopardy from Iranian security authorities” or
they are unable to obtain the information themselves.92
In one particular instance, the U.N. urged the Government of Iran to
stop the execution of Saman Naseem, who was sentenced to death for a
crime committed when he was only seventeen.93 “He had been convicted of
moharebeh (enmity against God) and mofsed fel-arz (corruption on Earth)
85.

Id.

86.

Id. ¶ 16.

87.

Id.

88.

A/HRC/28/26, supra note 79, ¶ 16.

89.

Id. ¶ 17.

90.
Report].

AMNESTY INT’L, IRAN: STILL EXECUTING CHILD OFFENDERS 8 (2015) [hereinafter Iran

91.

Id.

92.

Id.

93.
U.N. Secretary-General, Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, ¶ 15,
U.N. Doc. A/70/352 (Aug. 31, 2015); See Iran: UN Experts Urge Iran to Halt Immediately Execution
of A Juvenile Offender, Scheduled for Tomorrow, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH
COMMISSIONER (Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?News
ID=15582&LangID=E [hereinafter Iran: UN Experts].
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for alleged involvement in armed activities on behalf of the Party of Free
Life of Kurdistan.”94 He was tortured into confessing and the Iranian
government stated that he was in prison and “his case was under review by
the judiciary.”95
In addition, serious shortcomings in the Iranian criminal justice system
remain. Unfair trials are commonly conducted in situations where alleged
child offenders face the death penalty.96 These failings include:
[L]ack of access to legal counsel and to a lawyer of one’s
choosing; torture and other ill treatment in pre-trial detention;
allowing confessions extracted under duress to be used in trial
proceedings; the use of detention centers outside the official
prison system; denial of the right to call defen[s]e witnesses;
failing to give adequate time to the defen[s]e to present its case;
and imprisoning defen[s]e lawyers if they protest against unfair
proceedings.97

The current Code of Criminal Procedure in Iran only gives defendants
“the right to a lawyer after investigations are complete and the offender has
been formally charged. This allows for prolonged periods . . . ” without the
assistance of a lawyer and allows for interrogations to occur without a
lawyer present, both of these will lead to the use of torture or other
mistreatments to obtain confessions.98
According to the 2016 Amnesty Report, seventy-eight juvenile
offenders remained on death row.99 Based on the 2013 Islamic Penal Code,
many of those who were below the age of eighteen when the crime was
committed were granted retrials, however, they were re-sentenced to death
after the courts determined that “they had attained sufficient ‘mental
maturity’ at the time of the crime.”100 Many of the executions of the
juvenile offenders were then stopped last minute due to “intense
international pressure.”101

94.

Iran: UN Experts, supra note 93.

95.

Id.

96.

Iran Report, supra note 90, at 16.

97.

Id.

98.

Id.

99.
AMNESTY INT’L, DEATH SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS IN 2016 GLOBAL REPORT 32
(2017) [hereinafter Amnesty 2016 Report].
100.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

101.

Id. at 33.
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III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LAW
A.

Similarities

The United States, Saudi Arabia, China and Iran are all a party to or
have signed on the UNCRC, but the United States and Somalia are the only
ones that have not ratified the treaty.102 However, these countries have all
been some of the slowest countries in their progression of abolishing the
juvenile death penalty and the death penalty, generally.103 It is clear,
though, that Saudi Arabia, China and Iran are violating the terms of the
Convention and breaking international law because the juvenile death
penalty is still occurring in these countries, in fairly unknown
circumstances. Although it is difficult to find out clear information about
these countries regarding the juvenile death penalty, various media outlets
and undercover agencies have been able to document several cases of the
death penalty being imposed.104 It is surprising that one of the most
developed and rich countries in the world, the United States, is on the same
level as under-developed countries such as Iran.
B.

Discussion

In Roper, it is interesting to note Justice Kennedy’s more societal
reasons in advocating for the abolishment of the juvenile death penalty.105
He makes the argument that it would not make sense to have a minor pay
the ultimate price with his life if he has diminished culpability compared to
an adult.106 Further, trained psychiatrists with diagnostic testing tools
normally refrain from assessing anyone under eighteen with antisocial
personality disorder, so it would not make sense for juries to make the
decision that a person under eighteen is so irreparable as an individual that
they should face the death penalty.107
It is also interesting to note that Justice Kennedy refers to the
international community, even while acknowledging that the only issue in

102. The Convention, CHILD RIGHTS INT’L NETWORK, https://www.crin.org/en/home/rights
/convention (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
103.

See generally Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, supra note 1, at 2.

104. U.N. Doc. A/70/352, supra note 93; Amnesty 2016 Report, supra note 99; see Saudi Child
Offenders, supra note 6.
105.

See Roper, 543 U.S. at 568–75.

106.

Id. at 573.

107.

Id.
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the case is whether the juvenile death penalty is cruel and unusual.108
However, the Court has noted that previous Courts have referred to the laws
of other countries and to international authorities as instructive, but not
authoritative, for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.109 In looking
at the international community, the Court noted the UNCRC.110 At that
time, in 2005, every nation in the world had ratified this treaty which
contained a prohibition on juvenile capital punishment, except for the
United States and Somalia.111
The main reasons for any criminal punishment are retribution and
deterrence, but it is not clear that the juvenile death penalty accomplishes
either of these goals.112 In Roper, Justice Kennedy points out that juveniles
necessarily have lessened culpability than their adult counterparts and
because of this we should hold them to a lower standard.113 The Court is
correct in stating that if retribution is the way to express the community’s
moral outrage or an attempt to right the wrong done to the victim, it is not
necessarily fair if there is lessened culpability.114 Retribution would then
not be “proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is imposed on one
whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished” due to age or
incapacity.115 He also notes that the deterrent effect is less apparent, but it
would lead one to believe that if there is lessened culpability and
characteristic immaturity of juveniles, it would likely do little to deter other
juveniles from committing the same crimes.116
As time progresses since Roper, the United States is going further in
lessening harsh punishments for juveniles.117 In Graham v. Florida, the
Court ruled that sentencing non-homicide, juvenile offenders to life
imprisonment without parole “was unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause.”118 Justice Kennedy
108.
109.
opinion).
110.

Id. at 575.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010). See also Trop, 356 U.S. at 102–03 (plurality
Roper, 543 U.S. at 576; G.A. Res. 44/25, supra note 8, at pt. 1, art. 37.

111.

Roper, 543 U.S. at 576.

112.

Id. at 572.

113.

Id. at 572–73.

114.

Id. at 571.

115.

Id.

116.

Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.

117.

See Graham, 560 U.S. at 67–68 (2010).

118. Id. at 79–80; see Kallee Spooner & Michael S. Vaughn, Sentencing Juvenile Homicide
Offenders: A 50-State Survey, 5 VA. J. CRIM. L. 130, 136 (2017).
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wrote in his opinion while referring to developments in psychology and
neuroscience, that juveniles are more capable of change than adults since
“parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through
late adolescence.”119 Additionally, Justice Kennedy stated that life without
parole is not exactly equivalent to the death penalty, but both sentences
share common attributes.120 They are both irrevocable and diminish hope
of release, except in cases of executive clemency, which is a “remote
possibility of which does not mitigate the harshness of the sentence.”121
Other purposes of criminal punishment, which apply universally
among all societies and legal systems are:
1) incapacitation, 2)
rehabilitation, and 3) restitution.122 “Incapacitation refers to the technique
of rendering a criminal powerless . . . .”123 “Rehabilitation refers to the
process by which attempts are made to help former criminals reenter
society as productive citizens.”124 This is done by ordering offenders to
undergo certain things such as counseling, engaging in community service,
or attending job training classes.125 Restitution is aimed at making the
victim whole at the expense of the criminal in a material, property based
sense, and is done, for example, by ordering a criminal to return stolen
property to the victim or ordering a vandal to pay for repair of her victim’s
damaged property.126
In addition to the conclusion that juveniles have lessened culpability,
other important factors weigh against giving juveniles death sentences.
Most juveniles who commit crimes suffer “unthinkable circumstances at the
hands of parents, community members, and overwhelmed government
agencies for years prior to landing in the adult criminal justice system.”127
Juvenile offenders share many of the same common attributes: “robbed
childhoods, disappointing circumstances, mistrust in adult role models and

119.

Graham, 560 U.S. at 68.

120.

Id. at 69.

121.

Id. at 70.

122. Mohamed A. Arafa & Jonathan G. Burns, Judicial Corporal Punishment in the United
States? Lessons from Islamic Criminal Law for Curing the Ills of Mass Incarceration, 25 IND. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 385, 388.
123.

Id.

124.

Id.

125.

Id.

126.

Id.

127. Tiffani N. Darden, Juvenile Justice’s Second Chance: Untangling the Retroactive
Application of Miller v. Alabama Under the Teague Doctrine, 42 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 3 (2014).
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regretful choices.”128 “Most juvenile delinquency stories demonstrate that
governmental systems in place to protect these children fail to ensure their
safe upbringing, but not for lack of trying.”129 These convicted felons are
forced to acknowledge what they did was wrong, show their redeemable
qualities and ask for an opportunity to demonstrate how they can be
rehabilitated.130 Rehabilitation is not tailored to juveniles who are facing
significant prison time and of course, not able to be shown if there is a
death sentence.131 Further, if one is sentenced to death, we will never know
their rehabilitative potential.132 In comparing adults versus juveniles, it is
much more likely that a juvenile will have some small chance of
rehabilitation.133
“International human rights law has now become an established,
essential, and universally accepted part of the life of the international
community.134 Individuals, including the citizens of the United States, are
now understood to possess remediable rights based on international law.”135
The remainder of the countries should follow and adapt and to this custom
of looking at the international community in deciding what laws are
appropriate for their own country.
“Many international legal scholars [agree] . . . that the prohibition on
the juvenile death penalty now constitutes a rule of customary international
law . . . .”136 In order for a specific practice to become a customary rule of
international law, four elements must be met.137 Over time, the practice
must have developed consistently in a number of countries and opinion
juris—which is a collection of countries who feel a certain level of conduct
is required by international law—must also exist.138 Scholars have applied
the circumstances to these four principles, noting the widespread and
consistent rejection of the juvenile death penalty in the international
128.

Id.

129.

Id. at 4.

130.

Id.

131.

Id.

132.

Darden, supra note 127, at 5.

133.

Id.

134. Philip Sapsford, An End to the Death Penalty for Juvenile Offenders, 45 VA. J. INT’L L.
799, 804 (2005).
135.

Id.

136. William Feldman, Role of International Human Rights Law in the American Decision to
Abolish the Juvenile Death Penalty, 7 APPALACHIAN J.L. 89, 97–98 (2007).
137.

Id.

138.

Id.
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community, the development of the practice over the past fifty years, and
the behavior of countries showing the general recognition of the
prohibition.139 This has led to the conclusion that the prohibition on the
juvenile death penalty is a customary norm.140
Some scholars have stated that the prohibition on the juvenile death
penalty is a jus cogens norm.141 Jus cogens is defined as “a norm accepted
and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a
norm which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by
a subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character.”142 A practice must satisfy three conditions in order to be
considered a jus cogens under international law.143 “First, a large number
of states must consider it necessary for international public order.144
Second, multilateral agreements must prohibit the derogation from the
norm.145 Finally, international tribunals must have applied the norm.”146
Based on the ICCPR and the UNCRC, it appears that the juvenile death
penalty would be classified as a jus cogens norm.147 However, there was
still much disagreement in the past as to whether the juvenile death penalty
rose to the level of genocide, slavery, and torture, which are routinely
condemned in the international community.148
However, some of the countries discussed have a basis and rationale in
their own law to prohibit the juvenile death penalty.149 In Iran, the initial
legislation having to do with children was the Formation of the Child
Offenders Court Act, which said that minors convicted of crimes carrying a
sentence of death or life imprisonment, should be held in a correctional and
rehabilitative center.150 In addition, the Islamic Penal Code states that
crimes committed by children are an absolute mistake and remuneration

139.

Id.

140.

Id.

141.

Feldman, supra note 136.

142.

Id.

143.

Id.

144.

Id.

145.

Id.

146.

Feldman, supra note 136.

147.

Id.

148.

Id.

149. NISRINE ABIAD & FARKHANDA ZIA MANSOOR, CRIMINAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF THE
CHILD IN MUSLIM STATES: A COMPARATIVE AND ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVE 151–52 (2010).
150.

Id.
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should be done by their guardian.151 It further states that children lack
responsibility for crimes, and the age of adulthood is often based on
physical characteristics, rather than a defined age, which is determined
region by region.152 Although the Protection of Children and Juveniles Act
was ratified in 2003, stating that those under eighteen would benefit from
children’s rights, in practice, the law is not carried out regularly in Iran, and
many judges have refused to accept that eighteen should be the age of legal
protection and criminal responsibility.153 In Saudi Arabia, the trouble is
that the age of majority is not well-defined and as of 2010, they did not
have a law prohibiting the death penalty for juveniles.154 In China,
children’s rights are very limited and rights and freedoms are only granted
if they are useful to the state or society, with the Communist party deciding
what is favorable.155 There has been little basis for children’s rights in
China, especially with the one child policy, severely limiting the benefits
afforded to the child if he is not the first.156
Furthermore, all jurists and those in the international community do
not agree that the juvenile death penalty should be abolished in all
circumstances. Justice Scalia was one of the detractors of the abolishment
and wrote adamantly about it in his dissenting opinion in Roper.157 Scalia
felt that that the United States should not necessarily compare itself to other
countries when deciding which laws to abolish.158 Justice Scalia stated that:
The Court’s special reliance on the laws of the United Kingdom
is perhaps the most indefensible part of its opinion . . . . Instead,
the Court undertakes the majestic task of determining . . . our
Nation’s current standards of decency.
It is beyond
comprehension why we should look, for that purpose, to a
country that has developed, in the centuries since the
Revolutionary War—and with increasing speed since the United
Kingdom’s recent submission to the jurisprudence of European
Court dominated by continental jurists—a legal, political and
151.

Id. at 152–53.

152.

Id. at 153.

153.

Id. at 153–54.

154.

ABIAD & MANSOOR, supra note 149, at 21.

155. Timothy John Fitzgibbon, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Are
Children Really Protected? A Case Study of China’s Implementation, 20 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 325, 342–47 (1998).
156.

Id.

157.

See Roper, 543 U.S. at 624–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

158.

Id. at 626–27.
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social culture quite different from our own . . . . The Court
should either profess its willingness to reconsider all these
matters in light of the views of foreigners, or else it should cease
putting forth foreigners’ views as part of the reasoned basis of its
decisions. To invoke alien law when it agrees with one’s own
thinking, and ignores it otherwise, is not reasoned decisionmaking, but sophistry.159

At the time, no national consensus among legal scholars and individual
citizens existed, and thus Justice Scalia believed this was reason enough for
the Court to continue the possibility of executing juveniles.160 This opinion
was written in 2005 and must be viewed with some hesitation, but the
United States and most of the international community have come a long
way in reforming juvenile justice, although much remains to be achieved.161
There are still other arguments against the imposition of the juvenile
death penalty, in addition to the traditional lack of maturity and diminished
level of culpability arguments. An especially interesting argument reveals
the conflict between a state or country’s duty as parens patriae to protect
children on the one hand, and its role in executing children on the other
provides another reason why there should be no capital punishment of
children.162 The concept of parens patriae refers to the state being the
ultimate guardian of the child; and therefore, the state should be involved in
providing for the child’s welfare and setting standards for their care. 163
This concept is prevalent in other areas of juvenile justice and should “be
applied in the context of the juvenile death penalty” if the best interests of
the child are truly the goal of a society.164 It is clearly not in the best
interest of a child to be executed, so countries utilizing the juvenile death
penalty cannot maintain that they are interested in the general welfare or
that they are looking out for what is best for the child.
Although the United States has put an end to juvenile executions,
Saudi Arabia, China, and Iran have not stopped the practice.165 Many
159.

Id. (emphasis removed).

160. Jacqulyn Giunta, Roper v. Simmons: The Execution of Juvenile Criminal Offenders in
America and the International Community’s Response, 22 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 717, 725
(2008).
161.

See Roper, 543 U.S. at 624–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

162. Suzanne D. Strater, The Juvenile Death Penalty: In the Best Interests of the Child?, 26
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 147, 160–62 (1995).
163.

Id.

164.

Id.

165.

See Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, supra note 1.
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factors weigh—even outside the United States—that the juvenile death
penalty has a deleterious effect on children and should be ended.166
“Reports on the death penalty’s deterrent effect consistently conclude that it
is no more a deterrent than lengthy prison terms.”167 In fact, many children
do not like to be enclosed for long periods of time.168 This would give
weight to the idea that a life sentence would have more of a deterrent effect
on a juvenile. Of all the arguments against the juvenile death penalty, the
one that harms society the most is the execution of innocent offenders, and
this continues to occur in the United States and throughout the world.169 In
Saudi Arabia, China, and Iran, it is troublesome that juveniles are being
executed for low-level offenses, which are offenses not even criminalized
in other countries.170
Furthermore, “[t]he existence of a stringent life sentence[, such as the
option of life without the possibility of parole,] can either partially or
completely eliminate the need for the death penalty.”171 For example, after
the state of Maryland instituted the option of a sentence of life without
parole, there were only eight new defendants added to death row in the next
five years.172 It is possible that juries believe that criminals may serve a
shorter time than their sentence, and would opt for the death penalty if they
feared the offender would be back in society.173 In addition, many prison
wardens report that those serving life sentences, commonly referred to as
lifers, “are the best-behaved prisoners in the entire system.”174 Lifers also
have the possibility of giving back to society and intervening early on by
mentoring others who are starting down the same path.175 Executions of
offenders would cut off the possibility of any restitution to society of the

166.

See Roper, 543 U.S. at 604; Strater, supra note 162, at 156–58.

167. Richard C. Dieter, Sentencing for Life: Americans Embrace Alternatives to the Death
Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (April 1993), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/sentencinglifeamericans-embrace-alternatives-death-penalty.
168. Growing Up Locked Down: Youth in Solitary Confinement in Jails and Prisons Across
the United States, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 10, 2012), https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/10/10/growinglocked-down/youth-solitary-confinement-jails-and-prisons-across-united.
169.

Dieter, supra note 167.

170. U.N. Doc. A/70/352, supra note 93; Amnesty 2016 Report, supra note 99, at 7; see Saudi
Child Offenders, supra note 6.
171.

Dieter, supra note 167.

172.

Id.
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Id.
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family of the victim.176 The United States has decided that non-homicide,
juvenile offenders should not receive a life sentence without the possibility
of parole.177 However, if the governments of Saudi Arabia, China, and Iran
feel strongly that juvenile offenders need to be punished, they could use
mandatory life sentences, and this would likely lead to a better behaved
prison population and inmates that could pay part of their debt to society
and to the victim’s family.178
IV. CONCLUSION
The death penalty has been a heavily debated topic across the globe
for many years. The juvenile death penalty is even more controversial, and
most would believe that it is not permitted anywhere in the world.179
Although juvenile executions are infrequently occurring in some
countries—notably, Saudi Arabia, China, and Iran—many are being done in
secret so that the international community will not be aware.180 However,
Amnesty International and other undercover agencies have been able to
highlight some of the instances where the death penalty has been imposed
on juveniles.181
It is surprising to note that the United States took until 2005 to
officially abolish the juvenile death penalty, which is much slower than
comparably developed countries.182 The United States has followed a slow
path of juvenile justice reform, including abolishing the juvenile death
penalty, and the process of reform is still ongoing as it learns more about
the maturity and psychology of individuals.183
Saudi Arabia, China, and Iran are some of the countries of the world
that have had the slowest progression in putting an end to the juvenile death
penalty.184 They are breaking international law and are not following the
terms of the treaties, which each party signed, every time a juvenile is
executed. Furthermore, most juveniles have been through a tough
childhood and certain circumstances, through no fault of their own, have
176.

Dieter, supra note 167.

177.

Graham, 560 U.S. at 82.

178.

Dieter, supra note 167.

179. See Time to Stop Executing Children, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Oct. 19, 2004),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/1042#sedilia.
180.

Bochenek, supra note 5; Spencer, supra note 54.

181.

Juvenile Offenders, supra note 11.
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Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.

183.

See Graham, 560 U.S. at 52–82.
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See generally Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, supra note 1.
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led them down the path of juvenile criminal behavior.185 The government
of each country should have a parenting role in addition to the child’s actual
parents and should be looking out for the best interests of the child. If
countries are imposing the death penalty on juveniles, there is no way they
can have the best interests of the child at heart.
Saudi Arabia, China, and Iran should put an immediate end to the
juvenile death penalty in their respective countries. The United States has
not been a model country to follow regarding the abolition of the juvenile
death penalty, but Saudi Arabia, China, and Iran should follow the general
rationale that the United States used. The culpability and maturity levels of
juveniles are less than their adult counterparts and, therefore, they should
not face the most extreme form of criminal punishment.186 Further,
juveniles are not fully developed emotionally, socially, and physiologically,
and do not understand all the implications of their criminal behavior.187
Saudi Arabia, China, and Iran need to keep this in mind when sentencing
criminal juveniles and should use less harsh forms of punishment other than
the death penalty. There has been significant progress in the world toward
the goal of abolishing the death penalty for adults, and the first step would
be to abolish the cruel and inhumane practice of imposing the death penalty
on the most vulnerable of individuals, juveniles.

185.

Strater, supra note 162.

186.

See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–74.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

“Kurds are the largest ethnic and linguistic minority in Turkey.” 1
Kurds are perceived as a threat to Turkish national unity. Turkey has
suppressed many attempts by the Kurds to ameliorate the protection of their
human rights and stifled any plight for the recognition of their minority
rights. The Kurds have no friends. Today’s great powers, as those of
yesterday, benefit from a status quo that maintains the Kurds in their
helpless position. My purpose in this paper is to argue for changing this
status quo.
This paper will first introduce who the Kurds are and the area they
inhabit to establish that the Kurds are a distinct group separate to the
Turkish, Persian and Arab nations that occupied them. The distinctiveness
of Kurds is a fundamental notion underlying the right to self-determination.
Second, the treatment of Kurds by the Turkish Government will be detailed.
In doing so, this paper recognises the lack of accountability and systemic
culture of oppression that underscores the reality for Kurds in Turkey.
The third section will adopt a human rights law analysis to elucidate
the existing safeguards for minority rights and the right to selfdetermination under international law. Section four will then highlight the
failure of Turkish law to comply with the aforementioned international
standards to protect Kurdish rights as a minority group and to recognise
their claim to self-determination. To date, Turkey has prioritised a unitary

1.
Turkey-Kurds, MINORITY RTS. GROUP INT’L: WORLD DIRECTORY MINORITIES &
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, http://minorityrights.org/minorities/kurds-2/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2017).
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state approach leading to the disenfranchisement of Kurds and the persistent
violation of their fundamental rights.2
The fifth section will employ a legal analysis of the right to selfdetermination under international law and articulate the necessary tests and
criteria for a successful claim to self-determination by a group. The
concept of a distinct group, a minority and indigenous peoples will then be
discussed.
The sixth section of this paper will address Turkey’s stance on selfdetermination and will then apply self-determination to Kurds. By claiming
their right to self-determination, Kurds can effectively combat the systemic
oppression and abuse of their fundamental rights by Turkey. Indeed, this
paper determines that Kurds need to have an active role in their governance,
which places them at the centre as champions of change. The final section
recommends a strategy for the Kurds in Bakur to gradually achieve an
independent Kurdistan through the “earned sovereignty” approach.
II.

WHO ARE THE KURDS?

“Kurdun heval ninin bes ciya ([t]he Kurds have no friends but the
mountains).”3 Before embarking on an analysis of the problem in issue,
what is meant by the “Kurds” and “Kurdistan” must be defined and used
consistently throughout this paper. This section also demonstrates that
Kurds are a distinct group who, by virtue of their distinctness, have rights
as a separate group and have a claim to self-determination.4
A.

Historical Characteristics

In the ancient lands of Mesopotamia in the Middle East, there exists a
geographical region where the Kurds form a prominent majority—
Kurdistan. Kurdistan encompasses the area from the southern end of the
Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, and the Northern Zagros and Eastern Taurus
mountain ranges.5

2.
See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, VIOLATIONS OF FREE EXPRESSION IN TURKEY
(1999) (providing an example of the Kurds’ fundamental rights being violated through suppression).
3.
ROBERT L. BRENNEMAN, AS STRONG AS THE MOUNTAINS: A KURDISH CULTURAL
JOURNEY 58 (2007).
4.
Ieva Vezbergaite, Self-Determination of the Kurdish People: Undermining the Unity of
the «Turkish Nation»?, 3 (Univ. of Fribourg, Working Paper No. 9, 2015).
5.
See Where is “Kurdistan”?, KURDISH PROJECT, https://thekurdishproject.org/kurdistanmap/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2017).
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Kurds, who are of Aryan descent, are a unique ethnic group distinct
from the neighbouring Arabs, Persians and Turks.6 The Kurds speak their
own language deriving from the Iranian branch of the Indo-European group
of languages. 7 An independent Kurdistan has long been the dream of
Kurds.
B.

Twentieth Century Treatment

The triumph over the Ottoman Empire during the First World War led
to the creation of the modern Middle East by the Allies. 8 In 1920, the
Ottoman Empire and the United Kingdom stipulated the Treaty of Sèvres,
which assured Kurdish independence.9
However, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s victory at the Turkish War of
Independence barred the ratification of the Treaty of Sèvres and the Allies
reneged on their promise of Kurdish independence.10 In 1923, the Treaty of
Sèvres was nullified and the Treaty of Lausanne superseded, containing no
reference to Kurdistan. 11 Atatürk’s nationalist movement led to the
occupation of the Kurdish regions and the region was split between the four
newly emerged states—Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Persia (now Iran). 12
However, the Kurds have not acquiesced to domination quietly. Since the

6.
History: Who Are the Kurds, and Where Do They Live?, ROJAVA SOLIDARITY SEATTLE,
https://www.rojavasolidarityseattle.com/history (last visited Oct. 29, 2017).
7.

Id.

8.
Philip Mansel, The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire, HIST. TODAY,
http://www.historytoday.com/philip-mansel/great-powers-and-end-ottoman-empire (last visited Oct. 29,
2017).
9.
Chris Trueman, The Treaty of Sevres, HIST. LEARNING SITE (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.
historylearningsite.co.uk/modern-world-history-1918-to-1980/the-treaty-of-sevres/; Treaty of Sèvres,
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-Sevres (last visited Oct. 29, 2017).
10.

Trueman, supra note 9.

11.

Treaty of Sèvres, supra note 9; N.Y. CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE, THE
TREATIES OF PEACE 1919–1923 959–1022 (vol. 2 1924) (referencing art. 39) [hereinafter Treaty of
Lausanne].
12.
GEORGE BLACK, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GENOCIDE IN IRAQ: THE ANFAL CAMPAIGN
AGAINST THE KURDS 24 (1993); Nick Danforth, Stop Blaming Colonial Borders for the Middle East's
Problems, ATLANTIC (Sept. 11, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/09/stopblaming-colonial-borders-for-the-middle-easts-problems/279561/ (stating that some Kurdish and Middle
Eastern commentators have recognised that these borders were drawn arbitrarily and without
consideration of the traditional boundaries of the region).
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early 1920s, there have been a myriad of Kurdish rebellions in Bakur:
Koçkiri, Sheikh Said, Dersim, and Ararat.13
In 1927, the Kurds, backed by the United Kingdom (U.K.), declared
independence and formed the ‘Republic of Ararat’.14 However, this selfproclaimed state was short-lived and the Turkish military conquered it in
1930.15 Between 1937 and 1938, an estimated 50,000–70,000 Kurds were
killed and thousands were exiled in a dire crackdown on Kurdish
rebellion.16
C.

The Kurds Today

Today, Kurdistan comprises a region partitioned between four
different sovereign nations—northern Iraq (‘Bashur’), southeastern Turkey
(‘Bakur’), northwestern Iran (‘Rojhalat’) and northeastern Syria
(‘Rojava’).17
Kurds, estimated to have a population of approximately 25–30 million
people, are the world’s largest ethnic group without a state. 18 Kurdistan
remains divided by the repressive colonialism of these states who have
stifled any attempts by the Kurds of securing freedom against domination
and their struggles for the recognition of minority rights.19 The Kurds have
endlessly “faced oppression, discrimination, assimilation, ethnic cleansing
and genocide” at the hands of their oppressors.20 As encapsulated cogently,
“the Kurds are one of the most persecuted minorities of our time.”21

13.
Robert Olson, The Kurdish Rebellions of Sheikh Said (1925), Mt. Ararat (1930), and
Dersim (1937–38): Their Impact on the Development of the Turkish Air Force and on Kurdish and
Turkish Nationalism, 40 DIE WELT DES ISLAMS 67, 67 (2000).
14.
FACTS ON FILE LIBRARY OF WORLD HISTORY, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE PEOPLES OF
AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST 385 (Jamie Stokes ed. 2009).
15.

Id.

16.
DAVID MCDOWALL, A MODERN HISTORY OF THE KURDS 209 (I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 3d
ed. 2004); Ruwayda Mustafah, Why Did Erdogan Apologise for the Dersim Massacre?, HUFFPOST:
WORLDPOST, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/ruwayda-mustafah/why-did-erdogan-apologise_b_11137
32.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2017).
17.
18.
ed. 2011).

See Appendix 1 for a contemporary map of Kurdistan.
MICHAEL M. GUNTER, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE KURDS 1 (Jon Woronoff ed., 2d

19.
See THE CTR. OF HALABJA AGAINST ANFALIZATION & GENOCIDE OF THE KURDS
(CHAK), “ANFAL”: THE IRAQI STATE’S GENOCIDE AGAINST THE KURDS 7 (2007) [hereinafter Chak].
20.

Id.

21.
Dominique Callimanopulos, Kurdish Repression in Turkey, CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q.
MAG. (June 1982), https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/kurdishrepression-turkey.
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I believe that the current state of Kurdish populations continues the
oppression of the Kurds by occupying colonialist states which denies their
fundamental rights. This paper will thus seek to remedy this situation and
argue the case for Kurdish self-determination.
III.

KURDS IN TURKEY

“The Turks are the only lords of this country, its only owners. Those
who are not of pure Turkish stock have in this country only one right, that
of being servants, of being slaves. Let friend and foe, and even the
mountains know this truth!”22
Kurds are the largest ethnic and linguistic minority in Turkey and “are
concentrated in [the] provinces of the southeast, the same [region] that their
ancestors inhabited . . . in fifth century B.C.” 23 Although there are no
accurate statistics on Kurdish populations, as Turkish censuses do not
identify Kurds as a separate ethnic group, it is estimated that half of the
world’s Kurdish population are located in Turkey.24 Due to the size of the
Kurds in Turkey, they are perceived as the ultimate threat to Turkish
national unity and have been subject to various efforts to thwart their
progress. The purpose of this section, therefore, is to understand how
Kurds are treated in Turkey. In doing so, I highlight that because of such
treatment, the case for self-determination of Kurds is urgent.
A.

Historical Treatment & Movements of Kurds in Turkey

Since the aftermath of the First World War, “Kurds in Turkey have
been the victims of persistent [abuses] of their linguistic, ethnic, cultural,
religious, economic and political rights by successive Turkish
Governments.”25
In an attempt to eradicate all vestige of Kurdish existence, extreme
measures were adopted in the 1920s. In 1924, a “mandate [outlawed]
Kurdish schools, organisations and publications,” the use and teaching of
the Kurdish language entirely and the wearing of Kurdish dress as part of a
policy of compulsory assimilation. 26 All “Kurdish insignia were

22.
Martin van Bruinessen, Genocide in Kurdistan?: The Suppression of the Dersim
Rebellion in Turkey (1937–38) and the Chemical War Against the Iraqi Kurds (1988), in GENOCIDE:
CONCEPTUAL & HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS 141, 154 (George Andreopoulos ed., 1994).
23.
Eric Hooglund, The Society and Its Environment, in TURKEY: A COUNTRY STUDY 71, 98
(Helen Chapin Metz ed., 5th ed. 1996).
24.

Id.

25.

Callimanopulos, supra note 21.

26.

Id.
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outlawed.”27 The Turkish Government (the Government) even banned the
words “Kurds,” “Kurdistan,” and “Kurdish” from usage and the Kurdish
language was banned by law. 28 The mere acknowledgement of Kurdish
existence was illegal.29
Kurdish language suppression has been one of the Government's key
strategies for assimilating the Kurds.30 The use of Kurdish was deemed a
threat to Turkey’s unity and indivisibility and the use of the Kurdish
language has historically been perceived as a sign of separatist intentions.31
The Government perceived that the use of Kurdish language would
strengthen the identity of Kurds, increasing moves towards separatism and
threatening political unity.32 It has been argued that speaking one’s mothertongue language is an important component linked to the manifestation of
one’s identity, a sense of belonging and affiliation as identity is embodied
in language, culture and tradition.33
Turkey demonstrated a deliberate intent to destroy Kurds, as
evidenced by the policy of assimilation directed at them and their language.
The policy should be more appropriately termed ethnocide—the eradication
of Kurdish ethnic identity. 34 The Government categorised Kurds as
“Mountain Turks.” 35
Ismet Inonü, former President of Turkey,
encapsulated the attitude towards Kurds when he publicly announced, “We
shall, at any price, Turkicize those who live in our country, and destroy
those who rise up against the Turks and Turkdom.” 36 Notwithstanding
vigorous attempts over a long period to disseminate the Turkish language

27.

Id.

28.

Id.

29.

Id.

30.
Michael Chittenden, Turkey and the Kurds: Conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
and Implications for Turkey-United States Relations, GLOBAL SECURITY STUD., Summer 2016, at 31,
32.
31.
Culture and Language Rights – Mother-Tongue Education in the Kurdish Regions,
KURDISH HUM. RTS. PROJECT 1, 8 (July 2011), http://www.observatori.org/paises/pais_66/documentos/
Mother%20Tongue%20Education%20in%20Kurdish%20Regions.%20KHRP%20Briefing%20Paper.%
20July%202011.pdf [hereinafter Mother-Tongue Education].
32.

Id. at 12.

33.

Id. at 11.

34.
Genocide and Ethnocide, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, http://www.encyclopedia.com/socialsciences/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/genocide-and-ethnocide#B (last visited Oct. 29,
2017).
35.

YASEMIN ÇELIK, CONTEMPORARY TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY 3 (1999).

36.

van Bruinessen, supra note 22, at 151.
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amongst the Kurds, a majority of Kurds have preserved their native
tongue.37
The Kurds have sought the inclusion of Kurdish as a language of
instruction and as a subject in public schools.38 Presently, Kurdish is still
prohibited as a language of instruction in both public and private schools
but is allowed in some schools as a subject.39 The freedom to use mother
tongue language by minority groups is an essential means for expressing
their cultural identity, yet, as illustrated in this section, the Kurds were
repeatedly bereft of this right.
B.

Kurds as A Minority Group in Turkey

The recognition of a group as a minority is pivotal to the rights and
protection they are afforded. This section aims to elucidate Turkey’s
approach to the identification and status of Kurds as a minority group,
legally and politically. The failure to recognise Kurds as a minority
contributes to the ongoing human rights violations by Turkey and thus selfdetermination is the best solution to ensure their protection as a minority
group.
While the genesis of the conflict between the state and Kurds stems
from the Ottoman era, the political and legal underpinning of Turkey’s
stance pertinent to their Kurdish minority arose in the start of the
Republican epoch.40 From its inception, the Republic of Turkey built a new
state ideology to shape a modern nation on European premises of a single
secular national identity.41 The notion of Turkish identity was premised on
social and cultural conditioning rather than ethnicity. All Muslims were
Turkish notwithstanding their ethnicity. 42 This ideological perspective
defined Islam as the “homogenising glue of the Turkish nation” and was
used as a restraint to countervail the influence of Kurdish nationalism.43

37.
Sevda Arslan, Language Policy in Turkey and Its Effect on the Kurdish Language (Aug.
2015) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Western Michigan University) (on file with the Graduate College at
ScholarWorks, Western Michigan University).
38.

Mother-Tongue Education, supra note 31, at 13.

39.

Id.

40.
See Mesut Yegen, The Kurdish Question in Turkish State Discourse, 34 J. CONTEMP.
HIST. 555, 555 (1999).
41.
ROBERT OLSON, THE EMERGENCE OF KURDISH NATIONALISM AND THE SHEIKH SAID
REBELLION, 1880–1925 5 (1st ed. 1989).
42.

Yegen, supra note 40, at 557.

43.
Ana Dević & Marija Krstić, The Incentives and Actors of Protests in Turkey and BosniaHerzegovina in 2013, in ‘EVERYWHERE TAKSIM’: SOWING THE SEEDS FOR A NEW TURKEY AT GEZI 59,
61 (Isabel David & Kumru F. Toktamiş eds. 2015).
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Turkish policy towards the Kurdish minority is encapsulated by the
term denial: denial that Kurds exist in Turkey and denial that Kurds are a
distinct group to Turks. This denial has been an underlying notion since the
establishment of modern-day Turkey. 44 During the negotiations for the
Treaty of Lausanne, the Allies sought the inclusion of all minorities,
including ethnic minorities, within the Treaty’s terms.45 However, Turkey
rejected any distinct status for non-Turkish Muslims and defined minorities
on the basis of religion excluding Turkey's numerous ethnic, linguistic and
cultural minorities, specifically the Kurds. 46 It only recognised official
minority status for non-Muslim religious minorities, for example, Greek
Christians, Armenian Christians and Jews.47
Problematically, the Treaty of Lausanne only safeguards rights for
non-Muslim minorities and fails to consider in any way the cultural,
linguistic or ethnic minorities in Turkey, of which the Kurds make up the
greatest proportion of.48 A report by the Human Rights Advisory Board
mandated by the government found that the minority definition used in the
Treaty was too restrictive and recommended that the law be amended to
recognise that minorities exist where groups are ethnically, linguistically
and religiously different. 49 Shortly after, the authors of the report faced
criminal proceedings under Articles 216 (incitement of racial hatred) and
301(denigration of the Turkish nation) of the Penal Code due to their stance
in the report.50
Despite Turkey’s refusal to acknowledge the existence of Kurds as a
distinct ethnicity or to give Kurds formal recognition as minorities, Turkey
offered the semblance of protection of their minority rights through the
affirmative obligations under the Treaty of Lausanne.51 Article 39 assured
“[n]o restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national
of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press,
or in publications of any kind or at public meetings.” 52 It further
44.

INT’L HUM. RTS. L. GROUP, WASHINGTON, D.C.: THE COMM’N ON SEC. & COOPERATION
(1994).

IN EUR., CRIMINALIZING PARLIAMENTARY SPEECH IN TURKEY 8

45.
HUM. RTS. ADVISORY BOARD, THE MINORITY RIGHTS AND CULTURAL RIGHTS WORKING
GROUP REPORT: OCTOBER 2004 1 (2004) [hereinafter WORKING GROUP REPORT].
46.

Id.

47.

Treaty of Lausanne, supra note 11 (referencing art. 39).

48.

Id.

49.

WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 45, at 2.

50.
EDWARD GRIEVES, KURDISH HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, SUPPRESSING ACADEMIC
DEBATE: THE TURKISH PENAL CODE - TRIAL OBSERVATION REPORT 1, 22 (Joanna Hunt et al. eds.,
2006).
51.

See Treaty of Lausanne, supra note 11.

52.

Id. at 971 (referencing art. 39).
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guaranteed: “adequate facilities shall be given to Turkish nationals of nonTurkish speech for the oral use of their own language before the Courts.”53
Turkey has continuously breached the Treaty of Lausanne. 54
However, even strict adherence to it would not comply with contemporary
international standards and the changing expectations; it does not afford
proper legal protection to minorities in Turkey.

1.

Turkish Reform of Minority Rights for European Union
Membership

Turkey formally applied for full membership of the European Union
(EU) in April 1987, and was recognised as a candidate for EU accession in
1997.55 In its endeavour to satisfy the minority protection element of the
EU membership criteria stipulated at the June 1993 European Council in
Copenhagen (Copenhagen Criteria), Turkey legislated various
constitutional and legislative reform laws.56 These reforms sought to grant
ethnic and linguistic minorities some language rights, at least in theory.57
The reforms precipitated greater freedom of expression; ended the ban
of publications and broadcasting in Kurdish and ushered a series of laws for
teaching Kurdish as an elective subject in schools.58 However, Turkey has
avoided any express reference that might indicate official recognition of its
minorities. By demanding restrictive conditions, the Government has made
the implementation of their limited minority rights essentially impossible.
C.

The Birth of the PKK & Kurdish Independence Movements

Due to the dissatisfaction with the lack of change and progress, many
Kurds have taken matters into their own hands to fight the repression by
Turkey and protect their identity. While many Kurdish groups have
emerged in the plight to ameliorate their rights in Turkey, the Kurdistan
Workers' Party Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK) has been the most
persistent in their activism.

53.

Id.

54.

WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 45, at 2.

55.

European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations:
Turkey, EUR.
COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/
turkey_en (last visited Nov. 4, 2017).
56.
European Commission Press Release IP/04/1180, The Commission, Commission
Recommends to Start Negotiations with Turkey Under Certain Conditions (Oct. 6, 2004).
57.
Id.; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TURKEY: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
ACCESSION PARTNERSHIP (2000).
58.

Dević & Krstić, supra note 43.
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In 1978, Abdullah Öcalan founded the PKK, an armed left-wing
organisation based in Bakur.59 The PKK’s ideology was initially based on
revolutionary Marxism-Leninism and Kurdish nationalism. 60 At its
inception, the PKK sought to create an independent, socialist Kurdish state
comprised of all its constituents—Bakur, Bashur, Rojhalat and Rojava—to
be known as Kurdistan. 61 However, since Öcalan’s capture and
imprisonment in 1999, the PKK’s objective has been moderated to asserting
cultural and political rights as well as self-determination for the Kurds in
Bakur; the urge for the establishment of a fully independent state has been
abandoned.62
Öcalan’s imprisonment has become a defining factor of the Kurdish
struggle. Many PKK members, supporters and sympathisers have insisted
that Öcalan’s freedom would epitomise the freedom of Kurds.63 However,
the reality is that the prospect of Öcalan’s release from prison, absent a
special amnesty, is non-existent.64 Öcalan is no longer facing death row as
the Turkish legislature revoked the death penalty in 2002 as part of the
array of reforms in preparation for EU accession.65 Thus, his sentence was
reduced to life imprisonment. 66 In 2005, in his appeal regarding the
fairness of his trial, the European Court of Human Rights ruled in his
favour, however, Turkey rejected its findings on the grounds that the ruling
was not binding on Turkey.67
During his time in prison, Öcalan’s ideology underwent a
transformational shift and he led the PKK to adopt a new political platform
of “Democratic Confederalism.” 68 According to Öcalan, Democratic
Confederalism is not modelled on or controlled by a state system; it is a
non-state social paradigm.69 He states “[t]his kind of rule or administration
59.
Tom Anderson & Eliza Egret, Democratic Confederalism in Kurdistan, CORP. WATCH
(Apr. 18, 2016, 16:05), https://corporatewatch.org/news/2016/apr/18/democratic-confederalism-kurdis
tan.
60.

Id.

61.

Id.

62.
8 HUSSEIN TAHIRI, THE STRUCTURE OF KURDISH SOCIETY AND THE STRUGGLE FOR A
KURDISH STATE 243 (2007).
63.

Aliza Marcus, Turkey’s PKK: Rise, Fall, Rise Again?, WORLD POL’Y J., Spring 2007, at

64.

Id.

65.

Id.

66.

Id.

67.

Id.

75, 83.

68.
ADEM UZUN, “LIVING FREEDOM”: THE EVOLUTION OF THE KURDISH CONFLICT IN
TURKEY AND THE EFFORTS TO RESOLVE IT 22 (Véronique Dudouet & Luxshi Vimalarajah eds., 2014).
69.

Id. at 21.
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can be called a non-state political administration or a democracy without a
state.”70 Democratic Confederalism centres on grass-roots participation and
decision-making within the communities.71 He asserted that we should not
leave history to the United Nations (U.N.) concept of the nation-state but
should instead formulate alternative modes of ordering.72
Over time, the PKK has grown more diverse and today is better
understood as a party-complex—a configuration of parties and
organisations encompassing numerous parties and their guerrilla forces.73
In 2007, the Association of Communities in Kurdistan—Koma Civakên
Kurdistan (KCK)—was established in accordance with the new political
trajectory. 74 KCK is a societal organisation of Kurds from all regions
embodying Öcalan’s Democratic Confederalism and presents itself as an
alternative to the concept of the nation-state.75 The KCK is essentially a
network of village, city and regional councils across Kurdish zones whose
legislative body is called the Kurdistan People’s Congress—Kongra-Gel.76
With a focus on organising from the bottom up through village, town,
and city council assemblies, the Democratic Confederalism is a movement
“which struggles to establish its own democracy, neither grounded on the
existing nation-states nor seeing them as the obstacle.”77 Öcalan envisages
the KCK as model for the resolution of Kurdish problems through a new
political paradigm.78
D.

Continuing Armed Conflict in Turkey

Since its inception, the PKK has successfully mobilised a great
proportion of the Kurdish population in Bakur. 79 The first armed

70.

ABDULLAH ÖCALAN, DEMOCRATIC CONFEDERALISM 21 (Int’l Initiative, trans., 1st ed.

71.

Id. at 26.

2011).
72.
See ABDULLAH ÖCALAN, PRISON WRITINGS III: THE ROAD MAP TO NEGOTIATIONS 83–
89 (Havin Guneser, trans., 1st ed. 2012).
73.
Joost Jongerden & Ahmet Hamdi Akkaya, Democratic Confederalism As A Kurdish
Spring: The PKK and the Quest for Radical Democracy, in THE KURDISH SPRING: GEOPOLITICAL
CHANGES AND THE KURDS 163, 165–66 (Mohammed M. A. Ahmed & Michael M. Gunter eds., 2013).
74.

Id. at 166.

75.

Id.

76.

Id. at 166, n.10.

77.

PAUL WHITE, THE PKK: COMING DOWN FROM THE MOUNTAINS 130 (2015).

78.

UZUN, supra note 68.

79.
Ofra Bengio, The Kurds in A Volatile Middle East, MIDEAST SECURITY & POL’Y STUD.,
Feb. 27, 2017, at 1, 12.
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insurgency launched by the PKK against Turkey began in 1984. 80 Ever
since, there have been various periods of ceasefires ranging in length and
subsequent revocations of the ceasefire when the PKK believed their
attempts to negotiate with the Government about the long-disenfranchised
Kurdish minority were continuously ignored.81 On July 25, 2015, the PKK
announced the end of the most recent ceasefire stating that Ankara had
welched on its promises.82 Violence subsequently spread in the wake of
resurgence throughout Turkey by the PKK and the Government.83
Since the war between the PKK and Turkey began in 1984, over
40,000 people have been killed and the Government forcibly evacuated
more than 3000 Kurdish villages, resulting in the destitution of 3 million
people.84
The changing international circumstances that arose out of the 9/11
terrorist attacks had severe repercussions internationally. It had immense
impact on the EU’s engagement regarding the PKK and Turkey.85 “[T]he
European Council [proclaimed] the ‘fight against terrorism’ as a priority
objective and [released] a list of ‘persons, groups and entities involved in
terrorist acts.’”86 PKK is now listed as a terrorist organisation by a number
of states and organisations internationally, including the EU 87 and the
United States (U.S.).88
Despite that the armed insurgency instigated by the PKK being a result
of—rather than cause of—the war between Turkey and the Kurds, the
violence has overshadowed the roots of the war, allowing Turkey to frame
it solely as counter-terrorism.89 This allows Turkey to disguise its human

80.
John Pike, Kurdistan Workers’ Party, FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS: INTELLIGENCE RESOURCE
PROGRAM, https://fas.org/irp/world/para/pkk.htm (last updated May 21, 2004).
81.
See generally Gareth Jenkins, PKK Changes Battlefield Tactics to Force Turkey into
Negotiations, TERRORISM FOCUS, Oct. 24, 2007.
82.
PKK Group Says Turkish Ceasefire Over, RUDAW:
http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/turkey/120720151.

MIDDLE E. (Dec. 7, 2015),

83.
PKK Ends Unilateral Cease-Fire with Turkey, ALJAZEERA AM. (Nov. 5, 2015, 12:08
PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/11/5/pkk-ends-unilateral-ceasefire-with-turkey.html.
84.

Id.; Turkey-Kurds, supra note 1.
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Dilek Kurban, Europe As an Agent of Change: The Role of the European Court of Human
Rights and the EU in Turkey’s Kurdish Policies, STIFUNG WISSENSCHAFT UND POLITIK: GERMAN INST.
FOR INT’L & SEC. AFFAIRS, Oct. 2014, at 1, 18.
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Id. (citing 2001 O.J. (L 344) 93).
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2009 O.J. (L 151) 45.
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Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP’T STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/
other/des/123085.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2017).
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Kurban, supra note 85, at 5.
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rights violations in Bakur behind the cover of counter-terrorism.90 Instead
of addressing the rights of Kurdish minorities, Turkey’s persistent focus on
enforcing counter-terrorism policies against the PKK equates to a refusal to
address the root causes of the conflict. An unescapable cycle currently
exists whereby the Government attempts to quash Kurdish insurgency,
despite the fact that this insurgency is itself a reaction to Turkey’s lack of
recognition of Kurdish rights.
This section has demonstrated that despite the actions of Kurdish
independence movements, Kurds in Turkey have been consistently
oppressed, targeted and marginalised as a minority both historically and
today. Kurds are still not recognised and protected as a minority by Turkey
despite Turkey’s semblance of commitment to reform. Hence, it must be
recognised that the panacea to the conflict is likely linked to better human
rights for Kurds in Turkey and this can be achieved through selfdetermination.
IV.

HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ANALYSIS

“Behind all law is someone’s story; someone whose blood, if you read
closely, leaks through the lines. Text does not beget text; life does. The
question—a question of politics and history and therefore law—is whose
experience grounds what law?”91
This section adopts a human rights law analysis as an attempt to
remedy the situation for Kurds in Turkey. Key international instruments
will be examined to identify Turkey’s international obligations to protect
minorities. Lastly, the shortcomings of Turkish law in protecting its
minorities will be analysed to support the case that self-determination is the
best solution for Kurdish minorities whose rights have been abused.
Under international law, Turkey is obliged to guarantee rights to its
minority population.92 It is a party to many international conventions and
instruments that oblige Turkey to protect and promote minority rights. 93
The rights which are of particular concern to Kurdish minorities in Turkey
and which are systematically abused are the right to self-determination,
90.
Turkey: UN Human Rights Council Should Address Continuous Deterioration of
Freedom of Expression and Other Human Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 17, 2017, 6:13 AM), https://
www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/17/turkey-un-human-rights-council-should-address-continuous-deterioratio
n-freedom.
91.
59 (1993).

Catharine A. MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, 4 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 59,

92.
KURDISH HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, KURDISH HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT SUBMISSION TO
COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 11, ¶ 13 (May 2010) [hereinafter
KHRP].
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93.
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right to education, right to take part in cultural life, freedom of expression,
freedom of association, right to life and the right not to be subject to torture
or degrading behaviour.94
While Turkey is state party to various international instruments, it has
been reticent to become a party to binding international standards protecting
minority rights. 95 However, many fundamental rights safeguarding
minority culture and language are identified in various key international
instruments to which Turkey is a party, so it cannot escape international law
frameworks entirely.96
International human rights law is governed by “the International Bill
of Human Rights which comprises the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights [UDHR], the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights [ICESCR], and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights [ICCPR] and its two Optional Protocols.”97 Turkey is a
party to all these international human rights instruments as well as the
European Convention on Human Rights.98
A.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

“The UDHR is a milestone document,” the first in history, to
encapsulate the fundamental human rights to be universally protected. 99
Drafted by representatives from all regions globally with differing legal and
cultural backgrounds, the UDHR was manifested “as a common standard of
achievements for all peoples and all nations.”100
In essence, the UDHR guarantees free participation in the cultural life
of the community.101 It guarantees the right to education and recognises it

94.

See id. at 12–13, ¶¶ 16–17.

95.

Id. at para. 16, p. 12.

96.

See id. at 11–14, ¶¶ 13–21.

97.
Fact Sheet No.2 (Rev.1), The International Bill of Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS OFF.
HIGH COMMISSIONER, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf (last
visited Oct. 31, 2017).
98.
EUROPEAN COMM’N, 2015 PROGRESS REPORT ON TURKEY 5 (2015), https://ec.
europa.eu/neighbourhoodenlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_report_turkey
.pdf [hereinafter 2015 PROGRESS REPORT]; Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties Turkey, U. MINN.: HUM. RTS. LIBR., http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/ratification-turkey.html (last
visited Nov. 5, 2017).
99.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en
/universal-declaration-human-rights/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2017) (alteration in original).

1948).
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G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at art. 27(1) (Dec. 10,
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as an instrument to “promote understanding, tolerance and friendship
among all nations, racial or religious groups.”102 The UDHR guarantees the
right to freedom of expression, including “seek[ing], receiv[ing] and
impart[ing] information and ideas through any media . . . .”103 “Turkey was
among the [forty-eight] countries that voted for and signed the [UDHR].”104
While the UDHR is not a binding treaty and only has recommendatory
status, it is mostly like to be seen as evidence of state practice and thus
binding as customary international law on states.
B.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

The ICCPR requires state parties to respect the civil and political
rights of individuals in their nation.105 The ICCPR ensures the right of all
peoples to retain their cultural and religious heritage and way of life.106 It
protects the fundamental right to equality.107 It prohibits discrimination or
adverse distinctions based on race, language, religion, political or cultural
opinions, national or social origin.108
The ICCPR and the ICESCR, guarantee the right to self-determination,
namely the freedom to determine political status and economic, social and
cultural development in Article 1.109 State parties are obliged to promote
the realisation of the right to self-determination and respect it in conformity
with the provisions of the U.N. Charter.110 The right to self-determination
is a fundamental provision empowering minorities to determine how they
are governed.
In addition, it also guarantees individuals from minority groups culture
and language rights. The ICCPR prohibits state parties from denying their
minorities the right “in community with the other members of their group,
to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to
use their own language.”111 The ICCPR guarantees the right to freedom of
102.

Id. art. 26.

103.

Id. art. 19.

104. Marlies Casier, Contesting the ‘Truth’ of Turkey’s Human Rights Situation: StateAssociation Interactions in and Outside the Southeast, EUR. J. TURKISH STUD., no. 10, 2009, at 1, 3.
105. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR].
106.

Id. art. 26.

107.

Id.

108.

Id.

109. Id. art. 1; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1, Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
110.

ICCPR, supra note 105, at art. 1(3).

111.

Id. art. 27.
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expression, including seeking, receiving and imparting information and
ideas through any media.112
While Turkey ratified the ICCPR in September 2003, it issued a
reservation to Article 27 that this Article would be implemented pursuant to
the Turkish Constitution and the Treaty of Lausanne 1923.113 The effect of
Turkey’s reservation in practice means the exclusion of its application to
Kurds.
C.

International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights

The ICESCR, another international instrument that Turkey ratified in
2003, guarantees the universal right to take part in cultural life.114 “The
right . . . to take part in cultural life is ‘intrinsically linked’ to the right to
education [in Article 13,] which [empowers] individuals and communities
[to] pass on their . . . language and other cultural references . . . .”115 To
realise these rights, individuals must be able to express themselves in the
language of their choice,116 and to seek, receive and impart information on
all manifestations of culture in the language of their choice.117
Crucially, states must employ measures and “spare no effort” so that
education for minorities is carried out in their own language.118 This arises
from states’ obligations “to recognize, respect and protect minority cultures
as an essential component of the identity of the states themselves.”119 The
ICESCR recognises education as a vehicle that should be used for
strengthening adherence with other fundamental rights and freedoms.120
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)
requires states to ensure their education systems are available, acceptable,
accessible and adaptable.121 Essentially, this means that the burden is on
112.

Id. art. 19(2).

113. LAWYERS’ RIGHTS WATCH CAN. & THE OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN
RIGHTS DEF., BRIEFING TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, 106TH SESSION (15 OCT. – 2 NOV.)
GENEVA 2 (2012).
114.

ICESCR, supra note 109, at art. 15(a).

115. U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. On Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights General
Comment No. 21, at para. 2, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/21 (2009).
116.

Id. at para. 15(a).

117.

Id. at para. 16(b).

118.

Id. at para. 27.

119.

Id. at para. 32.

120.

ICESCR, supra note 109, at art. 13(1).

121. U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. On Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights General
Comment No. 13: The Right to Education (Art. 13 of the Covenant), at para. 6(a)–(d), U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1999/10 (1999). [hereinafter General Comment No. 13].
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the state to take affirmative action in ensuring “education is culturally
appropriate for minorities . . . .” 122 The state must ensure education is
accessible to everyone without discrimination both in theory and in
practice, and that it is accessible physically and economically.123 It needs to
be adaptable to the demands of fluid and ever-changing societies and
communities as well as meet the needs of all people within their diverse
social and cultural circumstances.124 These standards posit a strong case for
mother-tongue education.
The ICESCR emphasises the principles of non-discrimination and,
crucially, underline that the right to education must “enable all persons to
effectively participate in a free society . . . .” 125 States should promote
understanding amongst all ethnic, racial and religious groups and ensure
that equal educational opportunities are afforded to all minorities.126
Despite Turkey being a signatory to the ICESCR, it has issued
reservations to interpret and apply the ICESCR provisions regarding
academic freedom consistent with the Turkey Constitution.127 Specifically,
Turkey’s Constitution states that Turkish is the only official language of the
State and denies the right to education in other languages.128 While states
are permitted to choose one or more national or official languages, they are
not permitted to exclude, outside the spheres of public life, the freedom to
express oneself in a language of one’s own choice.129
The CESCR has voiced its concern over Turkey’s reservation and
recommended that Turkey withdraw its reservations to the ICESCR.130 The
CESCR has further recommended that Turkey apply and interpret the
ICESCR taking into consideration the jurisprudence of the CESCR. 131
Pertinent to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, state parties
cannot submit a reservation that is “incompatible with the object and

122.

Id. at para. 50.

123.

Id. at para. 6(b).

124.

Id. at para. 6(d).

125.

ICESCR, supra note 109, at art. 13(1).

126.

General Comment No. 13, supra note 121, at para. 30.

127.

Id. at para. 43.

128.
42 (1982).

TÜRKIYE CUMHURIYETI ANAYASASI [THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY CONSTITUTION], art. 3,

129. Ballantyne, Davidson & McIntyre v. Canada, CCPR/C/47/D/359/1989 & 385/1989/Rev. 1
(Mar. 31, 1993).
130. Comm. On Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., Rep. on Its Forty-Sixth Session, at (C)(6), U.N.
Doc E/C.12/TUR/CO/1 (2011).
131.

Id.
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purpose of the [Covenant].” 132 This would be true of the reservations
Turkey has made to the ICCPR and ICESCR. While Turkey has made
reservations to certain provisions of the ICCPR and ICESCR, the
reservations would only be applicable to the rights found in those
provisions; they would not apply to the same rights that also make up
customary international law.133 States are bound to customary international
law.134
Turkey has still not taken positive measures in the negotiation and
adoption of an optional protocol to the ICESCR. The adoption of an
optional protocol would provide an avenue for victims seeking public
accountability and the possibility of relief in relation to the violations of
individual economic, social and cultural rights at an international level, if
they are denied access to justice domestically.135
D.

European Convention on Human Rights

Turkey is a party to the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR). 136 The ECHR is pivotal: individuals subject to Turkey’s
domestic law have direct recourse, depending on meeting specific criteria,
to subject to the jurisdiction of the ECtHR to complain of a violation of
their rights under the ECHR.137
The right to equality is fundamental. However, Turkey has been
reluctant to ratify Protocol 12 to the ECHR, which protects the freestanding right to equality, despite signing it in 2001. 138 The purpose of
Protocol 12 is to promote equality beyond the limited scope afforded by
Article 14.139 Effectively, Protocol 12 supplements Article 14. Article 14
serves as a general prohibition against discrimination; however, it can only

132. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (with Annex) art. 19(c), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
133.

Id. art. 21(1); KHRP, supra note 92, at 10.

134.

Customary International Humanitarian Law: Questions & Answers, INT’L COMMITTEE
RED CROSS (Aug. 15, 2005), https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/customary-law-q-anda-150805.htm.
135.

KHRP, supra note 92, at 14, ¶ 21.

136. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms n.1, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S 221.
137. KHRP, supra note 92, at 13, ¶ 20; Human Rights, REPUBLIC TURK. MINISTRY FOREIGN
AFF., http://www.mfa.gov.tr/%C4%B0nsan-haklar%C4%B1.en.mfa (last visited Oct. 15, 2017).
138.

KHRP, supra note 92, at 13, ¶ 20.
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be invoked if a circumstance is within the ambit of a right stipulated under
the ECHR.140
Article 14 imposes an obligation “on the State and public authorities,
acting within the scope of convention rights, not to discriminate on the
[enumerated] grounds or any other status, . . . [without justification].”141
The possibility of justifying discrimination is a weakness which could
diminish the force of the principle.
Some academics have criticised that the ECtHR habitually elects to
decide cases based on other Articles rather than Article 14 even where
discrimination is crucial to the case.142 Article 14 is not a stand-alone right
and is only applicable in accordance with another provision under the
ECHR, thus limiting its potential application.143 It is much narrower in its
scope of application than the ICCPR equivalent in Article 26. 144 Such
weaknesses mark the failure of the ECtHR to embrace a substantive
conception of equality which would confront systematic disadvantage and
oppression.145 This failure underlies Judge Bonello’s dissenting judgment
in Anguelova v. Bulgaria:
Kurds, coloureds, Muslims, Roma and others are again and again
killed, tortured or maimed, but the Court is not persuaded that
their race, colour, nationality or place of origin has anything to
do with it. Misfortunes punctually visit disadvantaged minority
groups, but only as the result of well-disposed coincidence.146

While studies of the ECtHR jurisprudence found that the ECtHR had
taken steps to protect the marginalised in Europe, it still treads carefully.
The studies show that Article 3 and Article 8 were predominantly used for
the protection of the marginalised, rather than Article 14.147
E.

Turkish Constitution

Turkey’s ideology is based on the premise that the citizens’ first duty
is to safeguard the integrity of the Republic. This is incompatible with the
140.

Id.

141. Rory O’Connell, Cinderella Comes to the Ball: Art 14 and the Right to NonDiscrimination in the ECHR, 29 LEGAL STUD.: J. SOC’Y LEGAL SCHOLARS 211, 211 (2009).
142.

Id. at 214.

143.

Id. at 212.

144.
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145.

Id. at 214.

146.

Anguelova v. Bulgaria, 2002-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 355.
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inclusive and pluralistic culture of democratic tolerance advocated by
international human rights standards. The emphasis of international norms
is on the notion that it is the responsibility of nation states to safeguard the
rights of its citizens. However, the cultural ideology of Kemalist Turkey
demonstrates the opposite of these international standards.148
The fundamental law of Turkey is Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasi (the
Constitution).149 As required by international standards, Article 10 of the
Constitution states, everyone is equal before the law without distinction as
to “language, race, colour, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief,
religion and sect, or any such [grounds].”150 However, when read in light
of the Treaty of Lausanne, the prohibition against discrimination is
rendered ineffective in practice in regards to Kurds who are not recognised
as a minority group under the Treaty of Lausanne.151
Article 3 identifies Turkish as the only official language, despite Kurds
constituting a significant proportion of the Turkish population.152 Article
42 emphasises this restriction further, stating “[n]o language other than
Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any
institutions of . . . education.”153 The requirement that education shall “be
conducted along the lines of the principles and reforms of Atatürk . . . under
the supervision and control of the State,” means that even a reformist
administration wanting to advocate for the use of mother-tongue education
is constitutionally bound to embrace a nationalist Turkish State.154
Turkey’s Constitution fails to address minorities and makes no
reference to the word “minority” at all. In Turkey, no legal framework
exists to date for the protection of minorities, whether directly through
legislation explicitly protecting minority rights or indirectly through antidiscrimination laws.155
The lack of a Turkish legal framework on non-discrimination and
minority rights has not been overlooked and has been routinely condemned
by U.N. monitoring bodies. 156 European bodies have also denounced
Turkey’s refusal to safeguard the rights of Kurdish minorities and urged for

148. Thomas W. Smith, Leveraging Norms: The ECHR and Turkey’s Human Rights Reforms,
in UNIV. OF PA. PRESS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN TURKEY 262, 264 (Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat ed., 2011).
149.

See THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY CONSTITUTION, pmbl. (1982).

150.

Id. art 10.

151.

KHRP, supra note 92, at 11, ¶ 13.

152.

THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY CONSTITUTION, art. 3 (1982).

153.

Id. art. 42.

154.

Mother-Tongue Education, supra note 31, at 7.

155.

KHRP, supra note 92, at 10–11, ¶¶ 10–13.

156.

Id. at 10, ¶ 10.
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Constitutional reform.157 The CESCR has urged Turkey to enact legislation
to protect against discrimination consistent with the ICESCR and its
General Comment on non-discrimination.158 The CESCR has also raised
concerns about the lack of a legislative framework for the recognition of all
minority groups in Turkey, and the protection of their rights.159 Indeed, the
CESCR formally called on Turkey to recognise all minorities within its
territory and bestow full opportunities for minorities to enjoy economic,
social and cultural rights.160
While the implementation of rights consistent with international norms
has considerably improved recently, there are still immense shortcomings to
be addressed. 161 Rights standards within international and European
treaties are not fully implemented. There is an urgent need for Turkey to
adopt a comprehensive legal framework on combating discrimination and
protecting minorities in accordance with international standards. Turkey
must adopt a more inclusive definition of minorities that meets international
standards and that includes all minorities, not only non-Muslim minorities
as currently under the Treaty of Lausanne. The Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe (PACE) has already proposed the following
definition for minorities:
A group of persons in a state who:
a) Reside in the territory of that State and are citizens thereof . . . ;
b) Maintain long standing, firm and lasting ties with that state;
c) Display distinctive ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic
characteristics;
d) Are sufficiently representative, although smaller in number
than the rest of the population of the state . . . ; and
e) Are motivated by a concern to preserve together that which
constitutes their common identity, including their culture, their
traditions, their religion or their language. 162

Turkey should adopt this definition of minorities to give effect to
Article 2 of the ICCPR and ICESCR and ensure that Kurds as well as other
minorities are captured under definition.

157.

Id. at 12, ¶ 15.

158.

General Comment No. 13, supra note 121, at para. 2.

159.

KHRP, supra note 92, at 11, ¶¶ 11–12.

160.

See generally General Comment No. 13, supra note 121, at para. 2.

161. 2015 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 98, at 5. The European Commission stated that while
Turkey’s Constitution guarantees the protection of human rights, the enforcement of rights arising from
the ECHR and the case law of ECtHR is not entirely ensured. Id.
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Other Instruments

There are several other key international instruments that Turkey has
either failed to ratify or has ratified but failed to meet which are
fundamental to the protection of Kurds.
Despite international pressure, Turkey has not acceded to the
Framework Convention on National Minorities (FCNM). Turkey’s
ratification of FCNM is crucial, particularly due to Turkey’s reservation to
Article 27 of the ICCPR and also considering the FCNM is the only
multilateral binding treaty concerning minority rights specifically.163 PACE
has persistently urged Turkey to accede to the FCNM.164
Additionally, Turkey has not ratified the U.N. Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Convention against Discrimination
in Education 1960, the European Charter for Regional or Minority
Languages or the European Convention on Nationality. 165 In light of
Turkey’s historical and present relationship with its minority population, its
unwillingness to implement international standards on minority protection
and rights questions sheds uncertainty on the genuineness of its pledge to
respect and uphold minority rights within its jurisdiction.
Using a human rights law analysis, it is thus clear that Turkey is
failing to uphold and sustain international human rights standards in
relation to Kurds in its territory. This status quo cannot go on any longer
and hence I argue that self-determination is the most appropriate legal
framework to change this.
V.

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AGAINST KURDS IN TURKEY

“[T]here’s really no such thing as the ‘voiceless’. There are only the
deliberately silenced, or the preferably unheard.” 166 Turkey is failing to
comply with their international human rights obligations in guaranteeing
fundamental rights for minorities under their national legal framework, both
in theory and practice. As Kurban has stated: “The crux of the Kurdish
issue remains the structural inequalities against the Kurds . . . . These
inequalities are deeply rooted in Turkey’s authoritarian political regime and

163.

KHRP, supra note 92, at 13, ¶ 18.

164. KURDISH HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, KHRP SHADOW REPORT FOR THE REVIEW OF THE
TURKISH GOVERNMENT UNDER CERD 39 (2009).
165. U.N. EDUC. SCI. CULTURAL ORG., Universal Periodic Review, on Its Twenty-First Session
(Jan. 27, 2015); Council of Eur., Cong. of Local and Reg’l Authorities, Local Democracy in Turkey,
Rec. 229 (Nov. 20, 2007), https://rm.coe.int/1680719b53.pdf.
166. Arundhati Roy, Peace & the New Corporate Liberation Theology, CTR. FOR PEACE &
CONFLICT STUD., no. 04/2, 2004, at 1, 1.
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can only be addressed through structural reforms aimed at establishing
substantive democracy and the rule of law.”167
This fundamentally stems from Turkey’s persistent reluctance to
recognise minority groups, largely due to an ingrained fear of disunity of
the nation state. Turkey’s refusal to officially recognise minority rights
renders the guarantees stipulated in the Constitution futile. This is
exacerbated by the broad restrictions entrenched in the Constitution on
protecting Turkey’s indivisibility and unity, an instrument which could be
exploited to stifle any perceived indication of separatist intention by the
Kurds.168
The escalation of violence in the Kurdish regions of Turkey has raised
significant concerns over human rights violations. The ECtHR has found
that since September 2014 Turkey “violated the ECHR in [ninety-two]
cases [pertaining] mainly to the right to life, prohibition of torture, right to a
fair trial, right to respect for family life, freedom of expression, freedom of
thought, conscience and religion and right to liberty and security.”169
The fundamental rights of Kurds need to be strengthened in Turkey
both in law and in practice. Turkey insists that it places great significance
on the preservation of cultural heritage. It claims that tolerance and
diversity are core notions underlying its policy and that these are protected
by the fundamental rights to “freedom of religion and conscience, freedom
of thought and opinion, freedom of expression and dissemination of
thought,” freedom of press, “protection of the historical, natural and
cultural heritage, and the promotion of arts.”170 While human rights are
safeguarded in theory under the Constitution, in practice these rights are
applied discriminatorily when they concern Kurds.171 Existing violations of
human rights in Turkey include:
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Kurban, supra note 85, at 6.

168.

Mother-Tongue Education, supra note 31, at 7.

169.

2015 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 98, at 61.
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a) The lack of protection of Kurdish language and cultural rights;
b) The exploitation of terrorism laws used to imprison members
and sympathisers of legal Kurdish parties, students and
journalists, for which there is usually insufficient evidence of
violent activity;
c) The lack of accountability to date for breaches for thousands
of causes of torture, forced disappearances and the death of
civilians by state officials throughout the 1990s within the
background of the conflict between the Government and the
PKK.172

As discussed in Section III above, Turkey still denies the constitutional
existence of Kurds and has systematically failed to protect its Kurdish
minority population. A plethora of reports by various organisations
dedicated to observing human rights compliance provide conclusive
evidence of the extent to which malpractice and discriminatory laws have
contributed to mass human rights violations against the Kurds. 173 The
apparatus of the state has contributed to an atmosphere of lawlessness and
impunity of the abuse of human rights violations against the Kurds.
ECtHR has consistently condemned Turkey for its abysmal human
rights record.174 During the ECtHR’s fifty-year history, Turkey has had the
highest number of violation judgments against it; more than any of the other
forty-six signatory states to the ECtHR.175 Turkey was ranked the highest
for convictions for rights violations by the ECtHR from 1959 to 2011.176
Many cases before ECtHR and the European Commission have a concerned
trend of extensive and systematic human rights abuses against Kurds by the
Turkish state and its agents.177
The cases are predominately focused geographically and ethnically, in
Kurdish regions and related to either Kurdish victims or Kurdish cause
supporters.178 In the decade following 1999, Turkey was found in breach of
human rights in essentially all of the 1700 cases brought against it before
172.

See id. at 1–50.

173.

See, e.g., id.

174. See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT 2011 78 (2012) (noting
human rights cases against Turkey).
175. KURDISH HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, IMPACT REPORT 28 (2009) [hereinafter KHRP
IMPACT REPORT]
176. Turkey Ranks First in Violations in Between 1959–2011, BIANET: ENG. (May 15, 2012,
8:18), http://bianet.org/english/human-rights/138337-turkey-ranks-first-in-violations-in-between-19592011.
177. See, e.g., Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260 (discussing torture of a member of
PKK in Bakur).
178.

KHRP IMPACT REPORT, supra note 175, at 63.
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the ECtHR.179 The ubiquitousness of human rights violations against Kurds
are indicative of widespread practice and illustrate how human rights
violations by Turkey are carried out disproportionately against the Kurdish
minority.
Notwithstanding the prevalence of human rights violation cases
against it, Turkey continues to routinely engage in repressive measures in
the face of what it deems a threat to the state’s unity: the manifestation of
Kurdish cultural and linguistic identity and their plight for rights and selfdetermination.180 Turkey’s insistence on linguistic and cultural unity and
the goal of establishing an immensely homogeneous state make it difficult,
to recognise a legitimate space for ethnic diversity and thus lie at the root of
the conflict.181
Turkey has repeatedly, and continues to, violate the human rights of
Kurds living in its territory. Turkey thus fails to meet international human
rights standards both in theory and law, and in practice. Hence, I will now
argue that the right to self-determination is the best solution for Kurds to
determine their future and end the injustice against them.
VI.

THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION

“Self-determination is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle
of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril.”182 Given
their common background, history, language and culture, Kurds qualify as a
distinct group in Turkey and have the right to self-determination. The right
to self-determination needs to be recognised under both Turkish law and
international law. This section will analyse self-determination as a
fundamental principle under international law. It will set out the legal
criteria which must be satisfied for a claim to self-determination, namely
what constitutes a people, to make the case that Kurds meet the legal
definition of a distinct “people” and thus have a right to self-determination.
A.

Self-Determination Under International Law

The right of nations to self-determination is a fundamental principle in
international law.183 It is considered a rule of customary international law
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and is deemed as an erga omnes principle by the International Court of
Justice (ICJ).184
Self-determination was introduced by Woodrow Wilson after World
War I. 185 Wilson likened self-determination to the American ideal of
democracy and advocated it as the “foreign extension of American norms
of political fairness.”186 It has since been recognised as a universal right of
peoples to be free from domination by oppressors.187 The U.N. Charter
states that nations, based on respect for the principle of equal rights and fair
equality of opportunity, have the right to freely choose their sovereignty
and international political status with no interference.188 The notion of selfdetermination is deemed an “inalienable” right of all peoples or an
“essential condition” for the effective guarantee and the observance of
individual human rights.189
The right to self-determination can be defined as “the capacity of
people to control and participate in decision making in determining their
political status, in pursuing their economic, social, and cultural
development, and disposing of their natural wealth and resources.” 190
States are required to implement this right and to facilitate its realisation.191
This obligation became more pressing when the U.N. Human Rights
Committee (HRC) required state parties to the ICCPR and the ICESCR to
report on “the constitutional and political processes which in practice allow
the exercise of this right.”192
Under international law, the right of distinct “peoples” within
sovereign states to self-determination is recognised and their cultural,
physiological, linguistic and religious differences from other groups in a
given territory may be determinative of their status as a “peoples.” 193
184.
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International treaties have upheld the right by reference to it as the right of
peoples to self-determination. 194 Article 1(1) of the ICCPR and the
ICESCR stipulate, “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”195 Article 1(3) of
the ICCPR and ICESCR say that State Parties “shall promote the realisation
of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right . . . .”196
Generally, under international law, no state or group of people have
the right to violate the territorial integrity and sovereignty of another state.
A state’s sovereignty is pivotal. However, “self-determination [can
override] territorial integrity when a [state] has: i) violated the “economic,
social, and cultural development” of a people . . . ; and ii) the people have a
valid territorial claim to the area that they wish to claim.”197
Many issues stem from the ambiguity around the right to selfdetermination. It is unclear how the decision in relation to selfdetermination is to be made, how the right is realised, or what the outcome
should be—whether it should be independence, federation, protection, some
form of autonomy or full assimilation. Neither the U.N. Charter nor the
international treaties define what constitutes a nation for the purposes of the
right to self-determination.
There are irreconcilable definitions and legal criteria for deciding
which groups have a legitimate claim to self-determination. Professor
Alfredsson argues that the term “nation” was replaced with “peoples” by
the U.N. for a practical rationale as the former was too ethnically loaded,
although the two terms can be used interchangeably.198 International law
implies the solution is all in the label; if a group is labelled a “people” then
the right to self-determination exists, if a group is labelled a “minority” then
it does not. 199 Ultimately, these definitions can have severe legal

194. Self Determination (International Law), LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cor
nell.edu/wex/self_determination_international_law (last visited Nov. 5, 2017).
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197. Philip S. Hadji, The Case for Kurdish Statehood in Iraq, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 513,
521 (2009).
198. Ulrike Barten, What’s in A Name? Peoples, Minorities, Indigenous Peoples, Tribal
Groups and Nations 14 J. ETHNOPOLITICS & MINORITY ISSUES EUR. 1, 13 (2015) (citing Gudmundur
Alfredsson, Minorities, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, and Peoples: Definitions of Terms as a Matter
of International Law 163, 170, in MARTINUS NIJHOFF PUBLISHERS, MINORITIES, PEOPLES AND SELFDETERMINATION (Nazila Ghanea & Alexandra Xanthaki eds., 2005).
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Revisited, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 509, 515–16 (2007)).
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repercussions.200 The failure of states to grant a group rights is an issue
requiring better classification of groups. 201 Specifically, in relation to
minorities, the lack of an encompassing definition is misused as a
justification for not granting them the appropriate rights.202
B.

The Requirement of A Distinct Group

For a group of people to attain the right to self-determination, they
have to be sufficiently “distinct” as a people.203 The criteria for whether a
people can attain this distinctiveness can be split into objective elements
and subjective elements.204 The traditional two-prong test first examines
the objective elements of the group to ascertain the extent of the shared
“common racial background, ethnicity, language, religion, history and
cultural heritage” of the group.205 Secondly, to satisfy the subjective prong
of the test, the group members have to individually perceive themselves
collectively as a distinct “people.”206 Some academics within international
law discourse have defined peoples and nations using two very different
methods: the “territorial approach” and the “characteristics approach.”207
Each of these methods will be discussed in turn.

1.

The Territorial Approach

The territorial approach focuses on persons within a defined territory,
often the territory of a nation-state and identified them as a “people.”208 “A
people [means] one territory or one state with one people.”209 In using the
territorial approach to defining a “people,” it is necessary to distinguish
three key elements associated with self-determination: “the situation on the
ground [or the reality], the theory and the practice.”210 While you would
expect reality and state practice to intersect, it is not always so with this
approach.
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“The [notion] of self-determination was stipulated in the U.N. Charter
and [enacted within] the context of the decolonisation of Africa.”211 The
situation on the ground in Africa is clear in that sense that prior, during and
following decolonisation, all concerned states were multi-national. 212
Crucially, prior to decolonisation, the colonies were also multinational.213
At this point, practice during decolonisation was to endow the right of selfdetermination to peoples based on territorial grounds.214
Following the first ripple of decolonisation, the right to selfdetermination was denied to groups in the recently independent states on
the basis that they had already implemented that right in achieving
independence.215 “Theoretically, [the right to] self-determination became
international law [when it was elucidated] in the U.N. Charter.” 216
“However, General Assembly Resolution 1541 [fleshed out] selfdetermination and decolonisation.” 217 U.N. resolutions and international
treaties clarify that it is possible for any one territory to have several
peoples existing within its parameters, specifically by referring to “a
territory and its peoples.”218

2.

The Characteristic Approach

In contrast, the characteristics approach identifies a “people” by
reference to the common characteristics of its constituent members. 219
“This means many peoples could exist within the same territory.”220 Under
this approach, group composition and common characteristics ascertain the
group’s category and whether they qualify for particular rights. 221
According to UNESCO, the common characteristics determining a
“people” can be, but are not limited to, “a common historical tradition,
racial or ethnic identity, cultural homogeneity, linguistic unity, religious or
ideological affinity, territorial connection, and common economic life.”222
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To be identified as a “people,” the group needs to be “more than a
mere association of individuals within the [s]tate,” however there is no
prerequisite about how large the group must be.223 Furthermore, UNESCO
stipulated that holistically the group “must have the will to be identified as
a people . . . or the consciousness of being a people” and “have institutions
or other means of expressing its common characteristics and will for
identity.” 224 While the UNESCO criteria were written by experts and
continues to have force in academia, it has never been adopted
internationally.225
A “people” can be determined by either of the aforementioned
approaches. Pursuant to the territorial approach, every state that has
seceded, following the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples, has breached international law.226 “The
territorial approach does not [accept] secession, [because] there can only be
one people in one state.”227 In reality, we know that most states are not
homogenous and are actually comprised of more than one group—who may
be different culturally, ethnically and/or religiously.228 Therefore, I argue
that an approach that takes all common characteristics into consideration
when defining a “people” is pivotal if international law is to be relevant or
applicable practically. The characteristics approach, which looks at the
defining characteristics of a people, is very similar to the way minorities are
defined.229
C.

Minorities

International law is lacking in terms of providing a clear binding
definition of the term “minority.”230 Today, the most prevalent definition of
a minority continues to be the definition Fransceso Capotorti, the then U.N.
Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, proposed in 1977 in relation to
Article 27 of the ICCPR:
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A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a
State, in a non-dominant position, whose membersbeing
nationals of the Statepossess ethnic, religious or linguistic
characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population
and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed
towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or
language.231

The territorial approach has limited relevance in defining a minority; it
is relevant primarily in considering whether a group is settled
predominantly in a region or whether its constituent members are dispersed
over regions as this can affect their rights.232 For example, if the Kurds are
deemed a minority then the territorial approach is relevant to determining
that its members are spread across four states and consequently this affects
the realisation of their rights.
The implication for minorities in practice is that even if a binding
definition was adopted, the existence of a minority simply due to a legal
definition is not in itself sufficient. A state needs to recognise the group as
a minority and their rights. While there is no condition that a state must
recognise the minority for the theoretical definition, practically, without
state recognition, definitions are rendered meaningless. Thus, there is an
apparent gap between practice and theory. Generally, the view was that a
definition of the term “minority” was a sine qua non to ensuring the
international protection of minorities is a workable regime in practice; there
are, however, proponents of the idea that theory is superfluous and what
matters is that minorities realise their rights.233
The former United Nations Working Group on Minorities stipulated
that individuals of an ethnic group may seek protection under minority
rights and they may, when acting as part of a group, assert claims pertinent
to the right to self-determination.234
A determinative factor in minorities realising their rights is the state in
which they live in. While minority rights derive from international law, the
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state maintains responsibility for guaranteeing them. Without state
recognition, minorities are bereft of their minority rights.235
D.

Indigenous Peoples

In international law, the crux of the definition of an “indigenous
people” is whether a group considers itself as distinct from other groups,
whether there is a shared common ancestry with the occupants of a given
territory before its domination by another group or series of groups,
whether they live in a specific geographic area, and whether they share a
language, culture, and history.236 A people’s indigenous status stems from
them inhabiting a region before other settlers moved in as a result of
conquest, occupation, colonisation endangering the indigenous peoples’
livelihoods and very existence.237
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(UNDRIP) recognises indigenous peoples’ right to unrestricted selfdetermination. 238 The right to self-determination includes the right “to
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development.”239 Article 4 ensures indigenous peoples’
right “to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal
and local affairs,” and Article 5 safeguards their right “to maintain and
strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural
institutions.”240 Article 26 states that “[i]ndigenous peoples have the right
to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned,
occupied or otherwise used or acquired,” and it requires states to give legal
recognition to these territories.241
In addition to UNDRIP, international human rights law contained in
other treaties and international legal materials such as the ICCPR and
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ICESCR also guarantee indigenous peoples the right of cultural and
religious self-determination.242
The right to self-determination is guaranteed in international law;
however, the legal requirements, definitions and categorisation of groups
are pertinent to establishing a claim to self-determination. The law on selfdetermination is appropriate to apply to the Kurds in Turkey who have been
denied their fundamental rights and I will apply it in the following section.
VII.

APPLICATION OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION

“Self-determination denotes the legal right of people to decide their
own destiny in the international order.”243 The right to self-determination
has been guaranteed for distinct “peoples” and indigenous peoples,
however, the same right does not extend to minority groups.244 I believe
there is a compelling case for applying self-determination to Kurds and that
the test for self-determination can be substantiated regardless of which
category is used. Kurds satisfy the criteria for a “peoples”—a minority and
indigenous peoples—and have the right to self-determination. In this
section the historical application of self-determination will be examined and
then Turkey’s stance on self-determination. Lastly, I will apply selfdetermination to Kurds and stipulate the specific demands of selfdetermination by Kurds.
A.

Historical Application of Self-Determination

Self-determination rights have been bestowed through various forms
such as independence or at the very least autonomy to many peoples whom
were subject to Ottoman imperialism including, the Armenians, Israelis,
Lebanese, Iraqis, Syrians, Jordanians, and Saudi Arabians.245
The right to self-determination has also been extended to many
peoples that were living within nation states that were established following
World War II. 246 When the principle of self-determination was first
introduced following the Great War, it was applied solely to nations and
envisaged in its internal form.247 However since World War II, there has
been a shift in the way the right is perceived and it has become a right for
peoples.
The way self-determination has been stipulated through
242.
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international law more recently, it appears it is mostly applicable to peoples
and indigenous peoples; there is limited discourse around the right of
minorities to self-determination.
“The [nexus] between minority rights and the right to selfdetermination [is legitimised pursuant to the fulfilment] of the principle of
substantive equality, human rights, the right to identity and culture, and
self-determination’s [significance] for democratic governance.” 248 Selfdetermination can be realised through numerous avenues ranging from
actual participatory democracy to legal pluralism in which rights such as
the right to cultural, linguistic, and political autonomy are exerted.249 An
analysis of the principle of self-determination, historically, illustrates an
indissoluble connection between indispensability for minority protection
and the right to self-determination. This connection became increasingly
apparent in the International Committee of Jurists’ advisory report in
relation to Åaland Islands where the protection of minorities and the right to
self-determination were deemed as embracing “a common object to assure
to some national [g]roup the maintenance and free development of its
social, ethnical or religious characteristics.”250
B.

Turkey’s Stance on Self-Determination

In Turkey, there is currently no reference to the right to selfdetermination in the Turkish Constitution or any other legislation. Even
where rights exist in international law, the realisation of those rights depend
on the state. Without Turkey’s recognition, Kurdish are bereft of their
rights. In the international arena, Turkey’s political and legal stance
regarding the right to self-determination and minority rights has been
unreceptive to changes in international law.
Turkey has a tendency to refuse to adopt or ratify internationally
binding instruments that entail rights of people to self-determination,
reassert the rights of minority groups as a separate legal category, or are
international documents predominantly dealing with minority rights. 251
Turkey has not adopted “the European Charter for Regional or Minority
Languages, 1992, the Framework Convention on National Minorities, 1995,
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or the ECHR’s Optional Protocol 12 on discrimination.”252 Furthermore,
Turkey has not ratified the U.N. Convention on the Protection and
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions of 2005, which is
concerned with “[t]he protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural
expressions . . . the recognition of equal dignity of and respect for all
cultures, including the cultures of persons belonging to minorities and
indigenous peoples.”253
Even when it has adopted international binding instruments, Turkey
has been sure to make reservations in the face of anything that would
constitute minority protection, reserving its right to interpret and apply the
provisions of any treaty or document in accordance with the Constitution of
the Republic of Turkey and the Treaty of Lausanne. 254 Practically, this
means it limits the application of any international protection to those
identified in the Constitution as minorities such as the Greeks, Armenian
and Jews, and rejects the potential application to the unrecognised
minorities in Turkey, such as the Kurds, Alevis and Romas.
Turkey’s reservations to Article 1(1), which appear both in the
ICESCR and the ICCPR, state that it will perform its obligations under
those Covenants in accordance with the obligations under the U.N.
Charter. 255
Ultimately, Turkey accepts “self-determination” as a
“principle,” however, denies “self-determination” as a “right” and confines
its application to colonial territories.256 Through its denial of the right to
self-determination as a “right,” Turkey seeks to evade its legal implications,
which require states to take action towards fulfilling the right to selfdetermination.257
Turkey has persistently denied the relevance of self-determination to
democracy. A study on Turkey’s voting patterns in the U.N. General
Assembly revealed that Turkey also routinely denied the relevance of selfdetermination to groups within states.258 During voting in the U.N. General
Assembly for strategies connecting the right of peoples to selfdetermination and protection of substantive human rights, Turkey either
voted against or remained absent.259
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Turkey has also voted against, or abstained from voting for, any
resolution before the General Assembly advocating the protection of
cultural rights or the collective facets of human rights.260 Turkey’s attitude
to the right to self-determination demonstrates that it takes case-specific and
very political stances. There have been scenarios where Turkey has
willingly backed the right to self-determination, for example in the case of
Northern Cyprus, or has manifested support for the exercise of selfdetermination, for example in the case of Kosovo.261 The Turkish Ministry
of Foreign Affairs’ said it would render its full support in “developing a
positive and constructive dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia” in response
to the ICJ’s advisory opinion that Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence is
legal under international law.262 Turkey’s support of self-determination in
the context of Kosovo may be attributed to the equivocal nature of the ICJ’s
advisory opinion.
The most prevalent method the Government has used to persistently
deny the Kurds their right to self-determination is the criminalisation of
political and civil society organisations promoting Kurdish rights and
freedoms.263 The Government, through associating political support for the
Kurds with separatism, has taken advantage of the anti-terror laws to
prohibit pro-Kurdish parties, remove them from positions in the political
system and justify their subsequent arrest.264 This strategy of outlawing
peaceful and genuine Kurdish political parties, systematically, has been
used by the government from the early 1970s and has curbed the ability of
Kurdish parties to effectively and meaningfully participate in the Turkish
political system.265
C.

Turkey’s Constitutional Court and the Right to Self-Determination

Within the Turkish legal system, the perspective on the right to selfdetermination is encapsulated by the judgments of Turkey’s highest court,
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the Turkish Constitutional Court—Anayasa Mahkemesi (AYM) on political
party closures.
These cases arose when a series of Kurdish political parties were
closed down for insisting on the right to self-determination and striving for
rights including legal protection of their culture and language. 266 They
urged for a resolution to the “Kurdish problem” with proposals ranging
“from federation, territorial autonomy to devolution of power.” 267 The
AYM’s main rationale for the closure of Kurdish political parties was
grounded in Article 3 of the Constitution which states, “The Turkish State,
with its territory and nation, in an indivisible entity.” 268 Article 3 is
considered so important that it cannot be amended nor can its amendment
even be proposed, as set out in Article 4.269
The phrase “the state’s indivisible unity with its nation and territory”
[has been labelled a substitute] for the unitary state system.270 The phrase is
repeated throughout the Constitution and is identified as “one of the
fundamental aims of the state in [Article 5].”271 Articles 14, 26 and 28
stipulate that “the state’s indivisible unity with its nation and territory” can
trump fundamental rights and freedoms for its protection. 272 Anything
contrary to the state’s indivisible integrity with its nation and territory is
banned. 273 Ultimately, Article 3 preserves the notion of “one state, one
nation, one language, one country.”274
Under Article 80 of the Law on Political Parties 1983, political parties
are prohibited from legally demanding and taking action to change the
unitary nature of Turkey. 275 This provision has routinely been used to
collapse pro-Kurdish parties that promote decentralisation. 276 Article 81
states that political parties shall not “maintain that there are minorities in
the territory of Turkey based on differences of national or religious culture,
or race, or language,” and shall not “harm national unity by way of creating
minorities in the territory of the Republic of Turkey through protecting,
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developing or spreading languages and cultures other than the Turkish
language or culture.”277
The AYM has denied the relevance of minority protection and the
right to self-determination to Kurds and has denied their connection to the
safeguarding of human rights and to democracy overall.278 Essentially, the
AYM’s narrow interpretation of the unitary state system has been used as a
lawful justification in undermining Kurds’ demands.279
The AYM’s judgments identify, as one of the aims of the unitary state
concept, the need to prevent the creation of a minority in Turkey.280 In one
judgment, the AYM declared that there is sole sovereignty in a unitary
system, and thus there ought to be only one nation. 281 The concept of
federalism and autonomous regions are incompatible with this notion as
they allow for many sovereignties belonging to various nations.
Sovereignty is a right belonging to the Turkish nation, and not the
people. The Kurds’ only right to sovereignty is being part of the sovereign
Turkey. Thus, separatist ideologies aimed at the creation of a Kurdish
nation bestowed with sovereignty are unlawful.282
To date, the AYM has only referred to the right to self-determination
in its “external aspect [implying] secession.”283 As a result, by equating
self-determination to secession, the AYM has made any claim for the right
to self-determination illegal. 284 The AYM has asserted that discussing
“ethnic differences in a national and a unitary state is [outlawed] by
international law.” 285 Furthermore, “to differentiate between Turks and
Kurds, and seek the . . . right to self-determination for the Kurds . . . [also]
constitutes a breach of international law.” 286 Controversially, it has
neglected the internal aspect of self-determination entirely.
Turkey’s vehement stance towards the closure of any political parties
has been condemned on many occasions by the ECtHR as being in breach
of the ECHR.287 The ECtHR disagrees with Turkey that an alternate system
within a sovereign state such as a federation, autonomous region or the like
277.
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are contrary to democracy.288 Instead, the ECtHR has advocated that they
are in fact consistent with the interpretation of the ECHR. 289 In its
judgment of Socialist Party v. Turkey, the ECtHR held: “It is of the essence
of democracy to allow diverse political programmes to be proposed and
debated, even those that call into question the way a State is currently
organised, provided that they do not harm democracy itself.”290 Statements
that Kurds have a right to self-determination are not undemocratic; they are
the epitome of democracy.
In contrast to international norms, the AYM has interpreted the right to
self-determination as a “one-off” right to be claimed at a “particular period”
rather than as an on-going right.291 The AYM stated, “The right to selfdetermination is not a new concept . . . . It was dropped from the agenda of
the Turkish Nation with the Lausanne Treaty.”292
The reference to the right being dropped is relevant to the Kurds as the
AYM asserts that they have “used their ‘one-off’ right to self-determination
in Lausanne . . . by agreeing to live within the Turkish state.”293 The AYM
thus denies that the Kurds have any other right to self-determination. 294
More recently, the AYM has taken a more extreme view in its judgment
asserting that there has been no oppression of or any bans against Kurds
and held “the allegation that Kurdish people in Turkey are “oppressed and
exploited on the basis of ethnicity” to be a “fictitious hypotheses.”295
D.

Application of Self-Determination to Kurds

The Kurds meet the objective elements required to attain the legal
right of self-determination based on their common language, religion,
ethnicity, history, and culture. The Kurds share the common language of
Kurdish. While there are four distinctive dialects, the dialects are similar
enough that they are all referred to as “Kurdish.”296 The Kurds in Bakur
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share a common religion—being predominantly Sunni Muslim.297 Lastly,
the Kurds are a distinct ethnicity with a common history. 298 They are a
distinct ethnicity that “dates back to 2000 BC when the first vanguard of
Indo-European-speaking people arrived and settled” in the area known as
“Kurdistan.”299 The Kurds’ struggle for autonomy over thousands of years
shows that, notwithstanding all the turmoil and upheaval in the region, the
Kurds are connected by their heritage and common history than by any
arbitrary borders.
The Kurds also meet the subjective elements of self-determination, as
they perceive themselves collectively as Kurds. The Kurds do not identify
themselves as Turkish and want to have their own Kurdish state. They have
fought endlessly for their rights and freedoms. Given that the Kurds see
themselves collectively as Kurds and have been fighting for autonomy,
there is little doubt that they satisfy the subjective element of selfdetermination.
Pertinent to the definition of “indigenous peoples” in international law,
Kurds satisfy this criterion also. Kurds consider themselves a distinct group
from other groups living in their territory, namely Turks in Bakur, but also
Assyrians, Chaldeans, Iranians and Arabs in Bashur, Rojhalat and
Rojava.300 As the Kurds date back to the twelfth century and occupied a
village deemed one of the oldest villages in the Middle East, prior to the
establishment of modern day Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran, there is evidence
of a shared common ancestry before its domination a series of groups.301
Furthermore, there is a plethora of evidence corroborating that the Kurds
live in a specific geographic area they call “Kurdistan,” that they all speak
Kurdish whether one dialect or another and that they share a rich culture
and history.302 By all accounts, there is compelling evidence to suggest that
the Kurds meet the criteria to be deemed “indigenous peoples” and should
thus be guaranteed the same rights to self-determination.
Axiomatically, the Kurds also meet the criteria for being a minority
people. They are a group numerically inferior to the dominant ethnically
Turkish population in Turkey, maintain a non-dominant position and, while
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being nationals of the Turkish State, possess ethnic and linguistic
characteristics which differentiate them from the rest of the population.
There is strong evidence of a sense of solidarity as envisaged through the
majority support of the PKK which is aimed at ameliorating their minority
status and preserving their culture, traditions and language.
The Kurds as a group, whether deemed indigenous peoples or minority
people, ought to have the right to decide on the form of their national selfdetermination.
This may take the form of autonomy, federalism,
confederalism or independence.
While originally the PKK sought external self-determination as the
only solution to Turkey’s Kurdish question, as the reality of the quest sunk
in they abandoned their secessionist policy. 303 The PKK eventually
transformed their demands to one which could be embraced within the
current nation state structure but which guaranteed territorial and cultural
autonomy for the Kurds.304 As mentioned earlier, Öcalan now suggests a
structure beyond the bounds of the rigid nation-state, consisting of a
democratic
republic,
democratic
autonomy,
and
democratic
confederalism.305
The Kurds have a legitimate territorial claim to the right to selfdetermination. Kurds have inhabited the same territory for thousands of
years. They have survived and retained their distinct culture in the face of
genocide, assimilation, human rights abuses, and suppression at the hands
of their oppressors. They have remained on their homeland despite efforts
to remove them.
When the Treaty of Lausanne failed to include an independent
Kurdistan, Kurds did not acquiesce silently. 306 They have persistently
fought for autonomy and independence across all four regions. 307 Kurds
have a valid claim to the territory.
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The Demands for Self-Determination

On January 11, 2012, various Kurdish political organisations gathered
in Amed and declared their position vis-à-vis the Constitution. 308 They
demanded Turkey constitutionally recognise their right to selfdetermination and the realisation of their right through regional autonomy
under the current state structure and further demanded the protection of
their cultural and linguistic rights. 309 Specifically, their demands are as
follows:
a) The recognition and guarantee of Kurdish peoples’ identity;
b) Compliance with international standards pertinent to the rights
to associate and form political parties using the terms ‘Kurd’
and ‘Kurdistan’ in party names;
c) The recognition of Kurdish as an official language of Turkey,
the guarantee of the free use of the Kurdish language in every
aspect of life—private and public, and the guarantee of
education in the Kurdish language; and
d) Provision of political status for the Kurdish people on the
geography of Kurdistan to guarantee their right to selfdetermination.310

In 2013, the Amed Conference for Democracy and Peace took place
with members across the Kurdish political spectrum congregating to form a
resolution on the position of Kurds.311 They urged for Kurds to be granted
the right to self-determination through autonomy, federation, or
independence on the basis of their own decisions and approval. 312
Additionally, they reiterated the demands previously outlined that the new
constitution ought to grant their ethno-cultural rights and expressed that a
solution to the Kurdish problem cannot be attained without determining
Kurds’ legal status. 313 Therefore, they seek a contemporary democratic
constitution that guarantees the right to full political mobilisation, the use of
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Kurdish as a means of instruction and the recognition of Kurdish as an
official language of Turkey constitutionally.314
The demands by the Kurds require de jure recognition of the Kurds by
the Government as a distinct ethnic group. Furthermore, these Kurdish
demands constitute a challenge to the Turkish legal system, particularly
when taking into consideration that, to date, a myriad of political parties
have been shut down specifically in relation to their claims for the exercise
of the right to self-determination for the Kurds.315
In the absence of democratic decentralisation in Bakur, the ability of
Kurds to participate meaningfully in the creation of national policies and
laws is immensely limited. The creation of a truly representative
decentralised body or bodies in Bakur is fundamental for the realisation of
the right to self-determination by Kurds as elucidated by Article 1 of the
ICCPR and the ICESCR.316
VIII.

THE FUTURE FOR KURDS

This section postulates recommendations for Turkey to implement in
order to meet its legal obligations of protecting Kurds. Furthermore, a
strategy is recommended for the Kurds in Bakur to claim their right to selfdetermination through declaring a federal state and the prospect of a
Kurdish state is touched on.
A.

Recommendations for Turkey

No lasting solution to the Kurdish question can be achieved unless
Kurds gain legal status in Turkey as a distinct and separate group. The
failure to recognise Kurds as a distinct group and the persistent violation of
their human rights epitomises the Government’s embedded culture of
oppression and the marginalisation of Kurds. The lack of a legislative
framework to safeguard minority rights and protect against discrimination
as well as the lack of access to justice domestically reinforce a culture of
repression against Kurds.
Despite being involved in the EU accession process since 1991,
Turkey has failed to address its gross mistreatment of the Kurds. To
achieve lasting peace, it is crucial for Turkey to commit to a genuine
democratic transition by confronting abuses of rights, anti-democratic and
discriminatory practices, and the inequalities which have perpetuated
decades of conflict.

314.

Bayir, supra note 190, at 10 n.26.

315.

Id. at 10–11.

316.

KHRP, supra note 92, at 8, ¶ 4.
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Turkey must amend its Constitution to strengthen democracy and the
protection of human rights. The Constitution must be consistent with
international law by recognising all minorities within Turkey and protecting
their rights. Further, the Constitution must replicate the ICCPR and
ICESCR in protecting the right to self-determination of peoples. Turkey
must meet the requirements of the international conventions it is a party to,
as identified earlier in this paper. If Turkey has appropriate legal
mechanisms in place, there can be a more legitimate space for Kurds to
exercise their rights and to claim self-determination. However, given
Turkey’s reluctance and lack of commitment to effectuate concrete changes
towards an acceptable standard of human rights and minority protection, the
Kurds cannot rely on the amelioration of their rights any time soon. They
must take urgent action.
B.

The Exercise of Self-Determination

Pertinent to ongoing human rights abuses, pressure against politically
active Kurds, and, in light of the progress made by the Kurds in other
regions, the Kurds in Bakur should claim their right to self-determination
immediately. Given its constituents have succeeded in claiming selfdetermination—in Bashur by establishing an autonomous region in the last
decade, and more recently by the Kurds in Rojava by declaring a federal
state317—Kurds in Bakur should also declare a federal state. By doing so,
the Kurds will have more than just a seat at the table; they can organise
themselves, participate, and engage in decision-making. By empowering
Kurds, they can be champions of change for their own lives.

1.

Earned Sovereignty

Once Kurds in Bakur have claimed self-determination in its internal
form, they can work towards external self-determination—the formation of
an independent state through secession from Turkey. Immediate secession
is not a viable option presently as it may undermine stability in the already
fragile region and thus jeopardise the prospect of sufficient international
support to merit recognition.
The most feasible approach based on the probability of lasting success
and reduction of short-term violence is through the “earned sovereignty”
doctrine. “Earned sovereignty” “entails the conditional and progressive
devolution of sovereign powers and authority from a state to a substate

317. See Rodi Said, Syria's Kurds Rebuked for Seeking Autonomous Region, REUTERS (Mar.
17, 2016, 7:23 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-federalism/syrias-kurdsrebuked-for-seeking-autonomous-region-idUSKCN0WJ1EP.
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entity under international supervision.” 318 Under “earned sovereignty,”
Kurds in Bakur can eventually transition from Turkish authority to an
independent Kurdish state and facilitate a peaceful end to armed struggle.
The successful execution of “earned sovereignty” in ethnic conflicts across
the globe, for example in Montenegro, Kosovo, and Northern Ireland,
indicate its potential application to Kurds in Bakur.319
“Earned sovereignty” has three main elements: shared sovereignty;
institution building; and determination of the final status of the substate
entity and its relationship to the parent state.320 Each will be discussed in
turn.
The first element allows for the state and substate entity to
simultaneously exercise sovereign authority. 321 Through already-existing
organisations such as Kongra-Gel, 322 KCK, 323 and others, and by
establishing a federal state, Kurds in Bakur can demonstrate selfgovernment and satisfy the requirement for shared sovereignty in Turkey.324
The second element requires the substate to collaborate with the
international community to establish the political infrastructure and
government institutions required to manage the greater authority that comes
with effectively governing a sovereign state. 325 Kurds have already
established political infrastructures to facilitate grass-roots participation as
well as a legislative body. With international support, the existing
institutions can be bolstered and more can be established.
The third element can be determined via referendum or negotiations
between the parent state and substate entity, however, the determination of
final status for the substate entity relies on recognition by the international
community. 326 Although recognition is not an element of “earned
sovereignty,” lack of recognition would hinder Kurdistan’s political and
economic ties with other nation-states. Working with the international
318. Paul R. Williams & Francesca Jannotti Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap
Between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 347, 350–54 (2004).
319.

Hadji, supra note 197, at 515.

320.

Williams & Pecci, supra note 318, at 355–56.

321.

Id. at 355.

322. Kongra-Gel (KGK) / Kurdistan People’s Congress / PKK, TERRORISM RES. & ANALYSIS
CONSORTIUM, https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/kongra-gel-kgk-kurdistanpeople%E2%80%99scongress-pkk (last visited Nov. 5, 2017).
323. Serkan Kekevi, System of Group of Communities in Kurdistan (KCK): An Assessment of
State, Federalism, KCK Practices and International Developments, 10 J. STUD. SOC. SCI. 112, 112
(2015).
324.

Williams & Pecci, supra note 318, at 357.

325.

Id. at 355.

326.

Id. at 355–56.
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community to achieve independence is a powerful tool for attracting more
support within the international arena. This support is crucial in the
situation where the parent state does not recognise the substate entity, as
evidenced by Kosovo’s successful secession.327
Through the “earned sovereignty” approach, Kurds in Bakur can
achieve their dream of a Kurdish state and end their suffering at the hands
of Turkey. I believe this is the most appropriate solution for Kurds to take
to remedy their situation in Turkey.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The oppression of Kurds is not a new phenomenon. Kurds have been
victims of persistent abuses of their fundamental rights, discrimination,
assimilation and genocide—all aimed at the eradication of their existence.
Notwithstanding their history of persecution, Kurds have not backed down.
Since they were stripped of their right to independence by the Treaty of
Lausanne, Kurds have made concerted efforts to fight for their rights and
have persevered in their plight for independence. Turkey has actively
stifled any attempts by the Kurds to seek protection of their rights and
consistently refused to recognise Kurds as a minority.
In order to end the injustice suffered by Kurds and to afford them
adequate protection as a people, Turkey needs to legally recognise Kurds as
a minority. Turkey’s law has fundamental shortcomings in safeguarding
human rights, rights for minorities and recognising the right to selfdetermination. There is a culture of systemic oppression of Kurds. Turkey
needs a transformation of its laws to comply with international standards.
Despite condemnation from international bodies and the EU, Turkey has
failed to effectuate real changes. The truth remains that there will be no
solution to the Kurdish issue unless Kurds act urgently and for themselves
By claiming their right to self-determination, Kurds can escape the
cycle of suppression and determine their own future. Kurds must play a
central role in their own governance without interference. Once Kurds have
asserted their right to self-determination, Kurdistan is achievable if
strategically pursued through the “earned sovereignty” approach.

327.

Hadji, supra note 197, at 537.
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APPENDIX

Marked red on the map of Kurdistan is the Kurdish territory divided
among the states of Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria.328

328.

CHAK, supra note 19, at 7.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2010, the Secretary General of the United Nations (U.N.), Ban KiMoon addressed the recent rise of migrants entering Europe illegally by
sea.1 In his speech, Ki-Moon urged Europeans to refrain from demonizing
the recent arrivals by denying them basic human rights, such as access to
health care, and promoted the U.N. goal of social integration for this
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1.
Francesca Prati et al., Encouraging Majority Support for Immigrant Access to Health
Services: Multiple Categorization and Social Identity Complexity as Antecedents of Health Equality, 19
GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 426, 426 (2016).
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vulnerable population of newly arrived migrants.2 As the current situation
of the world continues to worsen in some areas due to war, famine, or
poverty, immigration rises. As these immigrants settle in their new
countries, many settling illegally, access to health care becomes an issue of
global consequence as a basic human right.3 The International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) has been interpreted to
state that denying anyone, even an unauthorized migrant, access to
healthcare as a part of a country’s policy is a violation of a human right.4
As of 2015, there were more than sixty million displaced migrants in
the world seeking a place to live, especially in developed and rich countries,
such as the countries in Western Europe and North America.5 For example,
in 2015, there were approximately 4.7 million people who immigrated to
one of the twenty-eight member states of the European Union.6 Of those
4.7 million, more than half were from a non-member country.7 Exclusion
from healthcare is a form of discrimination and it is especially egregious
when immigrants’ health tends to be poorer than the native group
members.8 This form of discrimination leads to the eventual health
problems and shorter life spans for those who are displaced.9
Currently in the United States (U.S.), under the Affordable Care Act
(ACA), unauthorized migrants are not covered.10 Furthermore, they cannot
qualify for subsidies through which they may purchase insurance through
the market exchange.11 The proposed Trump Care bill, Better Care
Reconciliation Act, seemed to be aimed at creating tax breaks for the those
in the highest tax brackets in the United States, and as a result left the

2.

Id.

3.
See Carin Björngren Cuadra, Right of Access to Health Care for Undocumented Migrants
in EU: A Comparative Study of National Policies, 22 EUR. J. PUB. HEALTH 267, 267 (June 9, 2011).
4.

Id.

5.

Phillip Connor & Jens Manuel Krogstad, Key Facts About the World’s Refugees, PEW
RES. CTR. (Oct. 5, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/10/05/key-facts-about-the-worldsrefugees/.
6.
Migration and Migrant Population Statistics, EUROSTAT, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/
statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics#Main_statistical_findings
(last visited June 19, 2017).
7.

Id.

8.

Prati et al., supra note 1, at 427.

9.

Id.

10.
Michelle Nicole Diamond, Note, Legal Triage for Healthcare Reform: The Conflict
Between the ACA & EMTALA, COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 255, 264 (2011).
11.

Id. at 265.

2017]

Castañeda Restrepo

111

possibility of achieving some sort of coverage for unauthorized migrants
quite slim.12
Unauthorized migrants represent a unique class of people in today’s
society that is seldom studied due to the lack of legal status.13 In most
countries, migrants contribute economically to the country, yet hold no
direct political power.14 Unauthorized migrants must be addressed, yet they
are a challenge for host countries due to the moral and economic arguments
that arise from their stay.15 Currently, the attitude toward immigrants, in
particular Muslim migrants, is highly prejudiced.16 It is roughly estimated
that six-in-ten Syrians have had to leave their homes due to the political
turmoil in Syria.17 The conflict has displaced more than 12.5 million
Syrians, creating a major surge in Syrian immigration in comparison to the
one million that emigrated from Syria in 2011.18 Many Syrians end up
relocating in countries such as Canada, the United States, or countries
within Western Europe, in search of a better and more prosperous future.19
However, many of these countries try to control migration patterns by
denying access to healthcare as a way to curb illegal immigration.
Ethnographic studies have shown the societal groupthink of native citizens
consider unauthorized migrants as undeserving of access to public health
regardless of the legal entitlement they may actually have.20 Groupthink is
a psychological concept that is used to explain a manner of group thinking
that occurs when the members of a group accept a group viewpoint
regardless of individual opinions on whether the viewpoint is correct or
12.
See Adam Gaffney, Trumpcare is Like a Vampire, Set on Sinking its Teeth into the Poor,
GUARDIAN (June 23, 2017, 6:00), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jun/23/trump
care-vampire-sinking-teeth-poor.
13.
Heide Castañeda, Illegality as Risk Factor: A Survey of Unauthorized Migrant Patients in
A Belin Clinic, 68 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1552 (Feb. 25, 2009) [hereinafter Castañeda Illegality]. Even
though the term “undocumented immigrant” or “illegal immigrant” is preferred in the United States for
purposes of this paper the term unauthorized migrant will be used because it better describes the group
of people as migrants who may have some sort of documentation about how they entered the country,
such as overstaying a tourist visa. It is also useful to better describe people who applied for asylum, and
were denied and still remained in the country. Id.
14.
Heide Castañeda, “Over-Foreignization” or “Unused Potential”? A Critical Review of
Migrant Health in Germany and Responses Toward Unauthorized Migration, 74 SOC. SCI. & MED. 830,
837 (2012) [hereinafter Castañeda “Over-Foreignization”].
15.

See id.

16.

Connor & Krogstad, supra note 5.

17.

Id.

18.

Id.

19.

Id.

20.
Susann Huschke, Performing Deservingness: Humanitarian Health Care Provision for
Migrants in Germany, 120 SOC. SCI. & MED. 352 (2014).
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not.21 It is often used to explain how a group mentality may control a
group’s thinking regardless of personal opinions.22 Data regarding
unauthorized migrants is scarce due to unauthorized migrants not wanting
to run the risk of exposing themselves.23
This note aims to compare the various approaches of entitlement to
healthcare that Western countries have implemented, specifically regarding
unauthorized migrant populations. First, this note will give a brief
overview of the structure of four Western European countries’ governments
(United Kingdom (U.K.), Spain, Germany, Italy) followed by an
explanation of the funding and the laws that deal with health care access for
unauthorized migrants in each of these countries. This note will then
discuss the structure, funding and laws that deal with health care in two
North American countries (Canada and the United States). Additionally,
this note will compare the six countries’ laws and their levels of access. An
opinion section will discuss how best to care for this marginalized group.
This note will conclude with a brief summary of the points made in the
discussion.
II.
A.

LAWS AND VARYING DEGREES OF ACCESS IN DIFFERENT
COUNTRIES

European Countries

1.

United Kingdom

Great Britain and Northern Ireland make up the U.K.24 The isle of
Great Britain includes England, Scotland, and Wales.25 England’s
government is a parliamentary constitutional monarchy led by the head of
the government, Prime Minister Theresa May (since July 2016) and the
head of state, Queen Elizabeth II.26 There is a bicameral Parliament
consisting of the House of Lords and the House of Commons. 27 The House
of Lords is comprised of 815 members of which there are hereditary peers
(people who inherited their spot), life peers (people the prime minister has
21.
Anna Schmidt, Groupthink, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.
com/topic/groupthink (last visited Sept. 6, 2017).
22.

Id.

23.

Castañeda Illegality, supra note 13, at 1553.

24.
The World Factbook: United Kingdom, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.
gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uk.html (last visited July 7, 2017).
25.

Id.

26.

Id.

27.

Id.
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appointed for life), and archbishops and bishops.28 The House of Commons
has 650 members of Parliament, which are all elected by a constituency.29
In 2016, the U.K.’s population was estimated at 65,630,000.30 Calculating
the total number of unauthorized migrants in the U.K. is difficult because
unauthorized migrants stay hidden without any relevant immigration
documentation; the closest approximation to a population estimate is a
figure from 2007 by the London School of Economics reporting an estimate
of 533,000 unauthorized migrants at that time.31 There is no question that
this number is low based on the more recent wave of immigrants seeking
refuge in the United Kingdom.32
The Parliament, the Secretary of State for Health, and the Department
of Health all control health care policy, especially access to health care.33
The United Kingdom funds the National Health Service (NHS) entirely
through national taxation, creating an insurance system which covers
England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales.34 Regardless of the fact
that each region manages its system independently, the systems are similar
in most aspects and are considered to be part of the same unified system.35
According to the Health Act of 2006, the Secretary of State for Health
“has a legal duty to promote a comprehensive health service that provides
care free of charge, apart from services with charges already in place.”36
The NHS Constitution delineates the rights for those entitled to health
care.37 Those eligible to receive health care have the right to access free
care without discrimination even though there may be certain time
limitations to it as determined by Parliament.38 Once a person is deemed to

28.
William A. Chaney et al., United Kingdom, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://
www.britannica.com/place/United-Kingdom (last visited July 6, 2017).
29.

Id.

30.

Id.

31.
Ruby Lott-Lavigna, How Many Illegal Immigrants Are in the UK?, NEWSTATESMAN
(Feb. 7, 2017), http://www.newstatesman.com/2017/02/how-many-illegal-immigrants-are-uk.
32.

See id.

33.
Ruth Thorlby & Sandeepa Arora, The English Health Care System, COMMONWEALTH
FUND, http://international.commonwealthfund.org/countries/england/ (last visited July 7, 2017).
34.
Access to Health Care for Undocumented Migrants and Asylum Seekers in 10 EU
Countries: Law and Practice, HUMA NETWORK 165 (2009), http://www.epim.info/wpcontent/uploads
/2011/02/Legislative-Rapport-HUMA-Network.pdf [hereinafter HUMA NETWORK].
35.

Id.

36.

Thorlby & Arora, supra note 33.

37.
The NHS Constitution for England, DEP’T OF HEALTH (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.
gov.uk/government/publications/the-nhs-constitution-for-england/the-nhs-constitution-for-england.
38.

Id.
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be eligible to receive access to health care, the coverage is universal.39
However, there is no absolute right to receive any particular treatment.40
Authorized residents and nonresidents with European Health Insurance
Cards are entitled to receive free health care for primary and secondary
care.41 Access to health care is limited for unauthorized migrants who are
not entitled to receive universal healthcare however, they are entitled to
receive treatment if a doctor finds that it is immediately necessary for
emergency care or certain infectious diseases.42 Free health care that is
available to all residents of the U.K., regardless of their legal residence
status, includes the following NHS services:
i) services provided in an “accident and emergency department”
(until the patient is admitted as an in-patient or an out-patient
clinic, thus emergency treatment given elsewhere in the
hospital) or walk-in [centers] in situation of emergency;
ii) family planning;
iii) services provided in the community where staff are not
employed by a Trust (e.g. practice nurses);
iv) treatment of certain communicable diseases, like tuberculosis
(excluding HIV/AIDS where it is only the first diagnosis and
connected counselling sessions that are free of charge);
v) treatment given in or referred by sexually transmitted
diseases clinics; and
vi) compulsory psychiatric treatment.43

All residents must register with a General Practitioner (GP) to access
NHS services to receive primary care, and then to further receive secondary

39.
Thorlby & Arora, supra note 33. Universal coverage of healthcare aims to provide
“promotive, preventive, curative, rehabilitative and palliative health services” to people who are legally
entitled to receive access to health care. Health Financing for Universal Coverage, WORLD HEALTH
ORG., http://www.who.int/health_financing/universal_coverage_definition/en/ (last visited Aug. 8,
2017). If a person is legally entitled to receive this benefit, then there must be no discrimination based
on ability to pay for services. Id. There is a duty to provide “good enough” health care that does
improve the health of those who request to use the service. Id. The cost of services is to be kept low
enough so as not to create a financial burden for using the system. Id.
40.

Thorlby & Arora, supra note 33.

41.
See Lea Williams, Guidance on Implementing the Overseas Visitors Charging Regulations
2015, DEP’T OF HEALTH 10–13 (Aug. 2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachmentdata/file/496951/Overseas_visitor_hospital_charging_accs.pdf. See also HUMA NETWORK,
supra note 34, at 165.
42.

Williams, supra note 41, at 12.

43.

HUMA NETWORK, supra note 34, at 165.
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care (outpatient care) with the clear exception of emergency care.44 If an
unauthorized migrant is able to get on a GP’s patient list, then he is entitled
to receive primary care free of charge.45 However, this creates a
discretionary factor rather than actual entitlement for unauthorized migrants
because access to free primary health care hinges on a doctor’s willingness
to put the unauthorized migrant on his list.46 Doctors are given broad legal
reasons to deny a person registration onto their patient list, such as their
own personal discretion or on the basis that the patient may not be
geographically desirable (there is a doctor that is closer to the patient’s
home that would better tend to him).47 Doctors are not allowed to refuse
patients on the basis of “race, gender, social class, age, religion, sexual
orientation, appearance, disability or medical condition,” however, doctors
may easily disguise any personal bias using the broad discretion afforded to
doctors to deny NHS registration.48
Since most unauthorized migrants work low-paying jobs due to their
status, a way to prevent their access to the free healthcare system is by
making them pay for services and treatments that may be too expensive; for
example, unauthorized migrants are responsible to pay the full cost of any
hospital treatment that may consist of “secondary care in out-patient
department, in-patient care, ante and postnatal care, medicines and
[antiretroviral treatment for the treatment of HIV].”49 Hospitals may also
refuse to treat a patient who may need secondary care if the hospital
realizes that the patient will have to pay for the treatment, but cannot afford
to pay.50 Hospitals, like doctors, end up with the discretionary decision of
who they choose to treat based on status and ability to pay, creating a lack
of constancy in the people admitted for treatment.51 Some hospitals will
check immigration status more than others and some may refuse to treat
migrants in the emergency room if they decide that the migrant does not
qualify for free emergency care.52 Therefore, unauthorized migrants in the

44.
Id. Primary health care refers to the initial and essential level of health care; secondary
health care refers to outpatient or inpatient procedures that require some kind of referral from a primary
health provider. Id. at 11.
45.

Id. at 166.

46.

See id. at 176.

47.

HUMA NETWORK, supra note 34, at 176.

48.

Id.

49.

Id. at 166.

50.

Id. at 176.

51.

Id.

52.

HUMA NETWORK, supra note 34, at 176.
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U.K. face both bureaucratic and economic obstacles restricting their access
to health care, even though they may have legal access to certain services.53

2.

Spain

Spain is a parliamentary constitutional monarchy comprised of
seventeen autonomous communities and two autonomous cities.54 The
head of the government is the Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy (since
December 2011) and the head of state is King Felipe VI.55 Spain has a
bicameral legislature known as the General Courts that consists of the
Senate and the Congress of Deputies.56 The Congress of Deputies,
consisting of 350 members, is the lower house and the most powerful of the
two.57 The Senate currently has 266 Senators of which the majority are
elected by each autonomous region; in the minority, half are elected as
regional representatives, and the other half are appointed per every one
million residents of their region.58 In 2016, the population estimate in
Spain was 46,370,000.59 There is no figure for the exact amount of
unauthorized migrants currently in Spain, however there was an estimated
11,624 unauthorized migrants that arrived in Ceuta and Melilla, consisting
of mainly Syrian refugees, in 2015.60
In 1986, the General Health Law established the Spanish National
Health System (SNHS) by expanding the social security system through
general taxation creating a tax-based health system regulated by Spain’s
autonomous communities.61 A 1989 decree further extended coverage to
the poor not entitled to Social Security, thereby covering unauthorized
migrants who did not have access to Social Security.62 In 2011, a public
53.

See id.

54.
The World Factbook: Spain, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sp.html (last visited July 7, 2017).
55.

Id.

56.

Id.

57.
Helmut Georg Koenlgsberger et al., Spain, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.
britannica.com/place/Spain (last visited Sept. 13, 2017) [hereinafter About Spain].
58. Composition of the Senate, SENADO DE ESPAÑA [SPANISH SENATE], http://www.senado.es
/web/conocersenado/t\emasclave/composicionsenadoelecciones/index.html?lang=en (last updated July
19, 2016),
59.

About Spain, supra note 57.

60.
The Number of Illegal Immigrants Arriving on the Spanish Coast Rises, EXPATICA (Sept.
21, 2016), https://www.expatica.com/es/news/esPulse-The-number-of-illegal-immigrants-arriving-onthe-Spanish-coast-rises_774313.html.
61.
Marta Cimas et al., Healthcare Coverage for Undocumented Migrants in Spain: Regional
Differences After Royal Decree Law 16/2012, 120 HEALTH POL’Y 384, 385 (2016).
62.

Id.
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health law extended coverage to cover those who were not expressly
covered by previous decrees.63 Article 12 of the Organic Law 4/2000 (Law
4/2000) on the Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain and their Social
Integration gave unauthorized migrants living in Spain the same access to
health care and education as Spanish citizens as long as they registered in
their municipalities.64
However, in 2012 due to the economic crisis, Spain changed its laws
and ended nearly universal access to health care restricting unauthorized
migrants’ access to the publicly funded healthcare system.65 Royal Decree
Law 16/2012 (RDL 16/2012) created coverage that was more explicitly
linked to social security entitlement and revoked unauthorized migrants’
access to healthcare through Law 4/2000.66 Unauthorized migrants were
left with only access to emergency care, maternal care, and child care for
those under eighteen, and access for those seeking asylum and victims of
human trafficking during a set period.67
After the passage of RDL 16/2012, ten regional governments chose to
implement an alternative legal way for unauthorized migrants to receive
access to health care.68 For example, the community of Navarre passed the
Navarre Regional Foral Law 8/2013 reestablishing unauthorized
immigrants’ entitlement to health care.69 The regions, on average, were
able to grant access to coverage for primary and secondary health care for
up to one year.70 The regions did vary in the requirements imposed upon
migrants for granting access to health care.71 For example, Catalonia and
Andalusia have granted greater access to health care for unauthorized
migrants with varying degrees of requirements and benefits allotted, yet
they have different regional policies that are influenced by the governing
party and the local economy.72 Residency requirements varied from no
time at all needed in Andalusia and Asturias, to one year of residency in
Basque Country, to three months residency required to obtain primary care,

63.

Id.

64.
Id. at 385. Right and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain and their Social Integration Law
art. XII (B.O.E. 2000, 10) (Spain).
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but one year residency was required to obtain secondary care in Catalonia.73
Benefits such as lower-pharmaceutical co-payments were given in Aragon,
while in the Canary Islands, unauthorized migrants were not covered for
any pharmaceutical benefit.74 Therefore, after the passage of RDL 16/2012,
unauthorized migrant access to health care depended on which region the
migrants lived in (whether more progressive or more adherent to RDL
16/2012).75
Spain is a perfect example of how a regional autonomous government
that does not agree with the central government’s policy can choose to
implement other measures to ensure all who reside in the region a better
quality of life.76 This is especially true in the area of health care where
central and regional governments share the responsibility of implementing
the service to the people.77 The regions that were most likely to rule against
the central government and create a more inclusive healthcare system for
their particular region were those who were led by an opposition party to
the one in power in the central government; those who were led by the same
ruling party were most likely to abide by the RDL 16/2012 stipulations.78
However, there were regions that were led by the same ruling party and still
decided to give unauthorized migrants access to health care, most likely
because of the cost of providing only emergency care would be higher and
ultimately more detrimental to the economy than granting access to health
care.79
The reason for implementing a severe health care adjustment, like
RDL 16/2012, was to cut costs in a declining economy.80 However, any
real savings that the government may have gained from blocking
unauthorized migrants from obtaining health care, in the end, seems to be
the opposite of what actually happened in Spain.81 Specifically for Spain,
unauthorized migrants constitute a very small percentage of the population
in comparison to Spaniards, so the cost cutting measure would not be one
that would necessarily create a major impact.82 Ultimately, a strict
implementation of this policy will cost tax payers more money because
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unauthorized migrants can only resort to the emergency room, which is
more costly than receiving preventive care through access to the SNHS.83

3.

Germany

Germany is a federal parliamentary republic that has a bicameral
parliament consisting of the Bundesrat and the Bundestag.84 The current
head of government is Chancellor Angela Merkel (since November 2005)
and the head of state is President Frank-Walter Steinmeier (since March
2017).85 The Bundestag, the more powerful of the two chambers, currently
has about 600 members, however the number is subject to change
depending on election results.86 The Bundesrat has a considerably smaller
number of members with just sixty-nine members that represent their
respective Länder.87 As of 2016, it is estimated that there are 81,762,000
people living in Germany.88 Germany has recently allowed a great number
of migrants to come and resettle within its borders; approximately one
million migrants within the last two years.89 The number of unauthorized
migrants in Germany was estimated at 174,438.90
The health care system is set up by the Federal Ministry of Health and
services rendered to the public are regulated by the Federal Joint
Committee, which is comprised of public and private health insurance
funds.91 “Germany has a predominantly income-based contribution health
insurance system that is also partly financed by other statutory insurance
scheme (e.g. civil servants), taxes, out-of-pocket payments and private
health insurance.”92 An employee’s and an employer’s contribution to the
Statutory Health Insurance System is on a case by case basis depending on
monthly gross salary.93 Once a person is eligible for the Statutory Health
83.

Cimas et al., supra note 61, at 390.

84.
The World Factbook: Germany, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gm.html (last visited July 7, 2017).
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nnica.com/place/Germany (last visited July 6, 2017).
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REUTERS (Apr. 24, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-crime-idUSKBN17Q1G4.
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FUND, http://international.commonwealthfund.org/countries/germany/ (last visited July 7, 2017).
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Insurance System, he may get further coverage through private health
insurance that may supplement or compliment the coverage already offered
by the State.94 Both the Länder and municipalities contribute to the funding
of a national healthcare system, however, the health insurance funds and
providers of insurance are the main regulators.95 The federal government is
not the sole controller of health care policy, the Länder and community
organizations also help shape the country’s policy.96 Both the private and
the state funded healthcare systems use the same hospitals and doctors that
will treat both public and privately insured people.97
Health insurance is mandatory for all citizens and permanent residents
in Germany; it is provided for by health insurance funds (so-called sickness
funds) from the statutory health insurance system and substitutive private
health insurance.98 Health care coverage is universal for all legal residents99
who are able to gain access to the health care system through employment
status, or through entitlement to state welfare.100 Low-income earners
usually attain health care through the Statutory Health Insurance System
since it is mandatory below a specific economic threshold; for those who
earn above the stipulated amount, they have the option to get full coverage
from private health care instead.101 Those who earn a very low income can
receive access to healthcare by receiving social benefits that will pay for the
insurance.102 Therefore, visitors who are not covered and those who are not
legal residents, such as, refugees and unauthorized immigrants, are not
entitled to universal health care coverage because they either cannot work
legally, or they are not approved for social welfare due to the lack of
residency documentation.103 Unauthorized migrants must apply for a
“krankenschein”—a document that allows the person to see a doctor,
similar to a health insurance certificate—at a social welfare center in order
to be registered to access the health care system free of charge under the
condition that the migrants have no income.104 Unauthorized migrants
supposedly have access to the health care system to treat “serious illness or
94.

Id. at 60.

95.

Blümel & Busse, supra note 91.

96.

Id.; see also HUMA NETWORK, supra note 34, at 60.
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acute pain and everything necessary for recovery, improvement or relief of
illnesses, and their consequences, post-natal care, vaccinations, preventive
medical tests and anonymous counselling and screening of infectious and
sexually transmitted diseases.”105 Social security will only cover medical
issues that are related to acute illness and pain, pregnancy, or childbirth.106
Due to being excluded from the national health care system,
unauthorized migrants are relegated to resorting to the use of nongovernmental organizations’ (NGOs) clinics, such as Medibüros or
Medinetze and the Malteser Migranten Medizin, for access to basic health
care.107 Even though the use of these NGOs’ clinics is better than no access
to medical care at all, the standard of care cannot match the German health
care system.108 Especially in the case of treating chronic or complicated
cases, such as cancer, lupus, or HIV, NGOs cannot offer care leaving
unauthorized migrants without a recourse.109
Germany has a unique approach to immigration and it is clearly
reflected in how it has constructed its health care policy and entitlement.110
In Germany, it is a felony to reside in the country illegally, a much more
severe penalty in comparison to other countries who view it as a failure to
abide by an administrative rule.111 Not only is it a felony to reside in the
country without having legal status, but aiding a person who is known to be
there unauthorized is considered a felony as well.112 According to Section
87 of the Act on Stay, Employment and the Integration of Foreigners in the
Federal Area if a public institution becomes aware of an unauthorized
migrant’s presence in the country they have the duty to disclose that
information to the Foreign Office.113 Furthermore, penalties will be
imposed on anyone who is deemed to have helped an unauthorized migrant
“irregularly stay or enter in the German territory . . . if acting for his or her
benefit for financial gain, if doing so repeatedly or for the benefits of
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several foreigners . . . .”114 In order to have access to the health care
system, unauthorized migrants must first register for the “krankenschein,”
however, social welfare offices are bound by law, as well as any other
public administrative institution, to report unauthorized migrants to the
Foreigners Office; a failure to report migrants poses the risk of being
penalized by the government thereby creating a state of heightened alert for
unauthorized migrants.115 In order to be reimbursed for services rendered
by Social Security, medical personnel must transmit information about
people residing in the country illegally.116 While the law has been clarified
to say that medical personnel will not be held personally accountable, there
is still a need to report who the patient is to the social welfare centers to be
reimbursed and in effect reporting the unauthorized migrant, creating the
ever-present fear of deportation.117 The imminent threat of being reported
to the Foreigners Office effectively bars all unauthorized migrants from
seeking any type of health care, even for emergency situations, because the
hospital must transmit the patients’ information to the social welfare centers
in order to be reimbursed.118 Many supporters of limiting access to health
care for unauthorized migrants reference the positive deterrent effect it has
on migration because it supposedly:
1) dissuades migrants from wanting to move to the country in
search of health care;
2) for those already present in the country, it dissuades them
from using the national health care system; and
3) it ultimately serves to stop unauthorized migrants from
creating an expense on nationals.119

Furthermore, doctors have confirmed that patients are justified in
being afraid of seeking health care because the doctors will report them and
ultimately have them deported.120 Therefore, while unauthorized migrants
are technically entitled to emergency care, that option is generally not a
viable option for those who fear being deported.121 “By ‘illegalizing’
undocumented migrants, criminalizing assistance to them and requiring
their ‘denunciation’ by all governmental and public institutions, the German
114.

HUMA NETWORK, supra note 34, at 63.

115.
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116.
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government has created a web of laws that effectively exclude
undocumented migrants from claiming their human rights, including their
right to health.”122

4.

Italy

Italy is a parliamentary republic that has a bicameral parliament
consisting of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.123 The current head
of government is the Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni (since December
2016) and the current head of state is the President Sergio Mattarella (since
February 2015).124 All members of the Chamber of Deputies, the lower
house, are elected through proportional representation.125 The Senate, the
upper house, has two methods of election: 1) proportional representation
and 2) members who serve life terms that are appointed by the president
and former presidents.126 Italy’s estimated population in 2016 was about
60,815,000.127 In 2016, there were approximately 181,405 migrants that
arrived in Italy.128
The Italian Constitution authorizes the central government to control
the distribution of tax revenue in order to fund public health care, which
every resident of the Italian regions is entitled to.129 The Italian
Constitution specifically guarantees all individuals’ fundamental right to
health care and specifically guarantees indigents the right to receive
treatment free of cost.130 The revenue that funds Italy’s National Health
Service (INHS) is corporate tax.131 The central government collects it, and
then redistributes it among the regions in proportion to their contribution.132
Both the central government and the regional government share the
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responsibility of insuring residents.133 The central government determines
what is included in the basic benefit package that is free to those who are
entitled, but the local authorities are the ones who must ensure the delivery
of services to local residents.134 While this in theory seems fair, it does
create financial inequalities among the richer and poorer regions and
ultimately results in disparities among the regions in relation to peoples’
access to health care.135 The central government tries to level out the
disparities by giving poorer regions a fixed proportion of the national valueadded tax to provide essential levels of care.136 Even though the central
government handles the distribution of funds, the nineteen regions and the
two autonomous provinces have considerable autonomy in determining the
structure and delivery of local health care.137
All citizens and legal residents have automatic universal coverage.138
Private health care is generally used to complement the state funded system
to provide for services not covered.139 Even though the basic benefit
package is supposed to be free to all, there are certain services that are more
in depth such as “specialist consultations, day hospitalizations after
diagnosis procedures, some pharmaceuticals, and thermal assistance and out
of clinic rehabilitation” for which a co-pay is required for all residents.140
Yet, the amount due will vary depending on the region that the patient is in
and ameliorating factors such as age, income, and type of illness making it
a subjective amount that may vary depending on who the person is.141
In order to have access to the INHS, citizens and authorized residents
must register with the local health administration where they are provided
with a health card that is used to access the system. 142 Since the INHS is
funded through corporate tax, applying for the health card is free for those
who pay income tax, for those who are unemployed but are enrolled in an
employment agency, refugees, asylum seekers, and any child of an
authorized recipient.143 For people who do not meet the prerequisite
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categories to qualify for health care, they may still be eligible to receive a
health card if they pay a specific sum.144
Even though unauthorized migrants do not have access to the INHS,
they may receive access to some limited services if they are able to receive
a Stranieri Temporaneamente Presenti (temporary residing foreigner code)
(STP code).145 Some of the healthcare services that the STP code gives
unauthorized migrants free access to or access upon payment are:
a) “urgent” and “essential” medical care (including continual
treatment);
b) preventive care; and
c) care provided for public health reasons including prenatal and
maternity care, care for children, vaccinations and diagnosis
and treatment of infectious diseases.146

Unauthorized migrants must first apply to receive indigent status and
then, free and anonymously, can apply at the local health administration
center for the STP code.147 Once granted, unauthorized migrants are still
responsible for charges for medical treatment.148
While on paper unauthorized migrants do seem to have a legal means
to receive access to the INHS, theory must not be confused with actual
application of the entitlement.149 As a marginalized faction of society,
unauthorized migrants are hesitant to reach out to health care facilities due
to common obstacles such as a lack of language comprehension, a failure to
actually know that they can receive access legally, fear of not being able to
afford treatment, or actual reporting of their illegal status in the country. 150
NGOs are used by unauthorized migrants as an alternate health care
recourse without exposing themselves to the INHS, unfortunately NGOs are
not able to provide more than just basic health care assistance.151
A migrant may be granted a permit to stay in Italy for humanitarian
reasons, if a doctor determines that this person has a medical condition
serious enough that medical care is necessary and there is no possible way
to obtain treatment in his native country.152 However this does not happen
144.
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often either due to the failure to report the patient’s information or because
the doctor in Italy does not know what kind of health care system is in the
patient’s home country.153 If granted, the medical permit must be renewed
yearly and once a temporary residence permit is granted, the migrant may
ask for the right to work which will grant them access to the INHS.154
B.

North American Countries

1.

Canada

Canada has a federal parliamentary democracy that is controlled by a
constitutional monarchy.155 The current head of government is Prime
Minister Justin Trudeau (since November 2015) and the head of state is
Queen Elizabeth II.156 Even though the Queen is the head of state, Canada
is an independent federal state.157 Canada has a bicameral parliament
consisting of the Senate and the House of Commons.158 The Senate
currently has 105 members and the House of Commons has 308
members.159 There are approximately 36,222,000 people living in Canada
as of 2016.160 President Trump’s election and his views on immigration
have increased the flow of unauthorized migrants to Canada leading to at
least half of all Canadians’ disapproval of unauthorized migrants in
Canada.161
Canada has a publicly funded health care system called Medicare.162
Medicare is not a national plan, instead it is a regional plan that is managed
by the thirteen provinces and territories that are responsible for ensuring the
citizens of their respective province or territory.163 The federal government
153.
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and the provincial and territorial governments share the roles and
responsibilities of delivering health care services to Canadian residents.164
“Both the public and private sectors finance Canada’s health systems.
Public-sector funding includes payments by governments at the federal,
provincial/territorial and municipal levels and by workers’ compensation
boards and other social security schemes. Private-sector funding consists
primarily of health expenditures by household and private insurance
firms.”165
Provincial and territorial governments are responsible for the control
and delivery of publicly funded services locally to the communities
ensuring delivery of various aspects of community health care.166 The
federal government must maintain national standards for the health care
system by funding support to the regional health care systems, facilitating
the delivery health care, and dealing with other health care matters.167 The
Canada Health Act of 1985 states that regional health insurance plans need
to be “publicly administered, comprehensive in coverage, universal,
portable across provinces, and accessible.”168 Under Medicare, all
Canadian residents that are entitled access to the health care system are able
to receive medically necessary procedures for free.169 Each province and
territory has the freedom to set its own residency requirement to determine
which territorial residents are entitled to universal healthcare.170
Unauthorized immigrants are not covered by any federal or provincial
program, however provinces and territories may provide limited services.171
As part of the new world countries, Canada has experienced waves of
immigration from the moment it was “discovered.”172 Canada’s health
policies have reflected the influx of people that came initially from Europe,
and later migrants from Asia, Africa, the Middle East, the Caribbean and
South America necessitating the need for new health screenings and
164.
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treatments.173 Authorized immigrants in Canada typically have to meet
certain health requirements in order to be given visas to enter Canada, so a
“healthy immigrant effect” is seen in which the migrants are generally
healthier than their Canadian counterparts.174 Ultimately this is seen as a
cost-effective measure because migrants will not need to access the publicly
funded health care system during their initial residency and will therefore
not be a burden on Canadian tax payers.175 Screening potential legal
migrants for health concerns that may be costly and a possible drain on
public services has been a fundamental principal of the Canadian approach
to migrant health care.176 However, for those who are not legal migrants
this may be a different story since they are coming from different countries
and do not have the same economic resources that a skilled worker who has
been granted a Canadian visa has; unauthorized migrants may constitute a
group who is in greater need of the health care system and who would
ultimately create a greater expense if they are denied access.177 The
growing demographic change of migrants who come to Canada results in
health disparities that this new group of migrants may require.178 In the
case of refugees who have been the victims of violence, torture, and trauma,
there are physical and mental health issues that the community can be
possibly responsible for.179

2.

United States

The United States is a federal republic that is currently led by
President Donald Trump as both head of state and head of government
(since January 2017).180 It consists of a bicameral congress made up of the
Senate and the House of Representatives.181 The Senate, the upper house,
consists of 100 senators that are elected two per state, and the House of
Representatives consists of 435 Representatives that are elected and their
seats are assigned in proportion to the population of congressional
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districts.182 The approximate estimate for the population of the United
States in 2016 is 323,349,000 people.183 As of 2016, there were
approximately 11.3 million people living in the United States as
unauthorized migrants.184 About 8 million unauthorized migrants form part
of the United States’ workforce, contributing to the economy.185
Immigration is not expected to wane anytime soon with a projected figure
that around one out of five Americans will be an immigrant around the year
2050.186 More striking is an estimated figure from 2007 where it was
approximated that one out three immigrants in the United States was an
unauthorized migrant.187
The ACA is aimed at ensuring that Americans have access to health
insurance through a program that apportions coverage through the
government, employers, and individuals.188 Health insurance is provided
through both private and public sources.189 States generally regulate private
insurance and public insurance is generally regulated by the federal
government.190 As of 2014, 49% of total health care spending came from
public spending.191 For example, Medicaid is tax-funded and is run by the
states within the general federal guidelines.192 Depending on the state’s per
capita income, the state will receive matching federal funds.193 The ACA
currently fully funds the Medicaid expansion, but this is subject to change
with the new administration’s desire to repeal the ACA and implement a
new version of health care coverage.194 With the proposed Trump Care Bill
failing on July 2017 as well as the President’s plan to let the ACA fail and
not propose any replacement, the ACA will continue providing health care
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coverage for Americans for the time being.195 One of the biggest reasons
for Trump Care’s failure was the cutting of health benefits for low-income
earners, which presumably could have affected low-income unauthorized
migrants who were able to receive some sort of health care through the
ACA.196
As of 2014, 66% of United States residents received health coverage
through private voluntary insurance and 36.5% of residents acquired
insurance through government coverage.197 While the ACA is an attempt at
providing greater health coverage for Americans, it is not a universal
healthcare policy.198 The ACA has increased the overall rate of health
insurance coverage for uninsured adults. In 2016, the rate of uninsured
adults decreased from 22.3% in 2010 to 11.9% in the beginning of 2016.199
“Both state and federal regulations limit immigrant access to
healthcare.”200 Unauthorized immigrants are generally ineligible for public
health care coverage.201 They are unable to purchase health insurance
through the health insurance exchange since it requires proof of legal
residency in the United States.202 As a result of the lack of coverage, even
after the ACA, unauthorized migrants in the United States are less likely to
go to a doctor and are less likely to be able to have a stable source of care in
comparison to authorized migrants residing in the United States.203 Around
two-thirds of unauthorized immigrants are uninsured, creating a potential
cost and burden to the hospitals that treat them.204 Furthermore,
immigration continues to be a highly debated topic in the United States with

195. See generally Jennifer Steinhauer et al., How the Senate Health Care Bill Failed: G.O.P.
Divisions and A Fed-Up President, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/
18/us/politics/trumphealthcaresenatebill.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story
-heading&module=a-lede-package-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news.
196.

Id.

197. JESSICA C. SMITH & CARLA MEDALIA, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HEALTH INSURANCE
COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2014 3 (2015).
198.

The U.S. Health Care System, supra note 188.

199. ROBIN A. COHEN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STAT., HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: EARLY
RELEASE OF ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, JANUARY–MARCH 2016 2
(2016).
200.

Irshad, supra note 186, at 801.

201.

The U.S. Health Care System, supra note 188.

202.

See id.

203. Arturo Vargas Bustamante et al., Variations in Healthcare Access and Utilization Among
Mexican Immigrants: The Role of Documentation Status, 14 J. IMMIGRANT MINORITY HEALTH 146
(2012).
204.

The U.S. Health Care System, supra note 188.
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polarizing views of the effects of immigrants on the economy, in particular
unauthorized migrants.205 “It is highly contested whether the economic
benefit of immigration, including all the taxes and contributions they pay,
are enough to compensate for the immigrant use of public services such as
healthcare.”206
Through the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
(EMTALA) unauthorized migrants are eligible to receive emergency care
if, after an emergency medical screening examination, an emergency
medical condition is found.207 Hospitals that accept Medicare funds must
stabilize any patient with an emergency medical condition, this includes
any unauthorized immigrant that would otherwise not have access to health
care.208 Since EMTALA serves to create a safety net that applies to
basically every person in the United States, most hospitals abide by it
because failing to do so could result in losing considerable funding and
possibly monetary penalties.209 However, states are sovereign entities that
may choose to have different laws and policies regarding state funded
health care thereby furthering the coverage of unauthorized migrants
beyond the point of just:
1) stabilization;
2) coverage for unauthorized children; or
3) coverage for unauthorized pregnant women.210

“Although the taxes and contributions to public programs is positive at
the federal level, and it is more often negative at the local level due to the
types of taxes and services for each level of government.”211 Unauthorized
migrant access to health care at the state level seems to be more of a cost on
the local tax payer prompting the restriction of access for unauthorized
migrants to health care services.212 Inevitably, unauthorized migrants’ lack
of access to health care hinges on the perception that they overuse the
system and do not really contribute toward its funding even though there is
evidence to the contrary.213

205.

Vargas Bustamante et al., supra note 203, at 147.

206.

Id.

207.

Irshad, supra note 186, at 806–07.

208.

The U.S. Health Care System, supra note 188.

209.

Irshad, supra note 186, at 807.

210.

See id. at 805.

211.

Vargas Bustamante et al., supra note 203, at 147.

212.

See id.

213.

Id. at 153.
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III.

A.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LAWS

Similarities Among the Countries

England, Spain, Germany, Italy, and Canada all have universal health
care that seeks to insure all citizens and the majority of all legal residents,
however, the United States does not have universal healthcare and the
upcoming Senate bill does not make it a possibility any time soon. All six
countries described in this paper afford unauthorized migrants with some
sort of access to health care to a varying degree, with the underlying theme
being that unauthorized migrants are marginalized and end up suffering
from their legal status. Health care access may also be compared in terms
of each country’s funding of their health care system.
In this paper, there are systems that are financed out of tax
contributions, social security contributions, and private health insurance
carriers. The U.K.’s central government collects the taxes that fund health
care as opposed to Italy and Spain that fund their systems through local tax
collection.214 Germany has a social insurance that is funded through the
health insurance fund.215 Similarly, Canada’s health care system is a social
insurance based system, however it is specifically taxed and managed by
regional authorities.216 Meanwhile, this leaves the outlier of the United
States, which has a mix of publicly funded health care for a few, but the
majority of people must purchase private insurance in order to have access
to health care.217 However, there seems to be no correlation, in the
European countries, between funding systems and unauthorized access to
health care, on the contrary these differences do not seem to affect access to
health care.218 Similarly, between Canada and the United States, even
though there are two entirely different systems, there does seem to be
limited access for unauthorized migrants regardless of their status, for
example, in the United States they cannot be turned away at the hospital for
emergency care,219 and in Canada the provinces and the territories do offer
limited services.220
There does seem to be a similarity between countries that grant greater
power to their municipalities or their regional governments and the
corresponding grant of greater access to healthcare to unauthorized
214.

Björngren Cuadra, supra note 3, at 267.

215.

Id.

216.

See NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURE TRENDS, supra note 165, at 11, 18–19.

217.

See The U.S. Health Care System, supra note 188.

218.

Björngren Cuadra, supra note 3, at 270.

219.

The U.S. Health Care System, supra note 188.

220.

Allin & Rudoler, supra note 168.
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migrants. Also, it does not necessarily stand to conclude that simply
because an area may be heavily populated by migrants, it will have more
restrictive policies.221 “[T]he proportion of undocumented migrants living
in a country [is] a poor predictor of their entitlement to healthcare.”222
Many countries view the “healthy migrant” effect as a method of spending
less on health care for newly arrived immigrants, but the common factor
seems to be the many unauthorized migrants who are coming from poorer
countries are in poorer health.223
B.

Differences Among the Countries

A country’s health policy can be an essential factor in determining the
level of access to health care that unauthorized migrants may have. 224 The
countries featured in this note should be viewed on a continuum regarding
their respective traditions of being receiving countries. The first level is the
legislative level, where a country implements legislation determining what
health care access migrants will receive; the second level is how the health
systems actually puts the first level legislation into practice.225 “Countries
with a longer tradition as receiving countries have formulated and
reformulated their policies over time while countries where this
phenomenon is more recent are in the process of formulating and
implementing policies.”226 The countries chosen for this note are all
receiving countries, but many have been for a longer period of time. The
United States and Canada227 have historically been receiving countries for
immigrants since they were founded as colonies; contrastingly, the
European countries in this note have been thought of as receiving countries
more recently, England has been considered a receiving country since the
1950s;228 Germany since the 1950s;229 Italy since the 1980s;230 and most

221.

Cimas et al., supra note 61, at 390.

222.

Id.

223. María Luisa Vázquez et al., Health Policies for Migrant Populations in Three European
Countries: England; Italy and Spain, 101 HEALTH POL’Y 70, 71 (2011) [hereinafter Vázquez England;
Italy and Spain].
224.

Id.

225.

Id.

226.

Id.

227.

Gushulak & Williams, supra note 172, at I-27.

228.

Vázquez England; Italy and Spain, supra note 223, at 71.

229.

Castañeda “Over-Foreignization”, supra note 14, at 832.

230.

Vázquez England; Italy and Spain, supra note 223, at 71.
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recently, Spain since the end of the 1990s.231 All of the countries are on the
second level regarding health care toward unauthorized migrants, but the
regions of Spain who have implemented greater access seem to be further
along the spectrum in comparison to Germany which has basically denied
all health care to unauthorized migrants.232 The United States stands alone
because it does not even offer universal health care to its citizens, so while
it has tried to give unauthorized migrants access, the second level is
currently in a state of flux considering the new administration.
Spain, Italy, and England implement an integration into the native
population approach for migrant access to healthcare which seems to be a
bigger influence on furthering specific health policies than a history as a
receiving country.233 Unauthorized migrants are not abiding by the native
population’s rules and are therefore not able to integrate completely making
them markedly different than authorized migrants which are welcomed.234
Just as health policy regarding new immigrants has developed with the rise
of immigration for each country, so have the approaches regarding
unauthorized migrants’ access to health care.235 As many countries further
restrict access as a cost-cutting measure, like in Germany,236 the country’s
economic situation is a direct factor in restricting access as was seen in
Spain with RDL 16/2012.237
Even though all the countries have given unauthorized migrants some
sort of health care access, Germany in particular has been criticized for its
approach toward undocumented migrants in reference to other European
countries.238 Germany has been criticized as being too “shortsighted” in its
approach in an effort to protect native Germans.239 Germany has one of the
most restrictive policies in the European Union, and even though it does set
up roadblocks to limit the access of unauthorized migrants by threatening
deportation if they seek help, a migrants’ unauthorized status is a significant
roadblock that is related to the low usage of health care among this
group.240

231.

Id.

232.

See id.

233.

Id. at 75.

234.

See id.

235.

Vázquez England; Italy and Spain, supra note 223, at 76.

236.

Castañeda “Over-Foreignization”, supra note 14, at 837.

237.

Cimas et al., supra note 61, at 385.

238.

See Castañeda Illegality, supra note 13, at 1553.

239.
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Like the United States, Canada is a country that has been heavily
influenced by immigration.241 Both of these countries approach to health
care access for immigrants is reflective of the waves of immigrants that
have helped shape the landscape of these countries.242 However, there is a
difference between the two in their approaches to health care; Canada has
universal health care for its citizens and some of its residents, while the
United States does not have universal health care and is currently struggling
to find a new health care measure through which people can actually afford
to buy private insurance.243
IV.

OPINION

Access to health care is an overarching international subject of
concern, not only because it is a basic human right, but because of the ease
in movement of people creating a new generation of people that is more
likely to live in a country other than his birth. “[M]igration and population
mobility are major factors underlying the processes of globalization.
Changes in immigration health policy are needed to reflect these new
realities.”244 There is no uniform approach on how to implement a more
inclusive system since each country is different and factors such as different
health systems, legal systems, immigrant stereotypes, and geographic
location of the country (easily accessible countries will have a different
outlook than landlocked countries).245 The risk of the spread of infectious
diseases may be greater than the savings obtained by denying access to
health care.246 Even though access to primary care may seem like an
expense that countries do not feel they should shoulder for a population that
does not directly contribute to its economy, especially in countries that are
subsidizing their health care systems through employment tax, the cost of
health care for a more serious health problem that results from a failure to
get preventive care ends up being a greater expense to tax payers and is
contradictory to the reasons for not granting such access.247 While all
countries do state that they will provide emergency care for unauthorized
migrants the reality is more complicated because unauthorized migrants are

241.

See Gushulak & Williams, supra note 172, at I-27.

242.

Id.

243. See The U.S. Health Care System, supra note 188; see also Canada Health Act, R.S.C.
1985, c C-6.
244.

Gushulak & Williams, supra note 172, at I-27.

245.

HUMA NETWORK, supra note 34, at 7.

246.

Cimas et al., supra note 61, at 390.

247.

HUMA NETWORK, supra note 34, at 7.
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fearful of possible deportation if they seek help and this ultimately nullifies
any notion of access to emergency care.
There is also a sociological fear and alienation that is perpetuated by
denying unauthorized migrants access to health care.248 There is a group
mentality of “us against them” that may promulgate and even legitimize
racism.249 The validation of exclusionary labels, “us” and “them” leads to
exclusionary practices whereby migrants are restricted from accessing
health care.250 This fear can be overcome by stopping the exclusion of
unauthorized migrants which eventually is counter-productive to the goal of
creating laws that help cut costs and wasteful spending.251 The laws
implemented while aimed at limiting the over spending of scant public
resources is counterproductive when unauthorized migrants’ way of life is
taken into account, such as the higher risk jobs they must take and the fact
that many come from poorer countries with poorer health care leading to a
threat of disease spreading throughout the host population.252 Rather than
segregating each other into groups based on nationality, a better
redistribution of funds that is aimed at integrating and creating a more
harmonious view of common interests may be a better approach at health
care access.253
V.

CONCLUSION

Access to health care will continue to be an issue for countries around
the world because people will always need access to some type of health
care. Especially considering the rise in Nationalist policies aimed at closing
borders and viewing immigration as way of siphoning off funds from
citizens, countries policies on access to health care for immigrants, in
particular unauthorized immigrants, is reflective of the underlying thoughts
that are being perpetuated.254 The issue eventually depends on how much
should the government, and by default the tax payers, pay out per resident
of a particular country. As seen above, a country’s health policy whether it
be to grant universal health care coverage (as the majority of the countries
featured in this note) or to let citizens buy their own personal coverage at

248. Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Social Psychology of Limiting Healthcare Benefits for
Undocumented Immigrants—Moving Beyond Race, Class, and Nativism, 10 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 201, 203 (2010).
249.

Id.

250.

Prati et al., supra note 1, at 427.
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their own expense does not necessarily mean that those who are in the
margins, such as unauthorized migrants, will be better off in in one country
or the other. If health care is seen—as many NGOs have declared it is—as
a basic human right, then a government’s limitations on health care is
denying people a necessity, it is not a luxury.
In the end, it comes down to how a country views the cost of caring
for those who are not seen as contributing toward the economy. However,
if history has shown something it is the repeat pattern of people searching
and moving for better economic opportunities. Considering the current
situation in many countries, war and poverty, are major motivating factors
to leave one’s country and try to succeed somewhere else, not access or
abuse of a country’s health care system as some may believe. 255
Unauthorized immigration is a problem that has resulted from the constant
moving of people. This note does not aim to justify or legitimize the fact
that people have broken the law in overstaying their visas, but unauthorized
immigration will not be curbed any time soon. The issue here is how to
handle those people who are already living in a country and to provide for
them in the most humane way. In a sense, the constant labeling of people
as migrants, as not from “here,” as being in the country “unauthorized,” just
serves to legitimize their exclusion from social welfare nets. Many
countries or autonomous regions, as explained above, that granted
unauthorized migrants greater access did so because the cost to provide
healthcare was eventually lower than keeping them out. This solidifies the
conclusion that the cost of granting access is lower in long term costs than
just granting limited access to emergency care.256 Furthermore, a summary
by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights concluded that in
the instances of prenatal care and hypertension it was a better cost-cutting
method to provide preventative care, than to restrict care just to emergency
access.257 The restriction of access to healthcare eventually led to more
serious health issues that eventually were more costly to treat rather than
giving preventative care.258 The more people realize that there is no need to
differentiate between the immigrant population and the native population,
the more the differences between both groups will diminish and lead to
greater support for granting greater access to health care.259

255.

Id. at 204.

256.

Bowen Matthew, supra note 248, at 203.

257.

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, COST OF EXCLUSION FROM
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Before the Japanese Constitution was adopted, the old Civil Code
under the Meiji Constitution governed family life in Japan. The old law did
*
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not extend suffrage to women, who were also not recognized as being able
to conclude contracts. The eldest son, rather than the wife, inherited the
home and farm upon the death of the father. These traditions were derived
from the feudal system of the Edo period.
When the Japanese Constitution of 1947 replaced the Meiji
Constitution after World War II, universal suffrage was achieved, and
equality between men and women was declared in Article 14 of the new
constitution.1 In addition, Article 24 affirmed that a marriage may only
take place with the mutual consent of both the husband and wife. 2 The
marriage must be maintained through mutual cooperation and on the basis
of the equal rights of the husband and wife.3
Given these changes, it appears that the legal system that was
introduced with the new constitution resulted in reforming the Japanese
family law system. However, the judiciary has struggled against the current
of conventional and closed ideas in Japanese society. The most famous
case in this regard is the Supreme Court case known as the patricide case,
the facts of which are described later in this paper, which involved a girl
who was repeatedly raped by her own father.4 She was prosecuted under
Article 200 of the Criminal Code, which stipulated that a person who kills a
parent or a spouse’s parent is punishable by death or life imprisonment with
hard labor.5 At the same time, Article 199 of the Criminal Code stated that
a person who kills another person shall be punished with death or
imprisonment with hard labor for not less than three years.6 The Supreme
Court struck down Article 200 on the basis of Article 14 of the Constitution
and opined that the means of achieving the law’s goals were too harsh. 7
However, it took twenty-two years after this decision for the article to be
amended by legislature.8
This paper first reviews several cases involving human rights issues
that have arisen under Japanese family law and the constitution, including
1.

NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 14 (Japan).

2.

Id. art. 24.

3.

Id.

4

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO
265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan).

SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB]

5.

KYŪ KEIHŌ [OLD PEN. C.] 1880, art. 200 (Japan).

6.

Id. art. 199.

7.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO
265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan).

SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB]

8.
KEIHŌ [PEN. C.] (Japan) (deleting art. 200 as last amended by Law No. 91, May 12, 1995);
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI JŌHŌ
[SAIBANSHO WEB] 265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan).
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two relevant 2015 Supreme Court decisions. The Court upheld the
constitutionality of Article 750 of the Civil Code, which requires married
couples to choose either the husband’s or the wife’s family name,
emphasizing the tradition of couples using the same family name.9 On the
other hand, the court struck down Article 733 of the Civil Code, which
prohibited women from remarrying within six months of a divorce.10 The
court stated that 100 days was a reasonable period to wait before a woman
should be permitted to remarry.11
Second, focusing on the justices’ opinions in these two cases, this
paper will consider the constitutionality of these decisions and the Supreme
Court’s function of imposing its interpretations on the two other branches
of government: the executive and the legislative branches.
II.
A.

HISTORY OF THE STATUS OF FAMILY AND WOMEN UNDER
THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION

Drafting History of the Japanese Constitution

The Japanese Constitution was adopted on May 3, 1947.12 Under the
previous (Meiji) constitution, only male adult suffrage was guaranteed with
regard to the election of public officials, although women participated in the
general election of the Imperial Diet in 1946.13 Moreover, women were not

9.
KYŪ MINPŌ [OLD CIV. C.] 1898, art. 750 (Japan); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16,
2015, Heisei 26 (o) no. 1023, 69(8) SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 2586,
http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan).
10.
KYŪ MINPŌ [OLD CIV. C.] 1898, art. 733 (Japan); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16,
2015, Heisei 25 (o) no. 1079, 69(8) SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 2427,
http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan).
11.

Id.

12.

NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] (Japan).

13.
Hiroko Tomida, The Association of New Women and its Contribution to the Japanese
Women’s Movement, 17 JAPAN F. 49, 49–51 (2005), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10
.1080/0955580052000337468#aHR0cDovL3d3dy50YW5kZm9ubGluZS5jb20vZG9pL3BkZi8xMC4M
DgwLzA5NTU1ODAwNTIwMDAzMzc0Njg/bmVlZEFjY2Vzcz10cnVlQEBAMA. Public officials
were purged from public service on January 4, 1946, and universal suffrage was achieved on April 10 of
that year. Rebuilding of Political Parties and General Election, NAT’L DIET JAPAN: MODERN JAPAN IN
ARCHIVES, http://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/cha5/description05.html#c551 (last visited Nov. 5, 2017). In
spite of these prohibitions, and before the current constitution was established, Raichō Hiratsuka worked
to achieve universal suffrage around 1920, and Hiratsuka, Husae Ichikawa, and Mumeo Oku established
the New Women's Association (Shin Fujin Kyoukai). Tomida, supra note 13. See also DAI NIHON
TEIKOKU [MEIJI KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] (Japan).
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able to form political associations or take part in political activities under
the Maintenance of Public Order Act, known as Chian Iji Hou.14
Also, under the old Civil Code15 and the Meiji Constitution, the eldest
son was the head of the family and succeeded to all property, including the
house and the land, when the head of the household passed away. 16
Married women were not competent to take legal action, and in a divorce,
women were not eligible for the right to the distribution of property.17 In
addition, only women were subject to criminal liability for adultery under
the old Criminal Code.18
When the United States General Headquarters (GHQ) and the
Japanese government worked together to propose the draft of the new
constitution, General Courtney Whitney hired Ms. Beate Sirota Gordon to
work on provisions related to human rights. 19 She advanced women’s
rights in the draft of the constitution.20 The provisions for women became
more advanced at that time, and the equality of men and women was legally
acknowledged. 21 The articles she drafted included those related to both
women and children. For example, pregnant women and women with
children would be protected under the new constitution and would be
subsidized when necessary. 22 Illegitimate children would not be legally
discriminated against and would be given the same rights as legitimate
children. 23 Adopting a child would require the consensus of both the
husband and wife, and the adopted child would be treated equally as a

14.
Chian Iji Hou [Maintenance of Public Order Act], Law No. 46 of 1925 (Japan) (The
Maintenance of Public Order Act is also sometimes called the Peace Preservation Law). See also
MASASHI TSUJIMOTO & YOKO YAMASAKI, THE HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN JAPAN (1600–2000) 71
(2017).
15.

KYŪ MINPŌ [OLD CIV. C.] 1898, art. 732, 749–51, 964 (Japan).

16.
Id. arts. 754–55, 807, 964(3) (noting that there was an exception for a female head of
household, although her authority was more limited than a male’s authority).
17.

Id. art. 732 (Japan).

18.
KYŪ KEIHŌ [OLD PEN. C.] 1880, art. 183 (Japan). This system was abolished by
amendments to the Civil and Criminal Codes in 1947. Kanako Takayama, Reform of the Criminal
Justice System in Japan, 82 INT’L REV. PEN. L. 245, 245 (2011); HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN SINCE 1868
297–98 (Wilhelm Röhl ed., 2005).
19.

BEATE SIROTA GORDON, THE ONLY WOMAN IN THE ROOM 104 (1st ed. 1997).

20.

Id. at 106.

21.
Id. at 107–08, 113–16, 125. Later, Ms. Gordon noted that the United States Constitution
did not have specific provisions for women’s rights. Id. at 107–08.
22.

GORDON, supra note 19, at 111.

23.

Id. at 117–18.
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member of the family.24 The privilege of the eldest son would be abolished,
and every child would be given equal opportunity in spite of the
circumstances of his or her birth. 25 Compulsory education would be
required for eight years in public school.26 Middle and higher education
would be provided free of charge.27 The government would be authorized
to support gifted children.28 All children would be eligible to receive free
medical treatment for their teeth and eyes.29 School-aged children could
not engage in full-time employment.30 Regarding adults, every adult person
would be given the right to pursue an occupation.31 If he or she could not
obtain it, the government would provide the necessary minimum financial
support.32 Women would be eligible for any occupation, including political
positions, and they would receive the same wage as that of males who
provided the same service.33
The Japanese government objected to Ms. Gordon’s drafts, because
the Japanese had no background to accept equality between men and
women. 34 However, this twenty-two-year-old woman’s opinion was
reflected in Articles 14 and 24 of the Japanese Constitution.35 She referred
to Articles 109, 119, and 122 of the Weimar Constitution, the First
Amendment of the United States (U.S.) Constitution, the Finland
Constitution, and the 1924 Soviet Constitution.36

24.

Id.

25.

Id.

26.

Id. at 118.

27.

GORDON, supra note 19, at 118

28.

Id.

29.

Id.

30.

Id.

31.

Id.

32.

GORDON, supra note 19, at 118.

33.
Id. See also MIYOKO TSUJIMURA, KENPŌ TO KAZOKU [CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY] 79–
84 (Nihon Kajo Shuppan 2016) (Japan).
34.
TATSUO SATO, NIHONKOKU KENPŌ SEITEI SI [HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN]
(Yuhikaku 1962) (Japan).
35.

See NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], arts. 14, 24 (Japan).

36.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.; Finland Constitution (Suomen perustuslaki), Ch. 2 § 6, 1999;
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNION OF SOCIALIST SOVIET REPUBLICS [SOVIET CONSTITUTION] Jan. 31, 1924
(Soviet Union); DIE VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN REICHS [WEIMAR CONSTITUTION] Aug. 11, 1919,
art. 109, 119, 122 (Ger.); GORDON, supra note 19, at 107–08.
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Three 1986 Statutes of Women in Society

A constitution typically binds the government in its relations with its
citizens but not the relationships of private citizens among themselves. It is
controversial when the constitution is applied to relationships between
private citizens. One famous case is the Nissan automobile case in which
Nissan set different retiring ages for males (sixty years old) and females
(fifty-five years old).37 The Supreme Court ruled the employment provision
void under Article 9038 of the Civil Code.39
The textbook on the Constitution of Japan classifies relationships
among private parties into three positions.40 The first position emphasizes
constitutional values and that constitutional norms are not directly
applicable to the relationship between publishers and authors.41 The second
position uses general basic provisions of the Civil Code to affect a
constitutional norm between private parties. 42 If a contract exists, the
constitutional norm applies through basic principles, such as the bona fide
(good faith) articles of the Civil Code used to interpret a contract.43 If there
is no contract, as in the case of a traffic accident, then principles that guide
public order and morality are applied.44
The third position recognizes no effect of a constitutional norm in
relationships between private parties. 45 Only statutes can assist with
providing a remedy. The Japanese Supreme Court has not clarified which
position it is likely to take.46 Currently, German constitutional theory is
37.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 24, 1982, Showa 54(o) no. 750, 35 SAIBANSHO
300, http://www.courts. go.jp (Japan).

SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB]

38.

MINPŌ [CIV. C.] art. 90 (Japan).

39.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 24, 1982, Showa 54(o) no. 750, 35 SAIBANSHO
300, http://www.courts. go.jp (Japan).

SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB]

40.
KOJI SATO, NIHON KOKU KENPŌ RON [JAPANESE CONSTITUTION] 164–69 (Seibundo
2011) (Japan) [hereinafter SATO 2011]; TOSHIHIKO NONAKA, MUTSUO NAKAMURA, KAZUYUKI
TAKAHASHI & KATSUTOSHI TAKAMI, KENPŌ I [CONSTITUTION I] 248–56 (Yuhikaku 2012) (Japan)
[hereinafter NONAKA ET AL. I].
41.

SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 165, 166–69; NONAKA ET AL. I, supra note 40, at 250–51.

42.

MINPŌ [CIV. C.] arts. 90, 709 (Japan).

43.

SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 165; NONAKA ET AL. I, supra note 40, at 249–50.

44.

SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 165; NONAKA ET AL. I, supra note 40, at 249–50.

45.

SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 165; NONAKA ET AL. I, supra note 40, at 249–50.

46.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 12, 1973, Showa 43 (o) no. 932, 27 SAIBANSHO
[SAIBANSHO WEB] 1536, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.]
July 19, 1974, Showa 42 (gyo tsu) no. 59, 28 SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 790,
http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan).
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influential. Advocates of German constitutional studies argue that the state
has a duty and responsibility to protect the rights of private citizens against
infringement by a private third party.47
Shigenori Matsui argues that the three above-mentioned classifications
should be abandoned.48 Matsui classifies the relationship between statutes
and private parties into four types.49 The first type is when a specific statute
orders a certain action by a private party.50 The second is when a specific
statute authorizes a private citizen to act.51 The third occurs when there is
no statute.52 Finally, the fourth type occurs when a specific statute prohibits
a private citizen from acting. 53 Matsui argues that the “public welfare”
doctrine would apply in the first and second cases.54 In the fourth case, no
state responsibility arises.55 In the third case, private action is permitted
and not prohibited by any statute.56
Even after the Japanese Constitution was adopted, the gender role
model in the family was partially maintained. Court decisions and the
Japanese legal system, which are based on civil law, have influenced the
lives of people as well. For the family environment in Japan, three statutes
enacted in 1986 promoted the social status of women, addressed lifestyle
and work life, and provided opportunities for women to work outside.57
47.
TAKESHI OYAMA, KIHONKEN HOGO NO HŌRI [PRINCIPLE REGARDING PROTECTION OF
BASIC RIGHTS] (Seibundo 1998) (Japan); see also SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 168.
48.
SHIGENORI MATSUI, NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN] 325–26 (Yuhikaku
2007) (Japan).
49.

Id.

50.

Id.

51.

Id.

52.

Id.

53.

MATSUI, supra note 48.

54.

Id.

55.

Id.

56.

Id. at 324.

57.
Danjo Koyō Kikai Kintou Hou [Act on Securing Equal Employment Opportunity and
Treatment Between Men and Women in Employment], Law No. 113 of 1972, translated in (Japanese
Law Translation [JLT DS]), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp [hereinafter Danjo]; Roudousha
Haken Jidyou no Tekiseina Uneino Kakuho Oyobi Haken Roudousha no hogo tou ni Kansuru Houritsu
[Act for Securing the Proper Operation of Worker Dispatching Undertakings and Improved Working
Conditions for Dispatched Workers], Law No. 88 of 1985, translated in (Japanese Law Translation [JLT
DS]), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp [hereinafter Roudousha] (noting this act is sometimes
also called the Temporary Staffing Services Law (emphasis added)); Kokumin Nenkin-hō [National
Pension Law], Law No. 141 of 1947, translated in (Japanese Law Translation [JLT DS]),
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp (as amended in 1959, and again in 2012 by Law No. 99)
[hereinafter Kokumin].
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First, the Equal Employment Opportunity Law (Danjo Koyo Kikai
Kintou Hou) prohibits gender discrimination in the workplace. 58 Its
purpose was to promote equality in recruitment, employment, and
retirement or dismissal. 59 In 1997, this law was partially amended and
regulations to protect women, such as the prohibition of overtime or
midnight work, were abolished.60 According to its original goal, however,
the revised act does still require legally equal treatment in recruitment,
employment, and retirement or dismissal.61
Second, the Temporary Staffing Services Law (Roudousha Haken
Jigyou no Tekiseina Uneino Kakuho Oyobi Haken Roudousha no hogo tou
ni Kansuru Houritsu) provides for certain employment conditions and
guarantees the rights of employees.62 Employers typically hire temporary
workers at cheaper rates than regular workers. Workers can choose flexible
working styles. This Temporary Staffing Services Law has been amended
several times.63 The 2006 revised Act provided an extension of part time
workers’ contracts, as well as improvements to welfare expenses.64
Third, the National Pension Act provides tax reductions for female
homemakers who belong to Category III Insured as defined by the National
Pension (Kokumin-Nenkin-Dai-San-Gou-Hi-Hokensha).65
Only those with income under 1.3 million yen receive a tax reduction
for filing income taxes as a husband’s dependent. 66 This law classifies
people in Japan into three categories. Category I is for self-employed
persons, students, and unemployed persons. 67 Category II is for public
officials or salaried workers.68 Persons in this category receive the common
national pension in addition to a welfare pension. 69 Category III is for
unemployed wives of persons in Category II.70 Unemployed wives do not
58.

Danjo, supra note 57, at art. 5.

59.

Id. art. 1.

60.

Id. arts. 27–31.

61.

Id. arts. 5–6.

62.

Roudousha, supra note 57.

63.
Id. (noting that the Temporary Staffing Services Law was amended in 1999 and 2006
(emphasis added)).
64.

Id. art. 40(2) (as most recently amended by Law No. 82 in 2016).

65.

Kokumin, supra note 57, at art. 7(3).

66.

Id.

67.

Id. art. 7(1).

68.

Id. art. 7(2).

69.

Id. (noting, for example, that public officials need to pay welfare insurance premium).

70.

Kokumin, supra note 57, at art. 7(3).
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have to pay tax, because they are their husbands’ dependents for the
purpose of receiving a pension.71 If the wives work outside the home and
earn over 1.3 million yen, they must pay employee pension and social
insurance premiums.72
Another limitation has prevented wives from working outside of the
home, a spousal deduction for housewives who can claim the deduction as
long as their income is less than 1.3 million yen a year. 73 Japanese
housewives have been reluctant to earn more than 1.3 million yen a year.
The obligation to pay higher taxes associated with higher earnings may
limit their revenue-making capacity when they decide to work outside the
home.
In late 2016, the Japanese government revised the spouse dependent
deduction from 1.3 to 1.5 million yen per year.74 This revision requires
companies to change their regulations in order for spouses to receive
additional payments. 75 This is a reflection that family life in Japan is
changing.
III.

DECISIONS UNDER THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION

The Supreme Court is the last and highest court in the judiciary under
the Japanese Constitution.76 Japanese lower courts have concrete judicial
review under Article 81 of the Japanese Constitution. 77 The judiciary
reviews disputes of law under the Court Act.78

71.

Id.

72.
Haigūsha Kōjo [Spouse Deduction], National Tax Agency Regulation No. 1191 of 2014,
http://www.nta.go.jp/taxanswer/shotoku/1191.htm (Japan).
73.

Id.; see also Kokumin, supra note 57, at art. 7(3).

74.
Haigūsha Kōjo Oyobi Haigūsha Tokubetsu Kōjo no Minaosi ni Tsuite [About Revision of
Spouse Deduction and Spouse Special Deduction], NAT’L TAX AGENCY, https://www.nta.go.jp/
gensen/haigusya/index.htm (Japan) (last visited Nov. 5, 2017) [hereinafter About Revision of Spouse
Deduction]. Nen Zeisei Taikō Wo Kakugi Kettei [Cabinet Decision on Fiscal Year 2005 Taxation
Outline Deduction of Spouse Deduction etc.], NIKKEI SHIMBUN (Dec. 22, 2016, 13:32), http://
blog.goo.ne.jp/kzunoguchi/e/937b9d3c573216bece30277a3bd29bb1?fm=entry_awc(Japan) [hereinafter
Fiscal Year 2005 Taxation].
75.
note 74.

About Revision of Spouse Deduction, supra note 74; Fiscal Year 2005 Taxation, supra

76.

NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 81 (Japan).

77.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 8, 1952, Showa 27 (ma) no. 23, 6(9) SAIBANSHO
783, http://www.courts. go.jp (Japan).
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78.
Saibansho Hou [Japanese Court Act], Law No. 48 of 2013, art. 3(1), translated in
(Japanese Law Translation [JLT DS]), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp.
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Under the new Japanese Constitution, pre-war family conventions
have survived and have emerged in Japanese courts in several cases. The
Japanese judiciary took part in introducing human rights concepts to the
Japanese people through Articles 14 and 24 of the Japanese Constitution.79
When the constitutionality of statutes, orders, regulations, or their
disposition is in dispute and a precedent is overruled, the Grand Bench of
the Supreme Court reviews the case.80 The Petty Court can review the case,
if it is clear, by referring to Grand Bench decisions.81
Japanese Constitutional Law courses teach that Article 14 of the
Japanese Constitution declares equal opportunities, not equal outcomes.
One explanation is that the classes enumerated under Article 14 of the
Japanese Constitution, which state that there shall be no discrimination in
political, economic, or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social
status, or family origin, have historically been used as justification for
discrimination. 82 Per se distinctions based on these enumerated classes are
presumed to be discriminatory. The government must argue that
differential treatment is reasonably constitutional. 83 However, different
treatment based on the effort and ability of the individual is considered
constitutional.
In other differential treatment, in spite of effort and origin, people are
sometimes in weak or fragile situations. Social rights as provided in
Article 25 of the Japanese Constitution 84 take on the role of assisting
economically fragile people. 85 A person who argues that differential
treatment is unconstitutional takes on the burden of proving that it is
unconstitutional.86

79.

See NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], arts. 14, 24 (Japan).

80.

Id. art. 81.

81.

Id. arts. 80–81.

82.

Id. art. 14.

83.
SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 196, 208; JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Belknap
Press of Harv. U. Press, rev. ed. 1999) (discussing how Rawls theory has been influential on Japanese
constitutional studies).
84.

NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 25 (Japan).

85.
Some Japanese constitutional scholars think Article 25 represents the political agenda with
no legal norm. See SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 363; NONAKA ET AL. I, supra note 40, at 502–03.
86.
Yuichiro Tsuji, Article 9 and the History of Japan’s Judiciary: Examining its Likeness to
American and German Courts, 68 TSUKUBA J.L. & POL. 35 (2016) (Japan); see also SATO 2011, supra
note 40, at 196, 208; NONAKA ET AL. I, supra note 40, at 278.
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The Patricide Case and Article 200 of the Criminal Code

One of the most famous cases, referenced earlier in this paper,
concerns patricide. The case involves a junior high school student who was
repeatedly raped by her own father. 87 Her mother left the house after
learning that her own daughter was pregnant by her husband. 88 The
daughter tried to leave as well, but in vain.89 She had five children as a
result of the rapes, two of whom died.90 Another six were aborted and she
later underwent sterilization.91 When she was twenty-nine, she met a man
at her workplace that she was eager to marry.92 She did not run away at that
point because her sister, who was still living at home, might have been put
in danger.93 Upon telling her father about her work colleague, he became
angry, put her in confinement, and raped her. 94 Eventually, she became
desperate and strangled him.95 At that time, she was twenty-nine years old
and her father was fifty-three years old.96

87.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) S AIBANSHO
[SAIBANSHO WEB] 265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Charles Qu, Parricide,
Equality and Proportionality: Japanese Courts’ Attitude Towards the Equality Principle as Reflected in
Aizawa v Japan, 8 MURDOCH U. ELECTRONIC J.L. ¶ 4 (2001).
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88.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) S AIBANSHO
265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Qu, supra note 87.
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89.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) S AIBANSHO
265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Qu, supra note 87.

SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB]

90.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) S AIBANSHO
265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Qu, supra note 87.
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91.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) S AIBANSHO
265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Qu, supra note 87.
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92.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) S AIBANSHO
265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Qu, supra note 87.
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93.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) S AIBANSHO
265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Qu, supra note 87.
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94.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) S AIBANSHO
265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Qu, supra note 87.
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95.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) S AIBANSHO
265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Qu, supra note 87.
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96.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) S AIBANSHO
[SAIBANSHO WEB] 265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Yuko Taniguchi, Songoku
Satsujin Ga Kieta Hi [The Day When Patricide Crime Was Disappeared], CHIKUMA SHOCBŌ (1987)
(Japan); Qu, supra note 87.
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In 1973, the Grand Bench of the Japanese Supreme Court 97 struck
down Article 200 98 of the Criminal Code. While accepting the law’s
purpose that children should respect parents, the court felt that the penalty
was too harsh to be sustained, as compared to the punishment for regular
murder provided under Article 199.99
Among the fifteen justices who reviewed this decision, Justice Takezo
Shimoda’s dissenting opinion noted that Article 200 should be left to the
legislature, not to the court.100 Six justices concurring still objected to the
majority opinion approving special provisions for patricide.101 At the end,
fourteen justices, with one dissenting, decided the case.102 Eight justices
upheld the court’s reasoning, with six dissenting.103 Accepting this decision
that declared the law unconstitutional, the Ministry of Justice sent an
official notice that Article 199 should be applied, even in cases of
patricide.104
In 1995, Article 200 was deleted by the legislature, after some twenty
years.105 Some conservative members in the ruling party have objected,

97.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO
[SAIBANSHO WEB] 265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Hidenori Tomatsu, Equal
Protection of the Law, 53 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 109, 112 (1990); Qu, supra note 87.
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98.
KEIHŌ [PEN. C.] ch. XXVI, art. 200 (Japan) (deleting art. 200 as last amended by Law No.
91, May 12, 1995); Qu, supra note 87; Tomatsu, supra note 97.
99.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO
[SAIBANSHO WEB] 265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Qu, supra note 87; Tomatsu,
supra note 97.

SAIBANREI JŌHŌ

100.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO
265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan) (Shimoda, J., dissenting); Qu,
supra note 87; Tomatsu, supra note 97.

SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB]

101.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO
[SAIBANSHO WEB] 265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Qu, supra note 87; Tomatsu,
supra note 97.

SAIBANREI JŌHŌ

102.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO
[SAIBANSHO WEB] 265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan) (joining the majority opinion
were Ishida, C.J., Iwata, Murakami, J., Sekine, J., Fujibayashi, J., Okahara, J., Kishi, J., and Amano, J.,
with concurring opinion written by Tanaka, J., Shimomura, J., Irokawa, J., Oshumi, J., Ogawa, J., and
Sakamoto, J.); Qu, supra note 87; Tomatsu, supra note 97.
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103.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO
[SAIBANSHO WEB] 265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Qu, supra note 87; Tomatsu,
supra note 97.
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104.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO
265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Tomatsu, supra note 97.

SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB]

105.

KEIHŌ [PEN. C.] (Japan) (deleting art. 200 as last amended by Law No. 91, May 12, 1995).
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favoring Article 200 of the Criminal Code, even after this decision. 106
Decisions declaring a law unconstitutional under concrete judicial review
do not delete the provisions of the statutes. 107 Under Article 41 of the
Japanese Constitution, the sole and highest organ of the state to pass a bill
is the Diet.108 Therefore, only the legislature can amend statutes at their
own discretion.
This case shows an instance where the Japanese judiciary assumed the
role of introducing the concepts of human rights and equality to the
Japanese people.109
B.

Article 900(iv), Constitutional Order of 1995

The Civil Code governs relationships regarding family and between
couples.110 The first sentence of Article 900, Item iv of the Civil Code,
provides different inheritance distributions between legitimate and
illegitimate children.111
The Japanese judiciary determined Article 900 to be constitutional in
1995. 112 In this case, a girl named Masao Tabata was born in a very
conventional family during the Meiji Constitution era and under the old
Civil Code.113 Her older brother had already passed away.114 Her father
Tonesaku Tabata wanted her to keep his family name, Tabata. 115 His
daughter Masao married four times in attempts to keep the family name and
two of the marriages were considered legal.116

106. Small Committee on Judicial Affairs for Revision of Article 200 of Criminal Code, DIET
(July 17, 1973), http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/071/0081/07107170081003c.html (Japan).
107.

NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], arts. 76, 81 (Japan).

108.

Id. art. 41.

109.
(2016).

See Yuichiro Tsuji, Constitutional Law Court in Japan, 66 TSUKUBA J.L. & POL. 65

110.

MINPŌ [CIV. C.] pt. V, ch. III (Japan).

111.

Id. art. 900.

112.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 5, 1995, Heisei 3 (kyo) no. 143, 49(7) SAIBANSHO
[SAIBANSHO WEB] 1789, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan).
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113.

See KYŪ MINPŌ (OLD CIV. C.) 1898, art. 732 (Japan).

114.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 5, 1995, Heisei 3 (kyo) no. 143, 49(7) SAIBANSHO
[SAIBANSHO WEB] 1789, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan).
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115.

Id.

116.

Id.
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In this particular case, the father adopted Masao’s husband as his
son.117 The second marriage to Gensaku, father of Katsuhiko Fukunishi,
was not considered a legal marriage due to the strong objections of the
father.118 Katsuhiko was born as an illegitimate child between Gensaku and
Masao, but was taken away from them and given to the Fukunishi family.119
The Fukunishi family had no son at that time and Katsuhiko was, in fact,
their sole heir.120 Two years later, the Fukunishi family had a son, and it
became undesirable to adopt Katsuhiko as a legal son.121 The father of the
Fukunishi family acknowledged Katsuhiko as an illegitimate child, even
though the father of Fukunishi was not the biological father.122 Even after
the old Civil Code was amended, the distinction between legitimate and
illegitimate children still remained under Article 900 of the Civil Code.123
Some of the relatives in the Tabata family complained that the child
Katsuhiko should not be eligible to succeed because he left the Tabata
family and his children should not be eligible to succeed to their
grandmother's inheritance.124 They pointed out that the new Civil Code was
very beneficial for the grandchildren of Katsuhiko. 125 Katsuhiko was
discriminated against by his birth family, the Tabatas, because he grew up
with the Fukunishi family, and he was also discriminated against by the
Fukunishi family for being born in the Tabata family.126
The majority of the Supreme Court thought that the distinction
between legitimate and illegitimate was reasonable in so far as it respects
legal marriage and protects illegitimate children, and its distinction was not
clearly or remarkably unreasonable in relation to the legislative purpose.127
It seems that the 1995 order rested on the belief that the inheritance
system was based on the individual, and that the provisions regarding
117.

Id.

118.

Id.

119.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 5, 1995, Heisei 3 (kyo) no. 143, 49(7) SAIBANSHO
[SAIBANSHO WEB] 1789, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan).
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120.

Id.

121.

Id.

122.

Id.

123. Id. Most provisions of the Civil Code were drastically amended just after World War II;
most regarding the feudal system were abolished although Article 900 remained. Saikō Saibansho [Sup.
Ct.] July 5, 1995, Heisei 3 (kyo) no. 143, 49(7) SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 1789,
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statutory shares of inheritance were designed to operate in a supplementary
way in cases where there is no designation by testament.128 The 1995 order
supported legislative intent in favor of constitutionality through a multitude
of factors. When designing the system, tradition, social environment,
perception of the people, other factors have to be considered, and the
system of inheritance in each country more or less reflects these factors.
Furthermore, a contemporary system of inheritance is closely related to the
idea of family in a given country, and the system cannot be established
without considering the rules of marriage and family in that country. It
should be concluded that the way the inheritance system is established is
left to the reasonable discretion of the legislature by taking all these into
consideration.129
The 1995 order noted: As long as the Civil Code adopts the principle
of legal marriage, the provision gives preferential treatment to the spouse
who has been in a marital relationship with the deceased and his or her
child(ren) in terms of the statutory share in inheritance, while at the same
time, it assures that a child born out of wedlock will have a certain statutory
share in inheritance so as to protect such child.130
This order held that legislative discretion was not excessively
unreasonable in relation to the reason for enacting Article 900 of the Civil
Code, and that it did not exceed the scope of reasonable discretion granted
to the legislature. There were concurring opinions from Justices Itsuo
Sonobe, Tsuneo Kabe, Katsuya Onishi, Hideo Chikusa, and Shinichi
Kawai.131
C. The Dissenting Opinion in the 1995 Order Would Become Mainstream
in the Courts
Justices Toshijirou Nakajima, Masao Ohno, Hisako Takahashi,
Yukinobu Ozaki, and Mistuo Endo wrote dissenting opinions. 132 The
dissenting justices thought that distinction by origin went unconstitutionally
beyond the scope of the legislative purpose of supporting legal marriage
128.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 5, 1995, Heisei 3 (kyo) no. 143, 49(7) SAIBANSHO
[SAIBANSHO WEB] 1789, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); see also Kazuhiro Ohishi,
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and protecting children.133 They explained that Articles 14 and 24 of the
Japanese Constitution set the limitations of legislative discretion.134 These
five dissenting opinions became the majority in the 2013 order.135 They
were of the opinion that the children were subject to uncontrollable
attribution beyond reasonable distinction.136 The purpose of the law and the
means to achieve the distinction should be substantially related.
Reasonableness alone could not be sustained in this case. Supporting
legal marriage might be reasonable, but the distinction between legitimate
and illegitimate children was beyond their will and effort. The distinction
gave the social impression that illegitimate children were inferior to
legitimate children.137 The legislative fact might have been consistent at
that time, but it has changed significantly since then. Social impressions,
changes in foreign countries’ legal systems, domestic movement to amend
the statute or conclude treaty, and changed legislative fact should be
considered when reviewing the provision.138
The dissenting opinion noted that the decision declaring the provision
unconstitutional should not be retroactive in effect because it might infringe
on the legal stability of this case.139 This opinion did not constitute the
majority in 1995. Reading only the majority opinion, and not the dissenting
opinion, it would be doubtful to conclude that the 2013 order referenced
legislative facts in support of constitutionality so much changed that they
were completely lost in the eighteen years since the 1995 order. In the
patricide case, it took twenty-two years before legislative action followed
through.140 Legislative fact theory is a useful tool for a majority of justices
to persuade others. It might be easier for a justice to declare statutes
obsolete and to ask the legislature to revise in order to avoid serious
conflicts with the parliament.
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The 2013 Order That Declared the Provision Unconstitutional

In the 2013 order, ancestor "A" passed away in July 2001, and the
heirs argued that the provisions of Article 900(iv) were unconstitutional
under Article 14 of the Japanese Constitution. 141 The Supreme Court
vacated and remanded the case to the High Court by holding the provisions
in Article 900(iv) unconstitutional.142
The Supreme Court explained that the inheritance system sets rules as
to who is to inherit the property of the decedent, and in order to define the
inheritance system, the circumstances in each country such as the tradition,
social conditions, and public sentiments should be taken into
consideration. 143 Furthermore, since the modern inheritance system is
closely related to the concept of a family, it cannot be defined without
ignoring the rules, people's perceptions, etcetera. regarding marital or
parent-child relationships in the country. It is left to the reasonable
discretion of the legislature to define the inheritance system while
comprehensively considering all these factors. The major issue disputed in
the present case was, within the inheritance system defined in that manner,
whether or not the distinction made by the provision in terms of the
statutory shares in inheritance between children born in wedlock and
children born out of wedlock constituted discriminatory treatment without
reasonable grounds. “If there is no reasonable ground for making such
distinction even when the abovementioned discretionary power vested in
the legislative body is taken into consideration, it is appropriate to construe
that said distinction is in violation of Article 14, paragraph 1 of the
Constitution.”144
Differential treatment relates to the distinction of legal marriage and
de facto marriage. The Japanese Civil Code respects legal marriage over a
de facto marriage.145
The Japanese Civil Code, revised in 1947, abolished the principle that
the eldest son was the head of the family and preserved the right to
succession.146 The code still stated, however, that the statutory share for a
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child born out of wedlock would be one half that of a child born in
wedlock, under Article 900.147
The 2013 Supreme Court Order held that the provision in Article 900,
Item iv of the Civil Code was unconstitutional. 148 The Supreme Court
explained that this provision would control in the absence of a designation
of the shares in inheritance by a will.149 The Supreme Court reviewed the
limits of legislative discretion under Article 14 of the Japanese
Constitution. The factors to review, such as tradition, social conditions, and
public sentiments, would change along with the times.
The judiciary constantly reviews individuals’ dignity and equality
under the law. The facts based on the 1947 Civil Code have changed. In
1947, the prevailing traditional obstacle for equal treatment under the new
constitution was that the eldest son was the head of the family.150 At that
time, when revising the code, the family law system and other systems of
inheritance in other countries were referenced. Since then, circumstances
surrounding legal marriage in Japan have changed in line with changes in
social and economic circumstances, and people's perceptions of marriage
and family have changed as well. People's lifestyles have also changed.
All of these changes brought about the evolution in the inheritance system
in the Civil Code.
Japan ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) in 1979. 151 However, the 1995 order recognized differential
inheritance treatment between children born in wedlock and those born out
of wedlock. 152 The United Nations Human Rights Committee advised
Japan to remove the distinction.153 The 1995 order deemed Article 900 of
the Civil Code to be constitutional. 154 Five justices dissented and
questioned its reasonableness because, by that time, the form of marriage
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and parent-child relationships had already changed.155 The reasonableness
of supporting a distinction between children born in wedlock and those
born out of wedlock was no longer supported.
It was deemed
unconstitutional in July 2001. 156 The reason why the court in the 2013
order used this date is because the Japanese court had exercised judicial
review on this issue in a concrete case in July 2001.157
It is not clear which factors made the court change its perspective, but
Article 900(iv) was held unconstitutional in the 2013 order.158 However, it
did not overrule the 1995 order.159 The losing party made a special appeal
(Tokubetu Koukoku) to the Supreme Court and argued infringement of the
statutes in the case.160 The Court made the decision in a special order.161
The standard of judicial review is puzzling, because the Supreme Court
declared the 1995 order to be unconstitutional but did not overrule it.
Yasuyuki Watanabe explains that not every judicial review holds the
purpose and means to achieve a goal.162 Kazuhiko Ohishi explains that the
general standard of judicial review did not change with the 2013 order and
that only the legislative facts had changed, at least in July 2001, and the
two-step review for the purpose and means to achieve a goal was not used
in the 2013 order.163
One explanation is that legislative fact is included in the Civil Code,
unlike other constitutional decisions,164 in relation to the Criminal Code. In
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cases in which the constitutionality of a certain criminal sanction is
disputed, 165 actions such as conducting unauthorized business are
prosecuted. The court revealed a lack of attention by the legislature, but as
in the 1995 order, changes in legislative fact were helpful to the justices in
asking parliament to amend the Civil Code—to avoid serious conflict and
allow a longer time to amend the statute so as to encourage the legislature
to amend it. However, legal stability regarding predictability may be lost in
making such decisions.166 The 2013 order was based so much on reasoning
surrounding human dignity that it did not even mention the provisions of
the constitution.167
In sum, this 2013 order limited the effect of the unconstitutional
decision by not overruling its precedent. However, there is another way to
restrict its effect by time scale.
E.

Time Limit of the 2013 Order in Declaring A Law Unconstitutional

Three months after the 2013 decision, Article 900(iv) of the Civil
Code was amended in the parliament with a very quick resolution compared
with the patricide case.168 One of the reasons for the quick response was
the effect of a decision declaring a law unconstitutional. The 2013 order
recognized that the unconstitutional conditions began in 2001, sending an
easily understandable message to the legislature.
The Civil Code provides that succession occurs when an ancestor
passes away.169 The new provision of the Civil Code regarding succession
occurred after September 5, 2013.170 The amended provision of the Civil
Code applies only to cases in which there is a legitimate and an illegitimate
child. 171 The Supreme Court held the provision unconstitutional on
KATSUTOSHI TAKAMI, KENPŌ II, CONSTITUTION II 303–05 (2012) (Japan) [hereinafter NONAKA ET AL.
II].
165. NONAKA ET AL. I, supra note 40, at 474–81 (introducing two levels of judicial review); see
also SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 665–71; NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE, KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION] 389 (2015)
(Japan).
166. TSUJIMURA, supra note 33, at 185 (discussing the 2013 order, which emphasized legal
stability but did not mention a purpose or any means to achieve a purpose).
167. Yasue Nukatsuka, Kongaisi Hōtei Sōzokubun Sabetsu Saikōsai Daihōtei Iken Kettei [2013
Unconstitutional Order], 400 HŌGAKU KYŌSITSU 4 (2014).
168.
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September 4, 2013.172 The 2013 order noted a few points for succession
cases that occurred before September 5, 2013.
The court noted that on July 2001 at the latest has no effect on any
legal relationships that have already been fixed by rulings or other judicial
decisions on division of estate, agreements on division of estate or other
agreements, etcetera made on the assumption of the provision of the first
sentence of the proviso to said item with regard to other cases of inheritance
that have commenced during the period after July 2001 until said judgment
is made.173
The Supreme Court reserved several comments on the time scale.
First, Article 900(iv) was unconstitutional for inheritance cases beginning
in July 2001.174 Second, the unconstitutional order did not control decisions
or agreements for distributions of the family court from 2001 to 2013.175
The Ministry of Justice explains that the 2013 order has de facto binding
power.176 The 2013 order applies to similar cases that occur thereafter. In
some cases, partition of inheritance takes time after the ancestor passes
away, even if succession already occurred.
After September 4, 2013, if an heir wanted to fix distribution for a case
in which succession occurred between July 2001 and September 4, 2013,
the distribution between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child would
be the same.177 If the distribution for an heir had already been fixed by an
agreement or judgment, the legal relationships had already been completed,
and the 2013 order would not hold. The Ministry of Justice explains that if
the partition of inheritance is not completed, then the legal relationship is
not yet fixed.178 An order by the family court or an agreement among heirs
completes inheritance and fixes the legal relationship.179 The Ministry of
Justice released a notice to keep legal stability, consistent with this instance
of concrete judicial review.180 The 2013 order restricts the influence of the
Supreme Court order on a time scale, based on legal stability of the family
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relationship once twelve years has passed.181 Thus, it has de facto binding
power.
The legislature has the responsibility to amend a statute after a
decision by the Supreme Court declares it unconstitutional, but the Japanese
Constitution does not specify a reasonable period for the legislature to
amend or abolish a statute.182 The constitution granted legislative power to
the Diet, but legislative inaction might permit a party to ask for damages
under the State Redress Act (Kokka Baishou Hou).183
F.

Nationality Act Decision of 2008

The Supreme Court held Article 3(1) of the Nationality Act184 to be
unconstitutional in 2008. The Supreme Court used the purpose and means
review approach. Here, two cases were decided on the same date—June 4.
In the first case, the child of an unmarried Philippine mother and a Japanese
father submitted an application for nationality to the Ministry of Justice on
the grounds that the child received affiliation through the father after he was
born.185 The ministry denied the application.186
In the second case, a son and a mother were ordered to leave Japan
because they lacked Japanese nationality. 187 Under the Immigration
Control and Refugee Recognition Act, 188 their objections were denied.

181.

See SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 668–69.

182. Id.; see also Yuichiro Tsuji, Law Making Power in Japan—Legislative Assessment in
Japan, 10 KOR. LEGIS. RES. 173 (2016).
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(Japanese Law Translation [JLT DS]), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp.
184. Kokuseki Hou [Nationality Act], Law No. 147 of 1950, art. 3(1), translated in (Japanese
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They argued that Article 3(1) of the Nationality Act was unconstitutional
under Article 14 of the Japanese Constitution.189
The Japanese Nationality Act uses jus sanguinis to determine
nationality.190 A child has the nationality of his or her father or mother,
regardless of his or her birthplace.191 Article 2 of this act provides that a
child is a Japanese citizen if his or her mother or father is a Japanese citizen
at the time the child is born.192 Article 3(1) permits those under twenty
years of age to acquire legitimate child status through parental marriage or
legal acknowledgment by the father, a process known as “Ninchi” in
Japanese.193
In Japan, the family relationship between a mother and child starts at
birth.194 The child is a legitimate child of the mother.195 Under Article 3(1)
of the Japanese Nationality Act, the father is eligible to acknowledge
(Ninchi) only while the mother is pregnant, in cases where the mother and
father are not married.196 However, illegitimate children may not acquire
Japanese citizenship after birth, even when they are acknowledged by the
father.197 These illegitimate children can acquire Japanese citizenship only
after the mother and father become legally married.198
The Supreme Court majority held that Article 3 of the Nationality Act
was unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of Article 14 of the
Japanese Constitution.199 Article 10 of the Japanese Constitution provides
that Japanese nationality is fixed by statute.200 The Japanese Nationality
Act provides requirements for acquiring or losing Japanese nationality.201
The nation's traditional, political, social, and economic environment
works to fix these requirements of nationality in the legislature. The
distinction caused by the requirements for nationality under the Nationality
Act would be unconstitutional if this distinction were to have no reasonable
189.
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grounds for justification. If the legislature acts beyond the scope of its
discretion, the judiciary can regard the provision as unconstitutional under
the equal protection clause of Article 14 of the Japanese Constitution.
Japanese nationality is a very important legal status that protects not
only fundamental rights but also one’s eligibility to receive public
assistance. A child who is born cannot change his or her condition—
whether or not the parents are married—by his or her own effort or ability.
In 1984, the Nationality Act was amended to grant Japanese
nationality only after the father and mother got married, apart from the
process of legitimation (Jun-sei).202 On the other hand, children born of a
Japanese father and a non-Japanese mother can receive Japanese nationality
through acknowledgement by the father during the pregnancy of the
mother.203 This amendment works to follow the principle of jus sanguinis.
The legislature was of the opinion that those children who could not acquire
Japanese nationality by nature would be able to establish a “close
relationship” with a foreign country, apart from Japan.204
Article 3(1) of the Japanese Nationality Act used jus sanguinis and the
legal marriage between a Japanese father and a non-Japanese mother to
mean a close relationship with Japan.205 The distinction in Article 3(1) of
the Japanese Nationality Act was based on reasonability of purpose at the
time it was amended in 1984.
In this case, the plaintiff submitted registration for Japanese nationality
in 2003, at which time the legislative argument to support constitutionality
had already been lost.206 The decision to strike down Article 3(1) of the
Japanese Nationality Act as unconstitutional did not mean that all
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provisions, including legitimation, became void in their entirety. 207
Legitimation to cover the principle of jus sanguinis still remained.208
The Supreme Court cited the patricide case and used the purpose and
means to achieve a goal approach.209 A change of legislative fact was one
of the critical factors. Japanese concrete judicial review only addressed the
individual plaintiffs in this case and excluded others in the same position.
In any case, the legislature amended the Japanese Nationality Act in
2008. 210 It is not clear how long the judiciary needs to declare that
legislative facts have changed so as to make a statute obsolete.
IV.

TWO FAMILY LAW DECISIONS IN 2015

In December 2015, the Japanese Supreme Court rendered two
decisions in the area of family law. The Court upheld Article 750 of the
Civil Code as constitutional, requiring a married couple to choose either the
husband’s or the wife’s family name. 211 The Court emphasized the
Japanese tradition of using the same family name for a couple.212 On the
one hand, the Court struck down Article 733 of the Civil Code, which
prohibited women from remarrying within six months of a divorce.213 On
the other hand, the Court stated that a 100-day waiting period was
constitutionally reasonable.214
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Same Surname Decision in 2015

The Supreme Court upheld Article 750 of the Civil Code as
constitutional in December 2015. 215 The plaintiffs sought damages as a
result of legislative inaction to amend Article 750 of the Civil Code. 216
They argued that they had a right not to be forced to change their family
name upon marriage, and that social pressure and discrimination to change
the family name to that of the husband’s family name infringed upon their
equal protection rights under Article 14 of the Japanese Constitution. 217
Those who wanted to keep the wife’s family name could not get married,
which infringed upon the freedom to marry as provided in Article 24 of
Japanese Constitution and also violated the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.218
The Supreme Court responded that the right not to be forced to change
one’s family name is a personal right and a symbol of one’s personality.219
The articles of the Civil Code regulate and control concrete personal rights
in light of the constitution. The Supreme Court thought that it was
inappropriate to argue that being forced to change one’s family name upon
marriage infringed upon the personal rights set forth in the constitution.220
The intent of the articles regulating the family under the Civil Code,
confirming that members using the same surname would belong to the same
family, reflect a fundamental component of society. Their purpose is
constitutionally reasonable. Change of family status is subject to an
individual’s will upon marriage, and thus, females are not forced to give up
their surname against their will.221 The family name has an identification
function in relation to others, and the right to establish or change one’s own
family name depends solely upon one’s own will. A change of surname
upon marriage is expected.
Responding to the argument that it is an infringement of equal rights
under the constitution, the Supreme Court stated that Article 750 did not
discriminate based on gender. No formal unequal treatment was caused by
Article 750 because the majority of couples use the husband’s surname and
215.

Id.

216.

Id.

217.

Id.

218. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18,
1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter Convention on Discrimination].
219.
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because husbands and wives discuss and conclude which family name is to
be adopted.222
The Supreme Court explained that the purpose of Article 24 of the
Japanese Constitution, which guarantees the right to choose whether to
marry, whom to marry, and when to marry, is subject to individual
choice.223 On the other hand, Article 750 of the Civil Code addresses the
effects of marriage.224 Giving up a marriage because of Article 750 does
not necessarily lead to an infringement of Article 24 of the constitution.
Married women can use their family name as their common name in their
social lives.
The Supreme Court further explained that Article 24 of the
constitution is only a suggestion and guideline for the legislature.225 The
family is regulated under the general perspective of relationships between
parents and family, and couples are subject to the times in which they live.
These influences include national tradition, social factors, and
circumstances surrounding the family. Personal rights and equal protection
rights take various forms and legislative discretion is very broad. The
means to achieve the goal are further fixed by social status, the environment
in which people are living, and the standpoint of the family as it changes
from time to time.
The judiciary reviews the effects of this system under Article 24 of the
Constitution and reviews the reasonableness of Article 750 in light of
human dignity and equal treatment between males and females. 226 The
same surname tradition was established in 1898.227 It is reasonable to think
that having the same surname is a fundamental component of being a
family. A child born between a husband and a wife using the same
surname is then assumed to be legitimate and protected under their
guardianship.
Five dissenting opinions saw Article 750 of the Civil Code as
unconstitutional. 228 Justice Kiyoko Okabe noted in her opinion that the
number of females working outside the home is increasing and that it is

222.
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reasonable for a woman to keep her family name after marriage.229 Without
exception, the use of a different surname for a woman could cause a loss of
personal identification. The majority of couples using the husband’s
surname reflects the actual power balance in our society. A requirement to
change one’s surname could be unconstitutional in so far as it infringes
upon one’s personal identification and leads to a sense of losing one’s
identity.230 One cannot use an alias in public documents and identification
by an alias versus official name brings about new issues. Women are
participating more and more in society such that the background of the
provision is becoming lost. Losing one’s identity goes against the dignity
of the individual and gender equality under Article 24 of the constitution.231
Furthermore, Justice Okabe emphasized that instances of divorce,
remarriage, non-marriage, and late marriage are increasing and that the
function of the surname is being lost.232
Justice Michiyoshi Kiuchi argued in his dissenting opinion that Article
750 of the Civil Code should be unconstitutional because at least one
person in the couple is obligated to give up his or her surname.233
Justice Kiuchi doubts that the sense of being a family member is
cultivated through the same surname.234 Children are not born with a sense
of whether they have the same surname as other family members. Having
the same surname is not proof of a relationship between a child and a parent
or of being a married couple.
Justice Yoshiki Yamaura concurred with Justice Okabe and noted that
the Diet has the responsibility to amend Article 750.235 He referenced a
Korean Constitutional Court decision that held a similar provision in Korea
to be unconstitutional.236 The same opinion has also been referenced by the
Commission of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women.237
This decision was controversial among Japanese constitutional
scholars. The scholars criticized the majority for allowing broad legislative
229.
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discretion and denying personal rights that are protected under the
constitution. A name signifies a person under a legal system, which leads
to attachment to that name.238
The Court explained that a surname has meaning as an individual’s
name, because the family name and the first name work together to identify
a person in society.239 Scholars criticized the majority opinion by stating
that the family name belongs to society. A certain uniform standard is
needed. Unlike the first name, a family name has an important function in
recognizing members of “one” family.240 A surname is assumed to change
when family relationships change in instances such as marriage.241 Thus,
Article 750 is related to personal rights protected under Article 13 of the
constitution.
Kazuyuki Takahashi explains that a name is used to identify oneself in
social life. 242 Recognizing the vital function of people living with
autonomy in social life, this constitutional right is guaranteed. Takahashi
opines that the Court should have analyzed whether there is a legitimate
public interest in changing a surname. 243 The majority opinion
distinguished the surname from the first name, stating that a surname is
granted by the government but is not guaranteed as a human right.244 For
Takahashi, this was an arbitrary interpretation.245
The legislature has discussed revising Article 750 since 1996. 246
Former Justice Tokuji Izumi argued that the mission of the judiciary had
been abandoned because the cabinet did not propose a bill and the

238. Manabu Ishizaki, Fufu Bessei Soshō [Constitutionality of Article 750 in the Same
Surname Decision] 104 SHIN HANEI KAISETSU WATCH 3 (2016).
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240. Shuhei Ninomiya, Saidai Han Heisei 27.12.16 To Kenpō Teki Kachi No Jitsugen
[Realization of Constitutional Value and the Supreme Court Decision of Heisei 27.12.16] 737 KOSEKI
JIHOU 28 (2016).
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242. Kazuyuki Takahashi, Fufu Bessei Soshō Dōsi Kyousei Gōken Hanketu Ni Mirareru
Saikousaino Sikō Yōsiki [Perspective of the Supreme Court in the Same Surname Decision], 879 SEKAI
[WORLD] 144, 144 (2016).
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legislature did not amend the law, leading the plaintiff to take the issue to
court in this case.247
The majority opinion must have responded by saying that Article 750
conflicts with the ICCPR.248 Miyoko Tsujimura was disappointed that the
court did not mention the ICCPR and thinks that, in the future, the Court
will allow all people to retain their surnames after getting married if they so
choose.249 The right of a married couple to use separate surnames is within
the legislature’s discretion.250
B.

Prohibition of Remarriage Decision in 2015

The Supreme Court 251 held Article 733(1) 252 to be unconstitutional
beyond the 100-day waiting period. In this case, the wife-plaintiff divorced
her former husband in 2008 because of domestic violence and because she
was pregnant by her current partner.253 She needed to wait for six months
after the divorce before she could remarry. 254 In 2011, she claimed
emotional damage, resulting from legislative inaction to amend Article 772
of the Civil Code, in the Okayama District Court.255 The district court and

247. Tokuji Izumi, Concerning the Japanese Public’s Evaluation of Supreme Court Justices,
88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1769, 1777 (2011). All fifteen justices of the Supreme Court are selected from
among judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and scholars. Id. Except for the Chief Justice, all justices are
appointed by the cabinet. Id. These appointments are left to the autonomy of the judiciary to some
extent. Id.; Court System of Japan: Judges, SUP. CT. JAPAN 10, http://www.courts.go.jp/english/
judicial_sys/Court_System_of_Japan/index.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2017) (explaining that for lower
court judges, the Supreme Court names nominees and submits the list to the cabinet). For instance,
Tokuji Izumi is a career judge. Izumi, supra note 247, at 1777–78 (explaining a career judge’s opinion
does not necessarily conform to conservative opinion).
248. ICCPR, supra note 151; see also Hajime Yamamoto, Transu Nashonaru To Domestikku
No Aida De Yureru Saikousai [Swinging Between Transnational and Domestic], 883 HŌRITSU JIHOU 3
(2016).
249.

TSUJIMURA, supra note 33, at 280–81.

250.
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the Hiroshima High Court held the requirement to be constitutional.256 The
plaintiffs argued that this provision was unconstitutional under Articles 14
and 24 of the Japanese Constitution. 257 The Legislative Council of the
Ministry of Justice advised in 1996 that Article 733 should provide a 100day waiting period, but conservative members of the Diet prevented an
amendment to Article 733.258
It is necessary to examine Article 772 259 before analyzing Article
733(1). Article 772 of the Civil Code provides for three scenarios
regarding the status of a child.260 First, a child conceived during marriage is
presumed to be the child of the husband.261 Second, a child born within 300
days after divorce is presumed to be the child of the divorced husband.262
Third, a child born after remarriage is presumed to be the child of the new
husband.263
When a wife gets a divorce and remarries immediately, a child born
within 200 days after the divorce would be presumed to be the child of the
ex-husband and not of the new husband. 264 Therefore, the period of
prohibition of remarriage was provided for in Article 733(1). 265 A
duplication of presumptions occurs from the 201st to the 300th day, but
Article 733 prohibited remarriage for a six-month period in any event.266
In December 2015, the majority opinion of the Supreme Court held
that the purpose of Article 733(1) is to avoid duplication of the presumption
of paternity so as to prevent paternity-related disputes.267 At the time the
Civil Code was drafted, during the Meiji Constitution era, it was considered
256.
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reasonable to impose a remarriage ban of six months, which is longer than
the present 100 days, not only for the couple but also in the interest of the
child.
The legislature generally regulates family and couple relationships by
taking into consideration national tradition, social factors, and
circumstances surrounding the family. Article 24 of the Japanese
Constitution sets limits on legislative discretion.268 The judiciary reviews
provisions in light of their reasonableness to sustain the constitutionality of
these provisions as established by the legislative branch. Today, as medical
technology develops, this foundation is being lost. The Supreme Court said
that imposing a 100-day waiting period was reasonable and appropriate but
imposing a period beyond 100 days would be unconstitutional and
unreasonable.269
Justices Ryuko Sakurai, Katsumi Chiba, Takehiko Ohtani, Yoshinobu
Ohnuki, Naoto Ohtani, and Tsuneyuki Yamamoto wrote concurring
opinions.270 They agreed with the majority that a waiting period of 100
days was constitutional under Article 14 or 24(2) of the Japanese
Constitution. 271 They believed that the prohibition period should be as
short as possible.272 Even within 100 days, the prohibition of remarriage
must be lifted in certain cases.273 The purpose of Article 733 was thought
to be sustained as long as it avoided a presumption of two fathers and
prevented disputes regarding paternity.274
The lack of presumption of paternity is not limited to cases where a
child is born within 100 days under Article 733(2). 275 There are cases
where the biological mother was too old to be pregnant or paternity was not
presumed, because the husband was missing for three years. 276

268.
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Additionally, when the wife has undergone sterilization, it is clear that she
cannot bear a child.277
When the couple registers a marriage, the officer reviews only the
formal documentary items. 278 Thus, new couples must file medical
evidence to rebut a presumption of paternity by the former husband if the
woman has been previously married.279
Justice Kaoru Onimaru opined that all of Article 733 was
unconstitutional because the overlap of the presumption occurs only in
exceptional and limited cases.280 Even though the purpose of Article 733 is
legitimate, a uniform prohibition to cover rare cases is too broad to
maintain reasonableness under Articles 14 and 24 of the Japanese
Constitution. 281 Clear and simple regulations should be prepared by the
legislature for family and couple relationships.
Justice Michiyoshi Kiuchi explained that scientific DNA data analysis
can objectively clarify paternity. 282 Therefore, a prohibition period for
remarriage to prevent confusion of paternity is no longer meaningful.
Justice Yoshiki Yamaura’s dissenting opinion argued that Article
733(2) restricts women through a legal technique to prevent the
presumption of fatherhood.283 There are very few instances where a woman
bears a child where the question of paternity overlaps with the former and
the new husband. A prohibition covering all women is meaningless. An
individual remedy for children should be provided by the legislature.
Justice Yamaura showed how a South Korean Constitutional Law Court
held a similar provision of the Civil Code to be unconstitutional in 2005.284
The remarriage prohibition and the same surname decision in 2015
illustrates several points. First, the judiciary will refrain from acting
beyond legislative discretion and restricts the scope of its decisions on
unconstitutionality. It should provide guidelines for the legislature to
follow in amending laws when necessary. The members of the Diet are not
legal experts. A simpler and easier message would be helpful for them to
react to court decisions. In this case, the court struck down the additional
eighty days as unconstitutional and held that a waiting period of 100 days
277.
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was constitutional. 285 The parliament should modify Article 733
immediately. Even though technology continues to develop, paternity
disputes lead to litigation costs that can still be burdensome for the general
public.286
Second, the minority opinion of the Supreme Court is not critical to
the parties in these particular cases, but over time, it could function as the
majority opinion. Constitutional law scholars have the responsibility to
disseminate these opinions throughout Japan.
C.

Local Government and Same Sex Marriage

Under Article 24 of the Japanese Constitution, the phrase “the mutual
consent of both sexes” is subject to interpretation.287 If this language means
both females and males, it would be unconstitutional to admit same-sex
marriage. Otherwise, it would be constitutional to read that “of both sexes”
means “of two parties.” This interpretation would prohibit polygamy.
Several decisions of the Japanese Supreme Court show that it takes a
long time to pass or amend statutes in the Diet. Article 41 of the Japanese
Constitution provides that legislative power belongs solely to the Diet.288
Deliberations in parliament under constitutionalism shall consider the
opinions of the minority, marginalized people, and freedom of speech as
these are channeled between the legislature and the people.
When the deliberative floor of central Tokyo does not work well, the
local government might be a model for the Diet. Chapter 8 of the Japanese
Constitution provides for local self-government. 289 A local government
may pass ordinances for regions within its jurisdiction, but not for all of
Japan’s territory.

285. See KOJI TONAMI, KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION] 433 (Gyosei 1999) (Japan); see also Anzai
Fumio, Sihū sinsa to rippou sairyou ron [Judicial Review and Legislative Discretion] 47(1) RIKKYŌ
HŌGAKU [ST. PAUL’S REV. L. POL.] 10, 10 (1997) (Japan); Hidemori Tomatsu, Hū no moto no byoudū
ni kakawaru hanrei riron [Decision Theory on Equality Under the Law], in TOMATSU & NOSAKA,
KENPŌ SOSHŪ NO GENJŪ BUNSEKI [ANALYSIS ON THE PRESENT STATE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LITIGATION] 190, 190 (2012) (Japan).
286. TSUJIMURA, supra note 33, at 245. Tsujimura feels that the court’s opinion neglects the
minority; other remedies should be prepared by the legislature. Id.
287.
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In 2015, Shibuya ward passed an ordinance to deal with relationships
of same-sex couples in the same way as legal marriage.290 The reason for
passing this ordinance was that some lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender (LGBT) couples could not rent rooms and were prevented from
visiting their partners in the hospital for medical checkups or other
procedures. 291 Shibuya ward approved eight couples and issued them
registration documents.292
In Setagaya ward, the mayor issued a protocol for the registration of
same-sex couples as partnerships. 293
Twenty-nine couples have
registered. 294 Yokohama city opened space for members of the LGBT
community to communicate.295 In Chiba city, more than fifty percent of
citizens are projected to register as same-sex couples.296
Registered same-sex couples do not receive the same tax and
inheritance treatment as legally married couples. 297 These ordinances
motivate the Diet to pass relevant statutes, although strong conservative
members object to amending the Japanese Constitution.
290. Shibuya-ku Danjo Byodo Oyobi Tayo-sei o Soncho Suru Shakai o Suishin Suru Jorei
[Shibuya Ward Ordinance to Promote a Society that Respects Gender Equality and Diversity],
https://www.city.shibuya.tokyo.jp/kusei/jorei/jorei/lgbt.html (Japan); see Shibuya-ku Danjo Byodo
Oyobi Tayo-sei o Soncho Suru Shakai o Suishin Suru Jorei [Shibuya Ward Ordinance to Promote a
Society that Respects Gender Equality and Diversity], Ordinance of 2015, pmbl., art. 10,
https://www.city.shibuya.tokyo.jp/kusei/jorei/jorei/pdf/danjo_tayosei.pdf (Japan) [hereinafter Shibuya];
see also Shibuya-ku danjo byōdō oyobi tayō-sei o sonchō suru shakai o suishin suru jōrei ni tsuite no
shōsasshi [Regulations to Promote a Society that Respects Gender Equality and Diversity in Shibuyaku] (2015), https://www.city.shibuya.tokyo.jp/kusei/jorei/jorei/pdf/lgbt_sasshi.pdf (Japan) [hereinafter
Shibuya Booklet].
291. Shibuya Booklet, supra note 290; see also Meg Murphy, Tokyo’s Setagaya Ward to Begin
Legally Recognizing Same-sex Partnerships, JAPANTODAY (July 31, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://japan
today.com/category/national/tokyos-setagaya-ward-to-begin-legally-recognizing-same-sex-partnerships.
292. See Shusuke Murai, Tokyo’s Shibuya and Setagaya Wards Issue First Same-Sex
Partnership Papers, JAPAN TIMES (Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/11/05/
national/social-issues/shibuya-set-issue-first-certificates-recognizing-sex-couples/#.Wf-3VROPLow.
293. Dousei Pa-tona-sippu Nitsuite [About the Setagaya Ward Same-Sex Partnership Oath]
(2017), SETAGAYA-KU [SETEGAYA CITY], http://www.city.setagaya.lg.jp/kurashi/101/167/1871/d00
142701.html (Japan) [hereinafter Setagaya].
294. Murai, supra note 292. Unlike Shibuya ordinance, Setagaya ward issues a certificate
under inner guideline. Id. See also Shibuya, supra note 290; Setagaya, supra note 293.
295. LGBT: “Yokohama Diversity Parade” Walking with Smiles, MAINICHI NEWSPAPERS
(Oct. 15, 2016, 17:26), http://mainichi.jp/articles/20161016/k00/00m/040/012000c (Japan).
296. Justin McCurry, Tokyo’s Shibuya Ward is First in Japan to Recognize Same-sex
Marriage, TOKYO SHIMBUN (Mar. 31, 2015, 7:50 PM), http://www.tokyonp.co.jp/article/national/list
/201604/CK2016041202000250.html.
297.
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THE FUNCTION OF A DECISION THAT STRIKES DOWN A LAW AS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL

V.

In Japan, the effect of a decision on the constitutionality of a law
applies only to the litigants in the case under concrete judicial review. The
decision on the unconstitutionality of a law by the Supreme Court has no
function to automatically delete the provisions at issue because the lawmaking power belongs solely to the Diet. The drafting history of the
Japanese Constitution shows that there was serious concern over leaving
absolute power to the judiciary. The concern was over the issue of where
sovereign power should reside.
Although a decision on the unconstitutionality of a law only binds the
parties and the government in a particular case, it must be respected by the
other branches of government. As in Article 200 of the Criminal Code, the
prosecutor applied the provision governing regular murder, Article 199 and
not Article 200, for a murder case where a child killed his or her parents
after the Supreme Court had rendered its decision on the relevant case.298
Soon after the remarriage prohibition case in 2015, the Ministry of
Justice notified municipalities to accept marriage registrations as early as
100 days after a divorce.299 The legislature must respect decisions on the
unconstitutionality of a law and rapidly amend or abolish the pertinent
provisions. However, it took twenty-two years to amend the relevant
statutes in the patricide case.
These cases illustrate some of the obstacles in the floor deliberations
of the Diet. There is no specific time limit obligating the legislature to
amend or abolish statutes under the Japanese Constitution, although the
Supreme Court indicates some guidelines for legislative action.
Decisions on the unconstitutionality of a law are retroactive only for
litigants and do not generally hold for other cases under concrete judicial
review and Article 41, as the Diet has the sole law-making power.
By analyzing the scope of the decisions on the unconstitutionality of
various laws, it might be possible to distinguish criminal from civil and
administrative cases. In criminal law, court decisions generally apply
retroactively, but final decisions would not automatically invalidate other
past decisions. In administrative or civil law cases, decisions in general do
not apply retroactively.
298.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) S AIBANSHO
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The Supreme Court announces decisions on the unconstitutionality of
a law, and sends them to the cabinet and the Diet. This means that the
decision should hold for similar cases in the future. Judicial review under
the Japanese Constitution is a concrete rather than an abstract review. The
application of a decision on the unconstitutionality of a law means that the
application of that law to the specific facts of a concrete case will be
unconstitutional even as the text of the statute on its face remains
constitutional.300
Regarding Article 900(iv), the order that rendered the provision
unconstitutional in 2013, limited its effect to a specified time scale on the
ground that the legal stability of family relationships for inheritance
purposes needed to be maintained. 301 If the distribution to an heir was
already fixed by an agreement or judgment, the legal relationship would be
complete. The 2013 order did not overrule the 1995 constitutional order,
but it managed to maintain legal stability through the uniform treatment of
families—preventing confusion with other family relationships.302
These decisions did not set forth a time limit for the legislature to act.
In subsequent analyses, when voting on disparity cases, the Japanese
Supreme Court reached decisions on the unconstitutionality of laws, even
as these provisions remained effective through the Administrative
Litigation Act. 303 In 1976, the Supreme Court adopted the Iken-Jotai
condition doctrine for the first time by invoking Article 31(1) of the
Administrative Case Litigation Act in an action for revocation of an
administrative decision. 304 It used an application by analogy method,
known as Jijo Hanketsu. 305 The 1976 decision rejected the claim that

300. Saikō Saibanashō [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 28, 1962, Showa 30(o) no. 2961, 16 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO
KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 1593 (Japan) (involving confiscation of the property of third parties, this
was a controversial decision as to whether the law at issue was unconstitutional on its face or in its
application); see also SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 671; NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 164, at 323,
332(c).
301. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 4, 2013, Heisei 24 (kyo) no. 985, 67(6) SAIBANSHO
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 1320, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan).
302.

Id.

303. Yuichiro Tsuji, Vote Value Disparity and Judicial Review, SINGAPORE L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016).
304. Gyousei Jiken Soshō Hou [Administrative Case Litigation Act.], Act no. 139 of 1962, art. ġ
31, translated in (Japanese Law Translation [JLT DS]), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp
/law/detail/?id=1922&vm=04&re=02 (Japan).
305.

Id.
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Article 219 of the Public Officer Election Act clearly prohibited the
application of Article 31(1) of the Administrative Case Litigation Act.306
The Supreme Court explained that parliament must address
unconstitutional states or conditions within a reasonable time.307 If it fails
to do so, the judiciary can make a determination of unconstitutionality.
Today, lower courts can declare unconstitutionality in cases of voting
disparities. In the disparity voting case referenced above, the effect was not
retroactive for the litigants.
Dissenting or concurring opinions are not critical as precedent to bind
future cases, but they play the role of sending a message to other
government branches. For the cases involving Article 733 of the Civil
Code, the dissenting opinion of Yamaura noted that, under the Meiji
Constitution, the old patriarchy had been maintained in the Civil Code,
while Justice Kiuchi suggested the availability of advanced medical
technology.308 Additionally, after the decisions on the unconstitutionality
of the law but before amendment by the legislature, the Ministry of Justice
ordered the office of municipalities to accept marriage registrations just 100
days after divorce.309 As in the patricide case, the conservative members of
parliament are reluctant to respond in some cases.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Under the Meiji Constitution, women did not enjoy the same rights as
men. Female suffrage was not recognized and women could not form
associations or take part in the parliament. Under the old Civil Code, only
the eldest son succeeded to the property of the family.
A young American lady who was raised in Japan suggested an
advanced proposal for equal rights after working with the GHQ. The
Japanese government, however, rejected her proposal because they
referenced traditions that did not exist in Japan.
The Japanese Constitution provides for equal rights in Articles 14 and
24 by stating that marriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of

306. Koshoku Senkyo Hou [Japanese Public Officer Election Act], Act no. 100 of 1952, art.
219, translated in (Japanese Law Translation [JLT DS]), http://www.japanese lawtranslation.go.jp
(Japan).
307.
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both sexes, and that it shall be maintained through mutual cooperation on
the basis of equal rights between the husband and the wife.310
The constitution governs the relationship between the government and
private citizens. The judiciary uses the constitution in some cases to
invalidate contracts between companies and laborers.
There are
controversies with regard to whether constitutional norms directly apply to
relationships among private citizens.
In 1986, three major statutes to guarantee equal protection were
passed, impacting the fields of labor and national pension.311
Decisions of the judiciary have been influential as a remedy for
unequal treatment in conventional family law. Under concrete judicial
review, the judiciary sends messages to the legislature to revise statutes.
Article 41 declares that the sole law-making organ is the Diet, so the
judiciary cannot amend the statutes being reviewed. 312 Under concrete
judicial review, the judgment only applies to the parties in litigation. In the
patricide case, the Ministry of Justice did not prosecute under the article in
question in similar cases.
In the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children, the
Supreme Court held Article 900 to be constitutional in 1995.313 This case
shows that conventional customs survive even under the current Japanese
Constitution. Dissenting opinions argued that children cannot choose their
parents and are subject to uncontrollable attributions.314 Decisions on the
unconstitutionality of a law may cause other similar family relationship
issues. The dissenting justice proposed that the decision should not be
retroactive, but this proposal did not receive the support of the majority.315
In 2013, the Supreme Court announced by order that Article 900 was
unconstitutional. 316 The Grand Bench of the Supreme Court called all
fifteen justices to change precedent and determine the constitutionality of
the order and statutes.317 The 2013 order did not overrule the 1995 order.
310.

NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 14 (Japan).
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The 2013 order noted that Article 900 would control in the absence of a
designation of the shares of inheritance by a will and pointed out that some
factors to limit legislative discretion such as tradition, social conditions and
public sentiment, would change along with the times.318 First, this order
shows that dissenting opinions may subsequently become mainstream in
Japanese family law decisions.
Second, the Court may reveal a lack of attention by the legislature.
The judiciary is obligated to constantly review statutes and hold them
unconstitutional if the legislative facts that supported the statutes have
changed. Recommending a change of legislative fact is a helpful tool to
receive majority support among justices, thus avoiding serious conflicts and
delays in amending the statute. It also encourages the legislature to amend
statutes. However, legal stability may be sacrificed through such decisions.
The 1995 order supported legislative fact in favor of constitutionality by
making reference to several influences including tradition, social
environment, perception of the people, and other factors. Justices do not
have to change the general standard of judicial review but can depend on
changed legislative fact.
Third, the Ministry of Justice can quickly respond when it receives
understandable messages from the judiciary. This limits the scope of an
order declaring similar cases unconstitutional. The judiciary cannot state a
specific time limit for the legislature to amend a statute. The 2008 decision
under the Nationality Act shows that the judiciary may review legislative
purpose and the means a law uses to achieve a goal even when that goal is
not yet clear.319 This decision supported the legislative fact carried forward
from1984 even though it had been lost by 2008. It is not clear how long it
will take for the judiciary to declare that a legislative fact has changed and
that statutes are now obsolete. A 2015 decision also upheld the article in
the Civil Code addressing surnames for couples. 320 The Supreme Court
stated that family traditions have not changed so much to allow the
judiciary to declare this provision unconstitutional. 321 Constitutional law
scholars are mainly against this decision. Another 2015 decision held

318.
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Article 733(1) to be unconstitutional regarding limitations on remarriage.322
In this case, national tradition, social factors, and other circumstances
contributed to the decision.323 This case shows that a judicial decision can
be used as a guideline for the legislature to amend a statute in question in a
certain way.
Fourth, while a minority opinion of the Supreme Court may not be
critical for the parties to the case at bar, it can function as a majority
opinion in the future.
Fifth, several decisions of the Japanese Supreme Court show that it
takes the Diet a significant amount of time to pass or amend a statute.
Local government initiatives can serve as models for statutes in the Diet.
The decisions of the Supreme Court have led the dialogue on how
couples and families should act in Japanese society. The judiciary can gain
trust as a fair umpire of the general public discourse through the
persuasiveness of its decisions. Tradition, legislative discretion, and
legislative fact are some of the interpretive tools that judges may use.
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JOINT NOTIFICATION
ADDRESSED TO THE REGISTRAR OF THE COURT:

The Hague, 12 September 2016
On behalf of the Federation of the Clans of the Atan and the Kingdom of
Rahad, and in accordance with Article 40(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, we have the honor to transmit to you an
original of the Special Agreement for submission to the International
Court of Justice of the Differences between the Applicant and the
Respondent concerning the Sisters of the Sun, signed in The Hague, The
Netherlands, on the twelfth day of September in the year two thousand
sixteen.
Her Excellency Cheva Visier, His Excellency Ned Karol, Ambassador
of the Federation, Ambassador of the Kingdom of the Clans of the Atan
Rahad to the Kingdom of The to the Kingdom of The Netherlands
Netherlands
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SPECIAL AGREEMENT
SUBMITTED TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
BY THE FEDERATION OF THE CLANS OF THE ATAN
AND THE KINGDOM OF RAHAD
ON THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM
CONCERNING THE SISTERS OF THE SUN
The Federation of the Clans of the Atan (“the Applicant”) and the Kingdom
of Rahad (“the Respondent”) (hereinafter “the Parties”);
Considering that differences have arisen between them concerning the
Sisters of the Sun and other matters;
Recognizing that the Parties have been unable to settle these differences by
direct negotiations;
Desiring further to define the issues to be submitted to the International Court
of Justice (“the Court”) for resolution;
In furtherance thereof the Parties have concluded this Special Agreement:
Article 1
The Parties submit the questions contained in the Special Agreement
(together with Corrections and Clarifications to follow) (“the Case”) to the
Court pursuant to Article 40(1) of the Court’s Statute.
Article 2
It is agreed by the Parties that the Federation of the Clans of the Atan shall
appear as Applicant and the Kingdom of Rahad as Respondent, but such
agreement is without prejudice to any question of the burden of proof.
Article 3
(a) The Court is requested to decide the Case on the basis of the rules and
principles of international law, including any applicable treaties.
(b) The Court is also requested to determine the legal consequences, including
the rights and obligations of the Parties, arising from its Judgment on the
questions presented in the Case.
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Article 4

(a)

Procedures shall be regulated in accordance with the applicable provisions
of the Official Rules of the 2017 Philip C. Jessup International Law Moot
Court Competition.

(b) The Parties request the Court to order that the written proceedings should
consist of Memorials presented by each of the Parties not later than the date
set forth in the Official Schedule of the 2017 Philip C. Jessup International
Law Moot Court Competition.
Article 5
(a) The Parties shall accept any Judgment of the Court as final and binding upon
them and shall execute it in its entirety and in good faith.
(b) Immediately after the transmission of any Judgment, the Parties shall enter
into negotiations on the modalities for its execution.
In witness whereof, the undersigned, being duly authorized, have signed the
present Special Agreement and have affixed thereto their respective seals of
office.
Done in The Hague, The Netherlands, this twelfth day of September in the
year two thousand sixteen, in triplicate in the English language.
Her Excellency Cheva Visier
Ned Karol
Ambassador of the Federation
Kingdom of Rahad
of the Clans of the Atan to the
The Netherlands
Kingdom of The Netherlands

His

Excellency

Ambassador of the
to the Kingdom of
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**SPECIAL AGREEMENT**
THE CASE CONCERNING THE SISTERS OF THE SUN
ATANIA / RAHAD
1.

Applicant, the Federation of the Clans of the Atan (“Atania”), and
Respondent, the Kingdom of Rahad (“Rahad”), are neighboring
states that occupy the Nomad Coast. The Nomad Coast,
characterized by arid and semi-arid lands, is bounded to the north by
the Great Garnet Desert and is otherwise surrounded by the Emerald
Ocean.

2.

Atania is a newly-industrializing state located in the eastern twothirds of the Nomad Coast. As of 1 January 2015, Atania had a
population of just over 22 million. Seventy-five percent of the GDP
of Atania is based on the extraction and exportation of hydrocarbons;
the country’s other major sources of revenue are tourism and grain
exports. In January 2010, the country’s GDP was US$102 billion,
although by January 2016, it had fallen to US$80 billion.

3.

The Kingdom of Rahad, a constitutional monarchy, occupies the
western third of the Nomad Coast. The current Queen, Teresa Savali
II, has executive authority to command the nation’s armed forces, to
convene and dissolve the national parliament, and to appoint and
dismiss government ministers. Rahad’s largest export is natural gas.
Rahad’s GDP in January 2016 was estimated at US$11 billion.
According to the February 2014 census, its population was 3.5
million.
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The Greater Inata Aquifer (“the Aquifer”) is the largest underground
source of fresh water in the Nomad Coast and is one of the largest
aquifers in the world. People of the Nomad Coast have relied upon
discharge from the Aquifer for many generations, but a definitive
map of the Aquifer itself was not produced until 1990.

5.

The Kin Canyon Complex (“the Complex”) is a group of three
canyons cut by long-extinct rivers straddling the border between
Atania and Rahad. The Complex covers approximately 300 square
kilometers. The canyons that constitute the Complex are located at
the deepest part of a greater wadi system. Each is over four
kilometers deep, consisting largely of layers of brightly colored
sandstone and limestone. Among the many historic sites located
within the Complex is a walled fortress known as “the Stronghold,”
an architecturally and archaeologically significant assembly of
ancient dwellings and ceremonial structures. Also of great interest to
archeologists and tourists is the Sunrise Mesa, a freestanding
sandstone butte approximately 160 meters tall positioned 250 meters
north of the Stronghold. When the rising sun strikes it, the butte
appears to sparkle with red light. Two of the three canyons are within
the borders of Atania; the third canyon and the Sunrise Mesa are
within the territory of Rahad.

6.

First settled in the Neolithic Era, the Kin Canyons are a rich source
of archaeological treasures. The Complex was described in a 2015
issue of National Geographic magazine as “a continuing source of
some of the most fascinating insights into early human civilizations.”
Critical archeological discoveries within the Complex include
terracotta figurines, flint axes, and jewelry all dating from between
10,000 and 5,000 BCE.
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The people of both Rahad and Atania descend from the Atan, the
original inhabitants of the Complex. When the rivers that carved the
canyons dried up more than 3,000 years ago, most of the Atan
inhabitants migrated to coastal regions and separated into 17 clans.
One of the clans, Clan Kin, remained in the Complex and provided
for the protection of the Canyons, which they venerated as the
birthplace of their ancestors.

8.

According to legend, in 500 CE, Teppa, a warrior of the Clan Kin,
uncovered a plot by a warlord, Ifan the Desert Fox, to invade the
Nomad Coast. To defend the Kin Canyons, Teppa persuaded all 17
Atan clans to stand together against Ifan’s raiders, and under her
leadership, the united clans defeated the invaders. Humbled by his
defeat, Ifan offered his life to Teppa. Teppa forgave Ifan, raised the
Ruby Sipar, a ceremonial shield laden with jewels, and declared
peace. Teppa died a hero. Her exploits were the subject of poetry,
and her image was featured in pottery, mosaics, and coinage of the
era.

9.

In recognition of her pivotal role in saving the sacred canyons and
uniting the people of the Nomad Coast, the Kin honored Teppa’s
memory by establishing “the Sisters of the Sun,” an order of women
dedicated to protecting and preserving the culture and traditions of
the Kin. Although much of their history has been lost through the
ages, the Sisters of the Sun continue to serve as social and cultural
leaders within Kin society and as mediators in local disputes. The
members wear miniature replicas of the Ruby Sipar around their
necks as a symbol of their loyalty to the Sisters and to the founder of
the order.
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After initial hostile contact with European explorers in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the 17 Atan clans held a
peaceful ceremonial gathering in 1863. Anticipating future contact
with other nations and in an attempt to unite in perpetuity, 16 of the
clans elected to enter into the republican federation, Atania, which
still exists today. Clan Rahad chose to remain independent and
established the Kingdom of Rahad. Permanent boundaries between
the two states were established at the gathering.

11.

The Kin lived in the Complex until the formation of the two new
states, when they migrated to lands east of the Complex in Atania.
They remain largely culturally and politically isolated from the rest
of Atanian society, avoiding modern technology and living off the
land through farming, hunting, and gathering. As of 1 January 2013,
the Kin accounted for 98% of subsistence farmers in Atania.

12.

For centuries, the original Ruby Sipar was believed to have been lost
forever. In 1903, Dr. Gena Logres, an archaeologist from the
University of Atanagrad, conducting an excavation in the Complex
within the territory of Atania, discovered what appeared to be the
original Ruby Sipar featuring more than 100 precious gems
surrounding a large sun made entirely of rubies. Dr. Logres took the
object to the University of Atanagrad, where it was placed on public
display.

Subsequent

archaeological

research

confirmed

its

authenticity.
13.

In 1990, Atania and Rahad jointly proposed that the Complex be
included on UNESCO’s World Heritage List as a cultural and natural
heritage property. The joint proposal included a two-kilometer
“buffer zone,” extending from the edge of the Complex in all
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directions. The World Heritage Committee accepted the proposal
and listed the Kin Canyon Complex as a mixed heritage site on 2
May 1994. In 1996, the Ruby Sipar, identified as “on loan from the
University of Atanagrad,” was moved to a newly constructed
Cultural Center on the Atanian side of the Complex. The Complex
and the Cultural Center have drawn on average 350,000 visitors each
year.
14.

As a result of record low rainfall, the entire Nomad Coast
experienced sustained drought conditions in each year from 1983 to
1988. Both Atania and Rahad were forced to import water from other
countries at great expense. In order to reduce its reliance on imported
water, Rahad permitted the drilling of wells on public land for
private, agricultural, and commercial use.

15.

In 1988, the Rahadi Ministry of Water and Agriculture hired a team
of hydrologists from Alberta, Canada to map the sources of its
subterranean fresh water. Using ground-penetrating radar, the
hydrologists conducted the first in-depth study of the Greater Inata
Aquifer. Their initial report, published in 1990, included a detailed
map and concluded that the Aquifer covered more than 274,000
square kilometers within the Nomad Coast, of which 65% was
located in Rahad and 35% in Atania. The Ministry then
commissioned the hydrologists to undertake a more in-depth study
to monitor the recharge rate and salinization of the Aquifer over the
next 10 years.

16.

On the first UN World Water Day, 22 March 1993, Queen Teresa
and the Atanian President, Alexander Vhen, appeared together at a
ceremony in Atanagrad, the Atanian capital, to recognize and
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celebrate the importance of water to all peoples. In a nationallytelevised address, the Rahadi Minister of Water and Agriculture said:
The people of Rahad today join our Atanian
neighbors and the world in recognizing the
importance of water to all who live on the Nomad
Coast. In honor of this World Water Day, Rahad
promises to make every reasonable effort to
preserve and protect the shared fresh water
resources of our Nomad Coast and to ensure their
equitable use. Future generations must be assured
that they will never be denied access to these
valuable, unique resources, on which life and
prosperity depend, and without which we cannot
survive.
The Minister’s Atanian counterpart responded with a message
communicating the “appreciation of the Atanian people for this
neighborly gesture of cooperation and brotherhood.”

17.

In a speech on the 5th World Water Day in 1998, UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan recalled the Rahadi Minister’s statement:
Rahad’s commitment to preserve and protect the
water resources it shares with Atania and to make
sure that they are used equitably is a testament to
the inspiration that lies behind the UN World
Water Day. The world might well emulate this
model of cooperation. Recognition must be
universal that human dignity, indeed human
survival, cannot be assured without access to fresh
and clean water.

18.

In 2000, the follow-up report from the team of hydrologists found
that the Aquifer contained approximately 35 cubic kilometers of
extractable fresh water. The report indicated that the major deposit
of the Aquifer’s waters occurred more than 10,000 years ago;
because of the arid climate of the Nomad Coast, the recharge rate of
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the Aquifer is negligible, and any water extracted from it would not
be replenished for many generations.
19.

Drought conditions returned to the region, beginning in 1999 and
continuing to the present day, with record-low rainfall recorded
throughout the Nomad Coast. In 2001, meteorologists in the Atanian
State Weather Service reported that there had been a 1.6-degree
Celsius average temperature increase throughout the Nomad Coast
during the period 1970 to 2000. The head of the Service repeatedly
expressed

concern

that

“the

combined

impact

of

these

meteorological and climatological changes on fresh water sources in
the Nomad Coast is likely to result in a long-term shortage of water
for the peoples of both Rahad and Atania.”
20.

In her annual birthday address on 16 June 2002, Queen Teresa stated
that it was her government’s desire to improve access to the waters
of the Aquifer, to ensure that the needs of the Rahadi people could
be met. She described the Aquifer as “a fundamental natural resource
of our country,” and declared that, “as a developing nation suffering
the effects of extreme drought and climate changes, Rahad has the
right and indeed the obligation to seek out ways of using that
resource to sustain our people.” On the next day, she formally
directed the Inata Logistic and Scientific Association (“ILSA”), a
Rahadi government-funded scientific organization, to study the
feasibility and long-term effects of directly tapping the Aquifer to
meet Rahad’s domestic need for water.

21.

ILSA released its report on 17 January 2003. It concluded that, in
light of projected consumption, growth and development,
completely ending Rahad’s reliance on imported water and re-
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establishing self-sufficiency would require an alternative supply of
approximately 1.2 cubic kilometers of water per year. Extraction of
water from the Aquifer at this rate would deplete its total extractable
fresh water reserve in approximately 30 years. The report was
subjected to blind independent peer review before being accepted for
publication in the International Journal of Hydrology. The study
noted that, because the Kin Canyons were located near the Aquifer,
care would need to be taken to ensure that any depletion of the
Aquifer waters did not harm the structural integrity of the Complex.

22.

On 2 February 2003, Queen Teresa made a televised appearance to
the nation, setting out her plans to address the increasingly serious
water crisis in Rahad. Among other things, she announced:
Our nation is confronted with a very grave dilemma,
and I want all of our people to understand how your
government is proposing to deal with it. We simply
do not have enough water to sustain our farmers,
who grow our food and provide our sustenance, and
there is no obvious solution to this problem that is
economically viable and practically possible. None,
that is, except one. I am today ordering the Bureau
of the Interior to begin implementation of a
comprehensive program to extract water from the
Greater Inata Aquifer. I certainly realize that this is
a short-term solution. If we exhaust the Aquifer, we
risk bankrupting our future generations. But we
must do something. All of our people are affected by
this crisis. So we will explore means of taking lifegiving water from the Aquifer so long as drought
conditions continue, and so long as we have no
other way of preserving the life and culture of the
great Rahadi nation.

23.

President Vhen responded by thanking the Queen for her remarks but
noting his ongoing concern about the “equitable division of the

2017]

Jessup Compromis

193

waters of the Inata Aquifer,” and “the integrity of the Kin Canyon
Complex, which is of enormous cultural and economic importance
to both countries.” President Vhen reminded the Rahadi government
of its obligation to respect the commitment it made on 22 March
1993, “when carrying out any plan to tap the largest source of fresh
water on the Nomad Coast for its own exclusive domestic use.” He
concluded, “unless and until my Government is assured that any
Rahadi extraction of Aquifer waters will not negatively affect our
use of the shared resource, we must express our serious concerns
about the potential dangers that this unilateral action may provoke.”
He called on the Queen to stop plans to tap the waters of the Aquifer
immediately and to seek alternative sources.
24.

The Bureau of the Interior prepared a plan for a network of 30 pump
wells located in Rahad’s northern territories to be connected by a
subterranean pipeline system (“the Savali Pipeline”), which would
provide a reliable source of water to Rahad’s farmlands and natural
gas industry. Given the concerns about its potential impact on the
Complex, Rahad submitted the Savali Pipeline plan to the World
Heritage Committee on 30 September 2004.

25.

The Committee’s decision on the submission, published on 12 July
2005, “note[d] with concern” potential issues regarding possible
subsidence of lands superjacent to the Aquifer, and “strongly urge[d]
Rahad to ensure that the proposed Savali Pipeline project develops
and implements targets for improving the conservation of the Kin
Canyon Complex, and that all plans, policies, and proposals
potentially affecting it demonstrate that they will make a positive
contribution to the achievement of those targets without risking harm
to sites of outstanding universal value.”
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Working to comply with the decision of the World Heritage
Committee, Rahad limited drilling for the extraction of water to areas
more than 15 kilometers outside of the Complex’s buffer zone. The
Savali Pipeline project was completed on 20 February 2006, and
pumping from the Aquifer began. Since 2006, 70% of the water was
used for agriculture and 22% by the natural gas industry (the
remaining 8% went to a variety of other uses). The Savali Pipeline
continues, as of the date of this Special Agreement, to pump water
from the Aquifer at a consistent rate of 1.2 cubic kilometers per year.

27.

In 2009, Atanian farmers in the region south of the Complex reported
that wells, springs, and small streams were drying up, and land that
had been rich and arable five years earlier was becoming dry and
difficult to farm. Alarmed by the loss of important farmland, the
Atanian Ministry of Water and Agriculture commissioned an
international panel of climatologists, geologists, and hydrologists to
determine whether the changing hydrology of the region was the
result of the Savali Pipeline project.

28.

The panel released a study in June 2010 that concluded that operation
of the Savali Pipeline had caused a permanent lowering of the water
table in the region. As a result, discharge from the Aquifer could no
longer provide a sufficient natural source of water for Atanian
agriculture. The study found that 20% of what had been Atanian
farmland could no longer be farmed, and that within 10 years an
additional 30% would be lost if extraction continued at the same rate.

29.

President Vhen addressed the findings in a Parliamentary speech
given on 6 July 2010, in which he said:
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Not long ago, our Rahadi neighbors agreed that
the waters of the Greater Inata Aquifer are a
shared resource. It is with great sadness that we
must now observe the plundering of this resource
to benefit economic interests in Rahad, with scant
regard for the harm they are doing to the people of
Atania. The destruction of our farmland has
already cost Atania more than US$300 million
annually in the loss of food and other agricultural
products. If this terrible trend continues, these
losses will double in 10 years. We must implore the
government of Rahad to stay true to its commitment
to ensure the equitable use of shared water in the
Nomad Coast, and to end the disastrous pipeline
experiment.
30.

Meanwhile, by late 2010, foreign tourists began posting photographs
on Twitter and Instagram using the hashtag #kincanyonscrumbling.
These images showed what appeared to be environmental
degradation in remote sections of the Complex. On 4 February 2011,
President Vhen ordered a panel of geologists to investigate the
veracity of the images. Weeks later, the geologists unanimously
agreed that there had been clear structural degradation of the
Canyons and the Stronghold within Atania. They attributed the
problem to subsidence due to depletion of the Aquifer, but offered
no opinion regarding whether continued extraction would lead to
further damage. On 1 June 2011, The Atanian Herald reported that
two Bhutanese tourists had barely escaped falling into a massive
sinkhole that appeared when a busy pathway in the Complex
collapsed. The Atanian government’s website announced that
sections of the Complex were being closed to visitors immediately
to ensure their safety.

31.

President Vhen sent a communiqué to the UNESCO World Heritage
Committee on 7 July 2011, requesting that the Complex be added to
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the List of World Heritage in Danger “due to the impact of the Savali
Pipeline.” Annexed to President Vhen’s message were the results of
the geologists’ investigation.

32.

At its 37th conference in Saint Petersburg in June 2012, the UNESCO
World Heritage Committee granted President Vhen’s application
and added the Kin Canyon Complex to the List of World Heritage in
Danger.

33.

Following the Committee’s decision, President Vhen requested a
meeting with Queen Teresa to propose “the immediate suspension of
Savali Pipeline operations until the situation, including potential
hazards, may be better understood.” The Queen declined the
invitation, and on 19 July 2012 the Palace issued a press release:
We respect the cultural heritage of the Kin Canyon
Complex that we share with our Atanian brothers
and sisters, and for that matter with all of humanity.
Our pumping of waters from the Aquifer is being
conducted in accordance with the highest possible
standards of care, in conformity with our
obligations as stewards of this marvelous treasure.
We voluntarily commit to undertake regular studies
of the long-term impact of this project on the region
in general and on the Complex in particular. But we
have no intention of surrendering our sovereign
right to develop the natural resources with which
our territory is blessed.

34.

Faced with the continued loss of farmable land due to the absence of
water seepage from the Aquifer, the Atanian government determined
that additional water needed to be allocated to agricultural
production. On 28 September 2012, the Atanian Parliament enacted
the 2012 Water Resource Allocation Program (WRAP) Act, which
set a quota on water supplied by the Atanian Public Water Works (a
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government agency) to every household, farm, and business in
Atania, to be in effect from 1 January 2013 until further notice. The
Water Works was ordered to provide the government with quarterly
reports of water consumption.
35.

Under the WRAP Act, all farming operations were also required to
purchase licenses to utilize public water. WRAP offered license
exemptions for farms that sold more than US$75,000 worth of crops
per year. Nearly 86% of farming operations in Atania qualified for
this exemption. Licenses were made available for purchase online or
at local WRAP offices. The WRAP Act empowered the Bureau of
Agriculture to prosecute anyone who used over-quota water and
farming operations that failed to obtain licenses under Atanian
Criminal Code provisions for “theft of public property.”

36.

Fewer than 5% of Kin farmers applied for licenses before the end of
2012, as required by law. The Bureau of Agriculture investigations
also showed that in the first two quarters of 2013, more than 80% of
Kin households and farms used water in excess of their quotas. In
July 2013, all violators were sent notification of their failure to
comply with WRAP.

37.

In August 2013, in accordance with the WRAP Act, the Department
of Justice began the prosecution of two Kin farmers for use of overquota water and failure to obtain a license. Both defendants asserted
that their cultural traditions prevented them from seeking permission
from the state to make use of natural resources. They also argued that
the law discriminated against the Kin because it favored profitgenerating farms, either because they qualified for an exemption or
because they were able to pay for licenses. The two defendants were
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convicted of theft of public property and were ordered to pay a fine.
Neither complied, and both were thereafter sentenced, in accordance
with provisions of the applicable Criminal Code, to prison terms of
five years. Although the Department of Justice distributed flyers
across Kin lands publicizing the results of the trials and warning that
more prosecutions might follow, over the following four months
there was neither a noticeable increase in the number of licenses
purchased nor a detectable decrease in the overall consumption of
water in Kin areas.

38.

In October 2013, the Atanian Parliament amended the WRAP Act to
provide that farms using water in violation of the Act were subject,
in addition to the existing criminal penalties, to the termination of
their state-controlled water supply. Invoking those procedures, by
the end of 2013, the government of Atania cut off water to the
majority of farms in Kin lands.

39.

United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (“FAO”)
Director-General José Graziano da Silva condemned the effects of
WRAP in a speech to the General Assembly on 2 February 2014. He
described numerous reports received from Kin villages in Atania
claiming that small farmers whose water supplies had been
terminated for failure to comply with WRAP and therefore had to
abandon farming had no other means of securing sufficient food and
were suffering severe deprivation. Dr. Graziano implored the
government of Atania to stop the denial of access to water and to
provide assistance to Kin villagers already affected by the changes
to the water rights regime in the country.
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On 28 June 2014, the International Federation of the Red Cross and
Red Crescent released a report entitled “It’s a WRAP: Starvation and
Illness among the Kin.” Based on six months of interviews and
surveys of Kin villagers by IFRC staff in the region, the report found
rapidly rising rates of food-deprivation-related illnesses such as
scurvy and beriberi among the Kin population. It also indicated that,
of the 1.1 million Kin then living in Atania, more than 500,000 were
undernourished. The report confirmed the FAO’s conclusion that the
termination of the Kin’s water supply was depriving them of the
ability to continue the traditional farming that had been their primary
source of sustenance.

41.

On 17 July 2014, Carla Dugo, one of the elders of the Sister of the
Sun, chained herself to a flagpole in the plaza outside the President’s
residence in Atanagrad. She told reporters that she was engaging in
a hunger strike to protest “the Atanian government’s persecution of
the Kin” through what she called “the theft of our water, our food,
and our way of life.” She also called on her fellow Sisters to “stand
together” and “remember Teppa, and the true meaning of the Sipar
that we proudly wear.” Within two weeks, over 5,000 Sisters of the
Sun, hundreds of Kin, and their supporters had congregated in the
plaza.

42.

The protest was widely reported in international media, which noted
that numerous public buildings and other structures, including the
seat of the Parliament, had been tagged with hand-painted Sipar
symbols. Many international human rights NGOs tweeted messages
of solidarity with the Sisters of the Sun. Thousands of demonstrators
and onlookers began to assemble in the plaza and the immediate
vicinity. Sisters led protesters to form human chains across major

200

ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 24:1
roads into the city, blocking traffic and preventing employees from
entering municipal offices. Sister Dugo spoke with reporters at the
scene and used the media spotlight to raise her Sipar, invoking “the
memory of Teppa,” calling on all Sisters of the Sun and the entire
Clan Kin to “stand together against the persecution of our people”
by the government. Other speakers, all of whom wore or carried
replicas of the Ruby Sipar, called for “stronger and more resolute
action until our representatives listen to our cries.” The crowds
refused orders to disperse, and on 2 August 2014, the mayor of
Atanagrad described conditions in his city as “chaotic, unsanitary,
dangerous, and entirely unsustainable.”

43.

On 5 August 2014, President Vhen issued the following order:
The ongoing unrest and the seditious protests led by
the Sisters of the Sun can no longer be tolerated. The
untenable situation in our capital city requires that
the Government take drastic action to preserve law
and order for all of our citizens. Therefore, I am
today deploying armed police to assist government
officials working to maintain peace and to permit all
of our people the opportunity to live their lives
without disruption. We respect the history of the
Sisters and are mystified by their apparent decision
to sacrifice their peaceful traditions to promote
social disorder and mistrust of the Government. The
Ruby Sipar, once a symbol of respect and even
veneration that represented the united cultures of
our nation, has come to identify and to provoke
disruptive elements within Atania. It must be
banned. We can no longer accept its public display.
All Ruby Sipar Pendants worn or carried in public
shall be confiscated and destroyed by agents of law
enforcement.

44.

Following this order, Atania removed the Ruby Sipar from public
display in the Complex Cultural Center and placed it in storage.
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Following President Vhen’s announcement, Atanian police cleared
the plaza, arresting more than 800 Sisters of the Sun and Kin
protesters. They were charged with disturbing the peace and
violating orders to disband. The remaining demonstrators were
driven from the plaza with tear gas and rubber bullets; no deaths or
serious injuries were reported. The police seized all of the Sipar
Pendants worn by the Sisters.

46.

In the following days, Sisters of the Sun throughout Atania publicly
expressed what they called their “outrage over the ongoing treatment
of the Kin and the government response to peaceful protests.” The
Ministry of the Interior claimed that in many areas, demonstrations
blocked roads, interfered with local businesses, and disrupted regular
social activities, although again, there were no reports of deaths or
serious injuries. Atanian police arrested more than 100 Sisters of the
Sun and 900 other Kin demonstrators across the country over the
following days. Hundreds remain in prison as of the date of this
Special Agreement.

47.

In early September 2014, Rahadi Immigration Department agents
reported that as many as 100,000 Kin had crossed into Rahad over
the previous two weeks. The Argentine daily newspaper La Nación,
which had sent a correspondent to interview members of Clan Kin,
reported that while most of those crossing the border identified “fear
of arrest” as their motivation, a substantial number claimed to be
fleeing starvation.

48.

On 18 September 2014, the Rahadi Parliament enacted the Kin
Humanitarian Assistance Act (KHAA). The preamble noted that the
Kin crossing into Rahad “were facing the desperate plight of people
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forced to escape hardship and persecution in their homeland.”
KHAA provided that Kin identified as Sisters of the Sun and their
family members were deemed to be fleeing persecution and were
therefore entitled to all of the rights and privileges of refugees under
Rahadi immigration law. All other Kin entering Rahad were
permitted to apply for refugee status, to be determined on a case-bycase basis. Because of the volume of applications and other
circumstances, including the unavailability of adequate funding,
Rahad anticipated at least a 24-month period until it could begin
review of those applications.

49.

KHAA ordered that the Government, in cooperation with the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, establish three temporary
camps in which all Kin entering the country were to be housed “until
other arrangements can be made or until they deem it safe to return
to their homeland.” As of the date of this Special Agreement, of the
approximately 800,000 Kin who crossed the border into Rahad,
21,000 were found to be Sisters of the Sun, and an additional 134,000
their family members; refugee status was provided to all of those
individuals. Applications for refugee status of other Kin remain
pending as of the date of this Special Agreement.

50.

During intake interviews of a group of Kin at one of the camps on 3
October 2014, Rahadi border patrol agents encountered Carla Dugo.
She told the agents that, a few days earlier, she had entered the Kin
Canyon Complex Cultural Center in Atania under cover of darkness
and removed the original Ruby Sipar from the vault in which it had
been stored. She declined to provide more details (including the
names of Center employees who she claimed had helped her) but told
the border personnel that she had taken the treasure “to ensure its
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protection from destruction,” and because “it belongs with the Kin,
wherever we are.” Sister Dugo voluntarily turned over the Sipar to
the border agents, who delivered it to the Rahadi Ministry of Culture.
51.

The Rahadi Minister of Culture, Sophia Casa, notified her
counterpart in Atania that she was in possession of the Ruby Sipar
and that, given that its public display had been prohibited by
President Vhen, it would be “inappropriate” for it to be returned. The
Atanian Minister replied that the refusal to return the Sipar
demonstrated “a blatant disregard for the cooperative relationship
shared by our two states and a clear violation of international law.”

52.

On 3 November 2014, Ms. Casa formally rejected the request for
repatriation of the Sipar, which she described as the lawful property
of Rahad. She said:
Atania has publicly declared the Sipar to be a symbol
of sedition and those who wear it to be enemies of the
state. The campaign to eradicate all vestiges of the
Sipar is incompatible with any claim to its ownership.
We will keep this priceless treasure where it will be
available to all who wish to see it, and we will treat
it with the respect and veneration that it deserves.

53.

By August 2015, the International Rescue Committee, which had
been invited by Rahad to monitor conditions at the camps, reported
that the number of Kin in Rahad exceeded the capacity of the
facilities created to receive them, and that national infrastructure
“was being stretched beyond the breaking point.” The reports
described sporadic power outages in 85% of the country lasting for
more than four hours at a time, and reduced access to clean water for
more than 150,000 Rahadi families, as well as the Kin in the camps.
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Members of the Rahadi Parliament introduced legislation to repeal
the KHAA.

54.

On 13 October 2015, The Rahadi National Times published a frontpage article reporting that of the thousands of Kin migrants who had
qualified for refugee status and were being resettled into urban
centers, some were engaging in petty crime, while others were
sleeping in the streets, apparently unable to acclimate to the culture
of Rahad. The article quoted numerous Rahadi citizens who
expressed concern about the social and economic costs of attempting
to integrate the Kin into their new society. Dismissed by government
spokesmen as “xenophobic exaggeration,” the Times article was
cited by members of the Rahadi Parliament urging repeal of the
KHAA and the revisiting of what they called “the Kin question.”

55.

After extensive debate, on 17 December 2015, Parliament adopted
the Border Protection Act (BPA), whose preamble recited, in
relevant part:
It is the opinion of Parliament that the Kin crisis and
the burden it has placed upon our society and
economy have been caused by internationally
wrongful acts of the Atanian state including the gross
mistreatment of the Kin in their homeland.
Parliament therefore humbly requests that Her
Majesty’s Government pursue all available means to
achieve three objectives: (a) negotiating a cessation
of the causes of the massive emigration of Kin from
Atania; (b) devising a plan for the safe relocation of
those Kin who do not qualify for refugee status; and
(c) obtaining financial compensation from the
government of Atania for the massive costs our
nation has had to bear as a result of our
humanitarian response to the influx of the Kin.
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In her keynote address at the annual meeting of an international NGO
the following month, Queen Teresa directly addressed the issues
raised by the Parliament:
Recently, our Parliament requested that I endeavor
to obtain compensation for the economic burdens
that the Kin are placing on Rahad’s economy. I have
instructed my Government to engage in discussions
with Atania, whose treatment of the Kin has given
rise, over the past few years, to a mass migration of
members of that Clan into our country. When their
legal and moral obligations are not sufficient to
compel states to treat their citizens with respect, it is
improper for them to shift the economic
consequences of such policies onto neighbors willing
to provide shelter to people fleeing their homelands,
in order to forestall even more serious catastrophes.
This is a moment for political vision and bravery, and
for insisting upon the sharing of humanitarian
burdens.

57.

On 18 January 2016, the Rahadi Ambassador to Atania submitted to
the Atanian Foreign Ministry a memorandum itemizing expenditures
associated with running the camps, relocating and integrating the
Kin, and repairing damage to national infrastructure, all of which
was said to be accruing. The list included particular costs claimed to
have been caused by the influx, such as provision of food, sanitation,
basic health and municipal services (including security services),
building the camps, access to clean water, connections to the power
grid,

and

road

maintenance

and

construction.

Deducting

contributions provided to Rahad by foreign aid programs and
international organizations, the net total was US$945,000,000, and
the memorandum demanded compensation in that amount as well as
for expenses continuing to accrue. Later that day, a spokesman for
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the Atanian Foreign Ministry, during a weekly press conference,
acknowledged

the

memorandum,

but

dismissed

it

as

“unprecedented, inconsistent with international law, and unworthy
of a reply.”
58.

At the suggestion of the Secretary General of the United Nations, the
governments of Atania and Rahad convened high-level discussions
of the Kin issue in March 2016. The discussions quickly revealed to
both parties that the crisis was part of a much larger dispute
concerning all of the issues set out in this Special Agreement. In
April 2016, the parties agreed to refer all of these matters to this
Court.

59.

Atania and Rahad are both members of the United Nations, and are
parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice; the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties; the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights; the 1972 World Heritage Convention;
and the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (and its
1967 Protocol). Atania is a party to the 1970 UNESCO Convention
on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, which Rahad has
signed with ratification still pending in Parliament. Neither state has
made any reservations, declarations, or understandings with regard
to any of these treaties other than Atania’s declaration regarding the
1970 UNESCO Convention referenced below.

60.

Upon its ratification of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, Atania
deposited the following declaration with the Director-General of
UNESCO:
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The properties designated as “of importance for archaeology,
prehistory, history, literature, art or science,” in accordance with
Article 1 of the Convention, include, without limitation, the
following:

61.

(a)

All Atan archaeological objects regardless of
material or value, dating from the year 1900 CE or
before;

(b)

All Atan paintings, drawings, water-colors, pastels,
photographs, and pictures more than 50 years old
and worth more than US$10,000; and

(c)

All original Atan sculptures, bas-reliefs, engravings,
and all copies thereof produced by the same process
as the originals, made before 1900, regardless of
their value. None of the above-referenced works
may be removed from the territory of the Federation
of the Clans of the Atan without an export license to
be issued by, and according to regulations
promulgated in the name of, the Ministry of Culture.

Applicant, the Federation of the Clans of the Atan, respectfully
requests that this Court adjudge and declare that:
1. Extraction of water from the Aquifer violates
international obligations undertaken by Rahad and
constitutes an inequitable use of a shared resource;
2. The Savali Pipeline operations violate Rahad’s
international obligations with respect to the Kin Canyon
Complex and therefore must cease;
3. Rahad must immediately return the Ruby Sipar to
Atania, its lawful owner; and
4. Atania owes no compensation to Rahad for any costs
incurred related to the Kin migrants.

62.

Respondent, the Kingdom of Rahad, respectfully requests that this
Court adjudge and declare that:
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1.

Rahad’s extraction of water from the Aquifer does not
violate Rahad’s international legal obligations
governing the proper use of shared resources;

2.

Rahad’s Savali Pipeline operations do not violate any
legal obligations relating to the Kin Canyon Complex;

3.

Rahad is entitled to retain possession of the Ruby Sipar;
and

4.

Atania must compensate Rahad for all direct and
indirect expenses incurred and accruing as a result of
accepting members of Clan Kin fleeing from Atania.

2017 PHILIP C. JESSUP
INTERNATIONAL LAW MOOT COURT COMPETITION
CORRECTIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS TO THE SPECIAL
AGREEMENT
The following corrections and clarifications to the Special Agreement
have been agreed to by the parties, and the text jointly notified to the Court
on 12 September 2016 should be considered amended accordingly. The
Registrar of the Court reminds all parties and participants of the following:
a. The Special Agreement is, in essence, a negotiated stipulation of
facts. Its words have been carefully chosen, and they are the result of
extensive negotiation. The parties decline to “clarify” matters about
which they are unlikely to agree. The parties will not stipulate as to
which legal principles are relevant, or which arguments are
acceptable or unacceptable.
b. Any request for clarification not addressed in the following
paragraphs has been considered by the parties to be redundant,
inappropriate, or immaterial, or the parties were unable to reach
agreement on a mutually acceptable answer.
c. Except to the extent that corrections and clarifications are set out
below, participants are to assume that the Special Agreement is
accurate and complete in all respects. In particular, both parties
stipulate as to the authenticity of all documents and of the signatures
on all documents referenced in the Special Agreement.
d. With respect to the pronunciation of the various proper names used
in the Special Agreement, all parties and the Court have agreed that
they will not take formal or informal offense at any reasonable effort
to pronounce proper names correctly.
e. Atania and Rahad are not parties to any bilateral or multilateral
treaties, conventions, or accords other than those referenced within
the Special Agreement or herein.
CORRECTIONS
1. In the fourth sentence of Paragraph 5, the reference to the depths of
“four kilometers” of the canyons should be corrected to “1.4
kilometers”.
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2. In Paragraph 32, the reference to the 37th Conference should be
deleted and replaced with “36th Conference.”
3. The second sentence of Paragraph 59 is deleted and replaced with
the following sentence: “Atania became a party to the 1970
UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing
the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property in 1991, and Rahad deposited its instrument of ratification
with UNESCO on 30 September 2014.” No other part of paragraph
59 is changed.
CLARIFICATIONS
1. The Greater Inata Aquifer is an unconfined fossil aquifer. It is not
subjacent to the Kin Canyon Complex.
2. The “Stronghold” is located within the Kin Canyon Complex in
Atania’s territory.
3. The report issued by ILSA on 17 January 2003 included an
environmental impact assessment undertaken and completed in
compliance with Rahadi domestic law. This environmental impact
assessment was included in Rahad’s 30 September 2004 submission
to the World Heritage Committee.
4. The University of Atanagrad is a public university founded and
predominantly funded by the Atanian Government.
5. The Kin Canyon Complex Cultural Center is owned and managed by
the Atanian Ministry of Culture.
6. At the 2014 Meeting in Doha, Qatar, the World Heritage Committee
began discussions with Rahad on a program of corrective measures
regarding the Savali Pipeline and Kin Canyon Complex. The
Committee requested that Rahad present plans for implementation at
the 2017 Meeting in Krakow, Poland.
7. Those arrested following the 17 July 2014 protest in Atanagrad were
charged with inciting a riot, a felony charge under Atanian domestic
law. They were provided with court-appointed counsel. Each
protester had an initial appearance and was remanded to custody
pending trial. No trial dates have been set as of the date of the Special
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Agreement. The pretrial detentions comply with Atanian domestic
law.
8. The camps opened in Rahad pursuant to the KHAA were operated
by and paid for exclusively by Rahad. The Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) participated
only to the extent necessary to inspect the camps and to ensure that
the camps met minimum UNHCR standards.
9. As of the date of submission of the Special Agreement, Atania
continues to import water from third-party nations. Rahad has not
imported water since 1 January 2007.
10. Atania and Rahad were admitted to the United Nations in 1962 and
became parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
Each country has been party to the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights since 1975; Atania and Rahad became party to the 1972
World Heritage Convention in 1981 and 1983, respectively, and the
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (and its 1967
Protocol) in 1971 and 1973, respectively.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Federation of the Clans of the Atan (“Atania”) and the Kingdom
of Rahad (“Rahad”) have submitted by Special Agreement this present
dispute concerning the differences between the parties concerning the Sisters
of the Sun and other matters to the International Court of Justice (“I.C.J.”),
and have transmitted a copy thereof to the Registrar of the Court in
accordance with Article 40(1) of the Statute of the I.C.J. (“Statute”).
Therefore, both parties have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court pursuant
to Article 36(1) of the Statute.
Atania undertakes to accept the judgment of the Court as final and
binding and shall execute it in utmost good faith.
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I.
Whether extraction of water from the Aquifer violates international
obligations undertaken by Rahad and constitutes an inequitable use of a
shared resource;
II.
Whether the Savali Pipeline operations violate Rahad’s international
obligations with respect to the Kin Canyon Complex and therefore must
cease;
III.
Whether Rahad must immediately return the Ruby Sipar to Atania, its lawful
owner; and
IV.
Whether Atania owes compenstation to Rahad for any costs incurred related
to the Kin migrants.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

Descent from the Atan
Atania and Rahad are neighboring States that occupy the arid Nomad
Coast. The people of both States descend from the Atan, the original
inhabitants of the Kin Canyon Complex (“Complex”), a group of canyons
cut by long-extinct rivers straddling the border between the States. When the
rivers dried up thousands of years ago, the Atan inhabitants migrated to
coastal regions and separated into 17 clans. Eventually, 16 of the clans
elected to enter into the republican federation of Atania, while members of
clan Rahad remained independent and established the Kingdom of Rahad.
The Greater Inata Aquifer
The Greater Inata Aquifer (“Aquifer”) is the largest underground
source of fresh water in the Nomad Coast. For generations, people of the
Nomad Coast have relied upon the discharge from the Aquifer. On the first
UN World Water Day, the Rahadi Minister of Water and Agriculture,
speaking on behalf of Rahad, declared to the Atanian people that Rahad
would ensure the equitable use of the Aquifer, and make every reasonable
effort to preserve and protect it.
The Kin Canyon Complex
The Complex has been recognized as a continuing source of
fascinating insights into early human civilizations. Within the Complex is a
walled fortress known as “the Stronghold” and the Sunrise Mesa, a
freestanding sandstone butte. While two of the three canyons are within the
borders of Atania, the third canyon and the Sunrise Mesa are within the
territory of Rahad. In 1990, both States jointly proposed that the Complex be
included in UNESCO’s World Heritage List. The World Heritage listed it as
a mixed heritage site on 2 May 1994. The Complex and the Cultural Center
draw on average 350,000 visitors each year.
Droughts in the Nomad Coast
Due to record low rainfall, the Nomad Coast experienced sustained
drought from 1983 to 1988. Both States were forced to import water from
other countries at great expense. Unfortunately, drought conditions returned
to the region in 1999 and continue to the present day.
Construction of the Savali Pipeline
Queen Teresa of Rahad announced to the Rahadi people her plan to
extract water from the Aquifer. President Vhen of Atania noted his concern
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about the equitable division of the waters, and the potential dangers of this
unilateral action. The Queen did not reply to his objection. Instead, Rahad
proceeded to plan a network of 30 pump wells to be connected by a
subterranean pipeline system to provide for Rahad’s industries. In light of the
domestic environmental assessment undertaken by Rahad, the World
Heritage Committee noted potential issues regarding subsidence of lands
superjacent to the Aquifer, which may harm the Complex.
Impact of the Extraction on Atania’s Agriculture
The rate of Rahad’s extraction was fixed to achieve its targeted
growth and development. As of the date of the Special Agreement, Rahad
has exhausted roughly one-third of all the water in the Aquifer, 22% of which
has been used to develop its natural gas industry. As a result, discharge from
the Aquifer could no longer provide a sufficient natural source of water for
Atanian agriculture. According to studies of Atania, 20% of Atanian
farmlands could no longer be farmed, and that within 10 years an additional
30% would be lost if extraction continued at the same rate.
Impact of the Extraction on the Complex
In 2010, foreign tourists noted the environmental degradation in the
Complex. Geologists reported structural degradations to the Complex and
attributed the problem to the depletion of the Aquifer. Moreover, tourists
were endangered by a massive sinkhole that appeared when a busy pathway
in the Complex collapsed. These incidents forced Atania to close off sections
of the Complex to the public. Due to the impact of the Savali Pipeline, the
World Heritage Committee granted Atania’s application to place the
Complex in the List of World Heritage in Danger. President Vhen proposed
to Queen Teresa to suspend the Savali Pipeline until the situation may be
better understood, but she rejected the invitation to negotiate.
The WRAP Act
Atania enacted the Water Resource Allocation Program Act
(“WRAP Act”) due to the absence of water seepage from the Aquifer. The
WRAP Act set a quota on water supplied to households, farms, and
businesses and required farming operations to purchase licenses to utilize
public water. To encourage efficiency, the WRAP Act offered license
exemptions for farms that sold more than US$75,000 worth of crops per year.
Prosecution of the Kin
While many of the Kin refused to apply for a license, and used water
in excess of their quotas, only two farmers were prosecuted under the WRAP
Act. The Department of Justice distributed flyers across lands to warn the
Kin, but they refused to obey the law. In response, the Atanian Parliament
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amended the WRAP Act to allow for the termination of the water supply to
farms that continuously violate the terms of the WRAP Act.
Protests in Atanagrad
The Sisters of the Sun, an order of women dedicated to protect and
preserve the culture of the Kin, participated in a series of protests in
Atanagrad. Carla Dugo, one of the elders, chained herself to a flagpole and
engaged in a hunger strike. Numerous buildings and structures, including the
seat of the Parliament were vandalized. Human chains across major roads
into the city blocked traffic and prevented employees from entering
municipal offices. Because the protests were chaotic and dangerous,
President Vhen dispersed the rallies and ordered for the confiscation of Sipar
Pendants, which had become a symbol for sedition. The Ruby Sipar was
placed in storage, away from public display.
The Ruby Sipar
The Ruby Sipar is a ceremonial shield that was raised by Teppa, the
legendary warrior of the Clan Kin, upon the defeat of the invaders of the
Nomad Coast in 500 CE. The Ruby Sipar is a symbol of respect and
represents the unity of the clans within the Nomad Coast. In 1903, Dr. Gena
Logres, an archaeologist from the University of Atanagrad, discovered it
within the territory of Atania.
The Kin Migrate to Rahad
A large number of Sisters of the Sun and Kin protesters were arrested
and charged with disturbing the peace. Subsequently, members of the Clan
Kin migrated to Rahad reportedly to avoid prosecution. As of the date of the
Special Agreement, approximately 800,000 Kin have crossed the border into
Rahad.
The Theft of the Ruby Sipar
Carla Dugo was discovered at one of the camps in Rahad. Before
entering Rahad, she clandestinely entered the Kin Canyon Complex Cultural
Center in Atania and took the Ruby Sipar. She turned over the Sipar to Rahad,
which claimed it as its lawful property. Rahad refused to return the Ruby
Sipar to Atania despite requests made by the Atanian Minister of Culture.
Rahad Detains the Kin
Only the Sisters of the Sun and their family members were granted
the rights and privileges of refugees. All other Kin were permitted to apply
for refugee status, but had to wait at least 24 months before Rahad would
begin a review of those applications. Since 2014, over 600,000 Kin have been
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detained in camps in Rahad. Rahad now demands US$945,000,000 from
Atania for housing the Kin.
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SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS

Rahad’s extraction of water from the Aquifer violates
international obligations undertaken by Rahad and constitutes an
inequitable use of a shared resource.
The Greater Inata Aquifer is a shared resource between Rahad and
Atania, and is governed by the principle of equitable use under customary
international law. The drought in the Nomad Coast does not amount to an
emergency situation, which would dispense with Rahad’s obligation to
equitably use the resource. Although every State exercises permanent
sovereignty over its natural resources, its actions are limited by the rules of
international law.
Moreover, Rahad has undertaken a unilateral obligation to equitably
use the Aquifer through the declaration of the Rahadi Minister of Water and
Agriculture, who possessed the authority to bind Rahad. The obligation
subsists as Queen Teresa did not validly revoke the declaration.
Rahad failed to equitably use the aquifer by not considering the
interests of Atania. Moreover, Rahad has not extracted an equitable share of
the water, and has used the water without considering the need to maximize
its long term benefits for both Atania and Rahad.
The Savali Pipeline operations violate Rahad’s international
obligations with respect to the Kin Canyon Complex and therefore must
cease.
As a State Party to the World Heritage Convention, Rahad has an
obligation to protect and to not deliberately cause damage to the Kin Canyon
Complex. This obligation includes the duty to cooperate with Atania to
protect the Complex, and to observe due diligence in order to prevent harm
to the heritage.
Rahad violated its international obligations when it failed to notify
Atania of its plans to construct the Savali Pipeline, to conduct an
environmental impact assessment consistent with international law, and to
negotiate with Atania in good faith. Rahad did not undertake active and
effective measures to protect the heritage and failed to observe the
precautionary principle. As a result, Rahad caused serious or significant
damage to the Complex.
Rahad’s continued extraction of water from the aquifer amounts to a
continuing breach which is substantive in character. Consequently, the
operations must cease.
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Rahad must immediately return the Ruby Sipar to Atania, its
lawful owner.
Atania enjoys the right of ownership over the Ruby Sipar. While
cultural property is significant to all States, the principle of Common
Heritage of Mankind does not divest Atania of ownership over the Ruby
Sipar. Atania’s act of safekeeping the Sipar was consistent with its rights and
duties under international law. In this light, Rahad must return stolen
property to its lawful owner.
As a signatory to the 1970 UNESCO Convention, Rahad has an
obligation to not defeat the object and purpose of the treaty which is to protect
declared cultural property from illicit theft, import, export and transfer of
ownership. Rahad defeated this object and purpose by adopting the acts of
Carla Dugo in clandestinely taking the Ruby Sipar from Atania to Rahad.
Rahad breached an obligation and as a means of reparation, Rahad must
return the Sipar.
Rahad is under a customary obligation to return cultural property
acquired illicitly. Thus, the Sipar must be returned.
Atania owes no compensation to Rahad for any costs incurred
related to the Kin migrants.
Atania does not owe Rahad compensation as a means of reparation.
In the first place, Rahad has no standing to espouse the human rights claims
of the Kin. Rahad is also barred by the Clean Hands Doctrine because the
Savali Pipeline operations caused the migration of the Kin. In any case,
Atania has not violated the human rights of the Kin. The WRAP Act was not
discriminatory legislation, and was enacted to maximize water within Atania.
Moreover, the purpose of the WRAP Act was to protect the future use of
water, as well as the cultural traditions of the Kin.
Rahad has no basis to claim that Atania owes compensation under a
quasi-contractual obligation. Rahad has the obligation to care for migrants
within its territory, whether refugees or not. Moreover, Rahad has
discriminated the Kin, and has arbitrarily detained them.
Finally, Atania has not violated the principle of sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas. The mass migration of the Kin was caused by Rahad’s
Savali Pipeline operations.
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PLEADINGS AND AUTHORITIES

I.

RAHAD’S EXTRACTION OF WATER FROM THE AQUIFER VIOLATES
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY RAHAD AND
CONSTITUTES AN INEQUITABLE USE OF A SHARED RESOURCE.
A. RAHAD HAS A CUSTOMARY OBLIGATION TO EQUITABLY USE THE
GREATER INATA AQUIFER.
The Greater Inata Aquifer is governed by the customary
obligation to equitably use shared water resources.

Shared water resources are governed by the principle of equitable
use in customary international law. 1 States share a “community of interest”
in these resources.2 Since Rahad and Atania share the Greater Inata Aquifer,
this vital resource is governed by the principle of equitable use.
Moreover, there is a customary obligation to equitably use
unconfined fossil aquifers.
To establish a development in custom, there must be settled state
practice and opinio juris sive necessitates. 3 The practice surrounding
documented utilized transboundary fossil aquifers establish the existence of
custom as regards equitable use of unconfined fossil aquifers.4
There is settled state practice of equitable use of
unconfined fossil aquifers.
State practice of a sufficient number of states whose interests are
specially affected by the rule must be extensive and virtually uniform.5 With
1
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uruguay), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14 (Apr. 20) [“Pulp
Mills”], ¶266; Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hun. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 [“Gabčikovo-Nagymaros”],
¶85.
2
Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder, Judgment No. 16,
1929, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 23, at 27.
3

Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.A.), Merits,
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 [“Nicaragua”] ¶207; North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Ned.),
Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3 [“North Sea”] ¶77; Michael P. Scharf, Accelerated Formation of Custom in
International Law, 20 ILSA J. INT’L & C.L. 306 (2014).
4

Renee Martin-Nagle, Fossil Aquifers: A Common Heritage of Mankind, 2 J. ENERGY & ENVT’L
L. 39, 50 (2011).
5

North Sea, ¶74.
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respect to transboundary unconfined fossil aquifers, state practice exhibits
the need to consider the interests of neighboring states.6 For instance, since
the 1970s, Egypt, Libya, Chad and Sudan have been in negotiations
concerning their common usage of the largest aquifer in the world, the
Nubian Aquifer System. 7 Joint management systems have also been
proposed for the Intercalaire Aquifer shared by Libya, Algeria, and Tunisia.8
State practice to the contrary is properly characterized as a breach of
the customary rule.9 Saudi Arabia’s unilateral overextraction of the Qa-Disi
Aquifer was objected to by a co-aquifer state, Jordan. 10 It treated the
extraction as a breach, confirming the existence of a customary rule.
The equitable use of unconfined fossil aquifers arises
from opinio juris.
Opinio juris may be deduced from the attitude of parties towards
General Assembly resolutions. 11 The United Nations General Assembly
Resolution adopted the Law of Transboundary Aquifers (hereinafter “Law of
Transboundary Aquifers”), which codifies the rule on the equitable use of
transboundary aquifers. 12 As this Court has affirmed in North Sea, the
International Law Commission (“ILC”) is a body of experts, mandated to
codify customary international law.13 Article 4 of the Law of Transboundary
Aquifers expressly provides that Aquifer States shall utilize transboundary
aquifers according to the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization.14

6
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, GA Res. 1803(XVII), pmbl., art. 1(1)-(2),(6)(7), U.N./A/5217 (Dec. 14, 1962) [“PSNR”].
7

Martin-Nagle, supra note 4, at 50.

8

Id. at 51.

9

Nicaragua, ¶187.

10

Martin-Nagle, supra note 4, at 51.

11

Nicaragua, ¶188, 202-203.

12

General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 63/124, The law of transboundary aquifers, (2009),
available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/66/TransAquifer.html [“Law of Transboundary Aquifers”].
See Joseph Dellapenna, The customary international law of transboundary fresh waters, 1 INT. J. GLOBAL
ENVT’L ISSUES 264, 265 (2001).
13

North Sea, ¶¶50-51.

14

Law of Transboundary Aquifers, art. 4.
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Rahad is not experiencing any emergency situation which
precludes the application of the customary rule.

The Law of Transboundary Aquifers acknowledges that the
obligation to equitably use a transboundary aquifer would not apply in case
of an emergency situation.15 However, for an emergency to exist, an event
must cause, or pose an imminent threat of causing, “serious harm”, which
must be more than mere “significant harm.”16
In lieu of this, the situation must pose a threat to vital human needs,
like the need for drinking water.17 This is not the case, as the vast majority of
water extracted from the Aquifer went to industrial or agricultural uses,18 and
in any case, Rahad has shown that it can satisfy the needs of its people by
simply importing water.19
B. THE PRINCIPLE OF PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL
RESOURCES IS INAPPLICABLE TO RAHAD’S EXTRACTION OF
WATER FROM THE AQUIFER.
The right to permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and
resources20 is a rule of customary international law21 that requires its exercise
through the mutual respect of states based on their sovereign equality.22 Since
flowing water respects no national borders, transboundary freshwater
systems, which largely concern aquifers, fall into the realm of international
water law and not within the purview of a single state’s sovereign rights.23

15

Law of Transboundary Aquifers, art. 17.

16

International Law Commission (ILC), Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers,
with commentaries, II.2 YILC 27, 74 (2008).
17

ILC, supra note 16, at 76.

18

Compromis, ¶26.

19

Clarifications, ¶9.

20
PSNR, pmbl., arts. 1(1)-(2),(6)-(7); General Assembly Resolution 2158, Permanent sovereignty
over natural resources, (XXI) (Nov. 25, 1966); General Assembly Resolution 3171, Permanent
sovereignty over natural resources, (XXVIII) (Dec. 17, 1973); see UN General Assembly, United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment, A/RES/2994 (1972) [“Stockholm Declaration”] principle 21;
UN General Assembly, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26
Vol. I (1992) [“Rio Declaration”] principle 2.
21

Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (D.R.C. v. Uganda.), 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶244.

22

PSNR, art. 5.

23

Martin-Nagle, supra note 4, at 40.
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Since 35% of the Aquifer is located within Atania’s territory, Rahad has the
obligation to respect the former’s interest in the resource.24
State exploitation of unconfined fossil aquifers cannot be conducted
in conformity to well-established regimes for oil and gas deposits. Unlike
non-renewable resources that can be extracted with little impact on surface
life, aquifer stores diminishes the arability of land. In fact, the rapid depletion
of the Ogallala aquifer in the United States has reduced crop yields in half of
what they were in the 1970s.25
C. MOREOVER, RAHAD HAS UNDERTAKEN A UNILATERAL
OBLIGATION TO EQUITABLY USE THE AQUIFER.
Unilateral declarations by states may have the effect of creating legal
obligations.26 The statement of the Rahadi Minister of Water and Agriculture
(“Rahadi Minister”) in 1993 bound Rahad to equitably use the Greater Inata
Aquifer (“Aquifer”) because (1) the Rahadi Minister possesses the authority
to bind the State, (2) the declaration was clear and precise, and (3) the
circumstances support the creation of a legal obligation.
The Rahadi Minister possesses the authority to undertake an
obligation on behalf of Rahad.
Persons representing a state in specific fields may be authorized by
the latter to make legally binding statements. 27 As held in the Armed
Activities case, “holders of technical ministerial portfolios exercising powers
in their field of competence in the area of foreign relations, and even of
certain officials,” can bind states with their declarations.28 In this regard,
international courts have looked into the statements of Ministers of Defense29
and Ministers of Justice. 30 The Rahadi Minister was appointed by the

24

Compromis, ¶15.

25

Martin-Nagle, supra note 4, at 40.

26

Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 253 [“Nuclear Tests”] ¶46; Land, Island
and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond., Nicar. intervening), 1990 I.C.J. 146 [“Frontier
Dispute”], ¶351; International Law Commission, Guiding Principles Applicable to Unilateral
Declarations of States Capable of Creating Legal Obligations, (2006) principle 1.
27

Unilateral Declarations Guidelines, principle 4.

28
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application) (D.R.C. v. Rwanda), 2006
I.C.J. 6 [“Armed Activities”], ¶47.
29

Nuclear Tests, ¶43.

30

Armed Activities, ¶48.
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Queen 31 and manages and studies the use of the Aquifer. 32 Despite the
Queen’s presence, it was the Rahadi Minister of Water and Agriculture who
spoke on behalf of “[t]he people of Rahad” in a televised event during an
international event regarding matters falling squarely within his
competence.33
The Rahadi Minister made a clear and precise declaration.
The declaration defines the nature of the obligation.
In Nuclear Tests, the Court stated that a unilateral declaration may
have the effect of creating legal obligations if it is stated in clear and specific
terms.34 In Eastern Greenland, the Ihlen declaration, which contained the
language “the Norwegian Government would not make any difficulties in the
settlement of this question,” was sufficiently clear to recognize the
sovereignty Denmark. 35 The statement of the Rahadi Minister was even
clearer as it employed commonly used legal terms such as “ensure” and
“equitable use.”36
The statement contains no reservations.
When a State provides multiple exceptions to a unilateral declaration,
it tends to prove that there was no intent to be bound by a legal obligation; it
was made for political accommodation.37 However, in this case, there was no
exception. In fact, the Rahadi Minister’s statement that makes reference to
“future generations” exposes the unmistakable intent to preserve the
Aquifer.38

31

Compromis, ¶3.

32

Id., ¶15.

33

Id., ¶16.

34

Nuclear Tests, ¶43, 51, & 53; Unilateral Principles Guidelines, principle 7.

35
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53, 95 [“Eastern
Greenland”], at 52.
36

Compromis, ¶16.

37

ILC, Eighth report on unilateral acts of States, A/CN.4/557 (May 26, 2005), ¶15.

38

Compromis, ¶16.
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The circumstances support the creation of a binding
obligation.
The legal effect of a statement depends on the circumstances in
which it was made. 39 Even though other States need not accept the
obligation,40 particular importance should be given to the reaction of other
States in determining a statement’s legal effect.41 Unilateral declarations are
not made in vacuo, and the declarant is bound to assume that other States
might rely on them.42 The statement was made in honor of World Water Day,
in the capital of Atania, in a nationally televised address. 43 The Atanian
Minister’s counterpart thanked the Rahadi Minister for the statement.44 UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan even urged other States to abide by the model
of cooperation.45 President Vhen later reminded Rahad of the binding nature
of their declaration.46
Rahad has not validly revoked its unilateral obligation.
According to the ILC, once a State has undertaken a unilateral
obligation, it may revoke it so long as revocation is not done arbitrarily.47
However, none of the grounds for a valid revocation exists in this case.
Atania has relied on Rahad’s undertaking.
According to the ILC, a revocation may be arbitrary depending on
the extent to which those to whom the obligations are owed have relied on
such obligations.48 This is known as the principle of estoppel, whereby one
party has detrimentally relied on the statement of another.49
39

Armed Activities, ¶49; Nuclear Tests, ¶51; Frontier Dispute, ¶39-40.

40

Nuclear Tests, ¶46.

41

Unilateral Declarations Guidelines, principle 3. For examples, see ILC, Guiding Principles
applicable to unilateral declarations of States capable of creating legal obligations, with commentaries
thereto, II.2 YILC 369, 372 notes 937-40 (2006).
42

Nuclear Tests, ¶53.

43

Compromis, ¶16.

44

Id.

45

Compromis, ¶17.

46

Id., ¶29.

47

Unilateral Declarations Guidelines, principle 10.

48

Unilateral Declarations Guidelines, principle 10.

49

North Sea, at 26; Elettronica Sicula (U.S. v. Ita.), Judgment, 1989 I.C.J. 15 [“Elettronica”], ¶54.
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Atania has relied on the declaration. Firstly, Atania acknowledged
the declaration and thanked Rahad for making it.50 Secondly, President Vhen
would frequently refer to the same in calling on Rahad to cease its extraction
operations both when Queen Teresa revealed her intent to build the pipeline51
as well as when the pipeline’s effects on Atanian agriculture became
apparent.52 Moreover, Atania has suffered damage due to its reliance. In the
belief that Rahad would not exhaust the aquifer, Atania has refrained from
extracting water and continued to import water53 and even imposed a water
quota.54 Atania did not unilaterally extract water from the Aquifer even if
they already lost arable land.55
There was no fundamental change of circumstances that
would justify revocation.
A revocation may be valid if it was done pursuant to a fundamental
change in circumstances. 56 The elements of a fundamental change in
circumstance57 are not present in this case.
i.
Rahad’s access to water was not an essential basis for
establishing the unilateral obligation.
A circumstance forms an essential basis of consent if its change or
absence would have led States Parties to draft a treaty differently, or not enter
into it at all.58 Its essential basis was “the importance of water to all who live
on the Nomad Coast.”59 The declaration was made without qualification.
50

Compromis, ¶16.

51

Id., ¶23.

52

Id., ¶29.

53

Clarifications, ¶9.

54

Compromis, ¶34.

55

Id., ¶28.

56

Unilateral Declarations Guidelines, principle 10; See Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, ¶104; I UN
CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF TREATIES [“UNCLOT”], OFFICIAL RECORDS 365, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.39/11 (1968) ¶22; II UNCLOT 116. ILC, Draft articles on the law of treaties with commentaries,
(1966) 2 YILC 187, 257.
57

ILC, supra note 41 at 381, note 984. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23,
1969, 115 UNTS 331 [“VCLT”], art. 62; Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Judgment, 1973 I.C.J. 3
[“Fisheries Jurisdiction, U.K. v. Ice”], ¶36; Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, ¶104.
58

Gerald Fitzmaurice, Second Report on the Law of Treaties, 2 YILC 16 (1957) ¶171,
U.N./A/CN.4/107.
59

Compromis, ¶16.
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The droughts were foreseen.

A fundamental change in circumstances must be “not foreseen by the
parties.”60 The entire Nomad Coast had experienced a drought in the past61
and the temperature had been on a steady rise since 1970.62 Moreover, the
Great Garnet Desert borders the Nomad Coast and arid and semi-arid lands
characterize the region.63 Rahad must have foreseen the later droughts.
iii.
The droughts did not radically transform the extent of
Rahad’s obligations.
Obligations radically transform when they are “something
essentially different from that originally undertaken.” 64 While obligations
need necessarily not become impossible, their continued performance must
somehow be much more onerous or unreasonable.65 Although the drought in
1999 could have made it more difficult to preserve the Aquifer,66 Rahad’s
previous importation of water67 means it would not be unreasonable for them
to do so again.
D. RAHAD HAS NOT EQUITABLY USED THE GREATER INATA
AQUIFER.
Rahad has not equitably68 used the Greater Inata Aquifer because (1)
Rahad has not considered the interests of Atania, (2) Rahad has deprived
Atania of a reasonable share of the Aquifer, and (3) Rahad has not aimed at
maximizing the long-term benefits derived from the use of the water.
Rahad has not considered the interests of Atania in the
Aquifer.
In Pulp Mills, the Court ruled that utilization is not equitable if the
interests of the other State and the environmental protection of the resource
60

VCLT, art. 62(1); Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, ¶104.

61

Compromis, ¶14.

62

Id., ¶19.

63

Id., ¶1.

64

Nicaragua, ¶207; North Sea, ¶77; Scharf, supra note 3.

65
A. Racke GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, 1998 ECR I-3655, ¶¶54-55, 57; Fitzmaurice,
supra note 58, at 60.
66

Compromis, ¶19.

67

Id., ¶14.

68

Law of Transboundary Aquifers, art. 4(c).
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were not taken into account.69 Rahad’s extraction of water was made without
contemplating the benefits derived by both aquifer states. Rather, Rahad only
considered its own projected consumption, growth and development.70
Rahad has not extracted an equitable share from the Aquifer.
In Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, Czechoslovakia’s act of “unilaterally
assuming control of a shared resource” was deemed inconsistent with
Hungary’s right to an equitable share of the River Danube.71 Czechoslovakia
appropriated for its benefit a majority of the waters of the Danube
notwithstanding the fact that it was a shared international watercourse. 72
Rahad has extracted about a third of all the water from the Aquifer,73 without
regard to factors relevant to equitable extraction, such as population size,
existing usage, and its role in the ecosystem. 74 This extraction likewise
ignores the greater cost of extracting water from the deeper recesses of the
Aquifer, which is what Rahad forces Atania to do should the latter ever
choose to extract water itself.
Rahad has not aimed at maximizing the long-term benefits
derived from the use of the water from the Aquifer.
Aquifer States must take into consideration present and future needs
in assessing and establishing a comprehensive utilization plan in order to
maximize the long-term benefits derived from the limited water contained in
unconfined fossil aquifers.75 The duty to maximize a non-renewable resource
requires lengthening its availability for future use.76 Instead of implementing
such a plan, Queen Teresa merely acknowledged that the extraction was
merely a “short-term solution.” 77 Rahad proceeded to extract water at a
continuous rate notwithstanding warnings of complete exhaustion in 30
years.78
69

Pulp Mills, ¶177.

70

Compromis, ¶21.

71

Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, ¶85.

72

Id., ¶78.

73

Compromis, ¶26.

74

Law of Transboundary Aquifers, art. 5(a), (e) & (i).

75

ILC, supra note 16, at 42.

76

Stockholm Declaration, principle 5.

77

Compromis, ¶22.

78

Id., ¶21.

2017]
II.

Distinguished Brief

243

THE

SAVALI PIPELINE OPERATIONS VIOLATE RAHAD’S
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE KIN CANYON
COMPLEX AND THEREFORE MUST CEASE.
A. RAHAD VIOLATED ITS DUTY TO COOPERATE IN PROTECTING THE
KIN CANYON COMPLEX.

As States Parties to the World Heritage Convention (“WHC”), 79
Rahad and Atania identified and delineated the Complex as important
cultural and natural heritage property, rightfully belonging in the UNESCO
World Heritage List.80 The WHC imposes obligations on all States parties to
cooperate in the protection and conservation of the cultural and natural
heritage found in the territory of other States.81 In light of the customary rules
of treaty interpretation, 82 Rahad has failed to cooperate in protecting the
Complex.
Rahad failed to notify Atania of its plans to construct the
Savali Pipeline.
The obligation to notify other States of plans that may have
transboundary impact is intended to create the conditions for successful
cooperation between the parties.83 It enables parties to assess the risks of the
plan and negotiate possible changes.84 Notification must be made through
diplomatic channels and other formal declarations. 85 Information coming
through the press is not sufficient to discharge the obligation.86 Queen Teresa
of Rahad only made a televised appearance addressed to the people of Rahad

79

World Heritage Convention, Nov. 16, 1972, 1037 UNTS 151 [“WHC”]. See VCLT, art. 26.

80

Id., art. 3. See William Lipe, Value and Meaning in Cultural Resources, APPROACHES TO THE
ARCHAEOLOGICAL HERITAGE 1 (Henry Cleere ed., 1984); Irini Stamatoudi, The National Treasures
Exception in Article 36 of the EC Treaty: How Many of Them Fit the Bill?, 3 ART ANTIQUITY AND L. 39,
47 (1998); See also Compromis, ¶6.
81

WHC art. 4, 6(1) & (3).

82

VCLT, art. 31(c).

83

Pulp Mills, ¶113.

84

Id., ¶115.

85

Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djib. V. Fr.), Judgment, 2008 I.C.J.
177 [“Mutual Assistance”], ¶150; Pulp Mills, ¶109-110.
86

Id., ¶150.
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regarding the plan to extract from the Aquifer. 87 Atania was not directly
notified through channels recognized in international law.88
Rahad conducted an environmental impact assessment
inconsistent with international law.
States are obliged to undertake an environmental impact assessment
(“EIA”) when there is a risk that a proposed industrial activity may have
adverse impact on a shared resource. 89 The assessment must address the
substantive obligations of the parties, taking into account the possibility of
alternatives, the populations likely affected, and the consultation with
affected parties in the context of the environmental impact assessment.90
Rahad, through ILSA, studied the feasibility and long-term effects
of directly tapping the Aquifer to meet Rahad’s domestic need for water.91
However, Queen Teresa declined President Vhen’s invitation for a meeting
to better understand the potential hazards of the operations, 92 and did not
address the Atania’s “serious concerns regarding the potential dangers that
the unilateral action may provoke.”93
Rahad failed to negotiate with Atania in good faith.
The duty to cooperate, in light of the principles of treaty
interpretation, 94 implies a duty to negotiate in good faith, 95 such that

87

Compromis, ¶22.

88

Id., ¶23.

89

Pulp Mills, ¶204.

90
Pulp Mills, ¶¶205-06; See XUE HANQIN, TRANSBOUNDARY DAMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4
(2003); See also United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 UNTS 3
[“UNCLOS”], art. 206; MOX Plant Case (Ire. V. U.K.) Order, Request for Provisional Measures, ITLOS
Case No. 10 (2001); Rio Declaration, principle 17; Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter art. 11, Aug. 30, 1975, 1046 UNTS 138; United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) Res. GC14/25 (1987); Convention on Environmental Impact
Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Sept. 10, 1997, 1989 UNTS 309.
91

Compromis, ¶20.

92

Id., ¶33.

93

Id., ¶23.

94

VCLT, art. 31.

95

Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (Macedonia v. Greece), Judgment,
2011 I.C.J. 644, ¶¶131-132, citing VCLT, art. 26; Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of
Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.A.), Judgment, 1984 ICJ 292, ¶87; Fisheries Jurisdiction, U.K. v. Ice., ¶33;
Nuclear Tests, ¶46; North Sea, ¶46.
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negotiations are meaningful.96 While there is no obligation to come to an
agreement,97 negotiations must be genuine, and not mere formalities.98 As
held in Lake Lanoux, bad faith includes interrupting communications or
causing unjustified delays.99
In this case, Rahad failed to negotiate with Atania despite persistent
objections from President Vhen.100 Rahad even declined an invitation to meet
regarding the Savali Pipeline operations (“Savali Pipeline”).101 On the other
hand, Atania did not show an unconditional and arbitrary opposition to
Rahad’s plans.102 Taken together, these facts establish that Rahad did not
negotiate in good faith.
B. RAHAD DELIBERATELY CAUSED DAMAGE TO THE KIN CANYON
COMPLEX.
Each State Party to the WHC undertakes not to take any deliberate
measures that might damage directly or indirectly the cultural and natural
heritage identified and designated as such under the treaty.103 This obligation
should be interpreted in light of the sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (“sic
utere”) principle,104 which provides that a State must not knowingly allow
activities within its control and jurisdiction to cause injury to the rights of
another State. 105 This is otherwise known as the principle of prevention,
which has its origins in the due diligence required of a State in its territory.106

96

Interim Accord, ¶¶131-132; North Sea, ¶85.

97

Railway Traffic between Lithuiania and Poland, Advisory Opinion, 1931, P.C.I.J., Series A/B,
No. 42, at 116.
98

Lake Lanoux Arbitration (Spa. v. Fra.), 24 ILR 101 (1957) [“Lake Lanoux”], at 15-16.

99

Id., at 23.

100

Compromis, ¶23 & 29.

101

Id., ¶33,

102

Lake Lanoux, at 23.

103

WHC, art. 6(3).

104

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶29;
Pulp Mills, ¶101.
105

Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4 [“Corfu”], a t 22; Trail Smelter
Arbitration (U.S. A .
v. Can.) 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941) [“Trail Smelter”],
1965; Stockholm
Declaration, principle 21.
106

Pulp Mills, ¶101. See also Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, ¶115; XUE, supra note 90, at 163.

246

ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 24:1
The Kin Canyon Complex suffered transboundary damage.
The damage to the Complex was serious or significant.

The transboundary damage suffered by a State must be proven by
clear and convincing evidence, and must be “serious”107 or “significant.”108
Damage must be greater than mere nuisance or insignificant harm. 109
Deliberately damaging heritage is unlawful especially if it is not necessary to
meet basic survival or subsistence needs.110 In Temple of Preah Vihear, this
Court emphasized that States should not deliberately cause damage to World
Heritage sites so as to deny the public access to these properties.111 Because
of the damage, the Complex was closed to ensure visitors to ensure their
safety.112
The Savali Pipeline was implemented in light of Rahad’s projected
consumption, growth and development, and desire to completely end reliance
on imported water and re-establishing self-sufficiency;113 it was not due to a
need for survival. The damage to the structural integrity of the Complex was
significant as to include the Complex in the List of World Heritage in
Danger. 114 A panel of geologists unanimously agreed that there had been
clear structural degradation of the Canyons and the Stronghold within Atania,
and attributed the problem to subsidence due to depletion of the Aquifer.115

107

Trail Smelter, at 1965.

108
In the Arbitration Regarding the Iron Rhine Railway (Belg. v. Neth), 23 R.I.A.A. 35 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 2005), ¶59.
109
J. Barboza, Sixth Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of
Acts not Prohibited by International Law, March 15, 1990, UN Doc. A/CN.4/428, arts. 2(b) & (e).
110

WHC, art. 4 & 6; see Kanchana Wangkeo, Monumental Challenges: The Lawfulness of
Destroying Cultural Heritage During Peacetime, 28 YALE J. OF INT’L L. 1, 268 (2003).
111

Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case Concerning the Temple of Preah
Vihear (Cam. v. Thai.), Judgment, 2013 ICJ Reports 281, ¶106.
112

Compromis, ¶30.

113

Compromis, ¶21.

114

Id., ¶30.

115

Id.
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The damage is proven by clear and convincing evidence.
To prove damage, the independence of experts is not determinative
of the probative value of expert evidence. 116 Resort to news reports or
photographs may be had if the same is corroborative of other pieces of
evidence. 117 In practice, the World Heritage Committee would place
property in the List of World Heritage in Danger if it has been threatened by
serious and specific dangers.118
The photographs of foreign tourists and the reports of local
newspapers contribute to corroborating the existence of a fact, as illustrative
material additional to other sources of evidence. 119 The inclusion of the
Complex in the List of World Heritage in Danger “due to the impact of the
Savali Pipeline” further proves the damage.120
Rahad failed to observe due diligence to prevent damage to
the Complex.
This principle of due diligence has been described in Pulp Mills as
the duty of each State to possess a certain level of vigilance in the
enforcement of rules and measures, including the monitoring of activities
undertaken, to safeguard the rights of the other party.121 The measures should
be effective and active,122 and appropriate and proportional to the degree of
risk of transboundary harm. 123 Further, states have a duty to consider any
alternatives that are less damaging.124
Rahad’s report did not reflect an assessment of harm or evaluation
of measures with a view towards the prevention, reduction, and control of the

116

Pulp Mills, ¶¶166-168.

117

United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 [“Tehran”],
¶¶12-13; see Nicaragua, ¶63.
118
World Heritage Committee (“WHComm.”), Dresden Elbe Valley (Germany), 33 COM 7A.26;
WHComm., Arabian Oryx Sanctuary, 31 COM 7B.11 [“Arabian Oryx Sanctuary”].
119

Tehran, ¶¶12-13. See Nicaragua, ¶63.

120

Compromis, ¶¶31-32.

121

Pulp Mills, ¶197.

122

WHC, art. 6(1). See Arabian Oryx Sanctuary.

123

ILC, Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities
[“Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm”] art. 3, ¶11.
124

See Wangkeo, supra note 110, at 270, in relation to WHC, arts. 4 & 6.
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harm. 125 The Complex was included in the List of World Heritage in
Danger, 126 but Rahad continued its operations knowing the risks. The
extraction of water in areas more than 15 kilometers outside of the buffer
zone127 does not satisfy due diligence as water seeks its own level leading to
damage to areas remote from the pumping zone. The importation of water
from third-party nations remains to be a viable option.128
C. RAHAD FAILED TO OBSERVE THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE.
The inclusion of the Complex in the List of World Heritage in
Danger indicates that it is threatened by serious and specific dangers. 129
Whenever action may cause significant harm, even if the possibility or extent
of the exact harm is unproven, precautionary measures, including cessation,
must be applied.130 While the findings of geologists regarding further damage
due to continued extraction were inconclusive,131 the evidence established
the possibility of harm to the structural integrity of the Complex, as noted in
the Decision of the World Heritage Committee. 132 Rahad was obliged to
observe precautionary measures necessary to prevent environmental
degradation, including cessation until a program of corrective measures
regarding the Savali Pipeline was implemented.133

125

Pulp Mills, ¶204.

126

Compromis, ¶32.

127

Id., ¶26.

128

See Clarifications, ¶9.

129
WHC, art. 11(4); Intergovernmental Committee for the Protection of the World Cultural and
Natural Heritage, Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention
(2013) [“WHC Operational Guidelines”], ¶177(b).
130

Rio Declaration, principle 15.

131

Compromis, ¶30.

132

Id., ¶21, 24-25.

133

Clarifications, ¶6.
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D. RAHAD HAS AN OBLIGATION TO CEASE THE SAVALI PIPELINE
OPERATIONS.
The commission of an internationally wrongful act gives rise to an
obligation to cease that act, if the act is a continuing breach. 134 Rahad’s
breaches of its continuing obligations justify an order for cessation.
Rahad’s breach is continuing.
A continuing breach is one that has been commenced but has not
been completed at the relevant time. 135 Since 2003, Rahad has extracted
water from the Aquifer without cooperating with Atania and performing due
diligence to prevent damage to the Complex. The Savali Pipeline continues
to pump water from the Aquifer as of the date of this Special Agreement.136
Rahad breached substantive obligations.
The duty to cooperate is integral to the discharge of the due diligence
standards. 137 In Pulp Mills, the Court held the view that procedural
obligations may have a functional link with substantive ones.138 Since the
project violates substantive obligations, ordering cessation would be an
appropriate remedy.139
III.

RAHAD MUST IMMEDIATELY RETURN THE RUBY SIPAR TO ATANIA,
ITS LAWFUL OWNER.

Cultural property constitutes one of the basic elements of civilization
and national culture.140 Every State has an obligation to respect the cultural

134
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Nov. 2001, Supplement No. 10
(A/56/10) [“Articles on State Responsibility”], art. 30(a); Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v.
Ital., Gre. intervening), 2012 I.C.J. 99, ¶137.
135
ILC, Draft articles on Articles on State Responsibility, with commentaries, II.2 YILC 31 (2001),
at 60, art. 14, ¶5.
136

Compromis, ¶26.

137

Owen McIntyre, The Role of Customary Rules and Principles of International Environmental
Law in the Protection of Shared International Freshwater Resources, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 157, 180-86
(2006). See also Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, ¶109.
138

Pulp Mills, ¶79.

139

Id., ¶275.

140
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer
of Ownership of Cultural Property, Apr. 24, 1972, 823 UNTS 231 [“1970 UNESCO Convention”], prmb.
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heritage of all nations.141 In the Temple of Preah Vihear, this Court stated
that cultural restitution is “implicit in, and consequential on, the claim of
sovereignty itself.”142
A. RAHAD MUST RETURN THE RUBY SIPAR PURSUANT TO ATANIA’S
RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP.
Atania is the owner of the Ruby Sipar.
A State is presumed to have sovereign authority over property found
within its territory.143 There is a presumption of state ownership of cultural
property. 144 Furthermore, the principle that a state has a right to acquire
discovered property found to be of interest to science, history or art is a
general principle of law.145 In this case, an archaeologist from the University
of Atanagrad, a public university of Atania,146 discovered the Ruby Sipar
within the territory of Atania.147 Thus, the Ruby Sipar is Atania’s property.
The principle of Common Heritage of Mankind does not
defeat Atania’s ownership over the Ruby Sipar.
The principle of Common Heritage of Mankind is not a rule of
customary international law, but is merely a philosophical framework of
protecting cultural property. 148 In any case, the principle of Common
Heritage of Mankind merely emphasizes the importance of international

141

1970 UNESCO Convention, prmb.

142

Temple of Preah Vihear (Cam. v. Thai.), Merits,͒ Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. 6, ¶36.

143

Rosalyn Higgins, The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in International
Law, 176 RECUEIL DES COURS 259, 280 (1982); Koen De Jager, Claims to Cultural Property Under
International Law, 1 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 183, 190 (1988).
144

Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.
United States Court of Appeals, 917 F.2d 278 (1990); Expert Committee on State Ownership of Cultural
Heritage, Model Provisions on State Ownership of Undiscovered Cultural Objects, provision 3.
145

Armory v. Delamirie, cited in JESSE DUKEMINIER AND JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY (5th Ed.),
(2002) 120. See, e.g., Treasure Act 1996, c.24, §4 (U.K.); The Antiquities and Art Treasures Act 1972
(Ind.).
146

Clarifications, ¶4.

147

Compromis, ¶12.

148
Craig Forrest, Cultural Heritage as the Common Heritage of Humankind: A Critical Reevaluation, 40 THE COMP. & INT’L L.J. OF S. AFR. 124, 127 (2007).
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cooperation in protecting cultural property.149 It facilitates the best possible
preservation and protection of cultural property by obligating other states to
assist the owner state in preserving and protecting the same. 150 This does not
extend to depriving the owner state of the property. In fact, the principle
prohibits the illicit trade of cultural property.151
Atania’s treatment of the Ruby Sipar is not inconsistent with
its right of ownership.
The abuse of rights doctrine prohibits the exercise of a right for a
purpose different from that for which the right had been created and as a
result injury is caused.152 The relationship between the measure taken and the
legitimate policy must be evaluated.153 Atania’s act of safekeeping the Ruby
Sipar within the Complex was a legitimate measure to ensure its
protection.154
B. RAHAD MUST RETURN THE RUBY SIPAR FOR VIOLATING THE
OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THE 1970 UNESCO CONVENTION.
Although the Ruby Sipar was taken at a time when the 1970
UNESCO Convention was not yet in force,155 Rahad, as a signatory, was still
obliged to refrain from acts, which would defeat the object and purpose of

149

Economic and Social Council (UNESCO), Declaration concerning the Intentional Destruction
of Cultural Heritage (Oct. 17, 2003); Alan Marchisotto, The Protection of Art in Transnational Law, 7
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 689, 717 (1974).
150

Id.

151
John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 THE AM. J. OF
INT’L L. 831, 843 (1986).
152
HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE PCIJ (1934) 164;
LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE (8th Ed., 1955) 345; MARION PANIZZON, GOOD
FAITH IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE WTO 27 (2006); Alexandre Kiss, Abuse of Rights, in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (Rudolf Bernhardted, 1992); Beyeler v. Italy,
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Application No. 33202/96, Judgment (Jan. 5, 2000)
[“Beyeler”]. See also Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Gua.), Second Phase, Judgment, 1955 ICJ Reports 4
(Apr. 6), ¶¶20-26.
153

Appellate Body Report, US–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/AB/R (Nov. 6, 1998) DSR 1998:VII, 2755; Corfu (Alvarez, J., separate), at 4.
154

Compromis, ¶¶43-44.

155
UNESCO, Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the Convention on the Means of
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property
[“Operational Guidelines Cultural Property”] ¶21. See Corrections, ¶3; Compromis, ¶50.
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the treaty.156 In Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. The Barakat
Gallery Limited, the court affirmed the significance of abiding by the
principles of the 1970 UNESCO Convention even if the treaty was not in
force when the acts were committed.157
The object and purpose of the 1970 UNESCO Convention is
to protect declared cultural property from illicit theft,
import, export, and transfer of ownership.
The interim obligation, which requires States to refrain from
violating the essential provisions of a treaty constituting its raison d’être158
can be determined in reference to the text and nature of the treaty. 159
Recourse may be had to the preamble of a treaty in determining said object
and purpose.160 The preamble of the 1970 UNESCO Convention provides
that it is incumbent on every State to protect the cultural property existing
within its territory against the dangers of theft, clandestine excavation, and
illicit export.161 In Beyeler v. Italy, the ECtHR recognized that the UNESCO
Convention “accords priority” to the ties between cultural property and their
country of origin.162 Moreover, according to the Operational Guidelines of
the 1970 UNESCO Convention, 163 the purpose includes the recovery and
return of stolen cultural property.164

156

VLCT, art. 18(b).

157

Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. The Barakat Galleries Ltd., Supreme Court of
Judicature (U.K.), [2007] EWCA Civ 1374.
158
Alain Pellet, Note by the Special Rapporteur on draft guideline 3.1.5 (Definition of the object
and purpose of the treaty) ¶1, Jun. 21, 2006, A/CN.4/572.
159

Id., ¶5.

160

Rights of United States Nationals in Morocco (Fra. v. U.S.A.), Judgment, 1952 I.C.J. 176 (Aug.
27),¶196; Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3), ¶52.
161

1970 UNESCO Convention, prmb.

162

Beyeler, ¶113.

163

UNGA Resolution 70/76.

164

Operational Guidelines Cultural Property, ¶9; VCLT, art. 31(2)(b).
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Rahad has defeated the object and purpose of the 1970
UNESCO Convention.
The Ruby Sipar is Atania’s declared cultural property
under the 1970 UNESCO Convention.
Under the 1970 UNESCO Convention, cultural property includes
property, which, on religious or secular grounds, is designated by each State
as being of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or
science. 165 The Convention reflects the theory of cultural nationalism by
which a nation’s cultural property belongs within that nation’s territory.166
i.
Atania has declared the Ruby Sipar as Atania’s cultural
property.
Cultural property must be specifically designated as such by a
State. 167 States have the indefeasible right to classify and declare which
property is cultural property. 168 The Ruby Sipar was designated by operation
of the interpretative declaration169 made by Atania upon its ratification of the
1970 UNESCO Convention.170
ii.
The Ruby Sipar is covered by Article 1 of the 1970
UNESCO Convention.
Article 1 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention covers property, which
relates to history, 171 is a product of archaeological excavations or of

165

1970 UNESCO Convention, art. 1.

166

Carol Roehrenbeck, Repatriation of Cultural Property- Who Owns the Past? An Introduction
to Approaches and to Selected Statutory Instruments, 38 INT. J. LEG. INF. 185, 190 (2010). See Merryman,
supra note 151, at 846.
167

1970 UNESCO Convention, art. 1. See id., at 842-43.

168

Operational Guidelines Cultural Property, ¶35.

169

Alain Pellet, Thirteenth report of the Special Rapporteur on reservations to treaties, Alain
Pellet, 20 May 2008, A/CN.4/600. An interpretative declaration was defined as, “a unilateral statement,
however phrased or named, made by a State or by an international organization whereby that State or that
organization purports to specify or clarify the meaning or scope attributed by the declarant to a treaty or
to certain of its provision” in II.2 YILC 178 2001.
170

Compromis, ¶60.

171

1970 UNESCO Convention, art. 1(b).
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archaeological discoveries172 or an antiquity more than a century old.173 The
Sipar, dating back to 500 CE,174 plays an important role in Atania’s history
and was thought to have been lost prior to its discovery in 1903.175
Rahad has defeated the object and purpose through the
acts of Carla Dugo.
i.

Carla Dugo’s acts violate the object and purpose of the
Convention.

The 1970 UNESCO Convention seeks to avert clandestine theft of
cultural property176 because the illicit transfer of cultural property is one of
the main causes of the impoverishment of the cultural heritage of countries
of origin.177 Carla Dugo admitted that she entered the Kin Canyon Complex
Cultural Center at night and took the Ruby Sipar from its vault a few days
before 3 October 2014.178
ii.

The acts of Carla Dugo are attributable to Rahad.

The conduct of non-state actors may be attributable to the state to the
extent that it acknowledges and adopts the act as its own.179 States may be
held liable for private acts committed by those who are not State officials if
it fails to penalize persons who have committed such private acts.180 Further,
States are encouraged to take sanctions against persons involved in the theft
of cultural property.181 The refusal of Rahadi authorities to take appropriate
steps to return the Ruby Sipar, its subsequent claim of ownership, and failure
to prosecute Carla Dugo renders Carla Dugo’s acts attributable to Rahad. 182

172

1970 UNESCO Convention, art. 1(c).

173

1970 UNESCO Convention, art. 1(e).

174

Compromis, ¶8.

175

Id., ¶¶ 8-9, 12.

176

1970 UNESCO Convention, prmb. & art. 3.

177

1970 UNESCO Convention, art. 2(1).

178

Compromis, ¶50.

179

Articles on State Responsibility, art 11.

180

Tehran, ¶74. See also Security Council (UNSC) Res. 138 (Jun. 23, 1960).

181

Operational Guidelines Cultural Property, ¶46.

182

Compromis, ¶¶50-52.
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As reparation, Rahad must return the Ruby Sipar to Atania
Every breach of an international obligation creates a concomitant
obligation to provide reparations. 183 The state must “wipe out all the
consequences of the illegal act[.]”184
Returning the Ruby Sipar is the proper means of
reparation.
A State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an
obligation to make restitution, or re-establish the situation, which existed
before the wrongful act was committed.185 Restitution is possible through the
return of the Ruby Sipar to Atania.
Return of the Ruby Sipar will not violate the rights of the
Kin.
While restitution should not involve a burden out of proportion to the
benefit deriving from restitution,186 the interests of the Kin must be balanced
with the interest of Atania, which has acquired the Sipar in good faith.187
Atania has possessed and displayed the Ruby Sipar for over a hundred years
without protest from the Kin after discovering it in 1903.188
C. RAHAD MUST RETURN THE RUBY SIPAR PURSUANT TO A
CUSTOMARY OBLIGATION TO RETURN CULTURAL PROPERTY
ACQUIRED ILLICITLY.

States have returned cultural property to the State of origin when
acquired illicitly, consistent with the principle of nemo dat quod non habet.189
This is evident through national legislation, 190 UN General Assembly
183

Articles on State Responsibility, arts. 1 & 31.

184

Factory at Chorzów, Jurisdiction, Judgment No. 8, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9 [“Chorzów
Jurisdiction”], 47. See ILC, supra note 135, at 91, art. 31, ¶3.
185

Articles on State Responsibility, art. 35. See id.

186
Articles on State Responsibility, art. 35. See Forests of Central Rhodope (Gre. v. Bulg.), 3
R.I.A.A. 1405, cited in Conor McCarthy, REPARATIONS AND VICTIM SUPPORT IN THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT (2012) 161.
187

Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People, principle 9.

188

Compromis, ¶12.

189

See Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.A.) 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (1928), at 842.

190
For examples, see UNESCO Database of National Cultural Heritage Laws, at
http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws (last accessed Jan. 12, 2017).
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Resolutions,191 and accession to international conventions.192
Pursuant to this, Germany returned an inscribed Babylonian tablet to
Iraq after discovering the same having been illegally removed and donated
to the Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation193. Similarly, Italy returned over
12,000 pre-Columbian artifacts to Ecuador.194
IV.

ATANIA OWES NO COMPENSATION TO RAHAD FOR ANY COSTS
INCURRED RELATED TO THE KIN MIGRANTS.
A. ATANIA DOES NOT OWE RAHAD COMPENSATION AS A MEANS OF
REPARATION FOR VIOLATING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE KIN.

Reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of
the illegal act and reestablish the situation, which would, in all probability,
have existed if that act had not been committed. 195 The obligation to
compensate is based on a wrongful act that is, the expulsion by the state of
origin of its nationals.196 Acceptance by a state of migrants is voluntary. By
accepting these migrants, a state is fulfilling its obligation to cooperate.197

191

UNSC Res. 1483, S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003); UNGA Res. 70/76 (Dec. 9, 2015); UNGA Res.
61/52 (Feb. 16, 2007); UNGA Res. 50/56 (Dec. 11, 1995); UNGA Res. 34/64 (Nov. 29, 1979).
192
List
of
States-parties
to
the
1970
UNESCO
Convention,
http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=13039&language=E (last visited Oct. 29, 2016).

at

193
Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the Return of Cultural Property to Its Countries of
Origin or Its Restitution in Case of Illicit Appropriation, 20th Sess., Sept. 29-30, 2016, ¶27.
194

ALPER TASDELEN, THE RETURN OF CULTURAL ARTEFACTS: HARD AND SOFT LAW Approaches
148 (2016). See, e.g., US v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F. 3d 131 (2d Cir. 1999), aff’g 991 F. Supp.
222 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). For more examples, see, generally, Marilyn Phelan, Cultural Property, 32 INT’L L.
448, 450 (1998).
195

Factory at Chorzów (Claim for Indemnity) (Ger. v. Pol.), Merits, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A), No. 17
[“Chorzów Merits”], 47.
196

Hannah R. Garry, The Right to Compensation and Refugee Flows: A ‘Preventative Mechanism
in International Law, 10 INT’L J. OF REFUGEE L. 97, (1998).
197
UN, Charter of the United Nations, Oct. 24, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI, arts. 55-56; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 171 [“ICCPR”], prmb.
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Rahad has no standing to espouse the human rights claims
of the Kin.
The Kin are Atanian nationals.
Generally, only the state of nationality is entitled to exercise
diplomatic protection.198 While a State may exercise diplomatic protection
on behalf of refugees it recognizes,199 claims may not be made against the
state of nationality of those refugees. 200 Nationality being the basis for
diplomatic protection, the same should not be allowed. 201 To allow
diplomatic protection in such cases would open the floodgates for
international litigation.202
Since the Kin are Atanian nationals, Rahad cannot espouse their
human rights claims. Although Rahad has declared that many of the migrants
are refugees under the KHAA, claims may not be made against Atania, the
State of nationality.
The Kin have not exhausted local remedies.
The rule of exhaustion of local remedies before international
proceedings may be instituted is a rule of customary international law.203 A
state must be given the opportunity to provide redress for violations by its
own means within the framework of its own domestic legal system before
resort may be had to an international court.204 This rule must be observed
when domestic proceedings are pending.205 Atanian domestic processes are
still ongoing.206

198

ILC, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, art. 3.

199

ILC, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, art. 8(2).

200

ILC, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, art. 8(3).

201

ILC, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries, II.2 YILC 51.

202

Id.

203

Elettronica, ¶46; Interhandel Case, (Switz. v. U.S.A), Judgment, 1959 I.C.J. 6, p. 27.

204

Id.

205

Id., at 27-28.

206

Clarifications, ¶7.
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The principle of erga omnes or erga omnes partes does not
apply.

While all States have a legal interest in the protection of basic rights,
this Court has never upheld a claim based on the principle of erga omnes.
The ruling in Belgium v. Senegal applied the principle of erga omnes partes
with respect only to the Convention Against Torture, which is not applicable
in this case.208
Rahad is barred by the Doctrine of Clean Hands.
207

The principle of ex delicto non oritur actio or the Clean Hands
Doctrine is a general principle of law209 by which a State does not have locus
standi necessary to bring its claim before the Court if it was itself guilty of
illegal conduct.210 A party engaged in a continuing breach is not permitted to
take advantage of the other party’s similarly illegal conduct. 211 The
extraction of water from the Aquifer exacerbated the already precarious
situation in Atania with regard to the availability of water. Rahad effectively
caused the migration of the Kin.212
Atania did not discriminate against the Kin.
All persons are entitled without any discrimination to equal
protection before the law. 213 Domestic legislation must not include
provisions involving discrimination in law or in fact in any field regulated by
public authorities.214 However, substantial distinctions may be the basis of

207

Barcelona Traction, Light and Power, Limited (Belg. v. Spa.) 1970 I.C.J. 3, ¶34.

208

Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), Judgment, 2012
I.C.J. 422, ¶70.
209

Nicaragua (Schwebel, J., dissenting), at 272; Eastern Greenland (Anzilotti, J., dissenting), at
95; Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Neth. V. Belg.), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 70 (Jun. 28) [“River
Meuse”], (Hudson, J., separate), at 78.
210

Nicaragua (Schwebel, J., dissenting), at 272

211

River Meuse, (Hudson, J., separate), at 78.

212

Compromis, ¶¶ 26-28.

213

ICCPR, art. 26

214
Centre for Civil and Political Rights (CCPR), General Comment No. 18: Non-discrimination
(Nov. 10, 1989) [ “General Comment 18”], ¶12.
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differentiated treatment. 215 No violation occurs if a restriction has a
reasonable and objective justification.216
The WRAP Act was not directly discriminatory because it applies to
all people within Atania, and aims to limit water usage for the good of
everyone, including the Kin. 217 Neither was the WRAP Act indirectly
discriminatory because the availability of exemptions is based on
productivity.218 In any case, the WRAP Act was enacted to conserve water
for all Atanians.
Atania has not deprived them of their right to an adequate
standard of living.
Under the ICESCR, States undertake to take steps, to the maximum
of their available resources, with a view towards progressively achieving the
full realization of rights.219 Pursuant to the right to an adequate standard of
living, people are also entitled to the right to water.220 In determining any
violation of the right to water or food, a distinction is made between the
inability and the unwillingness of a state to provide.221 A State that exerted
every effort to use all resources at its disposal to satisfy minimum obligations
will not be held liable.222
The WRAP Act was enacted in response to the loss of arable land
and the longstanding drought.223 The continued importation of water224 has
not alleviated public suffering.

215

European Union Burden of Proof Directive, Dir. 97/80/EC, OJ L14/6 (1998); Belgian
Linguistics Case, ECtHR, Appl. No. 1474/62, ¶10 (1968).
216
UN Human Rights Committee (UNHCR), Lovelace v. Canada, Comm. No. R.6/24, ¶16;
UNHRC, Kitok v. Sweden, Comm. No. 197/1985, ¶9.5.
217

Centre for Civil and Political Rights (CCPR), General Comment 18: Non-discrimination, ¶7.

218

Compromis, ¶35.

219

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3
[“ICESCR”], art. 2.
220

ICESCR, art. 11; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General
Comment No. 15: The Right to Water (Jan. 20, 2003) [“General Comment 15”], ¶3.
221

General Comment 15, ¶41.

222

CESCR, General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (May 12, 1999), ¶17.

223

Compromis, ¶34.

224

Clarifications, ¶9.
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Atania has not deprived them of their right to cultural life.

Persons belonging to ethnic minorities should not be denied the right
to enjoy their own culture.225 An ethnic minority’s right to enjoy its own
culture is violated when state action is “so substantial” so as to “effectively
deny” them the right.226 Assuming the Kin are an ethnic minority, the WRAP
Act did not prohibit the Kin from farming. Cultural traditions do not prevent
the Kin from applying for a license227 as at least 5% have done so.228
In any case, Rahad has no basis to seek compensation
for violations of the human rights of the Kin.
Compensation is the proper form of reparation if restitution is
impossible or impractical.229 The ICCPR provides that “any person” whose
rights or freedoms are violated shall be entitled to an effective remedy.230 In
the practice of the Human Rights Committee231 and this Court,232 the State
party was required to furnish the victim with an effective remedy, including
compensation. Rahad cannot rely on Article 48(2) of the ASR as a basis of
compensation for breaches of erga omnes rights since it is described as a
mere progressive codification of international law.233
B. ATANIA DOES NOT OWE RAHAD COMPENSATION BY VIRTUE OF A
QUASI-CONTRACT.
A quasi-contract is an obligation in law created absent an agreement,
due to a situation of unjust enrichment. 234 Though this may be a general
principle of law, it does not apply in this case.

225

ICCPR, art. 27.

226

UNHRC, Länsman v. Finland, Comm. No. 511/1992, ¶9.5.

227

Compromis, ¶37.

228

Id., ¶36.

229

Articles on State Responsibility, art. 36(1); Chorzów Merits, at 47.

230

ICCPR, art. 2(3)(a).

231

UNHRC, Huaman v. Peru, Comm. No. 1153/2003, ¶8.

232

Ahmadou Sadou Diallo (Guinea v. D.R.C.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 639 (Nov. 30), ¶50.

233

ILC, supra note 135, at 127.

234
Arthur Corbin, Quasi-Contractual Obligation, 21 YALE L.J. 533 (1912). See WILLIAM CLARK,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (4th Ed., 1939).
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Rahad has consented to providing protection to the Kin
migrants under international law.
By ratifying the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol,
Rahad has undertaken obligations to house and care for refugees.235 Thus,
even if the Kin are found to be refugees, Rahad has consented to undertaking
the obligation to protect the rights of refugees.236 Moreover, the customary
obligation to provide complementary protection gives rise to the duty to
provide protection for migrants based on their human rights. 237 Migrants
must be treated in the same manner a State does its nationals.238 In this case,
Rahad acted pursuant to its own obligations under international law.
In any case, Rahad has failed to comply with its duty to
provide protection for the Kin migrants.
States have obligations to uphold the human rights of all people
within its jurisdiction. 239 These rights include the right against
discrimination240 and the right against arbitrary detention.241 The Kin have
not received genuine protection in Rahad. 242
Rahad has discriminated against the Kin under the
KHAA.
International law prohibits discrimination on the ground of race,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin or status.243 The
KHAA was directly discriminatory because it claims that all Kin were
235

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S.
137 [“Refugee Convention”], arts. 20-23.
236
Refugee Convention & the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 257; JENNIFER PEAVEY-JOANIS, A PYRRHIC VICTORY: APPLYING THE TRAIL SMELTER
PRINCIPLE TO STATE CREATION OF REFUGEES, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 263
(2006); Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, A/AC.96/904, Sept. 7, 1998, ¶14.
237
KATIE SYKES, HUNGER WITHOUT FRONTIERS: THE RIGHT TO FOOD & STATE OBLIGATIONS TO
MIGRANTS, in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DISASTER RELIEF (David D. Caron, Michael J. Kelly, Anastasia
Telesetsky, Eds.) 191.
238

See, generally, Refugee Convention; PEAVEY-JOANIS, supra note 236, at 263.

239

ICCPR, art. 2; ICESCR, art. 2.

240

ICCPR, art. 26; ICESCR art. 2(2).

241

ICCPR, art. 9.

242

Compromis, ¶54.

243

ICCPR, art. 26. See General Comment 18, ¶12.
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“forced to escape hardship and persecution”, yet only the Sisters of the Sun
were immediately granted refugee status.244 All other Kin had to be processed
because they had to be assessed on a case-to-case basis. 245
Rahad has arbitrarily detained the Kin.
A State’s exercise of sovereignty through immigration detention is
limited by ensuring the protection of fundamental human rights. 246 Detention
should never be arbitrary.247 Detention is permissible if there exists a valid
cause and reasonable period248 and is necessary for purposes of admission
and deportation proceedings. 249 The UNHRC, 250 as supported by state
practice, 251 considers detention for six months to two years to be unduly
prolonged.252 Thus, a 24-month period of detention is arbitrary.253
C. ATANIA HAS NOT VIOLATED THE SIC UTERE PRINCIPLE IN
RELATION TO THE KIN MIGRANTS.
Under the principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, states
have an obligation not to knowingly allow their territory to be used in a
manner injurious to the rights of another.254 States must use all means at its
disposal to avoid activities within its territory that cause damage to another
244

Compromis, ¶48.

245

Id.

246

UNGA Res. 40/114 (Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who Are Not Nationals
of the Country in Which They Live) (1985) [“Declaration on HR of Non-Nationals”], art. 5; James A.R.
Nafziger, The General Admission of Aliens under International Law, 77 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 804 (1983).
247

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), UNGA Res. 217 A(III) Dec. 10, 1948, art. 9;
ICCPR, arts. 9(1) & 12(3); UNHRC, General Comment No. 8: Right to Liberty and Security of Persons
(Jun. 30, 1982), ¶4; Declaration on HR of Non-Nationals, art. 5.1(a); UN High Commissioner on Refugees
(UNHCR), The Revised Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention of
Asylum Seekers (2012), guideline 4.
248
UNHRC, A v. Australia, Comm. No.560/1993 (1997), ¶9.2; UNHRC, van Alphen v.
Netherlands, Comm. No.305/1988 (1990), ¶5.8.
249

UNHRC, Torres v. Finland, CCPR/C/38/D/291/1988 (1990), ¶7.3.

250

UNHRC, Comments on Peru, CCPR/C/79/Add.67 (July 25, 1996).

251

Directive 2008/115/EC, European Parliament and Council, art.15.5 (2008).

252
See Amuur vs. France, ECtHR, Judgment, Appl. No. 19776/92 (1996); Chahal v. United
Kingdom, ECtHR, Judgment, Appl. No. 70/1995/576/662 (1996).
253

Compromis, ¶47, 59.

254
Corfu, at 22; Trail Smelter, at 1965; Rio Declaration, principle 2; Stockholm Declaration,
principle 21.
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state. 255 A reasonable imputation of damage is sufficient to establish
causation. 256
Assuming this principle is applicable outside of environmental issues,
Atania cannot be considered to have violated it as the cause for the mass
migration is Rahad’s extraction of water from the Aquifer. The Savali
Pipeline was the catalyst for the eventual migration of the Kin.257
Moreover, Atania made compliance easier by making licenses
available for purchase online or at local WRAP offices,258 and providing that
the Act take effect four months after enactment. 259 The violators of the
WRAP Act were accorded due process.260

255

Pulp Mills, ¶101. See also Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, ¶115.

256

ILC, Draft principles on the allocation of loss in the case of transboundary harm arising out of
hazardous activities, with commentaries, II.2 YILC 157, on principle 4, ¶16; see Olivier De Schutter,
Asbjorn Eide, Ashfaq Khalfan, Marcos Orellana, Margot Salomon & Ian Seiderman, Commentary to the
Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, 34 HUM. RTS. Q. 1084, 1114(2012).
257

Compromis, ¶¶27-28.

258

Compromis, ¶35.

259

Id., ¶34.

260

Id., ¶¶36-37; Clarifications, ¶7.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

For the foregoing reasons, Atania requests the Court to declare that:
Rahad’s extraction of water from the Aquifer violates international
obligations undertaken by Rahad and constitutes an inequitable use of a
shared resource;

The Savali Pipeline operations violate Rahad’s international
obligations with respect to the Kin Canyon Complex and therefore must
cease;

Rahad must immediately return the Ruby Sipar to Atania, its lawful
owner; and

Atania owes no compensation to Rahad for any costs incurred related
to the Kin migrants.
Respectfully submitted,
Agents of Atania

TEAM 349R

IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
AT THE PEACE PALACE,
THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS

THE 2017 PHILIP C. JESSUP INTERNATIONAL LAW MOOT
COURT
COMPETITION

THE CASE CONCERNING THE SISTERS OF THE SUN

FEDERATION OF THE CLANS OF THE ATAN
APPLICANT

V.
KINGDOM OF RAHAD
RESPONDENT
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MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Federation of the Clans of Atan (“Atania”) and the Kingdom of Rahad
(“Rahad”) have consented to submit this dispute to the International Court of
Justice (“this Court”), in accordance with Article 36(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice (“the Statute”). Pursuant to Article 40(1) of the
Statute, this dispute was transmitted to the Registrar on 12 September 2016.
Atania and Rahad have undertaken to accept the Court’s decision as final and
binding on them and also commit to comply with it in its entirety and in good
faith.
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I. Whether extraction of water from the Aquifer violates Rahad’s
international legal obligations governing the proper use of a shared
resource.
II. Whether the Savali Pipeline operations violate Rahad’s
international obligations with respect to the Kin Canyon Complex.
III. Whether Rahad is entitled to retain possession of the Ruby Sipar.
IV. Whether Atania owes compensation to Rahad for any costs
incurred for accepting the Kin migrants.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

BACKGROUND
Rahad and Atania are neighbouring States on the Nomad Coast. As at January
2016, Rahad is a developing State with a GDP of US$11 billion, while
Atania’s GDP is US$80 billion. The Nomad Coast region is characterised by
arid and semi-arid lands. The entire Nomad Coast experienced drought
between 1983 and 1989. Drought returned in 1999 with record-low rainfall.
Atanian meteorologists confirmed meteorological and climatological
changes would result in long-term water shortage for both States.
THE GREATER INATA AQUIFER
The Greater Inata Aquifer (‘the Aquifer’), an unconfined fossil aquifer, is the
largest source of fresh water in the Nomad Coast. In 1988, a team of
hydrologists, commissioned by Rahad, conducted the first in-depth study of
the Aquifer, finding that 65% of the Aquifer was located in Rahad and 35%
was located in Atania.
WORLD WATER DAY 1993
On 22 March 1993, the first UN World Water Day, Rahad’s Queen Teresa
and Atania’s President Vhen appeared at a ceremony in Atania’s capital. The
Rahadi Minister of Water and Agriculture spoke of making reasonable efforts
to preserve, protect and equitably use the shared freshwater resources of the
Nomad Coast, and their importance for future generations.
THE SAVALI PIPELINE
On 16 June 2002, Queen Teresa stated her desire to ensure that the needs of
the Rahadi people could be met through improved access to the Aquifer. She
directed the Inata Logistic and Scientific Association (‘ILSA’) to study the
feasibility and long-term effects of tapping the Aquifer. ILSA’s Report of 17
January 2003 concluded that to end its reliance on imported water, Rahad
would require an alternative supply of approximately 1.2km3 per year. The
report included an EIA. On 2 February 2003, in response to the increasingly
serious water crisis, Queen Teresa ordered implementation of the Savali
Pipeline operations, a comprehensive program to extract water from the
Aquifer.
A 2010 study, commissioned by Atania, concluded that operation of the
Savali Pipeline had caused a permanent lowering of the water table in the
region. The study found that 20% of Atanian farmland could no longer be
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farmed, and that within 10 years an additional 30% would be lost if extraction
continued at the same rate.
THE KIN CANYON COMPLEX
The Kin Canyon Complex (‘the Complex’) is a group of Canyons of
archaeological significance. Two Canyons are located in Atania and one is
located within Rahad territory. After a joint proposal, the Complex was listed
as a mixed heritage site on 2 May 1994. The proposal included a twokilometre ‘buffer zone’ extending from the edge of the Complex.
The ILSA Study noted that in conducting the Pipeline operations, care would
need to be taken to avoid harm to the Complex’s structural integrity. The
ILSA Report and EIA were submitted to the World Heritage Committee. The
Committee urged Rahad to ensure the proposed Savali Pipeline developed
and implemented targets for improved conservation of the Complex.
Rahad limited drilling to more than 15 kilometres outside the Complex’s
buffer zone. Extraction of water from the Aquifer began on 20 February 2006
at a rate of 1.2km3 per year. Since 2006, 70% of the water extracted has been
used for agriculture and 22% by the natural gas industry, Rahad’s largest
export.
By late 2010, images emerged showing environmental degradation to remote
sections of the Canyon. The Atanian government closed sections of the
complex to visitors to ensure their safety. In June 2012, the Complex was
added to the List of World Heritage in Danger. Queen Teresa issued a press
release undertaking to conduct regular studies of the long-term impact of the
Savali Pipeline project on the region and the Complex.
THE WRAP ACT
On 28 September 2012, the Atanian Parliament enacted the 2012 Water
Resource Allocation Program Act (‘WRAP Act’), which set a water quota
for every household, farm and business in Atania. It also required farming
operations to purchase licences but offered an exemption to profit generating
farms. 86% of farming operations qualified for this exemption. In the first
two quarters of 2013, more than 80% of Kin household used water in excess
of their quotas. Less than 5% of Kin farmers had applied for licences.
In August 2013, Atania sentenced two Kin farmers to five years
imprisonment for failing to comply with the WRAP Act. In October 2013,
the Atanian Parliament amended the WRAP Act to provide that farms using
water in violation of the Act would have their State-controlled water supply
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terminated. By the end of 2013, Atania had completely cut of all water to the
majority of farms in Kin lands.
THE RUBY SIPAR
The Ruby Sipar (‘the Sipar) is a ceremonial shield that, according to legend,
was used by Teppa, a warrior of the Clan Kin, to unite the 17 Atan clans to
defeat Ifan the Desert Fox. The Kin honoured Teppa by establishing the
Sisters of the Sun, an order of women dedicated to the preservation of the
Kin culture and traditions. The Sisters of the Sun remain social and cultural
leaders within Kin society and wear miniature Sipar replicas as a symbol of
loyalty to Teppa.
In 1903, Dr. Gena Logres, from the University of Atanagrad, discovered the
original Sipar during an excavation in the Complex within Atania’s territory.
In 1996, the Sipar, identified as ‘on loan from the University of Atanagrad’
was moved to the Cultural Centre in Atania’s portion of the Complex.
THE PROTESTS
In 2014, the Kin and their supporters protested against the ‘theft’ of their
food, water, and way of life. The Sipar became a symbol for the protests;
Carla Dugo and other speakers wore or carried replicas of the Sipar. President
Vhen deployed armed police, who used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse
the protests. President Vhen also ordered all Sipar pendants to be confiscated
and destroyed. The Sipar was removed from display. In October 2014, Carla
Dugo took the Sipar from storage and delivered it to Rahadi border patrol
agents.
THE KIN MIGRANTS
The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (‘FAO’) condemned
the effects of the WRAP Act in a speech to the General Assembly on 2
February 2014. It was reported that farmers whose water supply had been
terminated had to abandon farming and had no other means of securing
sufficient food. The International Federation of the Red Cross confirmed that
more than 500,000 Kin were undernourished.
In early September 2014, Rahadi Immigration agents reported that
approximately 100,000 Kin, citing fear of arrest and starvation, had crossed
into Rahad in two weeks. Sisters of the Sun and their family members were
granted refugee status. The applications of all other Kin remain pending. The
Rahadi Parliament enacted the Kin Humanitarian Assistance Act (KHAA),
establishing three temporary camps in order to process the Kin. By 2015, the
number of Kin exceeded the capacity of Rahad’s facilities. Rahad suffered
sporadic power outages and reduced access to clean water. As at the date of

282

ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 24:1

the special agreement 800,000 Kin had fled to Rahad. On 18 January 2016,
Rahad submitted a memorandum to Atania itemising expenditures associated
with caring for the Kin. The total costs incurred and accruing as at the date
of the Special Agreement were US$945,000,000.
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SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS

PLEADING I
The statement made by the Rahadi Minister on 22 March 1993 did not create
legally binding obligations in relation to the utilisation of the Aquifer. Even
if the Court was to find that it did, Queen Teresa’s statement on 16 June 2002
constituted a valid revocation of any binding obligations that may have been
assumed. There is no rule in customary international law requiring the
equitable and reasonable utilisation of transboundary Aquifers.
In the event that this Court finds that either Rahad did bind itself unilaterally,
or that it is under a customary obligation to utilise the Aquifer equitably and
reasonably, Rahad has complied with its obligations in both respects. Rahad
has not caused transboundary harm in utilising the Aquifer. Rahad
discharged its due diligence obligations by conducting an EIA, notifying and
co-operating with Atania throughout the construction of the Savali Pipeline.
Irrespective of the Court’s findings vis-à-vis the aforementioned contentions,
a state of necessity precludes the wrongfulness of any of Rahad’s acts.
PLEADING II
Rahad has not violated its obligations under the WHC, or under customary
international law, with respect to the Kin Canyon Complex. Rahad exercised
due diligence, and so complied with its obligation under Article 6.3 of the
WHC and customary obligation not to cause transboundary harm. In any
event, Rahad has not caused significant harm to Atania as the degradation of
the Complex was neither significant, foreseeable nor causally related to
Rahad’s Savali Pipeline operations. Rahad fulfilled its obligations to prevent
transboundary harm by exercising due diligence. Rahad complied with any
developing prohibition on the intentional destruction of cultural heritage in
peacetime as Rahad did not intentionally destroy the Complex. The nonarbitrary nature of Rahad’s conduct is such that it cannot have abused its
rights. As in Pleading I, the wrongfulness of any act committed by Rahad is
precluded on the basis of necessity.
PLEADING III
Rahad is entitled to retain possession of the Sipar. On the evidence before
this Court, Atania cannot establish that it is the lawful owner of the Sipar.
Independent of this, Rahad is entitled to retain possession of the Sipar in
order to ensure the Kin’s right to use, control, maintain and protect the Sipar.
In the alternative, Rahad is entitled to retain possession of the Sipar as to
return it would render Rahad complicit in Atania’s violations of ICCPR and

284

ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 24:1

ICESCR. Atania’s abuse of its rights also renders return of the Sipar
inappropriate.
There is no other basis upon which Atania may compel the Sipar’s return.
Rahad’s retention of the Sipar is not an internationally wrongful act. The
1970 Convention had not entered into force upon Rahad at the time the Sipar
entered its territory, or at the time that Rahad refused to return it to Atania.
At customary international law, Rahad did not defeat the object and purpose
of the 1970 Convention between signing it and its entry into force upon
Rahad. Moreover, there is no custom for the return of unlawfully obtained
cultural property to its country of origin.
PLEADING IV
Atania’s internationally wrongful acts have caused 800,000 Kin to leave
Atania and enter Rahad, causing US$945,000,000 in costs to Rahad. Atania
has arbitrarily deprived the Kin of water, food and, consequently, their means
of subsistence. Atania has also violated the civil and political rights of the
Kin for protesting against this deprivation. Through this conduct, Atania has
abused its sovereign right to enact and enforce domestic legislation. Atania
has also caused transboundary harm to Rahad, failing to exercise due
diligence in its prevention. Further, Atania has violated the Kin’s human
rights under ICCPR and ICESCR. Irrespective of this Court’s findings vis-àvis Pleadings I and II, the clean hands doctrine does not bar Rahad’s claim.
Rahad, as a State specially affected by a breach of an erga omnes partes
obligation, is entitled to invoke Atania’s responsibility for these violations.
Atania’s internationally wrongful acts caused the mass migration of Kin from
Atania. The subsequent costs to Rahad were a ‘natural consequence’ of this
violation. Therefore, Atania has an obligation to make reparation, in the form
of compensation to Rahad.

PLEADINGS

I.

RAHAD’S EXTRACTION OF WATER FROM THE
AQUIFER
DOES
NOT
VIOLATE
RAHAD’S
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS GOVERNING
THE PROPER USE OF A SHARED RESOURCE
A.

RAHAD

DID
NOT
VIOLATE
ANY
OBLIGATIONS
UNDERTAKEN BY UNILATERAL DECLARATION

1.

The declaration by the Rahadi Minister was not
legally binding
On the first UN World Water Day, on 22 March 1993, the Rahadi Minister
for Water and Agriculture (‘the Minister’) stated that Rahad would make
‘every reasonable effort’ to preserve, protect and equitably use its shared
fresh water resources.1 Even if the Minister was vested with authority to bind
Rahad,2 Atania cannot enforce the statement as a source of legal obligation
as it was equivocal and did not express an intention to be legally bound.3
Rather, it was a non-legal statement ‘residing in morality and politics’.4 This
is confirmed by the circumstances surrounding the statement5 including: the
generality of the statement;6 the setting of World Water Day; the absence of
any equivalent statement by Queen Teresa; and Atania’s reception of the
statement as a ‘neighbourly gesture of cooperation and brotherhood’.7
2.

In the alternative, there has been a valid
revocation
If the Court finds that the Minister’s statement did create legal obligations,
Rahad, on 16 June 2002, validly revoked those by declaring its right and

1

Compromis, [16].

2

Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application : 2002) (Democratic Republic
of the Congo v Rwanda) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) [2006] ICJ Rep 6, 27-28 [47], [48] (‘Armed
Activities’).
3

Nuclear Tests (Australia v France) (Judgment) [1974] ICJ Rep 253, [43] (‘Nuclear Tests’).

4
International Law Commission (‘ILC’), First report on Unilateral Acts of States by Víctor
Rodríguez Cendeño, UN Doc A/CN.4/486 (5 March 1998), 325.
5

Armed Activities, [53].

6

Nuclear Tests, [52].

7

Compromis, [16].
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intention to use the Aquifer.8 This revocation was not arbitrary9 because:
first, it was made following a fundamental change in circumstances; and
second, Atania did not rely on the declaration.

a.

There was a fundamental change in
circumstances
The customary rules permitting treaties to be terminated on the ground of
fundamental change 10 apply mutatis mutandis to unilateral declarations. 11
Since the declaration was made, Rahad suffered from unprecedented drought
and climatological changes that deprived Rahad of sufficient water.12 This is
more than a ‘mere change’ in circumstance.13 Despite previous drought,14 it
was not foreseeable that Rahad would suffer such severe drought. 15 The
availability of water for both present and future generations constituted the
essential basis 16 of Rahad’s undertaking. The change to that availability
rendered Rahad’s obligations ‘essentially different.’ 17 To prioritise the
preservation of water for future generations would effectively require
denying water to present generations, an untenable proposition.

b.
There was no reliance by Atania
Prior to the declaration’s revocation in 2002, there is no evidence that Atania
took action, or suffered prejudice, in reliance on the Minister’s declaration.

8

Compromis, [22].

9

ILC, Unilateral Acts of States – Report of the Working Group – Conclusions of the International
Law Commission Relating to Unilateral Acts of States, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.703, Principle 10 (20 July
2006) (‘Guiding Principles’).
10
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS
171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) art 62 ('VCLT'); Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v
Slovakia) (Judgment) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, [104] (‘Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros’).
11
Report of the ILC, UN Doc A/61/10 (1 May-9 June and 3 July-11 August 2006), 381
(‘Commentary to the Guiding Principles’); Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Spain v Canada) (Jurisdiction)
[1998] ICJ Rep 432, [46] (‘Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v Canada)’).
12

Compromis, [19]-[20].

13

Mark Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Martinus
Nijhoff, 2009) 771 (‘Villiger (2009)’).
14

Compromis, [14].

15

Compromis, [19], [22].

16

VCLT art 62(1)(a).

17

Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom/Iceland) (Jurisdiction) [1973] ICJ Rep 3, [43].
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18

In light of this, Rahad validly revoked any unilaterally assumed
obligations.
3.

Further in the alternative, Rahad complied with
any obligation unilaterally assumed
Even if the declaration created binding obligations and was not validly
revoked, Rahad complied with its terms. The declaration must be interpreted
according to its ordinary meaning, in its context and with regard to its object
and purpose. 19 The customary rules of treaty interpretation 20 apply to
unilateral declarations.21
The Minister’s promise to ‘preserve and protect’ and ensure ‘equitable use’
is qualified by the words ‘reasonable effort’.22 ‘Reasonable’, as a ‘contextual
norm’, necessitates consideration of both the factual circumstances and
Rahad’s socio-economic capacities. 23 Considering the water scarcity, 24
expecting Rahad to refrain from using the Aquifer was not reasonable. The
reasonableness of Rahad’s utilisation of the Aquifer is evidenced by its
efforts in commissioning a report to ‘study the feasibility and long-term
effects’ of utilisation, including an environmental impact assessment (‘EIA’)
and undertaking to continuously monitor the long-term impact. 25 Further,
Rahad limited its utilisation to a finite rate and only for as ‘long as drought
conditions continue[d]’. 26 Accordingly, Rahad complied with any
obligations undertaken by way of unilateral declaration.

18

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of
America) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) [1984] ICJ Rep 391, [51] (‘Nicaragua (Jurisdiction)’).
19

VCLT art 31.

20

Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v Senegal) (Judgment) [1991] ICJ Rep 53, [48].

21

Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v Canada), [46].

22

Compromis, [16].

23
Duncan French, ‘Developing States and International Environmental Law: The Importance of
Differentiated Responsibilities’ (2000) 49 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 35, 39.
24

Compromis, [22].

25

Compromis, [20], [33]; Clarifications, [3].

26

Compromis, [21]-[22], [26].
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B.

RAHAD’S UTILISATION OF THE AQUIFER IS CONSISTENT
WITH CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING
SHARED RESOURCES

1.

Rahad is not bound by a customary obligation of
reasonable and equitable use specific to aquifers
The establishment of a rule of customary international law requires the
existence of ‘widespread international practice’ and the ‘opinio juris of
States’. 27 While a customary rule of reasonable and equitable utilisation
exists regarding surface water, 28 no such rule exists for transboundary
aquifers. The ‘well-established rules’ applicable to surface water are illadapted to govern aquifers because of the differing hydrogeological features
of each aquifer. 29
Caponera observed in 2003 that treaty provisions dealing with groundwater
are ‘too limited in scope to propose them in terms of customary law’. 30
Indeed, of the nearly 600 identified transboundary aquifers in the world, only
four are the subject of utilisation agreements.31 The prevalence of soft law
instruments in this area reflects the absence of opinio juris. 32
Notwithstanding the opinion of the Special Rapporteur that the International
Law Commission’s (‘ILC’) Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers 33
codified custom, 34 the response of States evidences a lack of opinio juris.35
In the absence of custom regarding transboundary aquifers, Rahad is

27

Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal) (Judgment)
[2012] ICJ Rep 422 [99] (‘Belgium v Senegal’).
28

Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, [85].

29

Joseph Dellapenna, ‘International Law Applicable to Water Resources Generally’ in Kelly (ed)
Waters and Water Rights (LexisNexis, 3rd ed, 2016) vol 3 49.06, 147 (‘Dellapenna (2016)’).
30

Dante Caponera, National and International Water Law and Administration (Kluwer, 2003) 421.

31

Reneé Martin-Nagle, Transboundary Offshore Aquifers (Koninklijke Brill NV, 2016) 45.

32
Eg, Memorandum of Understanding Relating to Setting up of a Consultative Mechanism for the
management of the Iullemeden Aquifer System (Bamako, 20 June 2009).
33

Report of the ILC, UN Doc A/63/10 (5 May-6 June and 7 July-8 August 2008) (‘Draft Articles’).

34

Chunsei Yamada, ‘Codification of the Law of Transboundary Aquifers (Groundwaters) by the
United Nations’ (2011) 36(5) Water International 557, 561.
35
See ILC, Topical Summary of the Discussion Held in the Sixth Committee of the General
Assembly during its Sixtieth Session, prepared by the Secretariat, UN Doc A/CN.4/560 (13 January 2006)
[43]; Summary Record of the 16th meeting, UN Doc A/C.6/68/SR.16 (1 November 2013) [37], [40].
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permitted to do that which is not specifically prohibited under international
law, namely extraction of water from the Aquifer.36
2.

In the alternative, Rahad’s utilisation of the
Aquifer is equitable and reasonable
If Rahad has an obligation to utilise the Aquifer equitably and reasonably,
Articles 4 and 5 of the Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers present a
potential articulation of the obligation’s content. Article 4 requires ‘equitable
and reasonable’ utilisation.37 Article 5 specifies factors to consider in this
determination. 38 Applying those factors, Rahad’s utilisation: first, is
consistent with an equitable and reasonable accrual of benefits; and second,
maximised the long-term benefits derived from the Aquifer.
a.

Rahad’s utilisation is consistent with an
equitable and reasonable accrual of
benefits
As 65% of the Aquifer is located within Rahad,39 Rahad is entitled to utilise
no less than 65% of its volume,40 provided that it does so in accordance with
the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation.41 As at the date of the
Special Agreement, Rahad has used approximately half its share. 42 A
determination of whether utilisation is equitable necessitates a balancing of
‘countervailing equities’. 43 The extreme drought and climate changes
deprived Rahad of water to sustain a supply of food for its people. The
continued importation of water was not an ‘economically viable and
practicably possible’ solution for Rahad.44 Therefore, Rahad’s utilisation of
the Aquifer was necessary to meet the ‘vital human needs’ of its population.45

36

S.S. Lotus (France v Turkey) [1927] PCIJ (ser A) No 10, 21.

37

Draft Articles art 4.

38

Draft Articles art 5.

39

Compromis, [15].

40
Julio Barberis, ‘The Development of International Law of Transboundary Groundwater’ (1991)
1 Natural Resources Journal 167, 177-8.
41

Draft Articles art 3.

42

Compromis, [21], [26].

43

Draft Articles art 5; Stephen McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses (OUP, 2nd ed,
2007) 394 (‘McCaffrey (2007)’).
44

Compromis, [22].

45

Draft Articles art 5(2); Compromis, [22].
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Rahad’s use of 22% of the extracted water for its natural gas industry46 is a
justified secondary usage 47 of Rahad’s sovereign resources, 48 particularly
considering Rahad’s reliance on natural gas exportation.49
Any harm indirectly caused to Atania from Rahad’s utilisation of the Aquifer
is justified by the fundamental benefits derived from utilisation. While both
States experienced drought, Atania, the wealthier of the two, has been able
to import water for over a quarter of a century.50 Atania’s decision to refrain
from utilising the Aquifer does not render Rahad’s use inequitable. In these
circumstances, Rahad’s use of the Aquifer to preserve the vital needs of its
population should take precedence over Atania’s commercial interests in
agriculture.51
b.

Rahad’s extraction sought to maximise
the long-term benefits derived from the
Aquifer
To maximise the long term benefits of the Aquifer, all that was required of
Rahad was an ‘utilisation plan’. 52 As a fossil Aquifer, with negligible
recharge, it is unreasonable to limit utilisation to the recharge rate.53 Rahad’s
utilisation at a rate of 1.2km3 per year complies with the recommendation of
the Inata Logistic and Scientific Association’s report (‘ILSA’) which
evaluated the ‘long-term effects of directly tapping the Aquifer’.54 At the
current rate of extraction, the benefits from the Aquifer will be enjoyed for
decades.

46

Compromis, [26].

47

Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Judgment) [2010] ICJ Rep 14 [175]
(‘Pulp Mills’); Eyal Benvinisti, ‘International Law and the Mountain Aquifer’ (1992) in Isaac and Shuval
(eds), Water and Peace in the Middle East (Elsevier, 1992) 41.
48

Nico Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources (CUP, 1997) 265.

49

Compromis, [2], [26].

50

Compromis, [14]; Clarifications, [9].

51

McCaffrey (2007) 396.

52

Report of the ILC, UN Doc A/63/10 (5 May-6 June and 7 July-8 August 2008) 42, (‘Draft
Articles Commentary’).
53

Draft Articles Commentary, 42.

54

Compromis, [20].
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Rahad’s utilisation of the Aquifer complied with
its obligation not to cause transboundary harm

a.
Rahad exercised due diligence
Rahad had a customary obligation to ensure that any activity within its
jurisdiction or control did not cause harm to Atania’s territory.55 Importantly,
this principle only required Rahad to exercise due diligence; Rahad was not
required to prevent the occurrence of all harm.56
i.
Rahad conducted an EIA and
undertook
continuous
monitoring
Queen Teresa directed ILSA to study the ‘long term effects of directly
tapping the Aquifer’ in its report, which contained an EIA. 57 There is no
indication that ILSA did not fulfil this direction and there is evidence ILSA
did in fact consider potential transboundary impacts.58 That no risk of harm
was identified by the EIA in relation to Atania’s agricultural industry
indicates that harm was either not reasonably foreseeable or not significant.
Therefore, Rahad was not required to exercise further due diligence. In any
event, Rahad committed to ‘undertake regular studies of the long-term
impact’ of the project, in compliance with its continuous monitoring
obligation.59
ii.
Rahad notified and cooperated
with Atania
In any case, Atania was sufficiently notified by Queen Teresa’s televised
speech in 2003 that water was to be extracted from the Aquifer. 60 Indeed,
President Vhen responded that same day.61 Cooperation only required Rahad
‘to enter into contact’ with Atania regarding the proposed Pipeline project.62

55

Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v
Nicaragua)/Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v Costa Rica)
(Merits) ICJ, General List Nos 150 and 152, 16 December 2015, [104] (‘Costa Rica v Nicaragua’).
56

Pulp Mills, [187].

57

Compromis, [20]; Clarifications [3]; Pulp Mills, [205].

58

Compromis, [21].

59

Compromis, [33]; Pulp Mills, [205], [215]-[216].

60

Compromis, [22].

61

Compromis, [23].

62

Rüdiger Wolfrum, ‘International Law of Cooperation’ in Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (OUP, 2010) [5].
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That Rahad did so is evidenced through the exchange of a number of
statements between Queen Teresa and President Vhen.63
b.
Rahad did not cause significant harm
If this Court finds that Rahad did not sufficiently exercise due diligence,
Rahad nonetheless did not cause significant harm to Atania. Atania’s loss of
farmland and associated revenue is not ‘significant harm’. The financial loss
only constituted 0.38% of its GDP,64 which does not meet the threshold of
severity for actionable transboundary harm.65
Even if the harm was significant, causation cannot be established between
Rahad’s conduct and Atania’s loss. First, the activity and the impact on
Atania are temporally separated; the initial reports of environmental impact
were three years after the project’s commencement.66 Second, as in Costa
Rica v Nicaragua, there are ‘other factors’67 causally linked to Atania’s lack
of water; the return of extreme drought conditions and the ‘record-low
rainfall.’68 These facts create sufficient uncertainty to sever the causal chain
between Rahad’s extraction from the Aquifer and Atania’s harm.69
C.
RAHAD HAS NOT ABUSED ITS RIGHTS
By virtue of Rahad’s permanent sovereignty over its natural resources, Rahad
has a right to extract groundwater from the Aquifer.70 As a general principle
of international law,71 there will be no abuse of rights where the right is
exercised in a ‘reasonable and bona fide’ manner which is ‘genuinely in
pursuit’ of its ‘legitimate interests’.72 As established, Rahad’s utilisation of
63

Compromis, [22]-[23], [33].

64

Compromis, [2], [29].

65

Report of the ILC, UN Doc A/56/10 (23 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August 2001), 388 (‘Draft
Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm Commentary’).
66

Compromis, [30].

67

Costa Rica v Nicaragua, [119].

68
Julio Barboza, The Environment, Risk and Liability in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff,
2011), 11 (‘Barboza (2011)’).
69

Barboza (2011) 11.

70
Draft Articles art 3; ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources’ GA Res 1803 (XVII), UN
Doc A/5217 (14 December 1962) 15-6 (‘Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty’).
71
72

Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, 95 (Separate Opinion, Vice President Weeramantry).

Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals
(Stevens & Sons, 1953) 131-2 (‘Cheng (1953)’).
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the Aquifer was reasonable and intended to secure Rahad’s legitimate interest
in sustaining its population and attaining self-sufficiency.73
D.

IN

THE ALTERNATIVE, ANY WRONGFULNESS
PRECLUDED BY THE DEFENCE OF NECESSITY

IS

The ‘increasingly serious water crisis in Rahad’ created a state of necessity
precluding any wrongfulness. 74 The extraction from the Aquifer was
necessary to safeguard Rahad’s essential interest in food and water security
for its population. 75 This essential interest was in ‘grave’ and ‘imminent’
peril as, at the time of decision-making, long-term water shortage had already
manifested itself and was projected to continue indefinitely. 76 In these
circumstances, for Rahad to refrain from utilising the Aquifer would have
been ‘self-destructive’.77 Queen Teresa specifically stated that there was ‘no
other way’ to safeguard Rahad’s essential interest.78
Rahad’s water and food security outweighs Atania’s interest in water for
commercial agriculture, 79 particularly considering Rahad’s comparative
economic inability to address the drought. Atania could have utilised the
Aquifer, and it continued to be economically viable for Atania to import
water.80

73

Compromis, [21].

74
Compromis, [22]; ILC, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, GA Res 56/83,
UN Doc A/RES/56/83 (28 January 2002) annex, art 25 (‘ASR’).
75

ILC, Addendum to Eighth Report on State Responsibility by Mr Robert Ago, Special Rapporteur,
UN Doc A/CN.4/318/Add.5-7 (19 June 1980) 50 (‘Ago, Eighth Report’); Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros [40][41], [51]-[52].
76

Compromis, [19]-[22]; Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, [40]-[41], [51]-[52].

77
Report of the ILC, UN Doc A/56/10 (23 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August 2001), 198 (‘ASR
Commentary’).
78

ASR art 25(1)(a); Compromis, [22].

79

ASR art 25(1)(b); ASR Commentary, 184; Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, [58].

80

Compromis, [14]; Clarifications, [9].
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II.

RAHAD’S SAVALI PIPELINE OPERATIONS DO NOT
VIOLATE ANY LEGAL OBLIGATIONS RELATING TO
THE KIN CANYON COMPLEX

A.

RAHAD COMPLIED WITH ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE
1972 UNESCO WORLD HERITAGE CONVENTION

Article 6.3 required Rahad to do all that it could
to prevent damage to the Complex
Rahad and Atania are both parties to the 1972 World Heritage Convention
(‘WHC’) 81 and are jointly responsible for conserving the Kin Canyon
Complex.82 Article 6.3 requires States ‘not to take any deliberate measures
which might damage directly or indirectly the cultural and natural heritage…
situated on the territory of other States Parties to [the] Convention.’
The Court should reject any submission by Atania that Article 6.3 imposes
strict liability for any deliberate action which might cause damage to a world
heritage site. The proper interpretation, in accordance with the customary
rules of treaty interpretation,83 is that the obligation involves a fault-based
standard. Therefore, Rahad complied with Article 6.3 as it exercised due
diligence vis-à-vis the Complex, even if actual damage nonetheless occurred.
The meaning of Article 6.3 must be interpreted in light of the context of the
provision within the WHC.84 Importantly, Article 6 ‘complements’ Articles
4 and 5.85 These Articles require a State to ‘do all it can to the utmost of its
resources’86 and ‘in so far as possible’ to protect the world heritage within
its territory. 87 Article 6, dealing with heritage located outside a State’s
territory, must be interpreted consistently with Articles 4 and 5 by similarly
imposing fault-based liability. It would be unreasonable to interpret the
Convention as imposing a higher standard of liability over world heritage
outside a State’s territory, over which a State has no sovereign control, than
81

Convention for the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage, opened for signature
16 November 1972, 1037 UNTS 151 (entered into force 17 December 1975) (‘WHC’); Compromis, [59].
82

83

84

Compromis, [13].
Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v Senegal) (Judgment) [1991] ICJ Rep 53, [48].
VCLT art 31.

85

Guido Carducci, ‘Articles 4-7 National and International Protection of the Culture Heritage’ in
Francioni (ed), The 1972 World Heritage Convention: A Commentary (OUP, 2008) 118.
86

WHC art 4.

87

WHC art 5.
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world heritage located within the State’s own territory, over which it has such
control. An interpretation of Article 6 as entailing fault-based liability is also
consistent with the object and purpose of the WHC,88 to ensure international
cooperation by all States where individual States are unable to secure the
protection of world heritage.89
Rahad’s interpretation is consistent with the approach of the World Heritage
Committee (‘the Committee’).90 For example, in a decision regarding world
heritage in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Committee requested
that Sudan, ‘in accordance with Art. 6.3… does its best to prevent transborder
poaching activities’. 91 In this way, Article 6.3 reflects the customary
obligation for a State to ‘use all the means at its disposal’92 to avoid doing
harm to another State’s territory. 93 Recourse to the travaux préparatoires
confirms this interpretation. 94 While Article 6.3 went through various
iterations during drafting, 95 ‘the Committee of Experts did not wish this
paragraph construed to impose strict liability for unintentional damage
caused’.96
Rahad has complied with Article 6.3 because it
exercised due diligence
While the Canyon has suffered some ‘environmental degradation in remote
sections’ and been placed on the Danger List,97 this does not mean that Rahad
has violated Article 6.3. Rather, as an obligation of conduct, ‘what counts is

88

VCLT art 31.

89

WHC Preamble paras 6-8.

90

Eg, Decision 27 COM7B.70, adopted at the 27th Session (Paris, 2003) WHC-03/27.COM/24, 74.

91

Decision 29 COM7A.4, adopted at the 29th Session (Durban, 2005) WHC-05/29.COM/22, 11.

92

Pulp Mills, [101].

93

International Council of Environmental Law, Draft International Covenant on Environment and
Development (4th ed, 2010, Environmental Policy and Law Paper) 91; Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983)
156 CLR 1, 196.
94

VCLT art 32.

95
‘Working Document prepared by the Working Group’ (7 April 1972) UNESCO Doc
SHC.72/CONF.37/5; ‘Article 6 (Text Presented by the Drafting Committee)’ (4-22 April 1972) UNESCO
Doc SHC.72/CONF.37/10 RED 2.
96
Robert Meyer, ‘Travaux Préparatoires for the UNESCO World Heritage Convention’ (1976) 2
Earth Law Journal 45, 52.
97

Compromis, [30]-[31].
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the violation of the best effort obligation, not the end result generally
achieved.’98
Rahad completed a full EIA99 consistent with Rahadi domestic law, which
considered potential harm to the Complex and was submitted to the
Committee 100 in accordance with Committee Guidelines. 101 In working to
comply with the Committee’s recommendations, Rahad ‘limited drilling for
the extraction of water to areas more than 15 kilometers outside the
Complex’s buffer zone.’ 102 Responding to the site’s inscription on the
Danger List, Rahad voluntarily committed to ‘undertake regular studies’103
and engaged in discussions with the Committee regarding the Pipeline. 104
Collectively, these factors indicate Rahad did all it could to prevent damage
to the Complex.

B.

RAHAD

HAS
OBLIGATIONS

NOT

VIOLATED

ITS

CUSTOMARY

Rahad has not caused transboundary harm
Rahad is under a parallel customary obligation to that in Article 6.3 WHC.105
For the same reasons outlined in Section II.A, Rahad has not violated this
obligation as it exercised due diligence vis-à-vis the Pipeline operations. 106
In any event, causation cannot be established between Rahad’s Pipeline
operations and any damage to the Complex. First, Atania has not
demonstrated the expertise and independence of the panel of geologists that
examined the degradation to the Complex, and thus the panel’s report is of

98
Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ‘Reviewing the difficulties of codification’ (1999) 10 European Journal of
International Law 371, 379.
99

Compromis, [20]-[21]; Pulp Mills, [205].

100

Compromis, [24]; Clarification, 3.

101
UNESCO, ‘Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention’
(8 July 2015) Doc No WHC.15/01, [118] (‘2015 Operational Guidelines’).
102

Compromis, [26]; 2015 Operational Guidelines, [103].

103

Compromis, [33].

104

Clarifications, 6.

105
Legality of the Threat or Use of Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, [29]; Trail
Smelter case (United States, Canada) (1938-41) RIAA 1905, 1965 (‘Trail Smelter’).
106

Pulp Mills, [187].
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minimal probative value. 107 Second, there are multiple potential overlapping
causes that sever the causal chain: the meteorological and climatological
changes to the Nomad Coast and the impact of tourism (i.e. an average of
350,000 visitors each year),108 a recognised threat to ‘site vulnerability’.109
Third, the damage lacks temporal immediacy to the commencement of the
Pipeline, occurring four years later.110
Rahad has not violated any customary
prohibition against intentional destruction of
cultural heritage in peacetime
Following the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas, commentators suggest
there is a developing customary prohibition against intentional destruction of
cultural heritage in peacetime. 111 Rahad’s conduct is not comparable to the
destruction of the Buddhas which was ‘motivated by invidious and
discriminatory intent’ and undertaken ‘in blatant defiance of appeals’ from
institutions and States.112 To the contrary, Rahad recognises its ‘obligations
as stewards’ of the Complex and took steps to ensure the Pipeline operations
would not cause damage to the Complex.113
Further, not all impacts on world heritage will contravene any developing
customary rule.114 Egypt’s construction of the Aswan Dam, resulting in the
relocation of the Abu Simbel temples and loss of cultural artefacts, was
recognised as justified by economic considerations.115 Similarly, any impact

107

Compromis, [30]; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Merits) [2007] ICJ Rep 43, [227].
108

Compromis, [13], [19], [30].

109

Adam Markham et al, World Heritage and Tourism in a Changing Climate (UNEP and
UNESCO, Paris, 2016) 26.
110

Compromis, [26], [30].

111
Francesco Francioni and Frederico Lenzerini, ‘The Destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan and
International Law’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law 619, 634-6 (‘Francioni and
Lenzerini (2003)’); cf Roger O’Keefe ‘World Cultural Heritage: Obligations to the International
Community as a Whole?’ (2004) 53 International Comparative Law Quarterly 189, 205.
112

Francioni and Lenzerini (2003) 635.

113

Compromis, [33].

114
Kanchana Wangkeo, ‘Monumental Challenges: The Lawfulness of Destroying Cultural
Heritage During Peacetime’ (2003) 28 Yale Journal of International Law 183, 264 (‘Wangkeo (2003)’).
115

Wangkeo (2003) 209, 268.

298

ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 24:1

on the Complex by the Pipeline was minimal, and justified by Rahad’s
essential needs.

C.
RAHAD HAS NOT ABUSED ITS RIGHTS
Rahad has not abused its right to use its natural resources.116 The Pipeline
operations were ‘genuinely in pursuit’ of its legitimate interest in sustaining
its population and attaining self-sufficiency. 117 Rahad demonstrated the
‘highest possible standards of care’118 towards the Complex throughout the
duration of its Pipeline operations and therefore did not exercise its rights in
a way ‘calculated to cause any unfair prejudice’119 to world heritage interests.
D.

ANY WRONGFULNESS IS PRECLUDED BY THE DEFENCE OF
NECESSITY

As established in Section I.D., Rahad’s construction of the Pipeline to extract
water from the Aquifer was the only way to safeguard its essential interest in
food and water security for its population.120 These interests also outweigh
the remote and minor damage to the Complex.121 Rahad cannot be expected
to deny its population food and water to avoid limited impacts to a world
heritage site.

E.

CESSATION IS NOT AVAILABLE
Cessation is not available as Rahad has complied with its obligations relating
to the Complex, or alternatively, any wrongfulness is precluded by necessity.
122

116

Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty, 15-6. Compromis, [21].

117

Compromis, [21].

118

Compromis, [33].

119

Cheng (1953) 131-2.

120

ASR art 25(1)(a).

121

Wangkeo (2003) 268.

122

ASR art 30; ASR Commentary, 216-7.
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RAHAD IS ENTITLED TO RETAIN POSSESSION OF THE
RUBY SIPAR

A.

ATANIA CANNOT ESTABLISH OWNERSHIP OF THE RUBY
SIPAR
International law contains no substantive rules regarding ownership of
moveable property, which falls to be determined by municipal law. 123
Pursuant to the ‘universal principle’ of lex situs, 124 ownership of the Sipar is
governed by Rahad’s municipal law as the Sipar is in Rahad. Even if the
Court was persuaded to instead apply Atanian municipal law, Atania bears
the onus of proving its ownership under its municipal law. It has furnished
no evidence of any municipal law relating to ownership.125 Accordingly, the
Court is ‘free to deny the relief sought’.126

B.

IRRESPECTIVE OF OWNERSHIP, THE KIN HAVE THE
RIGHT TO USE AND CONTROL OF THE RUBY SIPAR

Rahad has a positive obligation to retain possession of the Sipar to ensure
respect for the Kin’s cultural rights under ICESCR and ICCPR. Common
Article 1 provides that ‘all peoples’ have a human right to self-determination.
127
The Kin constitute a ‘people’ as they fulfil the definition of an ‘indigenous
group’128 on the basis of their long-standing relationship to their ‘ancestral’
lands as well as their distinct cultural isolation from the rest of Atanian
society.129 The Kin, as an ‘ethnic minority’, also have a right under Article
123
Christopher Staker, ‘Public International Law and the Lex Situs Rule in Property Conflicts and
Foreign Expropriations’ (1988) 58 BYIL 151, 154 (‘Staker (1988)’.
124
Ernst Rabel, The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study (University of Michigan Law School,
1958) vol 4, 66-9; Staker (1988) 163.
125

Nicaragua (Jurisdiction), [101]; Georg Schwarzenberger, International Law as Applied by
International Courts and Tribunals (Stevens & Sons, 1957) vol 1, 73.
126
Société Commerciale de Belgique (Belgium v Greece) [1939] PCIJ (ser A/B) No 78, 184
(Separate Opinion, Judge Hudson); D.P. O'Connell, International Law (Stevens & Sons, 1965) vol 2,
1187.
127
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966,
999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) art 1 ('ICCPR'); see also International Covenant on
Cultural, Economic and Social Rights, opened for signature 19 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered
into force 3 January 1976) ('ICESCR') art 1; Human Rights Committee (‘HRC’) General Comment 12,
Article 1, UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (13 March 1984) [2].
128

Jose Cobo, Special Rapporteur of Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, ‘Study on the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations’,
E/CN.4/SUB.2/1986/7ADD.4 (1986) [34], [379]-[82].
129

Compromis, [11].
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27 of ICCPR to enjoy their own culture.130 In addition, under Article 15 of
ICESCR, the Kin have a right to take part in cultural life.131
The practice of parties to the Covenants is relevant to the interpretation of the
rights contained therein. 132 The General Assembly Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples (‘UNDRIP’) reflects the practice of the parties to the
Covenants.133 UNDRIP provides a right to ‘use and control’ of ceremonial
objects134 and the right to ‘maintain, protect and develop’ manifestations of
culture.135 Carla Dugo, a Clan Kin member and Sisters of the Sun elder, by
taking the Sipar into Rahad,136 exercised her right to ‘use’ and ‘control’ of
the Sipar.137 The Sipar ‘belongs with the Kin wherever [they] are’.138 The
majority of Clan Kin are now located in Rahad. 139 As recognised in
Chabad, 140 cultural property can belong to a group or ‘communal …
movement’. Therefore, to comply with the Covenants, Rahad must retain the
Sipar so that it is available to the Kin and to ‘all who wish to see it’.141

C.

IRRESPECTIVE OF OWNERSHIP, RETURNING THE RUBY
SIPAR WOULD RENDER RAHAD COMPLICIT IN ATANIA’S
INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS

Under customary international law,142 as codified in Article 16 of the ASR,
Rahad’s complicity would arise as: first, returning the Sipar would constitute
aid or assistance in the commission of wrongful acts; second, Rahad has
130

ICCPR art 27.

131

ICESCR art 15.

132

VCLT art 31(3)(b).

133
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UN Doc
A/RES/61/295 (2 October 2007) annex (‘UNDRIP’).
134

UNDRIP art 12(1).

135

UNDRIP art 11(1).

136

Compromis, [50].

137

UNDRIP art 11(1).

138

Compromis, [50].

139

Compromis, [40], [49].

140

Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v Russian Federation, 528 F.3d 934 (2008) (2d Cir (US)), 943.

141

Compromis, [52].

142

Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Merits) [2007] ICJ Rep 43, [420].
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knowledge of the circumstances of the wrongful acts committed by Atania;
and third, if Rahad had acted as Atania did, Rahad’s actions would have been
wrongful.
This Court has interpreted ‘aid or assistance’ in Article 16 of the ASR as the
‘provision of means to enable or facilitate the commission’ of the wrong. 143
The ‘aid or assistance’ must have ‘contributed significantly’ to the
commission of the wrongful act. 144 Atania’s banning of the Sipar from
display and placing it in storage145 amounts to a violation of Article 15 of
ICESCR and Article 27 of ICCPR. The Sipar is an item of cultural heritage
of significant spiritual importance to the Kin.146 Article 15(1)(a) of ICESCR
includes an obligation to ensure physical access to and the availability of
cultural heritage.147 Article 27 of ICCPR provides that States shall not deny
the rights of ethnic minorities to enjoy their own culture, including ‘access to
cultural heritage’.148 By banning the Sipar, Atania has prevented physical
access to it and has therefore violated both articles.149 There is no indication
that if Rahad returns the Sipar, Atania will cease its unlawful conduct.
Therefore, to return the Sipar to Atania would aid or assist further violations.
The ILC’s commentary to Article 16(a) restricts complicity to cases where a
State ‘intended… to facilitate the occurrence of the wrongful conduct’.150
Special Rapporteur Ago has recognised that intent can be inferred from
knowledge of ‘the specific purpose for which the State receiving certain
supplies intends to use them’. 151 Any intent requirement is satisfied by
Rahad’s knowledge of Atania’s ‘campaign to eradicate all vestiges of the

143
Bosnian Genocide, [419]; Mile Jackson, State Complicity in the Internationally Wrongful Acts
of Another State (OUP, 2015) 153.
144

ASR Commentary, 156.

145

Compromis, [44].

146

Compromis, [43].

147
HRC, Report of the Independent Expert in the Field of Cultural Rights, A/HRC/17/38 (21 March
2011) [58]-[60]; CESCR, General Comment No 21, Right of Everyone to take part in cultural life (Article
15), UN Doc E/C.12/GC/21 (21 December 2009), [15]-[16] (‘CESCR General Comment 21’).
148

Janet Blake, International Cultural Heritage Law (OUP, 2015) 292 (‘Blake (2015)’).

149

ICESCR art 15(1)(a).

150

ASR Commentary, 156.

151

ILC, Seventh report on State Responsibility by Mr Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc
A/CN.4/307 and Add.1 & 2 and Corr.1 & 2 (29 March, 17 April and 4 July 1978) 58.
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Sipar’.152 Accordingly, Rahad would be complicit in Atania’s wrongful acts
were it to return the Sipar to Atania. Further, if Rahad acted as Atania did,
Rahad would also have violated the Covenants.153

D.

EVEN IF ATANIA IS THE LAWFUL OWNER, IT ABUSED ITS
OWNERSHIP RIGHTS RENDERING RETURN OF THE RUBY
SIPAR INAPPROPRIATE

A State will abuse its rights where it ‘avails itself of its right in an arbitrary
manner in such a way as to inflict upon another State’154 or the international
community ‘an injury which cannot be justified by a legitimate consideration
of its own advantage.’155 Ownership rights relating to cultural property must
be ‘seen in relative not absolute terms’156 because otherwise, a State by virtue
of its ‘sovereign rights’ would be entitled to damage or destroy cultural
property forming part of the ‘civilisation and heritage of mankind.’157 Here,
by banning the Sipar, Atania exercised its rights in an arbitrary manner,
injuring the interests of Rahad and the international community in cultural
property and the common heritage of humanity.158 Given the inextricable link
between the Sipar and the history and culture of the peoples of the Nomad
Coast, the Sipar is an invaluable cultural artefact that must be protected and
enjoyed by all. 159 Considering Atania’s abuse of rights, Rahad cannot be
required to return the Sipar.

152

Compromis, [52].

153

ASR art 16(b).

154
Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law: Peace
(Longman, 9th ed, 2008) vol 1, 407 (‘Oppenheim (2008)’).
155

Oppenheim (2008) 407.

156
Blake (2015) 317; Lyndel Prott and Patrick O’Keefe, ‘Cultural Heritage or Cultural Property’
(1992) 1(2) International Journal of Cultural Property 307, 309.
157
Sharon Williams, The International and National Protection of Moveable Cultural Property. A
Comparative study (Oceana, 1978) 64.
158

John Merryman, ‘Cultural Property Internationalism’ (2005) 12 International Journal of
Cultural Property 11, 11.
159

Cf SC Res 2199, UN Doc S/RES/2199 (12 February 2015); SC Res 2253, UN Doc S/RES/2253
(17 December 2015).
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E.

RAHAD’S RETENTION OF THE RUBY
INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACT

303
SIPAR IS NOT AN

Rahad did not violate the 1970 UNESCO
Convention

a.

The 1970 Convention does not apply
retroactively
Rahad cannot have violated any obligations contained in the 1970
Convention.160 This is because Rahad gained possession of the Sipar and
formally rejected Atania’s request for repatriation,161 prior to the entry into
force of the 1970 Convention for Rahad on 30 December 2014.162 The 1970
Convention does not have retroactive effect.163
Jurisdiction ratione temporis under the 1970 Convention cannot be extended
here by reference to any continuing acts.164 The import of the Sipar was a
completed, not continuing act165 and to find otherwise would have untenable
ramifications for the broader application of the 1970 Convention. 166 For
example, the United Kingdom would be required to return the Parthenon
Marbles to Greece; Germany, the Bust of Nefertiti to Egypt; and various
States, the Benin Bronzes to Nigeria.167 The parties to the 1970 Convention
never intended such consequences to flow.168

160
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer
of Ownership of Cultural Property, opened for signature 14 November 1970, 823 UNTS 231 (entered into
force 24 April 1972) (‘1970 Convention’).
161

Compromis, [50]-[52].

162

1970 Convention art 21, Corrections [3].

163

Patrick O’Keefe, Commentary on the 1970 UNESCO Convention (Institute of Art and Law, 2nd
ed, 2007) 9.
164

Phosphates in Morocco (Italy v France) (Preliminary Objections) (1938) PCIJ, (ser A/B) No
74, 23; Villiger (2009) 383.
165

ASR art 14.

166

Kurt Siehr, ‘Legal Aspects of the Mystification and Demystification of Cultural Property’
(2011) XVI(3) Art, Antiquity and the Law 173, 180-1.
167

See John Merryman (ed), Imperialism, Art and Restitution (CUP, 2006) 6-7, 98-113, 114-134.

168

UNESCO, ‘Final Report’ (27 February 1970) UNESCO Doc SHC/MD/5 Annex II, 4.
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b.

Rahad has not defeated the object and
purpose of the 1970 Convention
Article 18 of the VCLT requires a State, in the period between signature and
entry into force of the treaty for that State, to ‘refrain from acts which would
defeat the object and purpose of [the] treaty.’169 The VCLT came into force
after the UNESCO Convention and does not operate retroactively. 170 If
Atania seeks to rely on the rule set out in Article 18, it is for Atania to
establish its customary status. Publicists regard the customary status of
Article 18 as being ‘ambiguous’ and this Court has never ruled on the
issue.171
In any event, Rahad has not defeated the object and purpose of the 1970
UNESCO Convention.172 The object and purpose of a treaty is only defeated
when a State’s act ‘renders meaningless subsequent performance of the
treaty, and its rules.’173 An illustration of this would be if a State destroyed
artwork that it was treaty-bound to return to another State just prior to the
treaty’s entry into force.174 By contrast, Rahad’s receipt and retention of the
Sipar prior to entry into force of the 1970 Convention for Rahad has not
rendered ‘meaningless’ Rahad’s subsequent performance of its treaty
obligations under the 1970 Convention.
There is no custom requiring return of
unlawfully obtained cultural property during
peacetime
It is for Atania to establish the existence of a customary rule requiring return
of unlawfully obtained cultural property during times of peace. Rahad
submits that no such custom exists. This Court has stressed that the practice
of States that are parties to a treaty cannot provide evidence of opinio juris
to establish custom as it is the treaty which is the source of any sense of legal

169

VCLT art 18.

170

VCLT art 4.

171
Laurence Boisson de Chazournes et al., ‘Article 18 Convention of 1969’ in Corten and Klein
(eds), The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (OUP, 2011), vol 1 369, 371-2;
ILC, ‘Second Report on the Law of Treaties: Revised articles on the draft convention’ [1951] II Yearbook
of the International Law Commission.
172

VCLT art 18.

173

Villiger (2009) 249.

174

ILC, Report of the ILC on the work of the first part of its seventeenth session, UN Doc
A/CN.4/181 (3 May – 9 July 1965) 92.
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obligation.175 As the preponderance of instances of return of illicitly obtained
cultural property during peacetime has been by States bound by the 1970
Convention,176 no opinio juris can be derived from this State practice. The
widespread retention of cultural artefacts and antiquities by museums177 is
further evidence of the lack of any customary rule obliging States to return
unlawfully obtained cultural property.

IV.

ATANIA MUST COMPENSATE RAHAD FOR ALL DIRECT
AND INDIRECT EXPENSES INCURRED AND ACCRUING
AS A RESULT OF ACCEPTING MEMBERS OF CLAN KIN
FLEEING FROM ATANIA
As at the date of the Special Agreement, Rahad is providing refuge to
approximately 800,000 Kin. Rahad is entitled to compensation as reparation
for the internationally wrongful acts Atania committed by: first, abusing its
rights to enact and enforce domestic legislation; second, violating Rahad’s
territorial sovereignty by causing transboundary harm; and third, violating
its human rights obligations. Although Rahad has thus far determined that
approximately 155,000 of the 800,000 Kin are refugees, 178 Rahad’s
entitlement to compensation in relation to each of these internationally
wrongful acts is not legally dependent on a determination of refugee status
for all.179

A.
ATANIA HAS ABUSED ITS RIGHTS
In 1939, Sir Robert Jennings observed that ‘if a doctrinal ground be required
for regarding as illegal the conduct of a State of origin of destitute refugees,

175

North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark/Federal Republic of
Germany v Netherlands) [1969] ICJ Rep 4, [77]; Richard Baxter, Treaties and Custom (1970) 129 Recueil
des Cours 25, 64.
176

See, eg, Agreement between the Republic of Paraguay and the Republic of Bolivia on the
recovery of stolen cultural property and other property, stolen or illegally imported or exported,
Paraguay—Bolivia, signed 16 April 2004, 2429 UNTS 143 (entered into force 21 November 2005);
Agreement between the Swiss Federal Council and the Government of the Republic of Colombia on the
import and repatriation of cultural property, Switzerland—Colombia, signed 01 February 2010, 2801
UNTS (entered into force 4 August 2011).
177

Jeanette Greenfield, The Return of Cultural Treasures (CUP, 3rd ed, 2007) 63.

178

Compromis, [48]-[49].

179
Chaloka Beyani, 'Responsibility for the Prevention and Resolution of Forced Population
Displacements in International Law' (1995) 7 International Journal of Refugee Law 130, 142-143
(‘Beyani (1995)’).
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it will be found in the generally accepted doctrine of abuse of rights.’180 As
set out in Section I.C, a State abuses its rights where it ‘avails itself of its
right in an arbitrary manner in such a way as to inflict upon another State an
injury which cannot be justified by a legitimate consideration of its own
advantage.’181 A State must exercise its legislative discretion reasonably and
‘with due regard to the interest of others.’182
Atania’s enactment and enforcement of the Water Resource Allocation
Program Act (‘WRAP Act’) required farmers to purchase licences, but
exempted profit-generating farms. 183 This was arbitrary as it indirectly
discriminated 184 against the Kin. The Kin constituted 98% of subsistence
farmers. Those that were subsistence farmers were, by definition, not entitled
to the exemption 185 and were also less likely to be able to afford the
licences.186 Atania’s disconnection of the Kin’s water supply compounded
the arbitrariness of Atania’s conduct.187
The disproportionate measures taken to suppress the peaceful WRAP Act
protests were also an arbitrary exercise of enforcement rights. 188 The
cumulative effect of Atania’s conduct was to render the Kin’s continued
presence in Atania untenable, offering no alternative for 800,000 Kin (given
desert to the North and an ocean to the South) but to seek refuge in Rahad.189

180
Robert Yewdall Jennings, ‘Some International Law Aspects of the Refugee Question’ (1939)
20 BYIL 98, 112.
181

Oppenheim (2008) 407.

182

Cheng (1953) 133-4.

183

Compromis, [35].

184
Sarah Joseph, Jenny Schultz and Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (OUP, 2013) 777 (‘ICCPR Commentary’).
185

Compromis, [11], [35].

186

Compromis, [36]-[37].

187

Compromis, [38].

188

Compromis, [45]-[46]; Clarifications, [7].

189

Compromis, [1], [49].
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B.

ATANIA HAS
SOVEREIGNTY

VIOLATED
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RAHAD’S

TERRITORIAL

In Trail Smelter it was recognised that ‘no State has the right to use … its
territory in such a manner as to cause injury … to the territory of another’.190
Eminent publicists recognise the applicability of this doctrine to
transboundary mass-movements of people contrary to the territorial
sovereignty of receiving States. 191 Although equating the movement of
humans to cross-border pollution may seem unpalatable on a superficial
level, there is no principled reason for the ‘no-harm’ rule not to apply and,
importantly, its application ensures that expelling-States are held accountable
for refugee-generating policies.192
Atania’s use of its territory in a manner that led to the influx of 800,000 Kin
into Rahad constitutes a violation of Rahad’s territorial sovereignty. It was
foreseeable that depriving the Kin of food and water (in conjunction with
repressive measures), would cause them to seek food and water elsewhere,
and that it would be ‘immensely burdensome’ to receiving States where they
did.193 Notwithstanding this risk of significant harm, Atania failed to exercise
due diligence in relation to the food and water needs of the Kin, even after
pleas from the FAO.194
Atania’s conduct in causing mass human movement resulted in significant
harm to Rahad. The FAO and the Red Cross confirmed that Atania’s
termination of water resulted in undernourishment and mass starvation.195
International correspondents confirmed that starvation and fear of arrest were
the primary reasons for the border crossing.196 Rahad’s damage is significant;

190

Trail Smelter, 1965.

191

Guy Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (OUP, 3rd ed, 2007)
3 (‘Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (2007)’); Beyani (1995) 132; Luke T Lee, ‘The Right to Compensation:
Refugees and Countries of Asylum’ (1986) 80 American Journal of International Law 532, 553-4 (‘Lee
(1986)’).
192
Jack Garvey, 'Toward a Reformulation of International Refugee Law' (1985) 26(2) Harvard
International Law Journal 483, 495.
193

Mass Exoduses, GA Res 35/196, UN Doc A/RES/35/196 (15 December 1980).

194
Compromis, [39]; International Co-operation to Avert New Flows of Refugees: Note by the
Secretary-General, UN Doc A/41/324, (13 May 1986) [66](c)(d); Theo van Boven, Study Concerning the
Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, UN Doc EICN/41-Sub.2/1990/10, 298.
195

Compromis, [39]-[40].

196

Compromis, [47].
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the influx of a number of Kin equal to approximately one quarter of Rahad’s
original population197 has stretched Rahad’s national infrastructure ‘beyond
the breaking point.’ 198 This damage has been quantified at
US$945,000,000.199
This court should not countenance any submission by Atania that Rahad’s
acceptance of the migrants constituted consent to the harm. Rahad should not
be disadvantaged by its fulfilment of its non-refoulement obligations. 200
Atania, as creator of its refugee-generating policies, ‘must be deemed to be
estopped from claiming that to receive its citizens was an independent
decision’.201

C.

ATANIA HAS VIOLATED ITS HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS

Rahad can invoke Atania’s responsibility for its
human rights violations and its claims are
admissible
A State that is ‘injured’ is entitled to invoke the responsibility of another
State and seek compensation 202 for its own losses where, inter alia, the
obligation breached is owed to ‘a group of States including that State’ and
the breach ‘specially affects that State’.203 By being required to accommodate
800,000 Kin, Rahad has been ‘specially affected’ by Atania’s human rights
violations in a way that ‘distinguishes it from the generality of other States
to which the obligation is owed’.204 Human rights treaties create obligations
not only for the benefit of natural persons 205 but also ‘create rights and

197

Compromis, [3], [49].

198
Compromis, [53]; Hannah Garry, ‘The Right to Compensation and Refugee Flows: A
‘Preventative Mechanism’ in International Law?’ (1998) 10(1/2) International Journal of Refugee Law
97 (‘Garry (1998)’).
199

Compromis, [57].

200

Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (2007) 201-84.

201
Christian Tomuschat, ‘State Responsibility and the Country of Origin’ in Gowlland-Debbas
(ed), The Problem of Refugees in the Light of Contemporary International Law Issues (Martinus Nijhoff,
1994) vol 12, 78, 74; Beyani (1995) 136, 137.
202

ASR Commentary, 295; ASR art 36.

203

ASR art 42(b)(i).

204

ASR art 42(b)(i); ASR Commentary, 119.

205

HRC, General Comment No 31: The nature of the general legal obligation imported on States
Parties (CPPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13) (26 May 2004) [9].
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obligations between their parties’. 206 Additionally, Rahad is entitled to
invoke Atania’s responsibility for its human rights violations in the ‘interest
of’ the Kin, the beneficiaries of Atania’s human rights obligations.207
Rahad’s claim for direct injury is not constrained by any requirement to
exhaust local remedies.208 In relation to Rahad’s indirect claim in the ‘interest
of’ the Kin, the local remedies rule209 is not applicable because remedies are
not ‘effective’ in cases of large-scale human rights violations.210 In any event,
it would be for Atania to prove that available and effective local remedies
existed.211
Atania violated the ICESCR and ICCPR

a.
Article 11 of ICESCR
Atania has an obligation to provide its nationals with an adequate standard of
living, including, inter alia, a right to adequate food, which extends to
water.212 The CESCR has stressed the importance of ensuring access to water
insofar as is required to realise the right to adequate food,213 ‘even where’ a
State faces ‘severe resource constraints’.214 Arbitrary disconnections of water
are prohibited.215

206

Bruno Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law’ (1994) 250
Recueil des Cours 221, 370.
207

ASR art 48.

208

Report of the ILC, UN Doc A/61/10 (1 May-9 June and 3 July-11 August 2006), 74 (‘Diplomatic
Protection Articles’).
209

ICCPR art 41(c); cf European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
opened for signature 4 November 1950, ETS 5 (entered into force 3 September 1953) arts 33, 35(1).
210

Cyprus v Turkey (1978) 2 Eur Comm HR 85, [29]-[31].

211

Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of Congo) (Preliminary
Objections) [2007] ICJ Rep 582, [44].
212
ICESCR art 11(1); CESCR, General Comment No 15: The Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of
the Covenant), UN Doc E/C.12/2002/11 (20 January 2003) [31] (‘CESCR General Comment 15’) [3].
213

CESCR General Comment 15 [7].

214

CESCR, General Comment No. 12, Right to Adequate Food (Art 11 of the Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) UN E/C.12/1999/5 (12 May 1999) [28]; Ben Saul, David Kinley
and Jaqueline Mowbray, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (OUP,
2014) 871 (‘ICESCR Commentary’).
215

CESCR General Comment 15 [10], [43(a)].
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As established in Section IV.A, the licence scheme mandated by the WRAP
Act was indirectly discriminatory and deprived the Kin of the enjoyment of
their rights to adequate water and food. 216 Therefore, the ‘arbitrary
disconnection’ of the water supply in October 2013, as a penalty for
noncompliance with the licence scheme, necessarily constituted a
‘retrogressive measure’ and a violation of Article 11.217
Additionally, the disconnection of water led the Kin to suffer severe
deprivation and malnutrition. Even when the Director General of the FAO
implored Atania to stop denying the Kin access to water, 218 Atania failed to
take ‘immediate and urgent steps’ to ensure ‘the fundamental right to
freedom from hunger and malnutrition’.219

b.
Article 1(2) of ICESCR and ICCPR
As the Kin are ‘a people’ to which the right to self-determination extends,220
Atania has an ‘unqualified’ obligation not to deprive the Kin of its means of
subsistence. 221 As the Kin are entirely dependent on subsistence farming,
Atania must ensure adequate access to water to secure their livelihood. The
WRAP Act and consequent termination of water supply rendered it
impossible for the Kin to continue subsistence farming, 222 in violation of
Common Article 1.
c.

Article 27 of ICCPR and Article 15 of
ICESCR
As established in Section III.C, Atania has an obligation not to interfere with
the right of the Kin to enjoy their own culture,223 which includes ‘traditional
farming’.224 The Red Cross and the FAO concluded that the termination of

216
CESCR General Comment 15 [13]-[16]; ICCPR Commentary, 777 [23.40]; ICESCR
Commentary, 901.
217

CESCR General Comment 15 [15], [19].

218

Compromis, [39].

219

ICESCR art 11(2). This conduct is also a discrete violation of the right to health in ICESCR art

220

As established in Section III.B.

221

ICESCR Commentary, 121.

222

Compromis, [38], [39], [40].

223

ICCPR art 27; ICCPR Commentary, 25.

12.

224

Compromis, [40]; HRC, Views: Ángela Poma Poma v Peru Communication No. 1457/2006, UN
Doc CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006 (9 April 2009) [7.3] (‘Poma Poma v Peru’).
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the Kin’s water supply deprived them of ‘their primary source of sustenance’
(i.e. traditional farming).225 At no point did Atania consult with the Kin or
seek their ‘informed consent’ 226 about the WRAP Act’s effects on
subsistence farming. The restriction to the Kin’s ability to take part in their
culture also violates Article 15 of ICESCR.227

d.
Article 19 of ICCPR
Atania has an obligation to uphold the Kin’s ‘right to freedom of
expression’,228 which extends to political and human rights discourse and
commentary on public affairs.229 The Sipar is an expression of identity for
the Sisters of the Sun,230 and a medium to protest against the ‘persecution of
the Kin’.231 Atania has violated the right to freedom of expression of the Kin
by ordering the confiscation and destruction of all Sipar pendants.232
e.
Article 21 of ICCPR
Atania has an obligation to respect the right to peaceful assembly.233 The
protests and human-chains were nonviolent234 and therefore an exercise of
the right to peaceful assembly. Atania’s use of tear gas and rubber bullets to
supress the peaceful protests infringed upon this right.235
f.

Article 9 of ICCPR
Atania must ensure that ‘anyone arrested or detained on a criminal
charge...shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release’.236
The Kin protesters charged with inciting a riot have remained in pretrial

225

Compromis, [40].

226
Poma Poma v Peru [7.7]; HRC General Comment No 34: Freedom of Opinion and Expression,
UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34 (12 September 2011) [18] (‘HRC General Comment 34’).
227

CESCR General Comment 21 [6], [48].

228

ICCPR art 19(2).

229

HRC General Comment 34 [11].

230

Compromis, [9], [41].

231

Compromis, [41].

232

Compromis, [43].

233

ICCPR art 21.

234

Compromis, [41]-[42].

235

Compromis, [45].

236

ICCPR art 9(3).
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detention for over two years. 237 Such pretrial detention is excessive,
‘arbitrary’ and inconsistent with an expeditious trial.238
Atania cannot rely on Covenant limitation or
derogation provisions or a plea of necessity
Both Covenants include specific provisions allowing States to limit the
enjoyment of rights239 or to derogate from obligations.240 Atania cannot rely
on these provisions as their requirements have not been satisfied. These
provisions operate to exclude the general defence of necessity as they are lex
specialis.241

D.

THE ‘CLEAN HANDS’ DOCTRINE DOES NOT BAR RAHAD
FROM BRINGING THIS CLAIM

Even if the Court finds against Rahad in Pleadings I or II, Atania cannot
invoke the ‘clean hands’ doctrine to avoid responsibility for its own actions.
The doctrine only applies where the ‘two parties have assumed an identical
or a reciprocal obligation’.242 The violations asserted by Atania in Pleadings
I or II in relation to the Pipeline are not identical or reciprocal to any
obligations that Atania has violated in relation to the flight of the Kin.

E.

ATANIA MUST
REPARATION

COMPENSATE

RAHAD BY WAY OF

In relation to its wrongful acts, Atania must make full reparation to, ‘as far
as possible, wipe out all consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the
situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been
committed’.243 The wrongful conduct must be the ‘proximate cause’ of any
damage.244 Rahad is entitled to compensation to restore the US$945,000,000
237
Clarifications, 7; Compromis, [46]; HRC, Teesdale v Trinidad and Tobago, UN Doc
CCPR/C/74/D/677/1996 (1 April 2002) [9.3].
238
HRC, General Comment No 32: Article 14 Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to
fair trial, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/32 (23 August 2007) [35].
239

ICESCR art 4.

240

ICCPR art 4.

241

Ago, Eighth Report, [66]-[69]; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion [2004] ICJ Rep 136, [136]-[142].
242
Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Netherlands v Belgium) [1937] PCIJ (ser A/B) No 17, 77
(Separate Opinion, Judge Hudson), 49.
243
244

Chorzów Factory (Merits)[1928] PCIJ (ser A) no 17, 47; ASR arts 1, 31.

Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (OUP, 3rd ed, 2015) 355 (‘Shelton
(2015)’); ASR art 31; ASR Commentary, 207.

2017]

Distinguished Brief

313

loss suffered as a result of providing refuge to the Kin. 245 Rahad would not
be the first State to receive compensation in relation to refugee outflows.246
Rahad is entitled to compensation for its own
losses
Rahad is entitled to compensation for all direct and indirect costs incurred
and accruing as a result of accepting the Kin, as Atania’s internationally
wrongful acts were the ‘proximate cause’247 of that harm. The causal link
between Atania’s conduct and the Kin’s flight is evidenced by: first,
statements by the FAO and the Red Cross that Atania’s actions resulted in
mass starvation and undernourishment; 248 and second, reports by
international correspondents confirming that ‘starvation’ and ‘fear of arrest’
were the primary reasons for the Kin fleeing.249 The cumulative effects of
Atania’s wrongful acts were of such gravity250 as to cause 800,000 Kin to
flee Atania.251 The infliction of significant costs on Rahad was the natural
consequence of Atania’s wrongful acts.252
Rahad is also entitled to compensation in the
interest of the Kin
Rahad is entitled to seek compensation on behalf of each Kin in order to
restore them to the position they would have been in had they not been

245

ASR art 36.

246

Agreement between the State of Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany, signed 10
September 1952, 162 UNTS 2137 (entered into force on 27 March 1953); SC Res 687, UN Doc
S/RES/687 (3 April 1991) [16].
247

Shelton (2015) 355.

248

Compromis, [39]-[40].

249

Compromis, [47].

250

Shelton (2015) 14.

251
Compromis, [49]; ILA, Cairo Declaration of Principles of International Law on Compensation
to Refugees (65th Conference, Cairo, 1992) Principle 4.
252
Report and Recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners concerning the Egyptian
Workers’ Claims (Jurisdiction) (1995) 117 ILR 195, 248-9; Rainer Hoffman, ‘Refugee-generating
policies and the law of state responsibility’ (1985) 45(4) Heidelberg Journal of International Law 694,
709.
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victims of Atania’s human rights violations.253 Compensation is payable to
Rahad and can be allocated by it for the benefit of the Kin. 254

253
254

ASR art 48(2)(b).

See by analogy Diplomatic Protection Articles, art 19; Cyprus v Turkey (ECtHR, Grand
Chamber, Application No 25781/94, 12 May 2014) [46]-[47].
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF
The Kingdom of Rahad respectfully requests that this Court DECLARE that:
1. The extraction of water from the Aquifer does not violate
international obligations undertaken by Rahad and constitutes an
inequitable use of a shared resource;
2. The Savali Pipeline operations do not violate Rahad’s international
obligations with respect to the Kin Canyon Complex;
3. Rahad is entitled to retain possession of the Ruby Sipar;
4. Atania must compensate Rahad for all direct and indirect expenses
incurred and accruing as a result of accepting members of Clan Kin
fleeing from Atania.
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